Part 4 (PDF:522KB)

Chapter 2, Section 2. Performance in Peripheral Non-Eurozone Countries: Comparison with Eurozone Countries
~ (1) Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance, etc.
(2) Impact through Finance ~
 After the Euro’s introduction, the United Kingdom and Switzerland achieved better economic growth and employment performance than those of the Eurozone. The financial sector as a core industry has maintained its comparative superiority and its unshaken position as an international financial center. (Figs. 75 and 76)
 The two countries had raised funds from the Eurozone and lent them to non‐Eurozone countries before financial flow was reversed due to the global financial crisis. Both before and after the crisis, the two countries’ financial sector has increased its importance as a fund supply/demand contact between Eurozone and non‐Eurozone countries. (Figs. 77 and 78)
Fig. 77 UK’s External Loans and Borrowings by Country
(Borrowings)
(Loans)
70
スイス
Switzerland
60
6.0
-6.0
2.0
2000年代
2000s (after the crisis)
(危機後)
-8.0
0.0
UK Switzerland Eurozone Germany France
英国
ｽｲｽ
ﾕｰﾛ圏 ﾄﾞｲﾂ
ﾌﾗﾝｽ
(1) UK
（％）
UK Switzerland Eurozone Germany France
英国
ｽｲｽ
ﾕｰﾛ圏 ﾄﾞｲﾂ
ﾌﾗﾝｽ
Others
その他
70
（％）
Others
その他
Public management, 公的管理･
defense, healthcare
防衛･医療
Specialized, entertainment and 専門･娯楽等
other services
サービス
80
70
50
30
Construction
建設業
20
Manufacturing
製造業
10
Agriculture, forestry 農林水産業
and fisheries
0
2000
10
07
20
Manufacturing
製造業
10
農林水産業
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
0
2000
10
2000
07
11
Fig. 78 Switzerland’s External Loans and Borrowings by Country (Borrowings)
(Loans)
（％）
（％）
その他
Others
100
日本
Japan
90
アメリカ
USA
80
70
UK
英国
Others
その他
100
90
80
新興国
Emerging countries
70
Japan
日本
60
USA
アメリカ
50
30
Construction
建設業
0
11
Financial, insurance 金融･保険･
60
不動産
and real estate
50
Wholesale, transportation, 卸小売･運輸･
40
hotels and restaurants
宿泊･外食
30
20
20
10
0
2000
07
11
Other その他
Eurozone countries
ユーロ圏
South 南欧
European 諸国等
countries, etc.
ドイツ･
Germany フランス
and France
UK
英国
40
Other Eurozone その他
countries
30
ユーロ圏
南欧
South European countries, etc.
諸国等
20
10
ドイツ･
Germany フランス
and France
0
2000
07
11
18
ユーロ圏
40
2000
ユーロ圏
金融･保険･
Financial, insurance 60
不動産
and real estate
50
Wholesale, transportation, 卸小売･運輸･
hotels and restaurants
宿泊･外食
40
60
0
30
10
Germany ドイツ･
and France
フランス
10
スイス
Switzerland
Other その他
Eurozone ユーロ圏
countries
南欧
South European countries, etc.
諸国等
Germany ドイツ･
and France
フランス
40
非ユーロ圏
Specialized, entertainment and 専門･娯楽等
other services
サービス
80
20
Fig. 76 Industrial Structure (2) Switzerland
100
Public management, 公的管理･
defense, healthcare
防衛･医療
90
90
South 南欧
European 諸国等
countries, etc.
