早稲田大学法研グローバル COE・ io l Symposium o Audi

監査の国際シンポジューム
早稲田大学法研グローバル COE・��������
Interna�
tional Symposium on Audit Research
（ISAR）共催による監査の国際シンポジューム
の報告
鳥羽至英*
Ⅰ　シンポジュームの目的
Ⅱ　シンポジュームにおける共催事業の
内容
早稲田大学法研グローバル COE（企画 C-2：
企業活動の変容と会計，開示，監査，および内
ISAR が開催したシンポジュームは2012年 6
部統制：以下「法研 GCOE」という）は，
Inter-
月15－17日の３日間であるが，このうち法研
national Symposium on Audit Research
GCOE が ISAR との共催で行った事業（以下，
（ISAR）との共催事業として，2012年 6 月16日
「共催シンポジューム」）は，2012年 6 月16日の
（土）の午後，早稲田大学国際会議場において，
午後（13：30－17：30）のプログラムである。こ
とりわけ公認会計士による財務諸表監査に関連
のプログラムは，現在，欧米の会計プロフェッ
するシンポジュームを開催した。ISAR は，
1980
ションにおいて盛んに議論され喫緊の課題であ
年 代 に 南 カ リ フ ォ ル ニ ア 大 学・ 会 計 学 部 の
る「職業的懐疑心」（professional skepticism）
Theodore J. Mock 教 授 を 中 心 に 組 織 さ れ た
を中心としつつも，わが国の会計プロフェッ
Audit Judgment Symposium を母体とし，爾来
ションについての状況を報告してもらいたいと
今日まで活動を継続している，監査研究に関す
の ISAR 関係者の要請を受ける形で企画された。
るシンポジュームの中でも最も歴史の長く，か
全体のプログラムは，Plenary Session II: Audit
つ，世界各国の監査研究者によって支持されて
Quality and Corporate Governance Systems と
きたシンポジュームである。
Plenary Session III: Professional Skepticism in
法研 GCOE の企画 C-2が企業における会計・
Auditing の２つに分けられている。
監査領域の研究活動を対象とすることから，
共催シンポジュームは，鳥羽至英商学部教授
ISAR と法研 GCOE との共同事業を計画し，企
の開会挨拶のあと，法研 GCOE の拠点リーダー
業社会における監査─とりわけ公認会計士に
である上村達男法学部教授が共催シンポジュー
よる財務諸表監査─を対象としたプログラム
ムの開催を歓迎する挨拶を行った。その後で，
を企画することとした。監査研究者が主体と
ISAR の創設者である Mock 教授（University of
なって企画された監査の国際シンポジュームが
California, Riverside）が ISAR のこれまでの活
わが国において開催されることは非常に稀で，
動について総括的な説明を行った。
おそらく今回の開催が初めてではないかと思わ
共催プログラムの最初のセッション（Plenary
れる。
Session II）では，オリンパス会計不祥事や大王
* 早稲田大学商学学術院・商学部教授
77
製紙経営者不正を背景に，わが国の企業社会に
Ⅲ　共催シンポジュームの参加者の状況
おいて高まっている会計監査不信を踏まえて，
日本公認会計士協会会長山崎彰三氏が日本公認
会計士協会が実施している公認会計士監査の質
共催シンポジュームは，早稲田大学国際会議
を高めるための活動について報告を行った。ま
場において午後１時半から５時半まで，途中休
た，上記の不祥事に対する日本公認会計士協会
憩を挟みながら４時間にわたって行われた。共
としての対応について説明がなされた。また，
催シンポジュームへの参加者は総数128名であ
Aronson 教授（Law
��������������������������������
School, Creighton Univer-
り，その内訳は外国からの ISAR 参加者64名，日
sity）は，コーポレート・ガバナンスにおける
本人 ISAR 登録者22名，日本人 ISAR 非登録者
独立監査人の役割を念頭に，アメリカにおける
42名である。表１は国別の ISAR 登録参加者数
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 以後の法的環境の動きと
を，表２は共催シンポジューム日本人参加者の
日本におけるオリンパス以後の会社法を含む展
所属（職業）別内訳を纏めたものである。
開について報告がなされた。両氏の発表内容の
表１　国別の ISAR 登録参加者数
要旨は，本「シンポジューム報告」の後半に掲
載されている。特に，監査役監査の廃止を示唆
Country
Japan
USA
Australia
Netherlands
Canada
Singapore
Belgium
Finland
France
UK
Hong Kong
Korea
Malaysia
Norway
Taiwan
Thailand
New Zealand
Total
している点が興味深い。
休憩を挟んで開始されたセッション（Plenary
Session III）においては，Kadous 教授（Emory
University）が，統一テーマ「監査上の懐疑主
義」
（Professional Skepticism in Auditing）に
関連して，「疑うこと」と「批判的に考えるこ
と」とを対比しつつ，監査の失敗の原因は「職
業的懐疑心の問題」ではなく，十分な証拠に基
づいて批判的思考を展開しなかったことに起因
する，という考え方を示した。鳥羽教授（早稲
田大学）は，監査上の懐疑主義なる概念は，特
定の監査状況のもとで，監査人が監査証拠の入
手・評価にあたって働かせる「疑う姿勢」
（the
auditor’s disposition to raise a question）の側
面─職業的懐疑心の深度─だけではなく，
監査人がかかる証拠活動に従事する前に行う立
No.
