...

PDF 253KB - 日本アクチュアリー会

by user

on
Category: Documents
53

views

Report

Comments

Transcript

PDF 253KB - 日本アクチュアリー会
年金アクチュアリーに関連する
国際的な諸問題
平成17年2月4日
大山義広
1
1. 退職給付債務の計算方法の動向
退職(選択)一時金を給付する退職給付制度の債務は、
max(通常に計算した PBO,測定日での退職(選択)一時金要支給額)
とする方向か
実現すると日本企業の債務は増加すると考えられる。
2. イギリスにおけるアクチュアリーに関する見直しの動向
z 2000 年のエクイタブル生命の破綻を契機にアポインティ
ド・アクチュアリーの役割が変更された。
z 生命保険関係だけではなく、アクチュアリー全体に関する見
直しがモーリス卿をリーダーとするチームで実施中
z 12 月に中間評価報告書を公開し 2 月 4 日まで意見受付
z 最終報告は今年春の予定
z イギリスでの改革であるが、国際アクチュアリー会を通じて
日本アクチュアリー会の資格試験・継続教育の厳格化をもた
らす可能性がある。
2
IASB プレスリリース
2004 年 7 月 8 日
IFRIC、キャッシュバランス・プランに関する指針を公表
国際財務報告解釈指針委員会(IFRIC)* は、本日、キャッシュバランス・プランの会計
処理に関する指針を示す解釈指針案 D9「拠出金または名目的拠出金に対するリターンが約
束された従業員給付制度」を、一般のコメントを求めるために公表した。これらは、給付
が資産に対する将来の収益に左右される従業員給付制度である。
このような制度は、国際会計基準第 19 号「従業員給付」によれば確定給付型制度である
が、当該基準書で要求されている、確定給付型制度に対する伝統的な会計処理方法の適用
は困難である。D9 は、資産に対する将来の収益がどのようになるかの見積りは困難である
ため、資産に対する将来の収益に左右される給付に関しては、最終的に支払うべきことと
なる金額の見積りは行ってはならないと提案している。その代り、このような給付に係る
債務の測定は、貸借対照表日の資産の価値を基礎としなければならない。
本提案は、2004 年 9 月 21 日まで一般のコメントを求めるために公開される。
IFRIC 議長の Kevin Stevenson は、次のように述べた。
「キャッシュバランス・プランは、ますます年金引当の一般的な形式とな
っている。それらに首尾一貫して適用できる会計処理方法を開発すること
は重要である。アメリカの会計基準設定機関である FASB も、この問題に注
目しており、我々は統合化された解決を得るために FASB と共同で作業する
予定である。
」
IASB の 包 括 サ ー ビ ス の 契 約 者 は 、 解 釈 指 針 案 を IASB の 契 約 者 用 ウ ェ ブ サ イ ト
(www.iasb.org)で閲覧できる。解釈指針案は、2004 年 7 月 9 日以降、ウェブサイトから
無料で入手できる。
以
上
3
問合わせ先:
Kevin Stevenson, Chairman, IFRIC
電話: +44 (0)20 7246 6460
電子メール: [email protected]
Hans-Georg Bruns, IASB liaison member on the IFRIC
電話: +44 (0)20 7246 6410
電子メール: [email protected]
Gilbert Gelard, IASB liaison member on the IFRIC
電話: +44 (0)20 7246 6410
電子メール: [email protected]
James J Leisenring, IASB liaison member on the IFRIC
電話: +44 (0)20 7246 6410
電子メール: [email protected]
Anne McGeachin,Project Manager
電話: +44 (0)20 7246 6462
電子メール: [email protected]
編集者への注釈
解釈指針案について
1. IFRIC は、実際または名目上の拠出金に対するリターンが約束された従業員給付制
度に、IAS 第 19 号「従業員給付」をどのように適用すべきかどうかについての指
針の作成を要請されていた。
このような制度の例としては、次のようなものがある。
(a) 拠出が従業員の現在の給与を基礎として毎年行われ、従業員がその拠出金に次
のいずれか高い方の金額を加えた金額と同額の給付(一時金または年金)を受
け取る制度。(i) その拠出金が生み出した実際の収益、(ii)給付が支払われる
までの期間にわたる、その拠出金に対する最低限の固定収益;または、
(b) 約束された給付が、毎年の名目拠出額に、当該名目拠出額に対する収益として
次のいずれか高い方を加えた額である制度。(i) 指定された資産に基づいたリ
ターン(例えば上場債券に対するリターン)、(ii) 固定リターン†(例えば 4
パーセント)。この制度は、資産を保有している場合も保有していない場合も
ある。
4
2. D9 は、このような制度は確定給付型制度であると論じ、以下のような給付の取扱
いに関する指針を提案している。
(a)
固定リターンの保証
(b)
将来の資産収益に左右される給付、または
(c)
(a)と(b)の組合せ
3. D9 は、固定リターンが保証されている給付に係る負債については、最終的に支払
われる金額を見積るために、保証された固定リターンで拠出金を運用するものと予
測することにより算定することを提案している。その金額は、IAS 第 19 号で要求
されている優良社債の利率を用いて現在価値に割り引かなければならない。一方、
将来の資産収益に左右される給付については、D9 は、最終的に支払われる金額の
見積りを行ってはならないと提案している。その代り、当該負債は貸借対照表日現
在の資産の価値により算定しなければならない。最後に、D9 は、保証された固定
リターンと将来の資産収益とを組み合わせた給付に係る負債は、それぞれの個別要
素に係る負債のいずれか高い方とすべきだと提案している。
IFRIC について
4. IFRIC は、2002 年 2 月に第 1 回会合を開催した。IFRIC は、出身国や職業経験の異
なる 12 人(全員非常勤)の議決権を有する委員で構成され、議決権を有さない議
長の下で 2 ヶ月ごとに会議を開催している。IFRIC の原則的な役割は、権威ある指
針がないことにより異なった取扱いや容認できない取扱いを受ける可能性がある
ような会計上の問題について、国際財務報告基準及び IASB のフレームワークの文
脈の中で、適切な会計処理について合意に到達することを目的として、タイムリー
に検討することにある。解釈指針の開発にあたり、IFRIC は IFRIC に類似した各国
の解釈指針委員会と緊密な連携をとって作業を行った。
5
IASB について
5. IASB は、ロンドンに本拠を置き、2001 年に活動を開始した。世界中の主要会計事
務所、民間金融機関及び事業会社、中央銀行及び開発銀行、並びにその他の国際的
専門団体から、評議会、IASC 財団が集金した拠出金で運営されている。現在の 14
人の審議会メンバー(うち 12 人は常勤)は、9か国に居住し、さまざまな職務上
の経歴を有している。当審議会は、公共の利益のために、一般目的の財務諸表にお
いて透明で比較可能な情報を要求する、高品質で全世界的な単一の会計基準のセッ
トを開発することを公約している。この目的を追求するため、当審議会は、全世界
の会計基準の収斂を達成するために各国の会計基準設定主体と協力している。
6. 現在、約 35 カ国が、すべての国内上場会社に国際基準の使用を要求し、他の 6 つ
の国々は、特定の会社に国際基準の使用を要求している。又、多くの国々は国際基
準を国内の会計実務の基礎としている。2002 年には、豪州、欧州連合及びロシア
を含むいくつかの地域は、2005 年 1 月 1 日又はそれ以前に国際基準を要求すると
発表した。2002 年 9 月に、IASB と米国の相手方である財務会計基準審議会(FASB)
は、既存の米国の実務と国際的な実務との収斂及び将来の基準の共同開発に向けて
作業するという合意に達した。
*IFRIC は国際会計基準審議会(IASB)の基準解釈機関である。
† 最低限の固定リターンは、正のリターンであることもあれば、資本の欠損に対する保護
(すなわち、リターンがゼロ未満にならない)あるいは一定額を超える損失に対する保護を
提供することもある。
6
D9 への意見一覧(43 通)
CL 24:
Accounting Standards Board - Urgent Issues Task Force (ASB) (UK)
CL 36:
CL 3:
CL 10:
Actuarial Profession (UK)
Australian Accounting Standards Board – Urgent Issues Group (Australia)
Barclays Bank PLC (UK)
CL 12:
CL 19:
CL 18:
Canadian Accounting Standards Board (Canada)
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (UK)
Conseil National de la Comptabilité (CNC) (France)
CL 28:
CL 4:
CL 34:
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International
Ernst & Young (International)
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG)
CL 22:
CL 35:
CL 14:
CL 42:
F Hoffmann La Roche (Switzerland)
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE)
Financial Reporting Standards Board (FRSB) of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ) (New Zealand)
Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer FAR (Sweden)
CL 11:
CL 25:
CL 37:
German Accounting Standards Committee (DRSC) (Germany)
German Actuarial Association Pensions Section (IVS) (Germany)
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Hong Kong)
CL 40:
CL 17:
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW) (Germany)
Institute of Actuaries of Japan and the Japanese Society of Certified Pension
Actuaries (Japan)
CL 39:
CL 23:
CL 1:
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) (UK)
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) (Ireland)
Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas (Spain)
CL 15:
CL 43:
International Accounting Standards Review Committee (IASRC) of the Korea
Accounting Standards Board (KASB) (Korea)
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
CL 33:
CL 16:
J P Morgan Chase (USA)
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) (Japan)
CL 41:
CL 7:
CL 38:
KPMG (International)
Lane Clark & Peacock LLP (UK)
Lohman International Association (Japan)
CL 31:
CL 13:
CL 32:
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) (Malaysia)
Mellon’s Human Resources and Investor Solutions (USA)
Mercer Human Resources Consulting (UK)
CL 21:
CL 5:
CL 26:
Mitsui Asset Trust and Banking Co., Ltd (Japan)
Pendia Associates SA (Switzerland)
PricewaterhouseCoopers (International)
CL 2:
CL 9:
CL 27:
Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (Council for Annual Reporting) (Netherlands)
Royal Association of Belgian Actuaries (Belgium)
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Germany)
CL 8:
Syngenta International AG
7
CL 6:
Treuhand-Kammer (Switzerland)
CL 20:
CL 30:
CL 29:
UBS (Switzerland)
Watson Wyatt International Limited (UK)
Watson Wyatt International Limited (USA)
8
D9 への当会の意見
国際財務報告解釈指針委員会(IFRIC)解釈指針案D9に関する意見
社団法人
社団法人
04.09.21-01
2004.9.21
日本アクチュアリー会
日本年金数理人会
国際財務報告解釈指針委員会(IFRIC)解釈指針案D9に関する意見
日本アクチュアリー会および日本年金数理人会は、国際財務報告解釈指針委員会(IFRIC)
の解釈指針案D9拠出金または名目的拠出金に対する収益が約束された従業員給付制度に関
して、次のような意見を提出します。
第6節への意見
日本のキャッシュバランスプランおよびキャッシュバランスプラン類似(注)の制度に関
しては、次の理由により解釈指針案D9を適用して適切に退職給付債務を計算することが困
難である。このため、解釈指針案D9のパラグラフ6に「仮想勘定残高が退職給付債務とし
て適切でない場合には、将来給付を予測し、これを割り引くことによって給付の現価をもと
めることができる」ことを追加することを提案したい。これによって、日本のキャッシュバ
ランスプランおよびキャッシュバランスプラン類似制度は、通常の確定給付制度の退職給付
債務計算と同様の手法より適切に債務を算定することができるようになる。
理由
日本における確定給付型の従業員給付制度は一時金給付が基礎となっており、(保証期間
付き)終身年金を給付する場合であっても、一時金額と等価な確定年金の年金額を給付する
ことが一般的であり、キャッシュバランスプランやキャッシュバランスプラン類似制度に関
しても同様である。
日本で実施されているキャッシュバランスプランでは、年金給付額は、上述のとおり年金
開始時の仮想勘定残高をあらかじめ支給期間が定められた確定年金の現価率で除して得た額
とすることが通常であり、制度が終身年金を給付する場合にも、このように決められた年金
額給付を終身にわたって支払うことが多い。したがって、終身年金を給付する制度において
は、年金開始時の仮想勘定残高は確定年金部分(保証期間部分)の給付に充てられ、それ以
降(保証期間経過後)の給付は、仮想勘定残高とは別に事業主が負担することになる。
この仮想勘定残高とは別に事業主が負担する給付は退職給付債務に計上されなければなら
ない。この部分の退職給付債務を算定するためには、将来の年金給付額の予想と割引率を用
いた現価計算を行うことが必要である。一方、解釈指針案D9では、将来の収益により給付
額が変動する制度においては、将来の給付の予測を行い現価計算を行うべきではなく、貸借
対照表日付における仮想勘定残高を債務とすることとされている。このため、終身年金を支
給する日本のキャッシュバランスプランに解釈指針案D9を適用した場合、多くの制度で退
9
職給付債務が過小に評価されてしまうことになる。
また、キャッシュバランスプラン類似制度では、退職前の仮想勘定残高の概念が存在せず、
退職時の一時金給付は、収益率によって変動しない。一方、年金給付は、収益によって給付
額が変動する。
このような制度に、解釈指針案D9を適用することは想定されていないと考えられるが、
仮に解釈指針案D9をこのような制度に適用する場合には、退職前の仮想勘定残高を新たに
定義する必要がある。また、解釈指針案D9を適用しないとした場合、通常の確定給付制度
の退職給付債務の計算をこの制度に適用するとなるが、将来の収益によって変動する給付を
予測し、現価計算を行うことを避けることができない。このため、このような適用のしかた
は、解釈指針案D9の考え方との間で矛盾が生じる。
第8節への意見
運用収益率にマージンが含まれる場合、マージンの影響を債務に反映することに同意する。
しかし、制度債務はマージンの効果の配分方法に応じて変動する。配分方法は、例えば「マ
ージンに対する費用は、勤務年数に応じて均等に配分される。」というように、解釈指針で
特定されるべきであると考える。
以上
(注)日本には、次のようなキャッシュバランスプランに類似する従業員給付制度が普及し
ている。
(1)退職時の給与と勤務年数に基づいて計算される一時金の給付額を退職時の名目上
の年金の資産とする。
(2)退職時から年金開始時までの期間および年金開始後の期間について名目上の資産
に対する収益を加味して年金給付額が再評価される。
10
日本公認会計士協会はD9へ賛成を表明
The Japanese Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
4-4-1, Kudan-Minami, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-8264, Japan
Phone: 81-3-3515-1130 Fax: 81-3-5226-3355
e-mail: [email protected]
http://www.jicpa.or.jp/ n_eng/
September 21 , 2004
Comments on IFRIC DRAFT AMENDMENT D9,
“Employee Benefit Plans with a Promised Return on Contributions
or
Notional Contributions”
Dear Sirs:
We, The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, are pleased to provide our
comments on IFRIC DRAFT AMENDMENT D9, “Employee Benefit Plans with a
Promised Return on Contributions or Notional Contributions”.
We agree with the proposed consensus.
We found an error of a number entitled, “Change in additional variable component
liability” and “Surplus/(deficit)” of a table shown on page 15 of IFRIC D9. It should be
(31.4) instead of (34.1).
