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「地方分権と地域社会」シンポジウム報告書
ଽॐࡄݪఱ֭ڠఱڠڛ౷༷ুহࡄݪΓϋΗȜȪ˟˫˯˨˫ˣȫలˎٝΏϋεΐ;θ! 2nd Symposium of the Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG) 「地方分権と地域社会」シンポジウム報告書 “Decentralization and Local Communities” Symposium Report ଼ 32 ා 3 ! February 2009 ଽॐࡄݪఱ֭ڠఱ !ڠڛ౷༷ুহࡄݪΓϋΗȜ! Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) ᧄߩౝኈߪ⪺ޔᮭᴺࠄࠇߚ⑳⊛↪߹ߚߪᒁ↪╬ߩ႐วࠍ㒰߈ޔ ήᢿ ߢ ォタ ߢ ߈߹ ߖ ࠎ ޕᒁ↪ ╬ߦ ߚߞ ߡ ߪ ౖ ࠍ ⸥ߒ ߡߊ ߛ ߐ ޕ Except where permitted by the Copyright Law for “personal use” or “quotation” purposes, no part of this booklet may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission. Any quotation from this booklet requires indication of the source. วࠊߖవ (Contact) ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies(GRIPS) ޥ106 – 8677 ᧲੩ㇺ᷼ᧄᧁ 7㧙22㧙1 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677 Japan TEL: 03 - 6439 - 6333 FAX: 03 - 6439 - 6010 Email: [email protected] ߪߓߦ Ყ セ ᣇ ⥄ ᴦ ⎇ ⓥ ࡦ ࠲ (Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG)㧕ߪޔ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)) ߩቇౝ⚵❱ߣߒߡᐔᚑ 18 ᐕ 4 1 ᣣߦ⸳┙ߐࠇ߹ߒߚޕ ᧄࡦ࠲ߪ⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ࿖ࠍᆎᄙߊߩ࿖ߢ␠ޔળ⚻ᷣߩ⊒ዷ╬ߦౝߩలታߩᒝ ൻ߇᳞ࠄࠇޔᣇಽᮭߩផㅴߣࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะ߇ᄢ߈ߥ⺖㗴ߣߥࠆߥ߆ޔ ᣇ⥄ᴦߦ㑐ߔࠆᲧセ⎇ⓥࠍⴕߥ߁ߣߣ߽ߦߩߘޔᚑᨐߦ㑐ߔࠆᖱႎ⊒ା߿⎇ⓥᵹ╬ߩ ੱ⊛ࡀ࠶࠻ࡢࠢߩᒻᚑࠍㅢߓߡ⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ࿖ࠍߪߓߣߔࠆฦ࿖ߩᣇ⥄ᴦߩ⊒ዷߦ⽸ ₂ߔࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒߡ⸳┙ߐࠇ߹ߒߚޕ ᧄࡦ࠲ߢߪޔᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߣߘߩㆇ↪ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⺞ᩏ⎇ⓥࠍⴕ߁ߣߣ߽ߦ⽷ޔ࿅ᴺੱ ⥄ᴦ࿖㓙ൻදળ㧔CLAIR㧕ߣㅪ៤ߒޔᚒ߇࿖ߩᣇ⥄ᴦᐲ╬ߦߟߡޔᄖ࿖⺆ߦࠃࠆ ⾗ᢱᚑޔᶏᄖ߳ߩᖱႎឭଏ╬ࠍታᣉߒߡ߹ߔޕ ߹ ߚ ޔᐔ ᚑ 18 ᐕ ᐲ ߦ ߪ ⸥ ࠍ ┙ ⸳ ߩ ࠲ ࡦ ᧄ ޔᔨ ߒ ߡ ߩ ࠕ ࠫ ࠕ ޟޔ ᣇ ಽ ᮭ ޠ 㧔Decentralization in East and Southeast Asia㧕ߣ㗴ߔࠆ࿖㓙ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓࠍ㐿ߒ߹ߒߚޕ ᐔᚑ 20 ᐕ 3 5 ᣣߦߪ ╙ޔ2 ࿁⋡ߩࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓޟᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળ㧦ෳടޔදߣࠟ ࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะޠ㧔Decentralization and Local Communities㧦Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance㧕ࠍ㐿ߔࠆߎߣ߇᧪߹ߒߚޕหࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߪ⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ࿖ߩᣇ ಽᮭߣၞ␠ળߩ⁁ߣ⺖㗴ࠍࠄ߆ߦߒޔฦ࿖ߩᣇ⥄ᴦߩ৻ጀߩ⊒ዷߦะߌߡߤߩࠃ ߁ߥข⚵߇ലߢࠆ߆ߦߟߡ⼏⺰ߔࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⊛ߣߒޔ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇߦ߅ߡ 㐿ߐࠇ߹ߒߚޕᒰᣣߪࠕࠫࠕޔฦ࿖ߩ⎇ⓥ⠪ߦࠃࠆฦ࿖ߩᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળߩ⁁ߣ ⺖㗴ߦኻߔࠆႎ๔߮ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ߇ࠅޔᄙߊߩᣇߏߩޘෳടࠍᓧࠆߎߣ߇ ߢ߈߹ߒߚޕ ߎࠇ߆ࠄ߽ޔᣇ⥄ᴦߦ㑐ߔࠆᲧセ⎇ⓥ߿ᖱႎ⊒ାޔ࿖㓙ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߩታᣉߥߤᧄޔ ࡦ࠲ߩᵴേߩలታߦദജߒߡ߈ߚߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ߔߏޕදജߩ߶ߤ߅ߊߒࠈࠃޔ㗿 ߚߒ߹ߔޕ ߥ߅ߩ࠲ࡦᧄޔᵴേ߮หࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߦߟߡߩߏ⾰ߏޔᗧߥߤߪޔᲧセ ᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲߹ߢ߅ነߖߊߛߐ߹ߔࠃ߁߅㗿ߚߒ߹ߔޕ ᐔᚑ 21 ᐕ 2 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ ቇ㐳 ↰ ㆐ᄦ Foreword The Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG) was established as a research institute within the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) on April 1, 2006. Within the context of a broad framework characterized by the promotion of decentralization and strengthening of local governance on the part of many Asian countries, which are facing substantial challenges as their economies develop, the Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance㧔COSLOG㧕was