22
20
16
5
4
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
86
表２　共催シンポジュームの日本人参加者の
所属（職業）別内訳
証命題のたて方（assertion framing）の側面─
職業的懐疑心の幅─があることを指摘するこ
所属
参加人数
教授・大学院生（会計専攻・法学専攻）
28
公認会計士・弁護士
8
企業関係者（監査役を含む）
18
報道関係（雑誌社含む）
3
官庁関係
4
その他
3
Total
64
とにより，
監査上の懐疑主義は「深度」と「幅」
からなるハイブリッドな性格を有していること
を 主 張 し た。 木 村 公 認 会 計 士（PricewaterhouseCoopers, Aarata）は，職業的懐疑心の強
化に結び付くプラス要因（監査のやり方）と，
反
対に監査人の職業的懐疑心にブレーキをかけて
しまう要因（監査のやり方）に言及しつつ，監
付記：上記64名のうち，ISAR への登録を行った方は22名である。
査実務家の立場からの紹介と考察がなされた。
78
Ⅳ　共催シンポジュームのプログラム
「法研グローバル COE ・ISAR 共催シンポジュームプログラム」
SATURDAY JUNE 16
13:30 - 14:00
Symposium Welcome and ISAR Overview (Waseda Conference Hall)
Yoshihide Toba (Waseda University),
Tatsuo Uemura (GCOE and Waseda University)
Theodore J. Mock (Chair, ISAR Scientific Committee)
Plenary Session II: Audit Quality and Corporate Governance Systems
JICPA Activities regarding Audit Quality
Shozo Yamazaki (President of the JICPA)
14:00 - 15:10
Audit Firms as Gatekeepers in Corporate Governance Systems: The U.S. after
Sarbanes-Oxley and Japan after Olympus
Bruce E. Aronson (Creighton University)
Coffee Break
15:10 - 15:40
Plenary Session III: Professional Skepticism in Auditing
Refocusing the Professional Skepticism Discussion: Doubt versus Critical Thinking
Kathryn Kadous (Emory University)
Constructing a Conceptual Framework of Professional Skepticism in Auditing
15:40 - 17:30
Yoshihide Toba (Waseda University)
Professional Skepticism - Challenges for the Independent Auditors in Japan
Koichiro Kimura (Chief Executive Officer, PricewaterhouseCoopers Aarata)
Moderator: Robert Roussey (University of Southern California)
Ⅴ　共催シンポジュームの発表要旨
プログラムは，Plenary session II と III にわ
けて行われた（「Ⅳ　共催シンポジュームのプロ
グラム」）
。各セッションの講演者の発表内容に
ついては，以下にその要約を掲載しておくので，
ご一読いただきたい。
79
Plenary Session II
JICPA Activities regarding Audit Quality
Shozo Yamazaki
Chairman and President of JICPA
We are facing dramatic changes in the audit environment. The recent financial crisis has increased
concerns about reliance of the audit system in the world. The recent proposals on regulations around
audit in Europe and the US may change some traditional concepts in auditing.
If you look at Japan, the recent corporate scandals of certain listed companies have caused serious
doubts as to the reliance of audits and the role of auditors. However, I also believe that this is a good opportunity to discuss and re-emphasize the importance of audit, as well as to improve its quality.
In this session, I will provide a brief overview of the audit quality program by the Japanese Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) and insights from the outcomes in the last few years.
1. Audit Quality and JICPA
The JICPA is the sole organization for the CPA profession in Japan under the CPA Act. It is empowered by law to direct and oversee all Japanese CPAs and audit firms in audit standard setting, quality
control review and discipline.