****
We would be pleased to discuss any aspect of this letter with the IFRIC or its staff at
your convenience.
Very truly yours,
Michiyoshi Sakamoto
Chairman
Technical Committee for IASB
11
FASB の動向
Project Updates
Amendment of Statements 87 and 35
Project Summary
Last Updated: January 6, 2004 (Updated sections are indicated with an
asterisk *)
The staff has prepared this summary of Board decisions for information
purposes only. Those Board decisions are tentative and do not change
current accounting. Official positions of the FASB are determined only
after extensive due process and deliberations.
Objective(s)
Decisions Reached at the Last Meeting
*Immediate Plans
Summary of Tentative Decisions
Board Meetings/Public Meeting Dates
Related FASB Articles
当初はキャッシュ・バランス制度の債
History and Background
務と費用の計算ガイドライン作成を
Contact Information
目的としていた。
Objective(s)
The original objective of this project was to provide guidance regarding "cash
balance" pension plans, which are not specifically addressed in FASB
Statement No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions. Specifically, this
project was to address two issues:
1. The appropriate means of attributing the cost of benefits earned to periods of
service for plans that do not define annual retirement benefits in relation to salary
and years of service.
2. The appropriate measure of the benefit obligation for plans that provide a benefit
based on a variable formula, the future value of which depends, in part, or in total,
on future market performance of various reference investments, portfolios, or
indices.
12
2004/10/13 の理事会で退職(選択)一時金を給付する退職給付制度の債務は、
max(通常に計算した PBO,測定日での退職(選択)一時金要支給額)
とすることとなった。
At its October 13, 2004 Board meeting, the Board directed the staff to consider
the appropriate pension obligation measurement model for all defined benefit
plans that provide plan participants with a lump sum benefit feature at the date
of separation from employment.
This project will not reconsider other fundamental aspects of pension
accounting under Statement 87.
日本企業の債務は増加すると考えられる。
Decisions Reached at the Last Meeting
At its October 13, 2004 Board meeting, the Board provided the staff with
direction on how it should proceed with this project in light of the concerns
raised by constituents (via unsolicited comment letters and in small group
meetings with Board members) on the Board’s tentative decisions reached to
date.
The Board directed the staff to develop an amendment of Statement 87 for all
defined benefit plans with lump sum features (that is, plans that allow
employees to receive an immediate walk away amount upon separation of
employment) so that the pension obligation recorded would be the greater of
the undiscounted walk away amount that employees would be entitled to if they
separated employment at the measurement date or the actuarial present value
of the pension obligation at the measurement date.
2005 年第1四半期に FAS87 と 35 の改訂内容を討議する予定
*Immediate Plans
The staff provided the Board with an analysis of the comment letters received
by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) on
its Draft Interpretation D9, Employee Benefit Plans with a Promised Return on
Contributions or Notional Contributions.
The staff plans to meet with the Board in the first quarter of 2005 to discuss the
amendments of Statements 87 and 35 for all defined benefit plans that provide
13
plan participants with a lump sum feature at the date of separation from
employment.
Summary of Tentative Decisions
The tentative decisions made to date were deliberated in the context of cash
balance pension plans and these tentative decisions now may not be relevant
to the project because of the Board’s recent decision (October 13, 2004) on the
objective of the project. The staff has not yet considered the implications of the
Board’s recent decision to change the direction of the project and has continued
to include the tentative decisions in this project update so as to provide
constituents with a comprehensive history of the project.
Definition of Cash Balance Pension Plan (February 11, 2004)
A cash balance pension plan is a defined benefit pension plan (as defined
in the Glossary of Statement 87) that defines the promised employee
benefit by reference to a notional account balance. An employee’s notional
account balance is increased with periodic notional principal credits and
notional fixed and/or variable interest or investment credits, and may be
increased for other notional ad hoc credits. Upon separation of employment,
for any reason, by a fully vested employee, the employee is entitled to the
notional account balance as either a lump sum or an actuarially equivalent
annuity either immediately or at a future date. Subject to the terms of the
plan or regulatory requirements, an employee may be entitled to a
settlement amount greater than the notional account balance due to the
crediting of future interest (or investment) credits that are not conditioned
upon future service.
Measurement Guidance—"Hybrid Approach" (March 3, 2004 and March 31,
2004)
•
For cash balance pension plans with a fixed interest crediting rate, the obligation
would be measured by projecting forward the plan participants’ notional account
balances (notional account balance) at the fixed crediting rate as stipulated in the plan’s
provisions and discounting the resulting amount using a discount rate determined in
accordance with paragraph 44 of Statement 87.
•
For cash balance pension plans with a market or market-related (variable) interest
crediting rate, the obligation would be measured by reference to the notional account
balance. Entities are not to project and discount the notional account balance.
14
Scope, Effective Date and Transition, and Implementation (May 12, 2004)
The Board decided to expand the scope of the project to amend FASB
Statement No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans,
to apply the Board’s March 3, 2004 decision—that the obligation for cash
balance pension plans with a market or market-related (variable) interest
crediting rate should be measured by reference to the notional account
balance—to the measurement of accumulated plan benefits under Statement
35. The Board also asked the staff to research the implications of further
expanding the scope of the project to amend the guidance on the selection of
discount rates in Statement 35 to make that guidance consistent with the
discount rate guidance in Statement 87. The Board deferred discussion of the
transition and effective date of the amendment to Statement 35 until a decision
is reached regarding the discount rate issue.
With respect to the implementation issues that the Board was asked to consider,
the Board decided the following:
•
Service cost should be determined by the pay/principal credits allocated to
employees’ notional account balances. Similarly, interest cost should be determined by
the interest credits allocated to employees’ notional account balances.
•
The interest cost component of net periodic pension cost should be based on the
actual interest credited to plan participants’ notional account balances for the period.
•
For plans that contain a cash balance formula with a variable interest crediting rate,
the assumed discount rate that should be disclosed is the discount rate used to measure
the portion of the projected benefit obligation (PBO) that is not attributable to the variable
cash balance formula. The PBO amount measured at that rate also should be disclosed.
•
For mixed formula plans in which a cash balance pension plan formula has been
integrated into traditional defined benefit pension plans (or vice versa) and an employee
is entitled to the greater benefit of the two formulas, the PBO should be based on the
formula that results in the greater of the two PBOs to the participant at the plan’s
measurement date.
The Board discussed the transition guidance for a particular fact pattern in
which an entity has an unfunded accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) before
the application of the Interpretation and, upon application of the Interpretation,
the unfunded ABO increases but the PBO decreases. In such instances, the
Board decided that the following transition guidance should be applied:
15
•
The increase in the unfunded ABO should be recognized in the income statement
in a manner similar to the cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle.
•
The decrease in the PBO would reduce unrecognized losses and prior service cost
(the items giving rise to the unfunded ABO).
Board Meeting/Public Meeting Dates
The Board meeting minutes are provided for the information and convenience
of constituents who want to follow the Board’s deliberations. All of the
conclusions reported are tentative and may be changed at future Board
meetings. Decisions become final only after a formal written ballot to issue a
final Statement or Interpretation.
The following are links to the minutes for each meeting. Minutes for meetings
generally are posted within two weeks following the meeting.
October 13, 2004
Board Meeting—Project direction
May 12, 2004
Board Meeting—Scope, effective date and transition, and
implementation issues
March 31, 2004
Board Meeting—Measurement issues, disclosures, effective
date and transition
March 3, 2004
Board Meeting—Measuring a cash balance pension plan
obligation
February 11, 2004
Board Meeting—Discussion of a revised proposed working
definition of cash balance pension plan
January 21, 2004
Board Meeting—Discussion of a cash balance pension plan
characteristics and a proposed working definition of a cash
balance pension plan
September 24, 2003
Board Meeting—Decision to add project to Board agenda
Related FASB Articles
None.