30
USA
アメリカ
50
非ユーロ圏
100
2000s 00年代 2000s 00年代
(before (after the (危機前)
(危機後)
the crisis) crisis)
Japan
日本
ユーロ圏
-4.0
ユーロ圏
40
4.0
70
60
Other その他
Eurozone ユーロ圏
countries
50
Emerging 新興国
countries
Eurozone countries
0.0
-2.0
80
Non‐Eurozone countries
8.0
90
Non‐Eurozone countries
USA
アメリカ
Non‐Eurozone countries
80
Others
その他
100
Eurozone countries
2.0
90
Japan
日本
Non‐Eurozone countries
10.0
（％）
Others
その他
100
非ユーロ圏
4.0
（％）
1990s
90年代
12.0
Eurozone countries
（％）
00年代
1990s
90年代2000s (before the crisis)
(危機前)
非ユーロ圏
（％）
6.0
Eurozone countries
Fig. 75 Each Country’s Economic Performance
(1) Real Economic Growth (2) Unemployment Rate
Chapter 2, Section 2. Performance in Peripheral Non-Eurozone Countries: Comparison with Eurozone Countries
~ (3) Impact through Trade
(4) Comparison of Shock-Absorbing Capabilities in Peripheral Non-Eurozone and Eurozone Countries ~
 The United Kingdom and Switzerland have had close trade relations with the Eurozone. But changes in their real trade volumes with the Eurozone after the euro’s introduction contrast. (Fig. 79)
 The difference in the trade volume changes might be attributable to a difference between their directions of foreign exchange rate changes just after the Euro’s introduction and after the global financial crisis and a gap between their non‐price competitive positions against the Eurozone. (Figs. 80 and 81)
 While the ECB cannot take monetary policies satisfying all the Eurozone countries due to their different economic conditions, the UK and Swiss central banks can take relatively flexible measures. (Fig. 82)  But their respective currencies are more vulnerable to domestic and foreign economic shocks than the common currency of the Euro. (Fig. 83)
Fig. 79 Changes in Real Trade Volumes with Eurozone
Fig. 81 Changes in Coefficients of Specialization (Comparison of trade volumes before the euro’s in Trade with Eurozone
introduction, between the introduction and the financial crisis, and after the crisis) 0.3
Exports
輸出
8
0.4
0.2
2000s
2000年代
0.1
6
0.2
0.1
前 後 後
① ②
ドイツ
Switzerland
After
Before
前 後 後
① ②
Between
スイス
After
After
After
英国
UK Before
-0.5
-0.5
前 後 後
① ②
Between
-0.4
Before
-0.4
Between
-0.3
Before
-0.3
Between
-0.2
フランス
Germany
France
(Pound‐euro)
(ポンド/ユーロ）
1.0
(Swiss franc‐euro)
（スイスフラン/ユーロ）
2.0
実質スイス
Real Swiss franc value
フラン
0.2
1.8
0.9
0.8
1.6
Real pound value
実質ポンド
1.4
0.7
Euro’s appreciation against pound, Swiss franc
ポンド･フラン安ユーロ高
0.6
Euro’s depreciation against pound, Swiss franc
ポンド･フラン高ユーロ安
0.5
2000
02
04
06
08
0.3
10
1.2
1.0
(Year)
12（年）
(3) Machines and （３）
機械・輸送機器
transportation equipment
2000s
2000年代
0.1
(4) Optical and precision （４）
光学・精密機器等
0.4
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
1990s
90年代
-0.5
-0.6
-0.6
UK Switzerland Germany France
英国
スイス ドイツ フランス
％ -1.5
-2.0
-2.0
4th quadrant
第Ⅳ象限
第Ⅲ象限
3rd quadrant
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0
-2.5
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
【 ＧＤＰギャップ（％）
[GDP gap (%)] 】
利上げ幅
Rate hike
第Ⅲ象限
3rd quadrant
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0
【
4th quadrant
第Ⅳ象限
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
[GDP gap (%)] 】
ＧＤＰギャップ（％）
Fig. 83 Monthly Changes of Each Currency (effective rate)
4
2
2000s
2000年代
-0.4
-0.5
-1.5
Rate cut
利下げ幅
Rate cut
利下げ幅
(Month‐on‐month change, %)
（前月比、％）
Before the euro’s 8
introduction
導入前
After the introduction 導入後
6
(before the financial crisis)
（危機前）
0.2
-0.1
-0.4
instruments, etc.