2. Public Company Audit Firms in Japan
The JICPA is composed of more than 23,000 members (and 8,000 associate members) and more
than 200 audit firms. There are about 3,600 public companies in Japan. Any firms which audit the public
company must register with the JICPA registration system for listed company audit firms.
3. Registration for Public Company Audit Firms
The registration system was established under the following fundamental framework as part of
JICPA’s measures to enhance the quality control system of audit firms which perform audits of listed companies by being incorporated into the quality control review system currently conducted by the JICPA.
(a) Enhancement of the self-regulatory function (maintenance of indirect regulation)
(b) Mandatory registration
(c) Public accountability
(d) Sanctions by public disclosure
(e) Cooperation with stock exchanges (i.e. stock exchanges require listed companies to be audited
by the registered firms.)
(f) Ensuring fairness and transparency in administration of the registration system
I will introduce the outline of the Registration system, including the types of sanctions prescribed
in the JICPA Constitution.
80
4. Quality Control Review Program
Under the CPA Act, as amended in 2003, the JICPA has the legal authority to conduct quality control reviews. Since 1999, quality control reviews have been carried out as a self-regulatory activity of the
JICPA. The amended CPA Act also requires the establishment of a public oversight body, the CPAAOB, to
ensure a fair, neutral and effective auditor oversight system in Japan.
I will illustrate our quality control review program and its outcomes in the last few years, with
relevant data.
5. Responses to Accounting Scandals
The corporate scandals in 2011 are being investigated by several organizations including JICPA
Audit Practice and Review Committee. However, it may take time to establish a clear picture of the corporate scandal. We responded, on a timely basis, by the immediate internal investigation and issuance of
several press releases. In addition, the JICPA has also established the Special Committee on the Improvement of the Auditing System, in order to consider the current practice of auditing, and what should be the
appropriate corporate governance. The Special Committee, which includes also highly experienced individuals from outside the profession, will function as an advisory body to the Chairman and President. In
order to promote even greater trust in capital markets, the Committee will perform an extensive review
of the overall system of audit and corporate governance in Japan. I will now provide the matters for consideration by the Committee to date.
81
Audit Firms as Gatekeepers in Corporate Governance Systems:
The U.S. after Sarbanes-Oxley and Japan after Olympus–Summary
Bruce E. Aronson
Professor of Law at the School of Law at Creighton University
The role of audit firms as ‘gatekeepers’ in corporate governance has received great attention over
the past decade. The term gatekeeper became popular following financial reporting scandals at Enron,
Worldcom and other large corporations. These cases raised the issues of auditor independence and the
accuracy of financial reporting at a time when large accounting firms seemed to be focusing on providing
consulting services to large corporations that were also audit clients.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002 to deal with these issues and ensure the accuracy of financial reporting that is essential for securities markets. It adopted a number of measures that
directly affect audit firms: a re-emphasis on auditing work over consulting work, a new emphasis on auditing of internal controls, changing control of the auditing relationship from corporate management to the
board’s audit committee, requiring immediate disclosure of any change of auditing firms, and new regulation of the accounting profession.
How has this increased demand for audit firms to play a larger gatekeeper role altered sudit firms’
operating environment? SOX succeeded in shifting accounting firms’ emphasis back to audit work, but at
a cost. The biggest impact on accounting firms was a loss of professional independence, as self-regulation
was substantially replaced by governmental regulation under the PCAOB. The PCAOB, an independent
agency under the SEC, registers audit firms, sets auditing standards, and also engages in inspections and
enforcement with regard to audit firms and accountants.
Following SOX, over 40 countries have similarly set up some regime for governmental regulation
of auditors, including Japan. Although many of the issues that resulted in the passage of SOX have been
addressed, new issues such as globalization of the audit business and valuation methods for new financial
instruments have also arisen.
In addition to new regulation, audit firms are also concerned with litigation risk, especially with
respect to securities class actions. Efforts by Congress, the Supreme Court and others to limit securities’
class actions have gradually had some effect. However, the last decade has seen a volatile stock market
and investor losses that are conducive to such litigation. Overall, the situation may have stabilized after
the immediate post-SOX period as audit firms have gradually adjusted to new legal requirements and to
new heightened expectations of their role. However, there is also new litigation following the 2008 financial crisis, as exemplified by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case, in which trustees in bankruptcy or
receivers of financial institutions file lawsuits against audit firms.
