Maimonides and Aquinas

CHAPTER 12
Maimonides and Aquinas
Alexander Broadie
Comparison of Aquinas (1224/5–1274) with Maimonides (1135/8–1204) is for two
reasons, one historical and the other doctrinal, an obvious exercise to undertake. As
regards the first reason, through the centuries the two thinkers have been overwhelmingly
influential within their own faith communities, and are uniquely entitled to be regarded as
their spokesmen within the fields of both philosophy and theology. Furthermore both
faced bitter opposition within their communities; and the public incineration of part of
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah by Provençal Jews1 is comparable with the condemnations
in Paris and Oxford in the 1270s of propositions defended by Aquinas.2 As regards the
second reason, that concerning doctrine, it has often been noted that there are close
similarities between the teachings of the two, and that some of the similarities concern
matters at the heart of the belief systems of Jews and Christians. It is upon such central
matters that I shall focus here.
The question of the precise causal relation between Maimonides and Aquinas will not
be at issue here. Whether Aquinas adopted certain ideas because he found Maimonides’
arguments for them compelling, or whether a mode of expression used by Maimonides
attracted Aquinas’ attention and caused him to modify his position—these are interesting
historical questions which are extraordinarily difficult to answer, and no attempt will be
made here to answer them. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that whatever the
answers might be to these questions, there is greater significance in the sheer closeness of
the positions of the two men on key philosophical and theological matters, and it is to that
philosophical and theological closeness that we shall be attending in this chapter.
Nevertheless it is necessary to bear in mind that Aquinas was familiar with a Latin
version of the Guide of the Perplexed, and that he refers to it rather often, sometimes with
acknowledgment to “Rabbi Moyses” and to his book the Doctor Dubiorum. The Guide
was translated from Judeo-Arabic into Hebrew by Samuel ibn Tibbon in 1204, and not
long after that a less accurate translation into Hebrew was made by Judah al-CharƯzƯ. It
was al-CharƯzƯ’s translation that formed the basis of the Latin version, made in the 1220s,
which Aquinas read.3
In order to indicate the closeness of Maimonides and Aquinas I shall attend to four
topics that loom large in their writings; first, the question of the proper way to interpret
the “names of God,” that is, terms predicated in the Bible of God; second, the question of
whether the world is eternal or had a beginning in time; third, the objects of God’s
knowledge; and fourth, the problem of the apparent incompatibility of the claims that
human acts are free and that God foreknows all future human acts.
Despite the range and depth of the similarities, Aquinas is at certain points strongly
critical of Maimonides, indeed sees him as the person he has to oppose. A striking
example of such disagreement is to be found in the famous discussion in the Summa
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Theologiae on the names of God. It can however be demonstrated that the disagreement
is not as deep as Aquinas thinks it is. Both philosophers accept that certain terms
predicated affirmatively of God in the Bible do not in that context have their customary
signification but are being used metaphorically. All terms implying that God is corporeal
fall into this category. Are there however any terms which do have their customary
signification when predicated affirmatively of God in the Bible? We read that God is just,
merciful, wise, powerful, and so on. Are these predications to be taken literally?
Maimonides says not, on the grounds that to say otherwise would be to fall into the error
of denying the principle of God’s oneness. Understood literally, the terms signify
attributes. Hence to say that God is just, merciful, wise, and powerful would be to imply
that there are in God many attributes, which would imply that God is a many-in-one, and
therefore not one in the required sense.
Maimonides’ solution, that affirmative predications are to be understood negatively, is
an effective fence round the principle of God’s oneness, since to deny that God has a
given attribute is not to attribute anything to him. Hence if we accede to the demand to
deny, and never to affirm, things of God, we would not predicate things of him in such a
way as to imply that he has any attributes, and in that case we would not be ascribing to
God the complexity that is possessed by any substance in virtue of its having attributes.
Aquinas writes as follows: “Some have said that though all these terms are said
affirmatively of God, they are used to deny, rather than to affirm, things of him. Thus
they say that when we say that God is alive we signify that God does not exist in the way
that inanimate things do, and likewise with other such terms. Rabbi Moyses said this in
the book Doctor Dubiorum.”4 But this position does not satisfy Aquinas. Let us agree
with Maimonides in holding that God’s being alive is no more (or less) than God’s not
being inanimate. In that case, adds Aquinas, we could say that God is a body, for to say
that he is a body is to deny that he is mere potency like prime matter.