History and Background
The Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) discussed EITF Issue No. 03-4,
"Determining the Classification and Benefit Attribution Method for a ‘Cash
Balance’ Pension Plan," at the March 20, 2003 and May 15, 2003 EITF
meetings. In the course of preparing the discussion materials for Task Force
consideration of Issue 03-4, the staff became aware of pension plans that
provide annual interest credits that are variable, based on a market rate. The
16
staff decided to narrow the scope of Issue 03-4 to address only plans with fixed
interest crediting rates because plans with variable interest crediting rates
present unique measurement issues that were considered to be beyond the
scope of the specific EITF issue. In subsequent research and discussions, the
staff learned of the pervasiveness of plans with variable interest crediting rates,
and the wide variety of interest crediting formulas, none of which are addressed
specifically in Statement 87. Therefore, the staff recommended that the Board
add an interpretive project to its agenda to address the measurement of costs
and obligations under those types of arrangements. At the September 24, 2003
meeting, the Board decided to add that project to its application and
implementation agenda.
Contact Information
Gerard O’Callaghan
Practice Fellow
[email protected]
17
以下は、モーリス卿による中間評価報告書の抜粋
Morris Review of
the Actuarial Profession
Interim Assessment
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
1. The Government asked Sir Derek Morris to conduct a wide-ranging review of the UK
actuarial profession in response to Lord Penrose’s Inquiry into the Equitable Life. Lord
Penrose made a number of criticisms of the UK actuarial profession including: a lack of
comprehensive actuarial standards; an over-reliance on the Appointed Actuary; a lack of
scrutiny and audit of actuarial calculations; a reluctance to challenge fellow actuaries; a
reactive disciplinary procedure and concerns about the Government Actuary’s Department’s
role in advising on the prudential supervision of the Equitable Life.
2. Under its terms of reference the review has investigated three broad aspects of the
actuarial profession in the UK: the market for actuarial services, the overall regulatory
framework, and the future role of the Government Actuary and the Government Actuary’s
Department. The review team consulted widely with a broad range of users of actuarial
services, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, members of the actuarial profession, actuarial
consulting firms, clients of the Government Actuary’s Department and both consumer and
trade bodies.
3. The review received over one hundred written responses and held many consultation
meetings in the UK and abroad. This interim assessment report represents work-in-progress.
It sets out the feedback that the review has received during the initial consultation phase and
identifies what the review sees as the key issues and possible policy options for change going
forward. The review is interested to hear the views of interested parties on the issues and
policy options set out in this interim report by 4 February 2004. The review will submit its final
report, with final recommendations, to the Government in spring 2005.
18
Over view
4. Before considering the three main aspects noted above the review gives a brief overall
perspective of the actuarial profession in the UK, and the context in which it operates. The
defining feature of virtually all actuarial work is that it seeks to characterise, measure and
analyse an uncertain future. Within this the core activity that actuaries are trained to provide
is the assessment of long-term liabilities. The review has no reason to doubt that the
overwhelming majority of actuaries in the UK are dedicated, skilled professionals providing
important and useful advice to the best of their abilities, with commitment, integrity and a
strong sense of duty. However, the review also identifies a number of quite serious problems
faced by the profession in the UK.
5. The first concern is that the profession has been too insular, with insufficient contact
with other professions and too narrow a professional training, and has been slow to adopt
new approaches and techniques. This has resulted in useful inputs from the disciplines of
economics, statistics and demography, to name only a few, having less impact than they should.
6. Second, too much has been expected of actuaries and, explicitly or otherwise, too
much has been promised by them. The future is inherently uncertain and a proper
understanding of future risks, as analysed in actuarial work, can help people to cope with that
uncertainty. However, it has repeatedly emerged that most of those involved have tended to
avoid or resist clear presentation of the unavoidable risks and uncertainties that accompany
most long-term projections in the fields of life and general insurance and pensions. Instead,
clients have looked to actuaries to provide certainty, and actuaries have often appeared to
provide it.
7. Third, is an often repeated concern, that there is insufficient transparency in actuarial
advice. For quite some time, if less so recently, many have regarded actuarial advice as having
the characteristics of ‘black box’ analysis with the methodology and calculations lying behind
the outputs and even the input assumptions being quite opaque. The Profession is aware of
this problem and is seeking to deal with the issue; but it remains a significant contextual
factor in much of the review’s analysis.
8. A fourth factor, is the delineation of the work undertaken by actuaries as opposed to
that undertaken by other professions. Certain roles are reserved exclusively for actuaries, to
ensure that the specialised task of valuing long-term liabilities is carried out by appropriately
qualified people – whether this continues to be appropriate and if so to what extent and over
what range of activities is one of the issues considered by this review. However, much of what
actuaries do overlaps, sometimes extensively, with the work of financial analysts, economists,
statisticians, demographers and others. This is particularly true for the three-quarters of
actuaries who do not hold reserved roles. The review acknowledges the critical role of
19
actuaries’ skills in assessing long-term liabilities but questions whether actuaries are
necessarily best-placed to advise on asset allocation or fund manager selection. The review
provides an opportunity to reflect on whether users have become over-reliant on actuaries for
services beyond long-term liability analysis.
9. The fifth and final observation is to note that this review takes place against the
background of widespread concern that the population’s long term savings are substantially
below the level required to meet their needs. A number of contributing factors are identified
in the review. However, actuaries have been actively involved in the pensions and insurance
industry for many years and this review needs to take a view on the role of the actuarial
profession in the emergence of such problems.
10. Actuaries have been criticised in this context on three main grounds. These are: first,
failing to allow adequately for the persistently downward path of inflation and interest rates
in the 1990’s; second, failing to allow adequately for the subsequent precipitate fall in the
stock market; and third, more generally, for not questioning sufficiently the prevailing
orthodoxy at the time that high equity returns could be expected to provide healthy long-term
returns but with a degree of confidence only appropriate to bond investments. These
criticisms may be thought all the more telling in that actuaries were relied upon as being
particularly well qualified to assess such matters.
11. Against this, actuarial expertise must not be confused with an ability to forecast the
future. Moreover, an actuary who, in the early 1990’s, persisted with forecasts of inflation and
interest rates that in the event turned out to be correct would at that time have lost a
substantial amount of credibility. But actuarial work emphasising such outcomes as (rather
remote) possibilities would have been unlikely to have much impact.
12. A more sustainable view, however, is that actuaries, as the relevant experts, were too
slow to adjust to the changing circumstances; were, with some exceptions, too inflexible to
consider or reflect sufficiently on the likelihood or the consequences of large adverse
movements; and thereby provided, explicitly or implicitly, considerably more assurance to
customers and consumers than was warranted.
13. Against this background, the central question for the review, and indeed for the
Profession, is how it can ensure efficient delivery of best-practice actuarial services to users.
This relates, first, to how actuaries are trained; what standards are set and how they are
enforced; and to what scrutiny they are subject. Second, to whom are they accountable; how
does this incorporate public interest considerations; and how does an appropriate regulatory
regime secure this. Third, how is actuarial advice made available so that, through market or
other mechanisms, users are able to identify, select and evaluate the best advice.
14. This review takes place against a backdrop of considerable turbulence and change.
20
The FSA have taken over various regulatory functions and introduced significant changes.
The actuarial profession, mindful of the concerns that have been raised, are pushing through
a number of proposed reforms related to standards, training and discipline. Meanwhile
attempts are in train to achieve a degree of international convergence of actuarial standards.
The review has had to take all these into account.