In Japan the Olympus case has focused new attention on corporate governance issues and particularly on the roles of both audit firms and internal company auditors (kansayaku). In this case, losses of
U.S.$1.5 billion were concealed over 20 years, with the company twice utilizing complex schemes to avoid
new accounting standards and filing securities reports with inaccurate financial statements for a number
of years. The recommendation of a third party committee established by Olympus was that there be no
82
liability for the audit firm, but liability for the internal company auditors.
The role of internal company auditors, or kansayaku, in Japanese corporate governance is often
confusing to outsiders. Although their role began as internal accounting auditors, it gradually expanded
to include monitoring all business operations of the board and the company. Some critics claim that kansayaku do not have sufficient authority to undertake this broad role since they attend, but do not vote at
board meetings and because they have no authority to hire and fire directors or officers. Others, who think
they do have adequate power, point to their clear legal authority to investigate and obtain information and
their right to obtain injunctive relief against the company for any proposed illegal action.
Japanese corporations have the option to replace the traditional Japanese system using internal
company auditors with an “American-style” system that instead utilized three board committees of mainly outside directors to monitor management. However, very few Japanese companies have adopted this
alternative “board with committees” system.
Since 2003 Japan also has a system of governmental regulation of audit firms. The CPAAOB, an
independent body within the Financial Services Agency supervises quality control reviews conducted by
the accounting industry group (JICPA) and also directly inspects the Big Four accounting firms. The JICPA is in charge of inspection of all other accounting firms. The US PCAOB conducts join inspections of
Japanese accounting firms that audit US-listed companies.
In Japan there is no securities class action system, and no lawsuits against audit firms. However, as
a result of a financial reporting scandal in the Kanebo case (2005) one of the major audit firms, Chuo
Aoyama, was forced to cease operations much like Arthur Anderson in the U.S. following the Enron scandal.
There are a number of proposed reforms following the Olympus case. Possible amendments to the
Company Law include the introduction of a new, optional “one committee” form of governance in which
the kansayaku would also disappear to be replaced by a single board committee. The Financial Services
Agency is studying methods to strengthen the function of audit firms, which presumably could include
regulatory changes at the CPAAOB.
In addition, a new scandal arose at AIJ in February 2012. Like the Bernie Madoff case in the US, it
involves an asset management firm stealing large sums of investor funds under a ponzi scheme while
claiming consistently high, steady returns on investment. Like Dodd-Frank in the U.S., this eventually
could have an impact on auditing of asset managers and other financial institutions. In both the U.S. and
Japan audit firms face demands to play a stronger gatekeeper role to help ensure accurate financial reporting, and they are gradually responding to such demands. In the US regulation and enforcement are
now strong, but there is a question of whether they are worth the cost. In Japan new demands to strengthen regulation and enforcement are emerging. All this occurs in a time of increasing globalization and more
complicated business structures and financial assets that add to the challenge facing audit firms today.
83
Plenary Session III
Refocusing the Professional Skepticism Discussion:
Doubt versus Critical Thinking
Kathryn Kadous1
Professor at the Goizueta Business School at Emory University,
The PCAOB’s inspection program has provided insight into the specific types of decision problems
that auditors experience in doing their jobs. In our research into audits of accounting estimates, my coauthors and I have studied PCAOB inspection reports and have interviewed auditors to learn more about
decision problems that threaten audit quality for this important task. We find that auditors overwhelmingly choose to audit management’s model, rather than generating an independent estimate, and that they
make a number of specific errors (e.g., failing to appropriately evaluate the reasonableness of assumptions underlying the model) that result in overreliance on management and underreliance on external
evidence (Griffith et al. 2012).
The sorts of decision problems we identify are commonly attributed to a lack of professional skepticism. Professional skepticism is defined in the academic accounting literature as a propensity to defer
reaching a conclusion until sufficient evidence is accumulated in favor or one conclusion or another (e.g.,
Hurtt 2010) or as a propensity to view the risk of misstatement as heightened (Nelson 2009). While these
views of skepticism vary in terms of their starting position (i.e., neutral belief versus presumptive doubt),
they both view a skeptical auditor as one who needs more evidence to be convinced that management’s
estimates are accurate– that is, they focus on doubt. Similarly, practitioners seem to view skepticism as
centering on doubt, and they also view increased professional skepticism as essential to improving decision quality.