established with the objective of contributing to the further development of local governance in Asian countries through the promotion of comparative research on local governance, the dissemination of the research results, and the formation of networks with research institutes on local governance in the countries concerned. COSLOG conducts research related to Japanese local governance system and its implementation. In cooperation with the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), the Institute has been endeavoring on compiling reports about Japanese local governance and translating them into English in order to provide information about Japan overseas. Commemorating the establishment of COSLOG, in fiscal year 2006, a international symposium “Decentralization in East and Southeast Asia” was held. On March 5, 2008, we were able to host the second symposium titled “Decentralization and Local Communities㧦Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance.” This symposium aimed to clarify the present situation of decentralization and local communities, and problems associated with it in the Asian countries, and to discuss what approaches would be most effective in promoting further development of local governance in each country. The researchers from the Asian countries reported on the present situation and the problems of decentralization and local communities in each country. The reports were followed by a panel discussion. The symposium was well attended by a large number of participants. We will continually try to enhance the activities of the Institute in such ways as comparative research, the dissemination symposiums on local governance. of information, and international We will continue to seek your support. If you have any comments or inquiries on the activities of COSLOG or the symposium, please feel free to contact us. February 2009 Tatsuo Hatta President National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) ߪߒ߇߈ Ყ セ ᣇ ⥄ ᴦ ⎇ ⓥ ࡦ ࠲ (Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG)㧕ߪޔᐔᚑ 18 ᐕ 4 1 ᣣߦޔ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))ߦ⸳⟎ߐࠇߚ⎇ⓥᯏ㑐ߢߔޕ ᧄࡦ࠲ߪޔᣇ⥄ᴦᐲ߿⥄ᴦㆇ༡ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⎇ⓥߩ㜞ᐲൻࠍ࿑ࠆߚ⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ ࿖ߣᣣᧄࠍਛᔃߦߒߚᣇ⥄ᴦߦ㑐ߔࠆᲧセ⎇ⓥ⎇ޔⓥᵹࠍㅴߡ߅ࠅ߹ߔޔߚ߹ޕᚒ ߇࿖ߩᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߩ⁁߿⊒ዷߩᱧผޔᣇ⥄ᴦࠍߋࠆᦨᣂേะ╬ߦ㑐ߔࠆᖱႎ⊒ା ࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦⴕ߁ߣߣ߽ߦޔ࿖ౝᄖߩᣇ⥄ᴦߦ㑐ߔࠆᢥ₂⾗ᢱߩ㓸ߦദߡ߹ߔޕ ᧄࡦ࠲ߢߪޔᐔᚑ 19 ᐕ 2 ߦ⸳┙ࠍ⸥ᔨߒߡߩࠕࠫࠕޟᣇಽᮭޠ 㧔Decentralization in East and Southeast Asia㧕ߣ㗴ߔࠆ࿖㓙ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߩ㐿ߒޔᒁ߈⛯߈ޔᐔᚑ 20 ᐕ 3 5 ᣣߦߪ ╙ޔ2 ࿁⋡ߩ࿖㓙ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓޟᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળ㧦ෳടޔදߣࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ ߩะޠ㧔Decentralization and Local Communities㧦Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance㧕ࠍ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇߦߡ㐿ߔࠆߎߣ߇᧪߹ߒߚޕ ╙ 2 ࿁⋡ߩࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߢߪޔ⇇ฦ࿖ߢᣇಽᮭߩផㅴߣၞ␠ળߩ⊒ዷ߇ᄢ߈ߥ⺖ 㗴ߣߥࠆߥ߆ߢࠕࠫࠕޔฦ࿖ߩෳട⠪߇ߘࠇߙࠇߩ࿖ߩᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળߩ⁁ߣ㗴 ὐޔᓟߩዷᦸߥߤߦߟߡႎ๔ޔߕ߹ޕߚߒ߹ߥⴕࠍ⺰⼏ޔඦ೨߆ࠄඦᓟߦ߆ߌߡޔ ᣣᧄޔࡦࡇࠖࡈޔਛ࿖ޔࠗ࠲ޔ㖧࿖⎇ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗߡߒߘޔⓥ⠪ߦࠃࠅᦨޔᣂߩ⁁ᴫ ߥߤ߽〯߹߃ޔฦ࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടߩ⁁ߣ⺖㗴ߦߟߡႎ๔߇ ⴕߥࠊࠇ߹ߒߚޕᒁ߈⛯߈ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦߢߪࠕࠫࠕޔฦ࿖ߩࡄࡀࠬ࠻㧢ฬߦ ࠃࠅޔᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടߩ⺖㗴ࠍࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦ⸃ߩߘޔ╷ߩࡅࡦ ࠻߿᧪ߩㅢߒߦߟߡ⼏⺰ࠍⴕ߹ߒߚޕᒰᣣߪޔᣇ⥄ᴦ㑐ଥߩ⎇ⓥ⠪߿ታോኅ⚂ 80 ฬߦෳടߚߛ߈ޔᵴ⊒ߥᗧ឵߇ߢ߈ߚߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ߔޕ ᧄႎ๔ᦠߪ ╙ޔ2 ࿁⋡ߩࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߩౝኈࠍᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ߢขࠅ߹ߣ ߚ߽ߩߢߔߩߎޕౠሶ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળߩ㗴ߩℂ⸃ߣ⸃ߦᄙዋߥࠅߣ߽ᓎ┙ߟ ߥࠄ߫ᐘߦሽߓ߹ߔޕ ႎ๔⠪ߩᣇࠍޘᆎߏߦࡓ࠙ࠫࡐࡦࠪޔෳടߚߛߚᣇ⾆ߦ࠲ࡦߚ߹ޔޘ㊀ߥߏ ᗧߏޔഥ⸒ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚోߡߩᣇޔߦޘᡷߡᔃࠃࠅᗵ⻢↳ߒߍ߹ߔޕᓟߣ߽ ᧄࡦ࠲ߩᵴേߦኻߔࠆߏᗧߏޔഥജࠍ߅ነߖߚߛ߈߹ߔࠃ߁߅ߊߒࠈࠃޔ㗿 ߚߒ߹ߔޕ ᐔᚑ 21 ᐕ 2 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ ᚲ㐳 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ ᢎ Ꮉ ඳ Preface The Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG) is a research institute located within the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), which was established on April 1, 2006. With the aim of attaining a high level of research in the study of local governance systems and the running of local governments, our Institute carries out comparative studies and research exchanges in the area of local governance focusing on various Asian countries and Japan. We disseminate information on the developmental history and status quo of Japan’s local governance systems and the latest trends in local governance. We also try to collect documents and reference materials on local governance from both inside and outside Japan. In February of 2007, commemorating the establishment of COSLOG, an international symposium “Decentralization in East and Southeast Asia” was held. The following year on March 5, 2008, we were able to host our second international symposium titled “Decentralization and Local Communities㧦Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance.” The second symposium was held under circumstances in which the promotion of decentralization and the strengthening of local communities has become a major issue both inside and outside Japan. The participants from Japan and other Asian countries reported on and discussed the present situation and the problems of decentralization and local communities as well as the perspective for the future of decentralization and local communities in their own countries. From the morning through the early noon session, researchers from Japan, Philippines, China, Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia reported on the present situation and the problems of decentralization, local communities, and citizen participation in each country based on the latest information. In the subsequent panel discussion, the 6 panelists from the Asian countries listed above articulated issues on decentralization, local communities, and citizen participation, and discussed ideas for solving the issues and the prospects for the future. There were about 80 participants, consisting of researchers and persons actively engaged in the practice of local governance, and an active exchange of views took place. COSLOG has compiled this booklet covering the whole content of the second symposium. It would be a great pleasure for us if this booklet can help further your understanding and ideas for solving issues on decentralization and local communities. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to those who presented reports and to the participants in the symposium as well as to all the people who gave us their valuable inputs and opinions. We welcome any comments and suggestions you may have regarding the activities of our Institute. February 2008 Hiroshi Ikawa Director, Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies ⋡ ᰴ ࡊࡠࠣࡓ ······························································································································· Σ㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ߮ฦ࿖ႎ๔ 㧝㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ߅ࠃ߮ฦ࿖ႎ๔ߩⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆⺆⧷ޔ㧕····················································· ̆ ᧁ ବ㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᢎ㧕 㧞㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ ಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣၞ⥄ᴦߩᒝൻ㧔Decentralization Reform and Strengthening Local Governance㧕 ̆ ᄢ ᒫ㧔᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ㧕 ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ······························································································· ⷐ㧔⧷⺆㧕··········································································································· 㧟㧚ฦ࿖ႎ๔ 㧟㧙㧝㧚ࡈࠖࡇࡦ Decentralization and Local Autonomy in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 years of Implementation ̆ Alex B. Brillantes Jr. (ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳㧕 ႎ๔㧔⧷⺆㧕 ······························································································· ⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ··························································································· 㧟㧙㧞㧚ਛ࿖ From Assistant to Partner? NGOs in China’s Local Community Development ᧻ῆ㧔࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ㧕 ̆ ႎ๔㧔⧷⺆㧕 ······························································································· ⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ··························································································· 㧟㧙㧟㧚࠲ࠗ Directions of Local Government Under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Thailand ̆ Woothisarn Tanchai㧔ࠠࡦࠣࡊࠫࡖ࠺ࠖࡐ࠶ࠢ⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ㧕 i ႎ๔㧔⧷⺆㧕····································································································· ⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ································································································· 㧟㧙㧠㧚㖧࿖ Decentralization and Citizen Participation in South Korea : Recent Developments during the Rho Moo-Hyun Administration (2003-07) ̆ ㊄ ⋉ᬀ㧔੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ㧕 ႎ๔㧔⧷⺆㧕 ······························································································· ⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ························································································· 㧟㧙㧡㧚ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕ Decentralization in Indonesia and Its Impacts to Local Community ̆ Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro㧔ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳㧕 ႎ๔㧔⧷⺆㧕 ····························································································· ⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕 ························································································· Τ㧚ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ ޟಽ ᮭ ൻ ߦ ߅ ߌ ࠆ ࡠ ࠞ ࡞ ࠟ ࡃ ࠽ ࡦ ࠬ ߩ ะ ߩ ߚ ߦ 㧔 To Make