It can however be shown that Aquinas’ argument against Maimonides is itself open to
criticism. One criticism is this: If to predicate body affirmatively of something is no more
than to deny mere potency of it, then it could indeed be said that God is a body, for God
is not in mere potency. But to be a body is not simply not to be in mere potency. The pure
intelligences are not in mere potency and yet neither Maimonides nor Aquinas thought
that they were bodies. Hence the fact that God is not in mere potency does not, after all,
imply that he is a body.
A second criticism is based firmly upon a position that is presented several
times in the Guide. Maimonides writes:
One has ascribed to Him, may He be exalted, everything that in our
opinion is a perfection in order to indicate that He is perfect in every
manner of perfection and that no deficiency whatever mars Him. Thus
none of the things apprehended by the multitude as a deficiency or a
privation are predicated of Him… On the other hand, everything that the
multitude consider a perfection is predicated of Him, even if it is only a
perfection in relation to ourselves—for in relation to Him, may He be
exalted, all things that we consider perfections are the very extreme of
deficiency. However, if people imagined that this human perfection was
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226
lacking in Him, may He be exalted, this would constitute in their opinion,
a deficiency in Him.5
Thus the crucial point that Aquinas is missing is that on Maimonides’ agenda there is not
only philosophy but also pastoral care. Maimonides does indeed think that, literally
understood, “alive” and “wise” are no more truly predicable of God than “inanimate” and
“foolish” are—to attribute “wisdom” to God, understanding the term as we ordinarily
understand it, would be to attribute to God what would, in relation to God, be “the very
extreme of deficiency”. But Maimonides recognizes that if the ordinary people were told
that terms signifying what from their point of view are perfections were not truly
predicable of God, they would think him deficient and would cease to obey his
commandments. Since there is a special significance in such obedience, even when
grounded on ignorance about a fundamental truth about religious language, the Bible
predicates of God terms which ordinary people are bound to misinterpret. Better to be
wrong about theology than to disobey divine law.
Aquinas gives a second reason for rejecting Maimonides’ via negativa, namely: “It is
contrary to what people have in mind when they speak about God. For when they say that
God is alive what they mean is something other than that he is different from inanimate
bodies.”6 However, Maimonides has prepared the ground for a reply to this criticism by
distinguishing between the philosophically sophisticated and the multitude. He would
grant Aquinas’ premise that “It is contrary to what people have in mind,” but
Maimonides would deny that the multitude’s rejection of a sophisticated philosophical
doctrine is proof, even weak proof, that the doctrine is incorrect. If people misunderstand
a doctrine, then their rejection of it carries no implication concerning the doctrine’s
correctness. Indeed Aquinas’ criticism is a risky one for him to put forward since his own
account of the proper way to interpret terms when they are predicated affirmatively of
God may be no more kindly received by the multitude than Maimonides’ account would
be.
Aquinas’ account, that terms predicated of God and of creatures are to be understood
not negatively but analogically, is based upon the insight, accepted also by Maimonides,
that human language is an inadequate instrument for representing God. Maimonides
holds however that we cannot form a concept of God, and that therefore our language is a
totally inadequate instrument, whereas Aquinas holds that we can form a concept of God,
though one that represents him imperfectly, and hence we can use our language to speak
about him, but to do so imperfectly. We are bound to understand terms in a creaturely
way, which is of course an inappropriate way when they are predicated of God, but, as
Aquinas insists, the terms are truly predicated of God, even though our understanding of
them in that context is imperfect, and indeed the terms for the perfections are more
properly predicated of God than of ourselves. It is in virtue of our imperfect grasp of
those terms that Aquinas holds that they are applied analogically, not univocally, to God.