My view is somewhat different. While I believe that increased skepticism could improve audit quality, I don’t see it as a major cause of these decision problems. In fact, I view lack of skepticism as not so
much a cause of auditors’ judgment problems as a symptom of them. My collaborators and I argue that the
underlying causes of these poor decision behaviors are that the auditor tends to approach the task of
auditing with a mindset that does not facilitate critical thinking and therefore, does not facilitate high
audit quality, and that auditors sometimes lack critical knowledge and abilities to perform high quality
audits. In other words, we believe that focus on critical decision processes, as well as identifying critical
abilities and knowledge types is more likely to be production in improving audit quality than is increasing
doubt. This is consistent with evidence demonstrating that increasing auditor doubt may increase the
amount of planned audit work without increasing audit quality (Hammersley 2011, Hammersley et al.
2011), while higher audit quality is associated with whether the auditor identifies specific problem (Hammersley et al. 2011), and is improved by interventions designed to increase auditor critical thinking (Hoff1 This talk is based, in part, on research done with coauthors, especially Jackie Hammersley and Emily Griffith.
84
man and Zimbelman 2009, Brewster 2011).
In particular, it appears over-reliance on management arises because the auditor typically approaches the audit of estimates in a mindset that encourages efficient completion of a verification task
rather than one that encourages critical thinking and consideration of a broad set of evidence. We propose
that auditors with certain types of cognitive styles are more likely to find themselves in the type of mindset that facilitates critical thinking and, thus, high audit quality. We further propose that auditors with
particular abilities and knowledge will be better able to take advantage of being in the right mindset.
These ideas are summarized in our model in Figure 1.
We are currently conducting empirical tests of our model. So far we’ve conduced three pilot studies and we are collecting data from practicing auditors in June. Our results strongly support the idea that
individual differences in cognitive style (need for closure, need for cognition), as well as ability measures
(IQ, cognitive reflection, numeracy) determine whether individuals identify discrepancies between management’s assertions and reality, and thus, their overall conclusions about how reasonable management’s
assertions are. This implies that some individuals may make better auditors than others, and that we can
identify them ex ante. We have also identified a nudge that helps individuals to leverage their abilities to
identify discrepancies. We have had less luck so far with nudges designed to specifically change auditors’
mindsets, but we keep trying.
Figure 1 Framework for Improved Audit Quality
85
Figure 2 Pilot Results from Tests of the Framework
References
Brewster, B. E. 2011. How a systems perspective improves knowledge acquisition and performance in
analytical procedures. The Accounting Review 86 (3): 915-943.
Griffith, E. E., J. S. Hammersley, and K. Kadous. 2012. Auditing complex estimates: Understanding the
process used and problems encountered. Working paper.
Hammersley, J. S. 2011. A review and model of auditor judgments in fraud-related planning tasks. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (4): 101-128.
Hammersley, J. S., K. Johnstone, and K. Kadous. 2011. How do audit seniors respond to increased fraud
risk? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (3): 81-101.
Hoffman, V. B. and M. F. Zimbelman. 2009. Do strategic reasoning and brainstorming help auditors change
their standard audit procedures in response to fraud risk? The Accounting Review 84 (3): 811-837.
Hurtt, R. K. 2010. Development of a scale to measure professional skepticism. Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory 29 (1): 149-171.
Nelson, M. W. 2009. A Model and Literature Review of Skepticism in Auditing. Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory 28(2): 1-34.
86
Constructing a Conceptual Framework of
Professional Skepticism in Auditing
Yoshihide Toba
Professor at the Graduate School of Commerce at Waseda University
There has been an increasing number of arguments on a national and an international level, both
academically and practically, on “professional skepticism in auditing.” The internal and external environments surrounding independent auditors have resulted in an eroding of professional skepticism and have
threatened to weaken society’s trust in auditors. Professional standards have long emphasized an appropriate degree of skepticism throughout the evidence process, which is composed of planning audit programs, performing audit procedures, and evaluating the audit evidence. Auditors are expected to understand that the essence of skepticism is “raising a question” and “exhibiting a questioning mind,” yet this
is not enough to prevent audit failures resulting from insufficient skepticism.
1. The hybrid concept of professional skepticism
One of the basic issues facing the accounting profession in the US and Europe at the moment is
professional skepticism in auditing. This issue is fundamentally a matter of audit evidence and is, firstly,
concerned with how the auditor should doubt the financial statements of the company under audit and,
secondly, concerned with the degree and extent to which an auditor should doubt them. To put it another
way, professional skepticism contains the following two facets: the breadth and the depth of the auditor’s
cognition.
The breadth of professional skepticism in auditing
This facet is concerned with the auditor’s assertion-framing which includes determining the basic
nature (affirmative and negative) of assertions to be scrutinized. It is basically related to “an auditor’s way
of knowing” and symbolically deals with what approach (positive or negative) the auditor should (can)
adopt prior to initiating the evidence process. Thus, professional skepticism in auditing is epistemic in
nature. In general, the more assertions, positive and/or negative, the auditor scrutinizes, the more broadly the auditor’s skepticism will be applied and exercised.
The depth of professional skepticism in auditing
This facet is concerned with making an evaluative judgment concerning the relevance, quality
(reliability), and quantity of audit evidence to be collected for scrutinizing a particular assertion. This
facet is related to the auditor’s disposition to raise a question in making such an evidential judgment in a
particular audit setting and fundamentally deals with measuring the depth of the auditor’s questioning
mind. In this sense, professional skepticism in auditing is psychological in nature. In general, the more
evidence and the more competent evidence there is to use, the more deeply the auditor’s skepticism related to the assertion will be exercised.
In other words, professional skepticism in auditing is a hybrid concept constituting the epistemic
and psychological facets of audit cognition. Whether the auditor can successfully accomplish his/her as-
87
In other words, professional skepticism in auditing is a hybrid concept
constituting the epistemic and psychological facets of audit cognition. Whether
the auditor can successfully accomplish his/her assurance role under a financial
statement audit depends on his/her success in exercising professional
skepticism of a hybrid nature (Figure 1).
surance role under a financial statement audit depends on his/her success in exercising professional
skepticism of a hybrid nature (Figure 1).
Figure11 The
The Hybrid
Hybrid Nature
Nature of
Figure
of Skepticism
Skepticism in
in Auditing
Auditing
a questioning mind
Psychology
a framework of
audit cognition
Philosophy/Linguistics
Skepticism in Auditing
2. Previous research on professional skepticism
Research on professional skepticism has been in progress for some time, yet almost all prior (empirical) research on the subject has focused entirely on the second facet, particularly on the effects of the
auditor’s psychological traits on his/her professional skepticism. Why? These studies seem to have been
based on a preconception that only an affirmative approach (“substantiating the assertions”: confirmation) can be accepted as the “way of knowing” under
2 a financial statement audit.
It should be noted, however, that another way of knowing is recognized in the philosophy of science, that is, a negative approach (“proactively looking for negative indications of material misstatements:
falsification). Under a negative approach, the auditor needs to scrutinize negative assertions so that he/
she can form a reasonable basis for corroborating his/her belief in the fair presentation of financial statements.
3. Objective of the presentation
The main objective of the presentation is to present a conceptual framework of professional skepticism (Figure 2) which gives due consideration to its hybrid nature as well as different views of the auditor’s mind-set on skepticism recognized in the auditing literature. This conceptual framework can show,
in terms of professional skepticism, not only where the current audit practice is considered to stand, but
also in which direction the practice is (may be) shifting.
Starting a fresh mind-set on professional skepticism implies the need for us to focus academic efforts on negative assertions in auditing. Expanding the attention of the auditor to encompass not only
positive assertions, but also negative assertions would strengthen the auditorʼs professional skepticism
and lead to improving the overall quality of a financial statement audit. In conclusion, major reserch issues, as might be expected in relation to negative assertions, will be presented.
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form a reasonable basis for corroborating his/her belief in the fair presentation
of financial statements.
3. Objective of the presentation
The main objective of the presentation is to present a conceptual framework
of professional skepticism (Figure 2) which gives due consideration to its
hybrid nature as well as different views of the auditor’s mind-set on skepticism
recognized in the auditing literature. This conceptual framework can show, in
terms of professional skepticism, not only where the current audit practice is
considered to stand, but also in which direction the practice is (may be) shifting.
Figure
2 A Conceptual
Framework
of Skepticism
in Auditing
Figure2
A Conceptual
Framework
of Skepticism
in Auditing
Breadth
Ways of knowing
Depth
A
questioning
mind
Positive approach
(substantiation)
Negative approach
(falsification)
Neutrality
I
II
Presumptive
doubt
Ⅲ
IV
3
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Professional Skepticism
– Challenges for Independent Auditors in Japan -
Koichiro Kimura
Chief Executive Officer of PricewaterhouseCoopers Aarata
Challenge #1 – Develop curiosity and willingness of auditors
New joiners to the audit profession in Japan are typically those who just passed the examination
(of less than 10% success rate) with full of compliance mindset. How would you coach and develop them
to be fully curious and willing to pursue issues to resolution with healthy professional skepticism?