Decentralization Work Better㧕ޠ 㧝㧚ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦⷐ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆⺆⧷ޔ㧕····················································· ̆ Ꮉ ඳ 㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ᚲ㐳㧕 㧞㧚ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕········································································ Υ㧚⾗ᢱ 㧝㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ ಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣၞ⥄ᴦߩᒝൻ ····················································································· ̆ ᄢ ᒫ㧔᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ㧕 㧞㧚ฦ࿖ႎ๔ᦠ⾗ᢱ 㧞㧙㧝㧚ࡈࠖࡇࡦ Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 Years of Implementation ································ ̆ Alex B. Brillantes Jr. (ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳㧕 ii 㧞㧙㧞㧚ਛ࿖ From Assistant to Partner? Social Organizations in China’s Local Community Development ····························································· ̆ ᧻ῆ㧔࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ㧕 㧞㧙㧟㧚࠲ࠗ Decentralization in Thailand The Case Study of People Participation in Local Government ··········· ̆ Woothisarn Tanchai㧔ࠠࡦࠣࡊࠫࡖ࠺ࠖࡐ࠶ࠢ⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ㧕 㧞㧙㧠㧚ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕ Decentralization in Indonesia and Its Impacts to Local Community··· ̆ Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro㧔ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳㧕 㧖⸥ߩ⊒⠪ߩᚲዻᓎ⡯╬ߪࡓ࠙ࠫࡐࡦࠪޔ㐿ᤨ㧔ᐔᚑ ᐕ ᣣ㧕ߩ߽ߩࠍ⸥タޕ iii Contents Program················································································································· Σ Keynote Address and Country Reports 㧝㧚Overview of the Keynote Address and the Country Reports (Japanese, English) ····· Ɇ Shunsuke Kimura (Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) 㧞㧚Keynote Address “Decentralization Reform and Strengthening Local Governance” Ɇ Wataru Oomori (Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo) Excerpts from Keynote Address (Japanese) ··················································· Summary (English) ···················································································· 㧟㧚Country Reports 㧟㧙㧝㧚Philippines Decentralization and Local Autonomy in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 years of Implementation Ɇ Alex B. Brillantes Jr. (Professor and Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines) Report (English) ··············································································· Summary (Japanese) ········································································· 㧟㧙㧞㧚China From Assistant to Partner? NGOs in China’s Local Community, Development Ɇ Chu Songyan (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, China National School of Administration) Report (English) ··············································································· Summary (Japanese) ········································································· 㧟㧙㧟㧚Thailand Directions of Local Government Under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Thailand Ɇ Woothisarn Tanchai (Associate Professor and Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok’s Institute) Report (English) ··············································································· Summary (Japanese) ········································································· iv 