0.3
0.0
-1.0
-2.5
英国
スイス ドイツ フランス
UK Switzerland Germany France
UK Switzerland Germany France
英国
スイス ドイツ フランス
0.4
％
-0.6
-0.6
Fig. 80 Real Exchange Rates (against euro)
90年代 2000年代
1990s
2000s
1.5
イ 1.0
ン
フ 0.5
レ
ギ 0.0
ャ -0.5
ッ
プ -1.0
利上げ幅
Rate hike
】
-0.2
1st quadrant
第Ｉ象限
）
0
2.5 2nd quadrant
第Ⅱ象限
2.0
（
-0.1
】
0.0
-0.1
）
0.0
2
イ
ン 1.0
フ 0.5
レ
ギ 0.0
ャ
ッ -0.5
プ
（
4
前 後 後
① ②
1.5
0.3
1990s
90年代
2.0
【
10
【
0.4
Imports
輸入
12
(2) UK
（２）
英国
1st quadrant
第Ｉ象限
2.5 2nd quadrant
第Ⅱ象限
(2) Chemical products
（２） 化学製品
[Inflation gap (%)]
(1) Fuels and raw materials
（１） 燃料・原材料
(1) Eurozone
（１）
ユーロ圏
[Inflation gap (%)]
(Average annual changes, %)
（年平均変化率、％）
14
Fig. 82 Economic Trends upon Policy Interest Rate Changes
1990s
90年代
0
-2
-4
英国
スイス ドイツ フランス
UK Switzerland Germany France
-6
-8
-10
After the introduction 導入後
(after the crisis)
（危機後）
Pound Swiss franc Swedish krona Euro
ポンド
スイス
スウェーデン
ユーロ
フラン
クローナ
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Chapter 2, Section 3. Monetary System Experiences in Asia ~ Asian Monetary System Choice and Its Assessment
(1) Background of Asian Currency Crisis
(2) Progress in Institutional Change and Structural Reform after Currency Crisis ~
 Some Asian countries had pegged their currencies to the US dollar until before the currency crisis. The inflow of short‐term funds into these countries expanded as deregulation was coupled with high interest rates. Pressure continued on their currencies to appreciate against the dollar. Their short‐term external liabilities far exceeded their foreign currency reserves. (Figs. 84‐86)
 Funds flowing from abroad contributed to domestic capital investment growth. Foreign funds also flew into housing markets, overheating such markets in some countries. (Figs. 87 and 88)
 Total factor productivity (TFP) growth followed a downtrend before the currency crisis, indicating that funds flowing from abroad did not necessarily contribute to improving growth potential. (Fig. 89)  Asian currencies other than the Indonesian one have generally been less volatile since the International Monetary Fund’s support
responding to the currency crisis. (Fig. 90)
Fig. 84 Capital Account Balance (Thailand)
Fig. 86 Short‐term External Liabilities’ Ratios to Foreign Currency Reserves (In billions of dollars)
（億ドル）
30
300
20
200
Other investment その他投資
(liabilities)
（負債）
（％）
400
Securities investment 証券投資
(liabilities)
（負債）
Hong Kong
香港
250
0
Indonesia
インドネシア
200
China
中国
150
-200
‐20
South Korea
韓国
5
300
0
-100
‐10
10
Currency crisis occurrence
通貨危機発生
350
Direct investment 直接投資
(liabilities)
（負債）
10
100
Fig. 89 TFP’s Contribution to Real Economic Growth Rate
(Contribution, %)
（寄与度、％）
Other investment その他投資
Direct investment 直接投資
(assets)
（資産）
(assets)
（資産）
1990
92
94
96
-5
South Korea
韓国
98
Fig. 85 Exchange Rate Trends
Thailand
タイ
50
-15
0
2000（年）
(Year)
Thailand
タイ
-10
100
Securities investment 証券投資
(assets)
（資産）
Hong Kong
香港
1990
1990 92
94
96
98 2000 02
04
(Year)
06 07（年）
94
インドネシア
Indonesia
96
98
2000（年）
(Year)
Fig. 90 Monthly Changes of Each Currency (effective rate)
(1) Thailand (2) Indonesia (3) South Korea (4) Hong Kong Fig. 88 Gross Fixed Capital Formation Fig. 87 Housing Prices
92
（1991年＝100） （前月比、％）
(1991 = 100)
(1992 = 100)
(1992 = 100) （1991年＝100）
（1992年＝100）
（1992年＝100）
(Month‐on‐month change, %)
Currency crisis South Korea
Currency crisis occurrence
通貨危機発生
1,600 25 May 1997–April 2000
韓国
150
200 180
通貨危機発生
occurrence
97年５月～2000年４月
(1991 = 100)
(January 1992 = 100)
Currency crisis occurrence
(January 1992 = 100)
Local currency’s depreciation against dollar
Dollar nominal effective rate
140
Local currency’s appreciation against dollar
Thai baht nominal effective rate
South Korean won nominal effective rate
Indonesian rupiah nominal effective rate (right scale)
120
140
110
120
100
100
100
80
80
60
60
80
(Year)
160
160
90
Hong Kong dollar nominal effective rate
180
Thailand
タイ
130
South Korea
韓国
Hong Kong
香港
(right scale)
（右目盛）
1992 94 96 98 2000 02 04 0607
(Year)
（年）
140
120
1,400
1,200
1,000
Indonesia
インドネシア
800
(right scale)
（右目盛）
600
400
Thailand
タイ 200
0
1991 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07
0
1990年～97年４月
-25 1990–April 1997
2000年５月～07年
May 2000–2007
-50
(Year)
（年）
20
Chapter 2, Section 3. Monetary System Experiences in Asia ~ Asian Monetary System Choice and Its Assessment
(3) Trends of Renminbi ~