One way is to motivate them through recognition and appraisal. Although we need to face some
cultural challenges such as a mentality that development of a professional has to be always strict, this is
an easier part of the development. Suggested change in approach by the Japanese CPAAOB to place more
focus on best practices at large firms is encouraging as well.
Another aspect is to embed the passion to pursue value for audit clients. This may sound contradictory to the professional skepticism. However, our experience indicates that there are certain correlation between audit quality and the results of client satisfaction survey. Very strong feedback in many
cases correlates to high quality audits. Poor results do not necessarily lead to poor quality, but indicate
that there are mis-communications between auditors and clients. The real issue resides in the average
zone — constant feedback of not-good, not-bad rating suggests poor interaction between auditors and
clients due to lack of curiosity and willingness to pursue value.
What are the things that audit clients suggest they don’t like? The number one is always the expensive fees. They feel the fees are expensive, because auditors are not valuable to them. What they don’t
see value in audits are boilerplate questions, shallow thinking or performance of excessive procedures
without convincing explanation. This is where I motivate audit teams to exercise professional skepticism
so that they can pose smarter questions and become a bit more valuable.
What clients do see value are the insights such as those on risk management, effective control or
fraud detection. In order to develop the capability to deliver these insights, we need to train our staff on
deep thinking about the core value of clients and businesses. We annually issue value report to clients so
that we can get mutual understanding about what the values are for the clients.
Fictitious circular transactions are the focus area for Japanese auditors over many years. If you
constantly think about value creation of the clients, you may be able to better detect the lack of substance
of those transactions.
Challenge #2 – Corporate governance
Strong corporate governance can strengthen the effectiveness of independent auditors’ skepticism. When auditors can have competent dialog with the clients’ governance bodies, the questioning mind
and critical assessment will really work. If audit clients do not take up difficult questions from auditors,
the skepticism will not achieve the objectives.
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One obstacle for auditors to pose difficult questions is the fear to challenge or change the things
that were once agreed in the past. Auditors have to be confident about the relationship with clients and
their governance bodies. The better you know a client, the more effectively you can exercise your professional skepticism.
Challenge #3 – Going to extreme
As there is no clear measure for the degree of professional skepticism, auditors tend to go to extreme when they get negative feedback at an inspection by regulators. One example is the balance between analytical procedures and detailed substantive testing. When a regulator pointed out insufficient
granularity of performance of analytical procedures, the inspected auditors determined it would be more
practical to perform detailed substantive testing rather than the analytical procedures. Once the inspected engagement team does this, it becomes the norm and other teams tend to automatically start testing
thousands of samples. This clearly deprives auditors of motivation to think through the risks to assess
them with healthy professional skepticism.
One good solution to avoid auditors going to extreme is the review panel at Japanese auditing
firms, which tend to place more reliance on this than on quality review partners. The panel is consisted of
several experienced client service partners and acts as the final gate keeper of the firms’ quality management. The panel typically meets every week and go through contentious audit issues with engagement
partners. The panel members share their experience of tough discussion with their clients and try to
make sure that consistent judgment is made to the firm’s clients. The judgment becomes relatively conservative, as the panel never allows engagement teams to exceptionally reach to easy conclusion. Engagement partners can have stronger comfort on their professional skepticism and judgment.
Challenge #4 – Diversity
If you are a member of global network firm, you will be exposed to different views from various
territories. Quality management cannot be an exception and heated debates are held from time to time
about the degree of taking those different views into consideration. One recent example was how much
we should test pension assets. For testing the existence and valuation assertions of pension assets, auditors in Japan typically obtain direct confirmation from custodians on the overall fair value of assets. Upon
an incident of fictitious reporting by an investment advisor in Japan, the view that pension assets should
be tested by obtaining the detailed listing of composites and examining the valuation of sample assets was
suggested. Auditors first tried to argue that local practice does not require or even allow performance of
such procedures, with no reference about how much skepticism should come into this situation. When the
push from the overseas firms won the argument, the degree of professional skepticism was more aligned
to the global standards. Diversity worked out quite well to practically define the degree of professional
skepticism.