The contrast between Maimonides and Aquinas is not however as clear cut as at first
sight it seems to be. Both philosophers stress the concept of the absolute oneness of God,
and they describe this oneness in very similar terms. In particular God is not to be
conceived as a substance in which attributes inhere. Both hold that though we can, with
biblical warrant, say that God has many perfections, these perfections, as existing in God,
do not differ from each other nor differ from God. It is plain that both men believe it
Maimonides and Aquinas
227
more appropriate to say that God is, than that he has, goodness, and that he is, rather than
has, wisdom, and so on for all perfections. Futhermore, all those perfections are identical
in God and with God. Maimonides encapsulates these points in his doctrine of negative
predication and Aquinas encapsulates them in his doctrine of analogy. Most especially,
Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy must be read in the light of the introduction to his
discussion of divine simplicity.7 He writes: “Since we can know what God is not but not
what he is, we can consider in what way God does not exist but not in what way he
does.” On the basis of these related considerations, therefore, I should wish to defend the
thesis that conspicuous differences of formulation conceal an identity of substance. Later
I shall provide further support for the thesis.
It was of course impossible for Maimonides and Aquinas to discuss the creation of the
world without looking over their shoulders at Aristotle. The rabbi and the priest,
profoundly affected by the system of Aristotle, knew the strength of his doctrine that the
world is eternal a parte ante and a parte post. Yet they were also heirs to a tradition that
the world had a beginning in time. Athens appeared to be contradicting Jerusalem.
Maimonides showed how the contradiction should be dealt with, and Aquinas, accepting
his solution, took the matter further. The influence of Maimonides upon Aquinas in this
matter is generally recognized in respect both of Maimonides’ grand strategy and of his
detailed argumentation.
In the course of his discussion of the eternity of the world Maimonides affirms: “I
shall pay no attention to anyone who besides Aristotle has engaged in speculative
discourse, for it is his opinions that ought to be considered,”8 and indeed the discussion
focuses almost entirely on Aristotle’s conclusions and on his route to them. Consideration
of those arguments is of special importance, for of course if Aristotle has succeeded in
providing a scientific demonstration of the doctrine that the world is eternal, then that
demonstration has to be accepted. To reject a scientific demonstration is to abandon the
very standards of rationality in terms of which the debate is being conducted.
Maimonides’ tactic therefore is to argue that none of Aristotle’s arguments for the
eternity of the world is a scientific demonstration, and that they are, instead, probable
arguments only. Granted that we cannot rule out on scientific grounds the possibility that
the world is not eternal, a question can then be raised as to whether there are arguments
supporting the doctrine that the world had a beginning in time. Maimonides finds
probable, though not demonstrative, arguments for the doctrine and concludes that it is
reasonable to turn to the Torah for guidance. And the Torah teaches that the world did
have a beginning in time.
A distinction, equally crucial for Maimonides and Aquinas, has to be drawn here
between the world coming into being ex nihilo and its having a beginning in time. We
learn from the Torah that the world is a product of the divine will. The world thus has the
metaphysical status of absolute dependency; it is absolutely dependent upon God’s will
for its existence. For Maimonides, as also later for Aquinas, it is this status of absolute
dependency for its existence upon something other than the world itself that is expressed
by the phrase “ex nihilo”. Thus, that the world was created ex nihilo implies not that it
had a beginning in time but that its existence is absolutely dependent upon the divine
will, whether it had a beginning in time or not. Hence proof that the world was eternal
would not by itself undermine the claim that the world was created ex nihilo.
Maimonides, like Aquinas, believes that he has demonstrated that the world is created ex
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228
nihilo. What he accepts on faith is that it had a beginning in time. This, then, is
Maimonides’ strategic response to Aristotle, and Aquinas’ response to Aristotle is
identical.
But what are the arguments for the eternity of the world? One that
Maimonides offers as due to Aristotle’s “later followers” is this: If we say
that the world was produced in time, then before it was produced the fact
that it was going to be produced could not have been necessary (for
otherwise it would never not have existed) nor have been impossible (for
otherwise it would never have existed), and therefore its future existence
was merely possible. But every possibility has a substratum; that is, to say
that there is a possibility is to say that there is something which has the
possibility. Hence, to say that the world was produced in time presupposes
that something existed prior to the world’s production, which is
tantamount to saying that the world existed before it was produced.