Competition
15. The review has examined the extent of choice and competition available in the
market for actuarial services. The review has paid particular attention to the markets for
actuarial advice provided to pension funds, and to life and general insurance companies,
because these industries together employ 80 per cent of practising actuaries in the UK. The
review recognises that increasingly actuaries work in other industries such as healthcare and
banking.
16. The review concludes that over the last decade there has been significant entry by
small and medium sized independent firms to the actuarial services market as well as entry
by the big four accountancy firms. As a result most users of actuarial services face a
reasonable degree of choice of provider. There is however, a degree of market concentration
in advice to the largest pension funds. This market is also characterised by high levels of fullservice
appointments – the joint supply or ‘bundling’ of services. The review did not receive
any evidence or suggestion of explicit product tying or cross-subsidisation. However, the
review is concerned about the extent to which full-service appointments may restrict
competition from other non-actuarial professionals such as fund managers who may wish to
compete for some of the services, in particular advice on asset allocation. It may also restrict
switching by users of actuarial services.
17. The market for actuarial advice is characterised by relatively low levels of market
testing and actual switching of provider. Less than 10 per cent of contracts are re-tendered in
any given year, and a similar percentage are subject to renegotiation. The review identified a
number of barriers to switching including the difficulty for users in assessing the quality of
actuarial advice; the importance of scheme-specific knowledge; the provision of bundled
services and the costs of market testing.
18. The review concludes that given the complex and technical nature of most actuarial
advice there often is a significant ‘understanding gap’ between users of actuarial services and
their advisers. A significant proportion of users of actuarial advice acknowledged that they
did not scrutinise or arrange for review of the actuarial advice that they received – often
relying instead on the trust that they placed in their actuarial adviser.
19. The review notes that a number of the above issues were also identified by Paul
Myners in his review of Institutional Investment in the UK and are addressed by the Myners
21
principles – a set of principles of best investment practice for the trustees of occupational
pension schemes. This review proposes a number of policy options in Chapter 2 to:
• encourage greater market testing of actuarial advice by users of these services;
• discourage the use of full-service appointments to pension funds;
• improve the way actuaries communicate with users in order to narrow the
‘understanding gap’ between actuarial advisers and their users;
• increase the level of user knowledge and understanding of actuarial matters;
and
• introduce greater scrutiny and challenge of actuarial advice.
Regulation
20. The regulatory framework for actuaries has four main aspects. The setting of
appropriate education and continuing professional development requirements for members
of the profession; the setting of high-quality professional and ethical standards to protect the
public interest; the monitoring of members’ compliance with these professional standards
and the administration of disciplinary procedures in the event of misconduct.
21. The review has identified a number of weaknesses in the current framework of
self-regulation by the actuarial profession including:
• inadequate protection of the public interest – for example in relation to
Equitable Life and pension scheme under-funding;
• professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited in
range; and perceived as influenced by commercial interests;
• an absence of pro-active monitoring of members’ compliance with
professional standards; and
• a profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking enough and
slow to modernise.
22. Going forward the review sets out three models of regulation:
• continued self-regulation by the Profession;
• independent oversight – Profession’s self-regulation overseen by an
independent body; and
• full statutory regulation.
23. The review’s current assessment is that the self-regulatory approach has not
adequately protected the public interest. A number of concerns have been expressed about
self-regulation by the Profession including, in particular, the weaknesses in actuarial
standards noted above; inadequate protection of the interests of consumers and scheme
members and the perception that commercial interests may, in some cases, have superseded
the interests of the wider public. The review’s view is that there are potential conflicts of
22
interest in the Profession both representing its members’ needs, and simultaneously
regulating them for the benefit of members and the wider public interest.
24. Similar issues have been considered in other professions. In the medical profession
the General Medical Council now sets medical and ethical standards of practice for doctors
and regulates doctors who practice in the UK. The British Medical Association and the Royal
Colleges, on the other hand, represent the professional interests of doctors. The issue of
separating the regulatory role of the medical profession from the representative role has
therefore already been addressed. However, the review notes that recent criticisms have been
made of the GMC’s self-regulatory role by Dame Janet Smith, the Chair of the Shipman
Inquiry. The Government has asked Sir David Clementi to review the regulatory framework
for the legal profession and his review is considering options which include moving away
from self-regulation. The review considers that, in the light of the concerns expressed about
self-regulation of the actuarial profession, there is a need to reconsider the self-regulatory
framework for actuaries.
25. At the other extreme, an alternative model to self-regulation is full statutory
regulation in the sense of an independent statutory regulator dedicated to the regulation of
the actuarial profession. Such an ‘Actuarial Services Authority’ appears to be a
disproportionate and costly response for a small profession of only 4,500 fully-qualified
practising members. Alternatively, the existing statutory regulators – the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) and the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (Opra) that currently
regulate insurance firms and pension funds, which a large number of actuaries advise, could
take on the role of regulating individual actuaries. However, these statutory regulators have
other competing priorities; and this approach may well lose the valuable input of actuaries in
the professional standard-setting process.
26. The review’s current thinking is that independent oversight of the Profession’s
self-regulation may be the best way to combine professional actuarial input into the
regulatory framework with sufficient independence from the Profession to provide the
necessary protection and assurance for the public. This is the regulatory model adopted for
the accountancy profession under the oversight of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC).
The FRC itself may be an appropriate independent body to provide oversight of the
Profession’s regulatory functions. These issues are considered in more detail in Chapter 3.
27. Against this overall framework, the review has considered in particular, five aspects of
the regulatory framework including; reserved roles, public interest and accountability;
education and continuing professional development (CPD); standard-setting, and scrutiny
and discipline.
23
Reserved roles
28. The review has considered the pros and cons of reserving particular roles explicitly to
actuaries. The main advantages of reserving roles are that the statutory regulators can expect
professional standards and codes of conduct to be adhered to and can place specific whistleblowing
and public interest duties on these role holders. The main disadvantage is that it can
create a professional monopoly and restrict competition or challenge from other
professionals. Lord Penrose was critical of the Appointed Actuary regime in his Inquiry into
the Equitable Life. The FSA is discontinuing this regime at the end of 2004.
29. The review’s view is that it is essential to overall financial stability that assessments of
long-term liabilities of insurers or pension funds are done, and done well. Currently, it is
widely recognised that, as a group, only actuaries have the required skills to perform these
functions. Therefore, the review concludes that at least in the short-term there is a need to
continue to reserve specific roles to actuaries in the life and pensions areas. This ensures that
technical and professional standards continue to be met. However there are also potential
adverse implications for competition which may need to be addressed in the future. In the
longer term therefore, the statutory regulators may wish to revisit the issue, and consider
opening up these roles to other suitably qualified professionals. See Chapter 4.
Public interest and accountability
30. The review believes that actuaries’ role in advising pension schemes and insurers are
central to overall financial stability. A number of commentators observed that actuaries face
multiple and often conflicting responsibilities: actuaries have duties to their employer or
client, duties to the statutory regulators if holding reserved roles and duties to the Profession
for adherence to professional standards of conduct. There is much confusion over to whom
actuaries are accountable. The review concludes that there is a real need to provide clarity
over to whom actuaries are accountable and for what; to have a clear hierarchy of
accountabilities; clear guidance on when the actuary must whistle-blow and act in the public
interest; and clear protections and incentives for whistle-blowing. See Chapter 5.