Another area that Japanese auditors can sharpen up the exercise of professional skepticism is the
use of specialists. When a company makes a big acquisition, for example, purchase price allocation will
become a big focus area of audit. You have to bring in the specialists on valuation and you may want to add
economists in particular industry as well. These specialists will bring about expertise of not just valuation
techniques, but also the perspectives about economic substance of the business. These expertise will be
a great luxury for the foundation of exercising the healthy professional skepticism. Auditors tend to think
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they know everything about the company and the business and auditors also wish to control everything
in the audits; however, by excluding different views, they are reducing the effectiveness of skepticism. In
order to achieve this, audit firms have to have a wide line-up of competent specialists.
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③　外国の若手研究者が取り上げる研究テーマ
報告後記
や研究方法論，とりわけ彼らの発表のやり方
（姿勢）を，日本の若手研究者が直接体験し，
2009年に Singapore において開催された In-
英語を使っての研究発表に向けて新たな刺激
ternational Symposium on Audit Research の
を得ることができること
運営委員会（Scientific Committee）において，
である。
2012年に早稲田大学での ISAR 開催をお引き受
今回のシンポジューム開催に関連してわれわ
するとの意向を表明してから，およそ３年間に
れ が 直 面 し た 問 題 は， こ の 種 の 国 際 シ ン ポ
わたる準備を経ての開催であった。外国研究者
ジュームの開催費用を参加者の登録料だけで賄
を中心とした本格的な国際シンポジュームが会
うことはできない，という現実であった。その
計・監査の分野で開催されたことはこれまであ
ため，大学組織（会計研究所）からの支援，大
まり耳にしたことがなく，おそらく初めての経
学関係の自治組織（公認会計士稲門会），および
験ではなかったかと思われる。さらに，シンポ
外部団体（日本を代表する大手・中堅の監査法
ジュームの運営（宿泊・会場・外部資金の調
人計10法人）に，資金助成をお願いすることと
達・登録料管理・各種支払い・マンパワー等）
なった。また，この過程で，われわれの台所を
のための計画・準備はシンポジューム主催大学
心配された個人（公認会計士：匿名）よりの寄
（監査研究者）において行わなければならず，
そ
付があったことも報告しておかなければならな
の意味でも大事業となった。
い。いろいろな意味で，「早稲田大学の大きさ」
傾向として続く円高と東日本大震災（および
を感ずることとなった。なお，法研グローバル
放射線問題）が重なったため，シンポジューム
COE 関係の事業支出─外国研究者の招聘・
企画・運営責任者としては，登録者数と発表の
宿泊，内外の発表者への謝礼，配布資料，同時
ための論文投稿数の減少が心配であったが，登
通訳関係費用，運営に関する雑費等─につい
録者数は例年と変わらず，嬉しいことに論文投
ては，早稲田大学法研グローバル COE よりの
稿者数においては過去最多であった。また，ISAR
支援を受けた。ここに，今回のシンポジューム
が他の組織と共催でシンポジュームを開催する
の企画・運営責任者として，法研グローバル
ことは今回が始めてであった。開催２日目午後
COE の拠点リーダである上村達男教授に対し
はすべて共催プログラムに当てられるため，ISAR
て心からのお礼を申し上げる次第である。
単独プログラムの発表者数を多少制限せざるを
今回のシンポジュームの運営に際しては，さ
得なかったが，共催プログラムも ISAR 単独プ
まざまな方からの献身的な，心温まるご支援・
ログラムも成功裏に終了することができた。
ご協力をいただいた。プログラム全体の企画・
われわれが今回のシンポジュームを通じて学
運営について正にパートナーとして働いていた
んだことは，
だいた福川裕徳氏（一橋大学教授），開催２日目
①　国際シンポジュームの開催がけっして容易
の夜の晩餐会の運営を担当していただいた永見
ではないこと，しかし，この経験を積み重ね
尊氏（慶應義塾大学教授）・小澤康裕氏（立教
ていくことによって，わが国の監査研究者は
大学准教授），プログラムの執行全体を裏方とし
国際的な会議の運営や参加（発表）に慣れる
て支えていただいた亀岡恵理子さん（商学研究
必要があること
科博士課程１年），および大学院・学部ゼミの学
②　国際シンポジュームの開催を引き受けるこ
生諸君に対してお礼を申し上げたい。また，共
とによって，初めてわれわれ日本の研究者が
催プログラムの実施については，法研グローバ
外国研究者のネットワークへの仲間入りがで
ル COE 業務に従事されている事務局の皆さん
きた，との実感を得ることができること
に感謝とお礼を申しあげる次第である。
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