Therefore, it was not produced in time.9 This argument is reproduced by
Aquinas as the first of his arguments for the thesis that the world never
began but always existed. He writes:
Regarding whatever has begun to exist, before it existed its existence was
possible, otherwise it was impossible that it would exist. If therefore the
world began to exist, then before it began its existence was possible. Now
that which is able to exist is matter, which is in potency to existence
which comes through a form, and to non-existence which is through the
absence of form. If therefore the world began to exist, then matter existed
prior to the world. But matter cannot exist without form, and the world’s
matter plus form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began
to exist, which is impossible.10
Against this Aquinas sets out his own position, that God’s will is the cause of things, and
that since there was no need for God to will anything but himself, there was no need for
God to will an everlasting world. Rather, Aquinas adds: “The world exists just as long as
God wills that it exist, since the existence of the world depends on his will as its cause.
Therefore it is not necessary that the world always exist, and hence that it is necessary
cannot be demonstrated.”11
This leaves Aquinas having to deal with the objection based on the insight that before
the world existed it must have been possible that it would exist. But Aquinas is not
impressed with the insight, for it ignores the fact that there is more than one way of being
possible. His response, very Maimonidean, is that to say that before the world existed its
existence was possible is to refer not to the passive power of matter, its power to receive
form, but to the active power of God, that is, the power of his will. And taking “possible”
in this way, the objection under discussion does not work. Aquinas proceeds immediately
to a discussion of the question: utrum mundum incoepisse sit articulus fidei—whether it
is an article of faith that the world began,12 and his reply is based on the consideration
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229
just stressed, that the existence of the world is due to an act of divine will. Since we
cannot on the basis of a reading of nature rule out either that the world did have a
beginning in time or that it did not, we are left having to read God’s will, that is,
Scripture, which affirms that the world had a beginning in time. Our acceptance of that
affirmation is an act of faith. Aquinas could hardly sound more like Maimonides.
The nature of God’s knowledge is explored by Maimonides and Aquinas, and their
conclusions are sufficiently close to warrant at least a second look at the claim that
Aquinas’ via, analogica is based upon a rejection of Maimonides’ via negativa. If the two
philosophers really have very different ideas as to the significance of terms predicated of
God, why do they say almost exactly the same thing when discussing the term “know” as
predicated of God? The problem both men face is this: Though we have some idea what
it is for human beings to know things, it does not follow that we have any insight into
what divine knowing is like, for our knowing is constrained by the conditions of
creatureliness under which we live. We are infinitely restricted in our knowing by the fact
that we look out upon the world from a spatial point, our here, and from a temporal point,
our now, and we draw conclusions by using our fallible reasoning about a world we know
from our infinitely restricted perspective. God is not constrained in these ways.
Maimonides and Aquinas take his unconstrainedness as their starting point. They
investigate what it is like to be a divine knower, and recognize that the investigation
requires us to attend first to human knowledge and then to undertake the psychological,
or conceptual, experiment of thinking away the conditions of creatureliness which
constrain such knowledge.
Significantly Maimonides’ account of divine knowledge is imbed-ded in his
discussion of divine providence, for he has to reply to some philosophers who have
claimed that since God does not reward the virtuous and punish the wicked, this must be
because he does not know the world. In a word, absence of divine providential acts
implies divine ignorance of his world. Maimonides’ reply is that God cannot be the
creator and not know his world. No doubt his knowledge is very different from ours but
we cannot deny that he has knowledge and also maintain that he is the creator. How
different is his knowledge? Maimonides lists several differences and we find them listed
also by Aquinas. I shall mention three in particular.
Things exist now which previously did not exist. We now know them but previously
we could not have done since they were not there to be known. But there cannot be things
that God now knows that he previously did not. Do we say, therefore, that since he had
not known certain things, for they did not exist, he now does not know them?
Maimonides and Aquinas draw the opposite conclusion. Since there is nothing in God’s
world with which he is unacquainted, it follows that he must know non-existent things,
and know them as fully as existent ones. That is, there are things which do not exist today
but will tomorrow, and God does not now know them the less for their presently not
existing. Both philosophers say this, but there is a difference. Maimonides holds that
“that which is never brought into existence is, with reference to His knowledge, an
absolutely nonexistent thing, which is not an object for His knowledge, as that which is
nonexistent for us is not an object for our knowledge.”13 Aquinas on the other hand
distinguishes between “knowledge of vision” (scientia visionis) and “knowledge of
simple understanding” (scientia, simplicis intelligentiae).14 By scientia visionis, God
knows things which do not exist though they have existed or will exist. By scientia
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230
simplicis intelligentiae, God knows those things which it is within the power of God or of
creatures to produce but which in fact neither do, nor will, nor did exist.