㧟㧙㧠㧚South Korea Decentralization and Citizen Participation in South Korea : Recent Developments during the Rho Moo-Hyun Administration (2003-07) Ɇ Ik-sik Kim (Professor, Department of Public Administration, Kyonggi University) Report (English) ··············································································· Summary (Japanese) ······································································· 㧟㧙㧡㧚Indonesia Decentralization in Indonesia and Its Impacts to Local Community Ɇ Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro (Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) Report(English) ·············································································· Summary (Japanese) ······································································· ΤPanel Discussion “To Make Decentralization Work Better” 㧝㧚Overview of the Panel Discussion (Japanese, English) ······································ Ɇ Hiroshi Ikawa (Director, Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) 㧞㧚Excerpts from the Panel Discussion (Japanese) ··············································· ΥMaterials 㧝㧚Keynote Speech Decentralization Reform and Strengthening of Community Self-Governance ······ Ɇ Wataru Oomori (Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo) 㧞㧚Materials of Country Reports 㧞㧙㧝㧚Philippines Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 years of Implementation ········································· ̆ Alex B. Brillantes Jr. (Professor and Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines㧕 v 㧞㧙㧞㧚China From Assistant to Partner? Social Organizations in China’s Local Community Development ····················································································· 㧙 Chu Songyan (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science China National School of Administration) 㧞㧙㧟㧚Thailand Decentralization in Thailand The Case Study of People Participation in Local Government ·················· ̆ Woothisarn Tanchai㧔Associate Professor and Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok’s Institute) 㧞㧙㧠㧚Indonesia Decentralization in Indonesia and Its Impacts to Local Community ·········· ̆ Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro (Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) *The official positions of the presenters shown above are as on the date when the Symposium was held (March 5, 2008). vi ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥ䉶䊮䉺䊷䋨䌃䌏䌓䌌䌏䌇䋩䉲䊮䊘䉳䉡䊛㩷 ᣇಽᮭ䈫ၞ␠ળ䋺㩷 ෳട䇮ද䈫䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ะ㩷 㩷 㩷 㪉㪇㪇㪏 ᐕ 㪊 㪌 ᣣ䋨᳓䋩㪈㪇䋺㪇㪇䌾㪈㪎䋺䋱㪌㩷 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ㩷 䋱㓏ળ⼏ቶ㩷 㩷 㩷 䊒䊨䉫䊤䊛㩷 㩷 㩷 㪈㪇䋺㪇㪇㩷 㐿ળ㩷 㩷 㩷 㪈㪇䋺㪈㪌䌾㪈㪈䋺㪇㪇㩷 ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ㩷 㩷 䊁䊷䊙㩷 䇸ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈫ၞ⥄ᴦ䈱ᒝൻ䇹㩷 㩷 㩷 ᄢ㩷 ᒫ㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 㪈㪈䋺㪇㪇䌾㪈㪋䋺㪋㪇㩷 ฦ࿖ႎ๔㩷 㩷 㪈㪈䋺㪇㪇䌾㪈㪈䋺㪊㪇㩷 㩷䍪 䍆 䍶 䍩 䍽 䍻㩷 㩷 㩷㪘㫃㪼㫏㩷㪙㪅㩷㪙㫉㫀㫃㫃㪸㫅㫋㪼㫊㩷㪡㫉㪅㩷 ᳁㩷 㩿䊐䉞䊥䊏䊮ᄢቇⴕ䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ቇㇱ㐳䋩㩷 㪈㪈䋺㪊㪇䌾㪈㪉䋺㪇㪇㩷 ਛ 㩷 㩷 ࿖㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 ᧻ῆ㩷 㩿㪚㪿㫌㩷㪪㫆㫅㪾㫐㪸㫅㪀㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 䋨ભᙑ 㪈 ᤨ㑆 㪈㪇 ಽ䋩㩷 㩷 㪈㪊䋺㪈㪇䌾㪈㪊䋺㪋㪇㩷 䉺 䉟㩷 㩷 㪮㫆㫆㫋㪿㫀㫊㪸㫉㫅㩷㪫㪸㫅㪺㪿㪸㫀㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨䉨䊮䉫䊶䊒䊤䉳䊞䊂䉞䊘䉾䉪⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ䋩㩷 㪈㪊䋺㪋㪇䌾㪈㪋䋺㪈㪇㩷 㩷㖧 㩷 㩷 ࿖㩷 ㊄㩷 ⋉ᬀ㩷 㩿㪠㫂㪄㫊㫀㫂㩷㪢㫀㫄㪀㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ䋩㩷 