24
教育と継続教育
31.英国のアクチュアリーの教育と継続教育に関して、レビューではいくつかの問題を指摘した。
かつて、教育シラバスではアクチュアリアルな思考、および非アクチユアリアルな思考の形成を完
全には考慮に入れておらず、あるいはコミュニケーション・スキルやもっと一般的なビジネス認識
スキルに充分注目することもなかった。
試験プロセスにも不備があった。
資格取得に長時間を要した。
アクチュアリー専門職者は、主に業務に基づく片手間の教育モデルを採用してきたが、これがこの
孤立した専門職が主に年金・生命保険・損害保険の伝統的な分野だけを指向する一因となった可能
性がある。
これまでは、大学ではアクチュアリー教育は比較的少なかった。大学で教育をすることについての
メリットには、アクチュアリーが伝統的ではない分野でも活躍できるようになることや、企業から
の資金支援を受けずに独立の立場で行うアクチュアリー研究により重点が置かれることのメリッ
トがあろう。
継続教育の内容の品質にはばらつきがあり、継続教育への適合監視も不十分だった。
アクチュアリー会は最近、その教育シラバスと継続教育要件の両方を変更している。これらの変更
を考慮し、今回のレビューでは第6章に、これらの問題に対する対策を目指す複数の選択肢を提示
した。
Education/CPD
31. In relation to the education and continuing professional development (CPD) of
actuaries in the UK, the review has identified a number of issues:
• in the past the educational syllabus failed to take full account of developments
in actuarial and non-actuarial thinking, or to give sufficient attention to
communication and more general business awareness skills;
• there have been failures in the examination process;
• the time taken to qualify has been lengthy;
• the profession has adopted a predominantly work-based part-time education
model that may contribute to an insular profession predominantly orientated
towards the traditional areas of pensions, life and general insurance;
• there has been relatively little provision of actuarial education through the
university system. Benefits which this might bring include: enabling actuaries
to work in non-traditional areas, and a greater emphasis on independent
actuarial research that has not been commercially sponsored;
• CPD content has been of variable quality and compliance with CPD has been
25
inadequately monitored.
The Profession has recently introduced changes, to both its education syllabus and its CPD
requirements. In the light of these changes, the review presents a number of options aimed at
addressing these issues in Chapter 6.
Standard-setting
32. The review is critical of the actuarial profession’s current approach to standardsetting.
A number of failures have been identified in this regard including:
• weak and ambiguous professional standards;
• a failure to resolve contentious issues;
• inconsistent approaches across practice areas; and
• perceived conflicts of interest in the process of standard-setting.
33. The review regards the setting of high-quality and continuously developing actuarial
standards as one of the most important issues facing the actuarial profession today. The
review concludes that the Profession’s Practice Boards’ approach to standard-setting in the
past has failed to ensure a coherent, consistent and comprehensive set of standards which
can then be relied on by users of actuarial services as a guarantee of best practice advice. Nor
has the Profession ensured that standards are met. The review’s current thinking is that the
Profession should, as it is now proposing, establish an independent Actuarial Standards
Board that would set, revise and regularly up-date professional actuarial standards. Its
independence would stem from its appointment, oversight and accountability, which all
need to be clearly independent of the Profession. This independence could be achieved by
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) providing oversight of the Actuarial Standards Board in
a similar way to the FRC’s current responsibility for oversight of the Accounting Standards
Board and the Auditing Practices Board. See Chapter 7.
Scrutiny and discipline
34. The review has also identified a lack of adequate scrutiny and challenge of actuarial
advice. This arises as a result of the complexity of the work of actuaries; the insular nature of
the profession; the existence of reserved roles; and professional norms that discouraged
criticism of one actuary by another. There are a number of ways to improve scrutiny of
actuarial advice: through better informed consumers; greater choice and market testing;
enhanced supervision by regulators and either ex-ante or ex-post scrutiny. This might be
done through audit of actuarial activity and/or by internal or external peer review.
35. The review believes that given the understanding gap that exists between users of
actuarial advice and their advisers it is essential to introduce formal scrutiny either through
audit or peer review. The review puts forward a number of alternative options for introducing
greater scrutiny of actuarial advice. See Chapter 8.
26
Government Actuary ’s Department (GAD)
36. The review asked a number of questions about the quality of service GAD provides,
and the rationale and continuing need for a separate department. GAD provides different
services to its clients and the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction expressed by clients varied
according to the service used. These services include:
• advice to public service pension schemes;
• broad comparability of pension schemes and advice on pensions aspects of
Public Private Partnerships (PPP)/Private Finance Initiatives (PFI);
• social security;
• general pensions policy advice;
• population projections and associated demographics;
• occupational pension scheme survey; and
• advice to overseas clients.
37. GAD is required in statute to provide advice to the majority of major public sector
pension schemes, including the large public sector schemes such as the NHS and the
teachers’ pension schemes. Most clients believed that GAD offered value-for-money,
consistency of approach, historical knowledge and understanding of the ways of government.
However, the review notes that where there was no statutory obligation to use GAD – as was
the case for the Principal Civil Service Scheme – private sector actuarial firms have been used
with success. The review is considering removing the statutory requirement that GAD advise
these public sector pension schemes, so that the administrators of the public sector pension
schemes have a choice of provider.
38. The Government requires the use of GAD’s services for assessments of broad
comparability of pension schemes when public sector staff are transferred from the public
sector to the private sector. There was some dissatisfaction with the service that GAD provides
but also a suggestion that an independent sign-off for certificates of broad comparability was
important to retain credibility in the system. The review recognises the need for independent
sign-off of these statements of comparability and will take this into account when
considering alternative options for provision of this service.
39. The Government Actuary provides advice to parliament on National Insurance
contribution levels and benefits. Clients felt that the Government Actuary offered credibility
and independence from government in providing this advice, which was important to retain
public confidence in the system. However, the review notes that one key government
department has already embedded part of the benefit forecasting work; some respondents
suggested that this work does not have to be done by an actuary; and others were critical of
the Government Actuary’s calculation of rebates – although GAD disputes these views. The
27
review recognises the need for independent sign-off of the National Insurance Fund advice
which could be given by the Government Actuary but believes that government departments
embedding some of the routine work is also an option.
40. Clients were satisfied with GAD’s ad-hoc pensions policy advice. Recent demand for
actuarial input has seen GAD actuaries located in-house within the relevant government
department. The review notes the use of the private sector on pension areas where GAD may
not have all the expertise. The review considers this to be a matter for the relevant
government departments.
41. GAD produces long-term population projections for the UK and conducts a survey on
occupational pension schemes. On the production of population projections and associated
demographic data, the consultation feedback highlighted the potential for inefficiency and
delay as the data is transferred from the Registrars-General to GAD. In the review’s view there
is unnecessary fragmentation of demographic expertise and potential efficiency and quality
gains from relocation of the work. The review is considering the potential benefits of
relocating this work to the ONS. In relation to the pension scheme survey the review is
considering options to relocate this work to the ONS or to The Pensions Regulator who will
have greater powers of data collection.
42. GAD’s work overseas is largely won on the basis of competitive tender. Some concerns
were expressed that the work that GAD conducts overseas in the area of insurance regulation,
is a function which they no longer undertake in the UK. Others questioned whether there was
a UK benefit to GAD’s overseas work. However, the majority of GAD’s overseas clients were
highly satisfied with the work. The review is not currently proposing any changes in this area.
43. On the basis of the feedback received, the review is considering de-regulating the
functions which the Government Actuary or the department are currently statutorily obliged
to provide, to enable users of these services to have a choice of actuarial service provider. For
certain functions in reporting to Parliament on the National Insurance Fund and issuing
statements of broad comparability, where there is a need to preserve public confidence in the
system, the review considers the need to retain independent sign-off to be important and will
take this into account in considering the way forward. The review will also look at the possible
benefits of transferring demographic data collection to the Office for National Statistics and
the occupational pension scheme survey to The Pensions Regulator.