This appears to be a substantive difference between the two philosophers. They agree
that God sees in a timeless instant whatever was, is, and will be, and that in consequence
whatever was, is, and will be are all simultaneously present to God. Hence, they agree
that a thing that now does not exist but did or will exist is not less present to God than
what exists now is present to us. However, what is to be said of, for example, a painting
of which a painter forms a concept although the painter never realizes it in pigment on
canvas? Does God know that painting? Maimonides would no doubt argue that
knowledge of the painting is impossible for there is no such thing as “the painting,” and
that what Aquinas would call “knowing the painting” would better be described as
knowing the concept. Aquinas would surely reply that though the painting does not exist
in actu it does in potentia, and existence in potentia is existence of a sort, and certainly
sufficient for God to know the painting itself.
A further area discussed by both philosophers is God’s knowledge of the infinite,
though their stated positions on this matter, while close, are not identical. Maimonides
tells us that, unlike our knowledge, God’s “may embrace the infinite”15 and that “it may
have as its object something that is infinite,”16 while Aquinas affirms that “God knows
infinite things even by scientia visionis.”17 Maimonides’ repeated use of the modal
auxiliary “may” contrasts with Aquinas’ formulation. Aquinas is thinking of things (in a
broad sense of “things”) in the created world, and declares these to be infinite, and it is
possible that Maimonides prefers not to commit himself on the question of whether they
are infinite. Aquinas is explicit on this matter. “God knows the thoughts and affections of
our hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity for rational creatures will always exist.”18
Here Aquinas is speaking as a theologian basing himself on the authority of Scripture,
rather than as a philosopher, and I speculate that Maimonides was speaking as a
philosopher rather than a theologian. Had he based himself on Scripture he would no
doubt have omitted the modal auxiliaries.
Finally in this section we should note the agreement between the two
philosophers on the question of whether God is immutable if he knows the
changing world. The argument with which both have to deal is simply
stated: knowing a changing world implies knowing first one thing and
then another; hence, the knower is changing and therefore not immutable.
Both reject this argument. Maimonides’ statement on the matter represents
the position of Aquinas also:
No new knowledge comes to Him in any way. For, seeing that He knows
that a certain man is now nonexistent, but will exist at a certain time, will
go on existing for such and such a duration, and will then again become
nonexistent, there will be for Him no additional knowledge when that
individual comes into existence as He had known beforehand. Nothing
was produced thereby that was unknown to Him.19
Here Maimonides is deploying the concept of scientia visionis, for what he is maintaining
is that everything that was, is, or will be is present instantaneously to God. God sees
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231
things which have a temporal ordering, knows the temporal ordering, but knowing these
temporally successive events is not a temporally successive act of God’s. Aquinas’
formulation of the underlying metaphysical reality would have been accepted in full by
Maimonides: “Since God’s knowledge is his substance, just as his substance is entirely
immutable so his knowledge must be entirely invariable.”20
There is no doubt that on certain matters regarding God’s knowledge Maimonides and
Aquinas are not in agreement. But there is also no doubt that across the whole range of
issues in that area the positions of the two philosophers are strikingly similar. Some of the
evidence for this has just been presented. And this similarity surely provides support for
the thesis that there is no significant philosophical difference between the via negativa
and the via analogica. The difference cannot be great if their application to terms
predicated of God results in closely similar analyses.
The issue of the apparent incompatibility of the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and
of human freedom is still a major one. Both Maimonides and Aquinas deal with it, and it
is appropriate to comment here, if briefly, on the relation between the two philosophers
on this matter.
Maimonides raises the question of whether a future contingent event is
any the less contingent for God’s knowing the event. He writes:
One of the things that has become clear to me by the texts of the Torah is
that His knowledge, may He be exalted, that a certain possible thing will
come into existence, does not in any way make that possible thing quit the
nature of the possible. On the contrary, the nature of the possible remains
with it; and knowledge concerning what possible things will be produced
does not entail one of the two possibilities becoming necessary… The
whole of religious legislation, the commandments, and the prohibitions
goes back to this principle: namely, that His knowledge concerning what
will happen does not make this possible thing quit its nature.21
On the one hand therefore there is God’s cognitive relation to the future event, and on the
other there is the metaphysical status of the event itself. The event is known by God, and
therefore it must occur, for otherwise God could not know it. But what is necessary is not
the occurrence of the event but the truth of “If God knows the future event, then it will
occur.” The event remains contingent despite God’s foreknowledge of it. Here we need to
recall Maimonides’ discussion of God’s knowledge of the created world as being an
instantaneous knowledge of all events past, present, and future. Since future events are
present to him, he knows them now, as we now know what is present to us. And just as
our seeing a contingent event unfold before our eyes does not affect the contingency of
the event, so also God’s seeing the event now does not affect its contingency. It follows
that God’s foreknowledge is not foreknowledge in relation to him, for the event, though
future in relation to us, is present to, or in the presence of, God.
Whether this is a coherent story is a matter of current debate, and indeed Maimonides
himself stresses the difficulty of understanding how God can have the kind of knowledge
of future events that the story requires. He is not however tempted to retreat from the
account; instead he notes that the underlying problem for us is the fact that the term
“know” is used equivocally when predicated of God. In the present context however my
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chief concern is to point out that Aquinas’ solution to our problem concerning the
apparent incompatibility of human freedom with divine foreknowledge is substantially
the same as Maimonides’.
Aquinas gives us a famous metaphor: a man who is walking along a road does not see
those who are walking along it behind him, but the person who is high up and sees the
whole road sees all the wayfarers simultaneously.22 Likewise God sees all past, present,
and future events simultaneously. What is future to us is known infallibly by God
because it is present to him, that is, is in his presence. But according to Aquinas this does
not affect the contingent character of events future in relation to us, for a distinction has
to be made between, on the one hand, the certainty of the event, a certainty which God
has because the event is unfolding before his gaze, and, on the other hand, the contingent
nature of the event, for the knowledge is not itself the cause of the event: it has causes in
nature, and so long as there is a contingent cause among its causes, the effect also has the
character of the contingent. There is room for uncertainty about the precise relation
between Maimonides’ solution to the problem under discussion and Aquinas’ solution.
But there can be no doubt that they take lines which are at least very similar in response
to the difficulty.
It has not been the aim of this chapter to argue that right across the board
there is a deep agreement between Maimonides and Aquinas; there
manifestly is no such across-the-board agreement, as becomes clear if one
seeks a well-worked-out theory of natural law in Maimonides’ writings
corresponding to the very detailed theory that Aquinas developed.
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that there is a close
correspondence between the two philosophers on a number of
philosophical matters, including the creation of the world, the nature of
divine knowledge, and the relation between divine fore-knowledge and
human freedom. On any account these are matters of central philosophical
importance.
NOTES
1 Silver 1965.
2 Weisheipl 1974, chapter 7.
3 The most readily accessible medieval Latin version is Dux seu
Director Dubitantium aut Perplexorum, edited by Augustinus
Justinianus (Paris, 1520) (reprinted Minerva GmbH: Frankfurt am
Main, 1964).
4 Summa Theologiae part 1, question 13, article 2 body (=corpus) of
text, hereinafter 1.13.2c.
5 The Guide of the Perplexed, translated by S.Pines (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963) part 1, chapter 26, p. 56,
hereinafter Guide 1.2.6:p. 56.
Maimonides and Aquinas
233
6 Summa Theologiae 1.13.2c.
7 Ibid. 1.3.
8 Guide 2.14:p. 285.
9 Ibid. 2.14:p. 287.
10 Summa Theologiae 1.46.1.1.
11 Ibid. 1.46.10.
12 Ibid. 1.46.2.
13 Guide 3.20:p. 481.
14 Summa Theologiae 1.14.90.
15 Guide 3.20:p. 481.
16 Ibid. 3.20: p. 483.
17 Summa Theologiae 1.14.120.
18 Ibid.
19 Guide 3.20: pp.480–1.
20 Summa Theologiae 1.14.15c.
21 Guide 3.20:p. 482.
22 Summa Theologiae 1. 14.13 ad 3.
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