 China has adopted a managed float system to strictly control exchange rate fluctuations and imposed strict restrictions on moves of international short‐term funds, allowing its renminbi (RMB) to remain stable even after the currency crisis. (Fig. 91)  As fund inflow after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 increased pressure on the RMB to appreciate against other currencies, the authorities repeated foreign exchange market interventions, leading to increases in foreign currency reserves. (Fig. 92)
 Investment from abroad has focused on direct investment under strict capital regulations. Both capital and current account balances have been in surplus. (Figs. 93 and 94)  The RMB’s gradual internationalization is going on through trade settlements and Hong Kong’s offshore market. (Figs. 95 and 96)
Fig. 91 RMB’s Real Effective Exchange Rate
Fig. 93 Capital Account Balance
(In billions of dollars)
（億ドル）
（人民元/ドル
）
(RMB‐dollar)
6
(2010 = 100)
（10年＝100）
110
RMB’s real effective rate
人民元実質実効レート
100
7
90
80
RMB appreciation
人民元高
70
8
Nominal RMB‐dollar exchange rate 人民元対ドル名目為替レートRMB depreciation
人民元安
(right scale)
（右目盛）
60
9
(Year)
(年)
3,000
300
2,500
250
2,000
200
1,500
150
1,000
100
50050
00
-500
‐40
-1,000
‐100
-1,500
‐150
Fig. 92 Changes in Foreign Currency Reserves
(In trillions of dollars)
（兆ドル）
ＧＤＰに対する
Foreign currency 外貨準備残高の割合
reserves’ ratio to GDP （右目盛）
(right scale)
3.0
2.5
40
(%, ratio to GDP)
（％、ＧＤＰ比）
15
経常移転収支
Current account 10
30
2.0
Foreign currency reserves
外貨準備残高
1.5
20
1.0
10
0.5
0.0
1990 92
94
96
98 2000 02
04
06
08
(In billions of RMB)
(Share, %)
（シェア、％）
（億元）
Outstanding RMB‐
人民元預金残高
7,000
12
denominated deposits
700
Capital account balance
資本収支
Share of total deposits 6,000
600 預金残高全体のうちのシェア
10
(right scale)
（右目盛）
5,000
Direct investment 500
8
直接投資収支
balance
4,000
400
6
300
3,000
4
200
2,000
2
100
1,000
0
Securities investment 0
0
証券投資収支
1 3 5 7 9111 3 5 7 9111 3 5 7 9111 3 5 7 9111 3 5 7 9 (Month)
balance
（月）
Other investment balance
その他投資収支
（年）
(Year)
2008
09
10
11
12
(Year)
1997
2000 02
07
11
（年）
Fig. 94 Current Account Balance
（％）
50
3.5
0
10 11 (Year)
(年)
5
Fig. 95 Changes in RMB‐denominated Deposits
in Hong Kong
Goods and services balance
財・サービス収支
transfers
Current account 経常収支
balance
Fig. 96 New RMB‐denominated Debt Issues
(In billions of RMB)
（億元）
120
1,200
100
1,000
80
800
60
600
40
400
20
200
0
-5
Income balance
所得収支
00
2007
08
09
10
11（年）
(Year)
(Year)
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 （年）
(備考）中国人民銀行より作成。
Note: Prepared from data from the People’s Bank of China
21
Chapter 2, Section 4. Conclusion

Limited Advantages of Fixed Monetary System
 The adoption of any fixed monetary system is not a necessary condition for invigorating trade and investment. Such invigoration can be achieved through the accession to free trade blocs like the European Union.
 Small countries expect to stabilize prices with fixed monetary systems. However, some are still inflationary (including Greece). Meanwhile, non‐Eurozone countries can control inflation depending on policies.  A common currency improves individual currencies’ stability. However, all common currency zones have great effects on and responsibilities for neighboring countries
Market Confidence and Safety Net Development Required for Maintaining Fixed Monetary Systems
 In the absence of foreign exchange risks, there is a risk that massive short‐term fund inflow from abroad could lead to speculative housing investment and loose fiscal policy. ⇒ Safety net development and structural reforms before or after any crisis should be implemented to increase resistance to internal shocks.
Conditions That Must Be Reaffirmed for An Optimal Currency Zone  According to the optimal currency zone theory, a common currency can be introduced even under asymmetric shocks if conditions such as the mobility of production factors and the flexibility of prices are secured.
⇒ Actually, the Eurozone includes certain countries plagued with frequent asymmetric shocks and features rigid labor mobility and wage adjustment.  Imbalances can be corrected if fiscal funds are transferred. Given public opposition to fiscal fund transfers, however, the feasibility of any fiscal union is uncertain.  The willingness to reaffirm conditions for an optimal currency zone and establish a solid monetary system internally and externally is put into question.
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