44. The review currently believes that there is a continued role for the Government
Actuary in that there is a need for independent actuarial advice to the government on the
National Insurance Fund and on statements of broad comparability for public service
pensions. However, the review may explore alternative mechanisms that have been proposed
which ensure independence. See Chapter 9.
28
SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
CHAPTER 2: THE MARKET FOR ACTUARIAL SERVICES
Increasing competition
Options
• Option 1: to the extent that the availability of professional indemnity insurance cover is acting or
may in the future act to constrain entry and limit choice, ways could be explored of introducing
liability caps; and/or
• Option 2: in the pensions area, unbundling the provision of advice related to statutory roles from
other types of advice (particularly investment consulting services) would help open up the market
to greater competition.
Increasing market testing
a) greater scrutiny of performance
Options
• Option 1: increased education/expertise of users; and/or
• Option 2: regular formal reviews of advisers could be recommended or required every 3-5 years;
and/or
• Option 3: performance measurement of actuaries could be encouraged; and/or
• Option 4: effective peer review of actuarial advice could provide actuaries with a set of incentives
that encourages them to improve the clarity of advice they provide, both technical and in relation
to underlying assumptions.
b) improving user understanding
Options
• Option 1: user knowledge and understanding should be encouraged by measures to raise the
required standards of knowledge and expertise, of which several initiatives are already in train;
and/or
• Option 2: in relation to pensions, trustees could be given information on the Profession’s own
guidance notes, to better understand what actuaries are supposed to do. This could be used as a
basis for encouraging more systematic challenge; and/or
• Option 3: greater use of professional trustees or trustees who are members of several trustee
boards.
29
Improving clarity of advice
Options
• Option 1: leave it to the market, on the basis that if users can be encouraged to challenge more
effectively, actuaries will stand or fall by their ability to respond positively; or
• Option 2: improve actuarial training and CPD requirements to equip actuaries with improved
communication skills; and/or
• Option 3: require clearer disclosure of actuarial advice, assumptions and key sensitivities. For
example by requiring the disclosure of forward-looking financial condition reports; and/or
• Option 4: explore means by which regulatory requirements might be simplified.
CHAPTER 4: ACTUARIAL ROLES
Reserved role in general insurance
Options
• Option 1: continue with the status quo – no reserved role; or
• Option 2: no reserved role, but require certification of the reserves by an approved person with
appropriate skills, who may or may not be an actuary; or
• Option 3: a full role reserved to actuaries, with associated public interest duties and whistleblowing
requirements; and/or
• Option 4: a requirement that the auditor take appropriate actuarial advice when auditing general
insurers (a role akin to the Reviewing Actuary role for life insurers).
CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC INTEREST AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Reporting and whistle-blowing
Options
• Option 1: more comprehensive guidance from the Profession or from regulators on the
circumstances in which whistle-blowing is permitted and when it is required, covering all relevant
statutory, regulatory and professional provisions, matters which regulators are likely to regard as
significant, and the safeguards and sanctions available; and/or
• Option 2: ensuring that, on the one hand, legal protections for whistle-blowers are wide and give
appropriate room for individual judgment, based on good faith and what an actuary “reasonably
believes”; while nonetheless ensuring that, on the other hand, duties to whistle-blow are clear,
objective and enforceable, for example based on what an actuary has “reasonable cause to
believe”; and/or
• Option 3: bringing whistle-blowing requirements for auditors and all actuaries more closely into
30
line, and extending protections for whistle-blowers, e.g. supplementing the existing relief from
duties of confidentiality with statutory provisions conferring qualified privilege (ie when acting in
good faith) from actions in defamation.
Actuarial Function Holder
Options
• Option 1: status quo – Actuarial Function Holder role as currently specified by the FSA; or
• Option 2: greater protections for whistle-blowers.
With-Profits Actuary
Options
• Option 1: status quo – With-Profits Actuary role as currently specified by the FSA; or
• Option 2: the With-Profits Actuary should be external to the insurer; or
• Option 3: the With-Profits Actuary should be appointed by the With-Profits Committee, if one
exists, or otherwise the Audit Committee; and/or
• Option 4: the With-Profits Actuary makes a full report to the regulator. Policyholders receive a
copy of the With-Profits Actuary’s opinion and have access to the full report.
Reviewing Actuary
Options
• Option 1: status quo – Reviewing Actuary role as currently specified by FSA, with the Reviewing
Actuary reporting privately to the auditor; or
• Option 2: Reviewing Actuary role as currently specified by FSA, with additional duty to provide a
private management letter to the Board on the Actuarial Function Holder’s compliance with
professional guidance; and/or
• Option 3: Reviewing Actuary to have direct whistle-blowing duties.
31
Pensions
Options
• Option 1: status quo – Scheme Actuary advises both the scheme sponsor and trustees, unless the
actuary deems there to be a conflict, in which case the Scheme Actuary only advises the trustees;
or
現状維持 – スキームアクチュアリーは、アクチュアリーが利益相反ありと判断しない限り
は事業主と受託者の両方に助言する。利益相反ありと判断した場合は受託者のみに助言す
る。
• Option 2: Scheme Actuary advises both the scheme sponsor and trustees, unless the trustees
deem there to be a conflict, in which case the Scheme Actuary only advises the trustees; or
スキームアクチュアリーは、受託者が利益相反ありと判断しない限りは事業主と受託者の
両方に助言する。利益相反ありと判断した場合は受託者のみに助言する。
• Option 3: role of advising the scheme sponsor and the scheme trustees is separated in some
clearly defined circumstances e.g. during scheme wind-up; or
事業主への助言と受託者への助言の役割を分割しなければならない状況を明確に定める。
例えば、制度の清算中は分離する。
• Option 4: role of advising the scheme sponsor and the scheme trustees is separated at all times.
常に事業主への助言と受託者への助言の役割を分割する。
32
CHAPTER 6: EDUCATION AND CPD
教育と継続教育
The syllabus and governance
シラバスとガバナンス
Options
• Option 1: minor reform of the existing governance structure to promote greater academic and
non-actuarial input; or
より一層学術的および保険数理以外の情報のインプットを促進するための、現行のガバナ
ンス構造の小規模な改革を行う。
• Option 2: establish an independent body with oversight of the Profession’s syllabus development
along the lines of the accountancy profession’s Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy
(POBA).
会計士の会計士監督評議会(POBA)に似た、アクチュアリー団体のシラバス開発に対する監
督権限を持つ独立機関を設立する。
Examinations issues
試験の課題
Options
• Option 1: reform of the existing governance structure to improve quality control; and/or
現行のガバナンス構造を改革し、品質管理を強化する。
• Option 2: involvement of full-time and dedicated professional examiners; and/or
フルタイムの選任の専門試験官を置く。
• Option 3: involvement of an independent oversight body in exam setting and marking.
試験設定及び採点を行う独立の監督機関を設ける。
Broadening actuarial education provision
アクチュアリー教育対策の拡充
Options
• Option 1: wider provision and accreditation of degrees that grant exemptions from the
Profession’s exams; and/or
アクチュアリー試験の科目免除を認める条件や資格を拡大する。
• Option 2: promotion of post-graduate fast-track law-style conversion courses for those with
university degrees.
大学の学位保持者対象の、法曹界式の卒業後の迅速転換コースの設置
33
Continuing professional development (CPD)
継続教育
Options
• Option 1: the Profession should set out clear objectives for the CPD Scheme and clarify what
constitutes formal CPD. The Profession should ensure that CPD that qualifies as formal CPD is
meeting an objective of the CPD Scheme, and is not simply a tick-box exercise based on
attendance at meetings or conferences; and/or
アクチュアリー会は継続教育制度のための明確な目標を設定し、公式な継続教育の内容を
明確にするべきである。アクチュアリー会は公式な継続教育の要件を満たすものが、継続
教育制度の目的に適合し、単に会合や会議に出席したというだけではないことを確実にす
るべきである。
(注)
英国アクチュアリー会は継続教育とはアクチュアリー個人が行うものであり、会が
関与しないものであると考えてきた。公式な継続教育を年15時間・非公式な継続教育
を年52時間という要件は決めたが、個人毎の継続教育の内容は以下に掲げるような目
標に合うよう個人が考えるものであり、どのようなイベントが継続教育の目的に適合
しているかどうかをアクチュアリー会が認定する事は行っていない。
公式な継続教育は、専門的な会議(Meeting)、講座、その他のイベントへの参加
により実施され、公式な継続教育に計上できる会議として下記の例示がなされている。
英国アクチュアリー会の通常総会や分科会、アクチュアリアル・コンベンション、
講座、セミナー、特別会議
等
• Option 2: the Profession should consider increasing the amount and quality of formal CPD
required for reserved role holders, in recognition of the importance of these roles. For example,
the Profession, with regulator input, could develop tailored CPD opportunities ahead of key
changes in the regulatory environment for actuaries in reserved roles; and/or
アクチュアリー会は、指定職務保持者の役割の重要性を認識して、指定職務保持者に求め
られる公式な継続教育の量と質の引上げを検討すべきである。例えばアクチュアリー会は、
指定職務に就いているアクチュアリーの規制環境に関する重要な変更が実施される前に、
テーラーメイドの継続貴養育の機会を、当局からの情報に基づいて提供することもできる
であろう。
• Option 3: closer links could be fostered between those within the Profession with responsibility
for syllabus development, the actuarial research community and those focused on CPD to ensure
that the CPD Scheme is kept-up-to-date and reflects recent developments in other disciplines and
actuarial research; and/or
シラバス開発責任を負うアクチュアリー会と、保険数理研究機関と、継続教育を活動の焦
点にしている者との間の連携をより密にすることにより、継続教育制度が確実に最新状態
34
を維持し、他の分野や保険数理研究の最新情勢を反映した内容にすることができる。
• Option 4: greater input to the CPD Scheme could be given to research-oriented actuaries,
overseas actuaries and non-actuaries, for example through involvement in an oversight body,
constitutionally independent of the Profession containing a mix of actuaries and non-actuaries. This
could monitor the Profession’s performance in relation to CPD Scheme development to ensure
that the scheme is kept up-to-date, that links to other disciplines and actuarial research are made
and that CPD is available to all actuaries, not just to those working in traditional areas.
例えば、アクチュアリー会から根本的に独立しており、その構成員がアクチュアリーと非
アクチュアリーの両方を含む監督機関に関与させることにより、研究指向のアクチュアリ
ーや、海外のアクチュアリーや、アクチュアリーでない者が、継続教育制度へより多くの
インプットをすることができるようになる。こうすることにより、アクチュアリー会の継
続教育制度の実施に関連する活動や、継続教育制度が最新の制度内容を維持していること
や、他の分野や保険数理研究との関連を持たせていることや、伝統的な分野で仕事をして
いる者に限らず全てのアクチュアリーが継続教育を利用できることを、この機関は監視す
ることができる。
CPD monitoring
継続教育の監視
Options
• Option 1: the Profession implements its three-tiered professional revalidation proposal as
currently envisaged, which introduces technical CPD requirements and annual monitoring for
reserved role holders, technical CPD requirements and three-yearly monitoring for holders of the
new voluntary non-statutory practising certificates, and basic CPD requirements and 10-yearly
monitoring for the remainder of working actuaries; or
アクチュアリー会は現在予定している3段階構造の専門職再確認案を実施する。即ち、指定
職務保持者には技術的継続教育要件と毎年の監視を、任意の法定ではない実務証明書の新
規保有者には技術的継続教育要件と3年に1度の監視を、その他の実務に就いているアクチ
ュアリーには基本継続教育要件と10年に1度の監視を行う。
• Option 2: as Option 1 but non-statutory practising certificate regime is expanded to cover all
actuaries (except those performing statutory roles) so the technical CPD requirements and
three-yearly monitoring apply to all working actuaries; and/or
技術的継続教育要件と3年に1度の監視を、法定職務を行っている全アクチュアリーに適用
することを除き、オプション1と同じ。
• Option 3: the task of monitoring CPD requirements and monitoring of compliance with the CPD
scheme should be made part of the remit of the independent professional oversight body referred
to above.
35
継続教育要件の監視と継続教育制度への遵守監視業務を、前述の独立の専門監督機関への
付託事項の一部とすべきである。
CHAPTER 7: STANDARD-SETTING
Actuarial standard-setting
Options
• Option 1: Actuarial Standards Board (ActSB) which is quasi-independent of the Profession (as per
the Profession’s proposal); or
• Option 2: Actuarial Standards Board (ActSB) subject to oversight by a suitably independent body,
for example the Financial Reporting Council; or
• Option 3: the FSA sets standards in life and general insurance, and DWP/Opra sets standards
for pensions.
CHAPTER 8: SCRUTINY AND DISCIPLINE
Scrutiny of actuaries in life insurance
Options
• Option 1: Reviewing Actuary as currently specified by the FSA, with no mandatory peer review as
proposed by the Profession; or
• Option 2: Reviewing Actuary as currently specified by the FSA, and peer review as proposed by
the Profession; or
• Option 3: Reviewing Actuary’s remit is expanded to include an explicit duty to report on
compliance with actuarial standards; or
• Option 4: Reviewing Actuary as currently specified by the FSA, with additional duty to provide a
peer review letter to the Actuarial Function Holder and/or the Board.
36
Scrutiny of actuaries in pensions
年金アクチュアリーに対する精査
Options
• Option 1: maintain the status quo of no formal scrutiny; or
正式な精査は行わないという現状を維持
• Option 2: include long-term liabilities within pension scheme financial statements, which are then
audited; and/or
年金制度の財務報告書に長期債務を含め、後で監査を受ける
• Option 3: introduce peer review of the Scheme Actuary as envisaged by the Profession; and/or
アクチュアリー会が想定するスキームアクチュアリーによる相互精査(ピアレビュー)を導
入する。
• Option 4: audit the Scheme Actuary’s triennial valuation.
スキームアクチュアリーによる3年毎の財政計算を監査する。
Scrutiny of actuaries in general insurance
Options (for the company market)
• Option 1: introduction of requirement for actuarial advice as part of audit; and/or
• Option 2: introduction of peer review.
Options (for Lloyd’s)
• Option 1: if the Statement of Actuarial Opinion is produced internally then it must be externally
peer reviewed; or
• Option 2: introduction of external peer review of the work of all Syndicate Actuaries; and/or
• Option 3: introduction of a requirement for actuarial advice as part of audit.
Discipline
Options
• Option 1: the disciplinary scheme remains accountable to the Faculty and Institute’s Councils; or
• Option 2: the disciplinary scheme is accountable to a suitable independent oversight body; and/or
• Option 3: encouragement of closer links between whistle-blowing to regulators and the
disciplinary scheme.
37
国際アクチュアリー会(IAA)組織図
各アクチュアリー会が会員
日本年金
数理人会
は正会員
年金・社会
保障セクシ
ョン
正会員を継続す
るためには、
2005 年 以 降 は
IAA シラバスを
カバーする必要
あり。
認定委員会
各アクチュアリー会の
正会員資格を認定
教育委員会
各アクチュアリー会の
教育レベルを評価
正会員要件 : 行動規範・懲罰規定・IAA 教育ガイドラインの満足
等
Fly UP