㪈㪋䋺㪈㪇䌾㪈㪋䋺㪋㪇㩷 䍐䍻䍢䍼䍦䍚䍏㩷 㩷 㩷㪙㪸㫄㪹㪸㫅㪾㩷㪧㪅㩷㪪㪅㩷㪙㫉㫆㪻㫁㫆㫅㪼㪾㫆㫉㫆㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝ᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳䋩㩷 㩷 䋨ભᙑ 㪈㪌 ಽ䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 㪈㪋䋺㪌㪌䌾㪈㪎䋺㪇㪇㩷 䊌䊈䊦䊂䉞䉴䉦䉾䉲䊢䊮㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 䊁䊷䊙㩷 䇸ಽᮭൻ䈱ਅ䈮䈍䈔䉎䊨䊷䉦䊦䊶䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴䈱ะ䈱䈢䉄䈮䇹䋨㗴䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 䊌 䊈 䊥 䉴 䊃䋺㩷 ᄢ㩷 ᒫ㩷 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 㪘㫃㪼㫏㩷㪙㪅㩷㪙㫉㫀㫃㫃㪸㫅㫋㪼㫊㩷㪡㫉㪅㩷 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨䊐䉞䊥䊏䊮ᄢቇⴕ䉧䊋䊅䊮䉴ቇㇱ㐳䋩㩷 㩷 ᧻ῆ㩷 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 㪮㫆㫆㫋㪿㫀㫊㪸㫉㫅㩷㪫㪸㫅㪺㪿㪸㫀㩷 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨䉨䊮䉫䊶䊒䊤䉳䊞䊂䉞䊘䉾䉪⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 ㊄㩷 ⋉ᬀ㩷 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 㪙㪸㫄㪹㪸㫅㪾㩷㪧㪅㩷㪪㪅㩷㪙㫉㫆㪻㫁㫆㫅㪼㪾㫆㫉㫆 ᳁㩷 㩷 䋨䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝ᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 䊝䊂䊧䊷䉺䊷䋺㩷 Ꮉ㩷 ඳ㩷 ᳁㩷 䋨╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥ䉶䊮䉺䊷ᚲ㐳䋩㩷 㩷 㩷 㪈㪎䋺㪈㪌㩷 㐽ળ㩷 1 Decentralization and Local Communities: Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance D a t e : Wednesday, March 5, 10:00 – 17:15 Venue: Conference Room (1F), GRIPS Building Program 10㧦00 Opening 10㧦15㨪11㧦00 Keynote Speech “Decentralization Reform and Strengthening of Community Self-Governance” Wataru Oomori (Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo㧕 11㧦00㨪14㧦40 Country Reports 11㧦00㨪11㧦30 Philippines Alex B. Brillantes Jr. 㧔Professor and Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines 㧕 11㧦30㨪12㧦00 China Chu Songyan 㧔Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, China National School of Administration㧕 (Lunch) 13㧦10㨪13㧦40 Thailand Woothisarn Tanchai 㧔Associate Professor and Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok’s Institute㧕 13㧦40㨪14㧦10 South Korea Ik-sik Kim 㧔Professor, Department of Public Administration, Kyonggi University㧕 14㧦10㨪14㧦40 Indonesia Bambang P. S. Brodjonegoro 㧔Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia㧕 (Break) 14㧦55㨪17㧦00 Panel Discussion “For Better Local Governance in the Decentralization Era” Panel members: Wataru Oomori Alex B. Brillantes Jr. Chu Songyan Woothisarn Tanchai Ik-sik Kim Bambang P. S. Brodjonegoro Hiroshi Ikawa Moderator: (Director, Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) 17㧦15 Closing 2 + ؕᛦᜒӏƼӲإԓ Keynote Address and Country Reports 㧝㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ߮ฦ࿖ႎ๔ߩⷐ ╷⎇ⓥቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ߢߪޔ2008 ᐕ 3 5 ᣣ㧔᳓㧕ߦޟᣇಽ ᮭߣၞ␠ળ㧦ෳടޔදߣࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะߣޠ㗴ߒߚࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓࠍ㐿ߒߚࡦࠪޕ ࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߢߪ↰ޔ㆐ᄦ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇቇ㐳ߩ㐿ળᜦߦᒁ߈⛯߈ޔᄢᒫ᧲੩ᄢቇ ฬᢎ߇ޟಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣၞ⥄ᴦߩᒝൻߣޠ㗴ߒߚၮ⺞⻠Ṷࠍⴕߞߚߩߘޕᓟࡇࠖࡈޔ ࡦޔਛ࿖ޔࠗ࠲ޔ㖧࿖ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔฦ࿖ߩ⎇ⓥ⠪߆ࠄޔ㗅ᰴฦ࿖ߩ⁁ᴫߦߟߡႎ๔ ߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕၮ⺞⻠Ṷ߮ฦ࿖ႎ๔ߩⷐߪએਅߩߣ߅ࠅߢࠆޔ߅ߥޕฦ࿖ႎ๔ߩᓟߦ 㧢ੱߩႎ๔⠪ࠍࡄࡀࠬ࠻ߣߒߡࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ߇ⴕࠊࠇߚ߇ߩߘޔౝኈߦߟ ߡߪߩޠࡦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄޟ㗄ࠍߏⷩߚߛ߈ߚޕ ޣၮ⺞⻠Ṷߩⷐޤ ᄢᢎߩၮ⺞⻠Ṷߢߪ⊓߇⪲⸒߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟޔ႐ߒߚ⢛᥊ߦߟߡ⺑ߒߚ ߢޔᢎߪߩޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟޔᗧߦߟߡޟᐭ߿᳃㑆ડᬺߥߤޔ᭽❱⚵ߥޘ㓸࿅ߩ ᝄࠆ⥰ᣇޔࠍߣߎߩޠᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߩᣇޔᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߩᒻᘒߦ⌕⋡ߒߚᔨߢࠅޔ ࠗࠡࠬߩታ㛎ታߩᓇ㗀ߩਅߢ᥉ߒߚߣㅀߴߚޕ ߹ߚޔᄢᢎߪޟޔද collaborationᦨ߽⪲⸒߁ߣޠㄭᕆㅦߦ᥉ߒߡ߈ߚ߇ޔᎹ ፒᏒߩ⥄ᴦၮᧄ᧦ߢቯ⟵ߐࠇߚޟᏒ᳃ߣᏒ߇ㅢߩ⋡⊛ࠍታߔࠆߚߩࠇߙࠇߘޔᓎ ഀߣ⽿છߩਅߢ⋧ߩ┙႐ࠍዅ㊀ߒޔኻ╬ߥ㑐ଥߦ┙ߞߡදജߔࠆߚߞߣޠᗧߢߩޟද ◲ޔߪޠනߦ㆐ᚑߢ߈ࠆ߽ߩߣߪᕁ߃ߥߣᜰ៰ߒߚߩߘޕߢޔᓥ᧪ޔਛᄩᐭޔ ᣇᐭߣ߽ߩ❑ޔ⒎ᐨߩਛߢ‛ࠍㅴߡ߈ߚਛߢޔኻ╬ߩ㑐ଥޔ᳓ᐔ⊛ߥ㧔ޟᮮߩޠ㧕 㑐ଥࠍࠅߥ߇ࠄㅢߩ⋡⊛ࠍታߔࠆߎߣߪኈᤃߢߪߥ߇ޟޔᮮߩޠ㑐ଥࠍ㊀ⷞߔࠆ ޟදߩޠᱧผ⊛ߥᗧ⟵ߪዋߥߊߥߣㅀߴࠅߩ࠻ࡦࡔࠫࡀࡑߩޠ❑ޟߩߢ߹ࠇߎޔᣇ ࠍᄌ߃ޔಽᮭᡷ㕟ߦߪ᳃⥄ᴦࠍଦㅴߔࠆേ߈߇ࠆਛߢߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔ᳃⥄ᴦࠍታߔ ࠆ߆߇⺖㗴ߢࠆߣߩ㗴ឭࠍⴕߞߚޕ ߐࠄߦޔᄢᢎߪⴕޔߦㆊᄢߥⷐ᳞ࠍⴕ⥄ᴦࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆᒰ⠪ߣߒߡߩᗧ⼂ࠍᜬߚ ߥ᳃߽ࠄࠇࠆਛߢޔ᳃ߩ߽⥄ࠄߩᝄࠆ⥰ࠍ⋥ߒޔ᳃ߣᓎᚲߩ㑐ଥࠍᡷ㕟 ߒߡߊᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣ߁⺖㗴ߦߟߡ߽ᜰ៰ߒߚޕ ޣฦ࿖ႎ๔ߩⷐޤ ฦ࿖ႎ๔ߪޔࡦࡇࠖࡈޔਛ࿖ޔࠗ࠲ޔ㖧࿖ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔ㗅ߦⴕࠊࠇߚࠖࡈߕ߹ޕ ࡇࡦߩ Alex B.Brillantes Jr.ቇㇱ㐳㧔ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㧕߆ࠄߪࠖࡈޔ ࡇࡦߢߪࠆޔ⒟ᐲߩ⥄ᴦ߇ࡓޔ㧔ࡃࡦࠟࠗ㧕ߩࡌ࡞ߢฎߊ߆ࠄሽߒߩߘޔᓟޔ ࠬࡍࠗࡦᬀ᳃ᤨઍߩࡑ࠙ᴺޔ1898 ᐕߩࡑࡠࡠࠬᙗᴺ╙ޔ㧞ᰴ⇇ᄢᚢᓟߩࡃࠝ࠴ ࡖ࠲ᴺ╬ߦࠃࠅᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߩᢛ߿ᣇಽᮭ߇ㅴࠄࠇߚ߇ߩߘޔታᘒߪਛᄩ㓸ᮭ ⊛ߥ߽ߩߢߞߚᣦߩ⺑߇ߥߐࠇߚޔߡߒߘޕ1991 ᐕߩᣇᐭᴺߩቯߦࠃࠅޔᣇ 5 ಽᮭ߇ᧄᩰ⊛ߦផㅴߐࠇⷙޔᮭ㒢ࠍᮭ㒢߇ਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄᣇᐭߦ⒖⼑ߐࠇޔ㧣ਁ ੱߩ࿖ኅോຬ߇ᣇോຬߦߥࠅޔᣇ⸘↹ߦኻߔࠆ᳃ෳടߩᅑബ߿ᣇ⽷Ḯߩలታ ߽࿑ࠄࠇߚߎߣޔߦࠄߐޔ㧮㧻㨀ߥߤ᳃㑆ડᬺߣߩㅪ៤߽ផᅑߐࠇߚߎߣ߇⚫ߐࠇߚޕ ߹ߚޔᏒ᳃ෳടߩᚑഞߣߒߡࠟ࠽ޔᏒߦ߅ߡᏒ᳃ᙗ┨߇ቯߐࠇࠧ࡞ࡈ႐ᑪ⸳⸘↹ ߇Ꮢ᳃ߩኻߦࠃࠅⷒߐࠇߚߎߣ╬߇ႎ๔ߐࠇߚޔߚ߹ޕಽᮭൻߩᢎ⸠ߣߒߡޔᣇᐭ ߩᬺኅ⊛㕙ߩᅑബ⽷ޔḮಽᮭൻߩ㊀ⷐᕈߩ⏕ൻޔᏒ᳃ෳടᐭ㑆දജߩଦㅴࡄޔ ࠳ࠗࡓ㧔⊒ᗐ㧕ࠍᄌ߃ࠆᔅⷐᕈߩ⼂ޔ࿖㓙ൻߩ⼂ޔ㧵㧯㨀ߩ↪ଦㅴ߇ߍࠄࠇޔ ᣇᐭߩࠨࡆࠬଏ⛎ߩല₸߿⾰ߩⴕേ᳓Ḱࠍਛᄩᐭ߇⏕┙ߔࠆᔅⷐᕈ߇ࠆߎߣ߇ ᜰ៰ߐࠇߚߩߎޕႎ๔ߦኻߒޔᮭ㒢⒖⼑ߦ߁ࠨࡆࠬឭଏߩᡷༀ╬ߦߟߡ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߇ ߥߐࠇߚޕ ᰴߦਛ࿖ߩ ᧻ῆᢎ㧔࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱ㧕߆ࠄߪޔᡷ㕟㐿╷ࠍផㅴߒ ߡ߆ࠄ㧟㧜ᐕࠍ⚻ߚਛ࿖ߦ߅ߡޔಽᮭߦߪԘਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄᣇᐭ߳ޔԙᐭ߆ࠄᏒ႐ Ꮢ᳃␠ળ߳߁ߣޔ㧞ߟߩ㕙߇ࠆ߇ޔਛ࿖ߢߪᧂߛᮨ⚝ߩᲑ㓏ߦࠅޔਛᄩᐭߣ ᣇᐭߣߩ㑐ଥࠍⷙቯߔࠆᴺᓞ߇ߥߊߥޘ⦡ޔታ㛎ࠍᐭߢⴕߞߡࠆ⁁ߦࠆߣႎ๔ ߐࠇߚޔࠄ߇ߥߒ߆ߒޕਛ࿖ߦ߽Ꮢ᳃␠ળߪሽߒߛᧂޔᒝ࿕ߢߪߥ߇ᓢ⊒ߦޘዷߒߡ ߅ࠅޔ1978 ᐕߦᡷ㕟㐿╷߇㐿ᆎߐࠇߡએ᧪ޔᐭߣ␠ળࠍߟߥߋᓎഀ߇ NGO ߦᦼᓙ ߐࠇߡࠆߎߣ⊓ޔ㍳ߐࠇߡࠆ NGO ߦߪ␠ળ⊛࿅⚵❱ޔ㕖༡⊛Ꮢ᳃࿅⽷ޔ࿅ߩ㧟 ߟߩ࠲ࠗࡊ߇ࠆ߇⊓ᧂޔ㍳ߩ߽ߩߩᢙ߇㆔߆ߦᄙߎߣ߇⚫ߐࠇߚߩ⨲ޔߚ߹ޕᩮߩ NGO ߇ᐭߣදߒߡ㜞㦂⠪ࠍታ〣ߒߡࠆ߽ࠆ߇ޔԘᐭߣኻ╬ߥ㑐ଥߦߥ ޔԙᐲ⊛ߥⅣႺᢛ߇ਇචಽޔԚNGO ߩജ߇߹ߛᒙ⺖߁ߣޔ㗴߇ࠆߎߣ߇ႎ๔ ߐࠇߚᦨޕᓟߦ⻉ޔᄖ࿖ߩ⚻㛎߿߇ᓟߩਛ࿖ߩၞ␠ળߩ⊒ዷߦෳ⠨ߦߥࠆߣ߁ ࠦࡔࡦ࠻߇ߞߚߩߎޕႎ๔ߦኻߒޔ㧺㧳㧻߇┹ේℂߩਅߢ⟎ߠߌࠄࠇᵴ↪ߐࠇߡ ࠆ߆ߣ߁ὐ╬ߦߟߡ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕ ᤤ㘩ભᙑߩᓟޔᒁ߈⛯ߡฦ࿖ႎ๔߇ⴕࠊࠇߚ ߩࠗ࠲ޕWoothisarn Tanchai ಎᢎ㧔ࠠ ࡦࠣࡊࠫࡖ࠺ࠖࡐ࠶ࠢ⎇ⓥᚲ㧕߆ࠄߩࠗ࠲ޔᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߪ⥄⋵ޟޔᴦ(ޠᣣᧄߩ⋵ ߦኻᔕ)ߣ࠲ࡦࡏࡦ⥄ᴦߣ߁߇㧞ጀߩ᭴ㅧߣߥߞߡࠆ߇ޔ1997 ᐕߩᙗᴺቯએ᧪ޔ ᣇಽᮭ߇ផㅴߐࠇޔᐭᱦߦභࠆᣇᐭᱦߩᄢߥᒁߍޔᮭ㒢⒖⼑ޔ࿖ኅോ ຬߩᣇ߳ߩ⒖▤ߥߤ߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ߈ߚᣦߩ⚫߇ߞߚޔࠄ߇ߥߒ߆ߒޕਛᄩᐭޔᣇ ᐭߩᓎഀ߇ਇ⏕ߢࠆߎߣޔᣇ⽷ߩ⥄ਥᕈ⁛┙ᕈ߇ਇචಽߢࠆߎߣ╬ߩ⺖㗴 ߇ߞߚߎߣ߆ࠄޔ㧞㧜㧜㧣ᐕᙗᴺߦ߅ߡߪޔᣇᐭߩോᮭ㒢⽿છ╬ߩ⏕ൻޔ ⥄ᴦߩ⋙〈ߦଥࠆ⏕ߥၮḰߩᔅⷐᕈੱޔ⽷ࠪࠬ࠹ࡓߩ⥄┙⊛ㆇ↪ޔ᳃ࠦࡒ ࡘ࠾࠹ࠖᏒ᳃␠ળߩಽ㊁߳ߩෳടޔᴦㆊ⒟ߩㅘᕈߩ⏕╬ߦ㑐ߔࠆⷙቯ߇⸳ߌ ࠄࠇߚᣦߩႎ๔߇ߞߚޔߡߒߘޕ᳃ߩෳടߦߪޔԘᖱႎឭଏޔԙද⼏⋧⺣ޔԚ ෳടଦㅴޔԛදޔԜᮭ㒢ઃਈߣ߁Ბ㓏߇ࠅޔฦᲑ㓏ߦ߅ߌࠆౕ⊛ข⚵߽ࠄࠇࠆ ߇ޔᣇᐭߪ⥄ಽ㆐ߩ߽ߩߛߣ߁ᗧ⼂㧔ࠝ࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊ㧕ࠍᜬߞߚᏒ᳃ߩෳടࠍᄢ ߒߡߊߎߣ߇ᣇಽᮭߩ⊒ዷߩߚߦߪᄢಾߢࠆߣ߁ࠦࡔࡦ࠻߇ߞߚߩߎޕႎ๔ 6 ߦኻߒޔ᳃ߩෳടߩⷰὐ߆ࠄߩᣇ⼏ળߦኻߔࠆ᳃ߩᗧᤋߩ⚵ߺ߮ࠦࡒ ࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ㐿⊒ߩᨒ⚵ߺߣ᳃ෳടߩᨒ⚵ߺߣߩ㑐ଥߦ㑐ߔࠆ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕ 㖧࿖ߩ㊄⋉ᬀᢎ㧔੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼㧕߆ࠄߪޔᣇߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߦߪޔᣇಽᮭߣ Ꮢ᳃ෳട߇ਇนᰳߢࠅޔ㖧࿖ߩᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߪޔ1961 ᐕߩァࠢ࠺࠲ߦࠃࠅᭂߡ ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣߥࠆ߇ޔ1980 ᐕઍએ㒠ޔౣ߮ᣇ⥄ᴦ߇ዅ㊀ߐࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥࠅ⋝ޔᱞ ㋚ᮭߢߪޟޔෳടဳᮭᐭ߇ޠឭ໒ߐࠇޔᮭ㒢ߩ⒖⼑ޔᣇ⽷ߩᡷ㕟╬ߩಽᮭൻ ߇ផㅴߐࠇߚޕᏒ᳃ෳടߦߟߡߪޔ2004 ᐕߦᣇ᳃ᛩᴺ߇Ꮣߐࠇޔ2005 ᐕߦߪޔ ᷣᎺፉߢᦨೋߩ᳃ᛩ߇ᣇᐭߩౣ✬ߦ㑐ߒⴕࠊࠇߚޔߚ߹ޕ2007 ᐕߩᏒ᳃ࠦ࡞ ᴺߩᣉⴕߦࠃࠅ㚂㐳߿⼏ຬߩࠦ࡞ᐲ߇ዉߐࠇޔᏒ᳃ߦࠃࠅ㆑ᴺߥ㊄ᡰ╬ࠍ࠴ ࠚ࠶ࠢߔࠆߚߩ⸷⸩ᐲ߽ 2006 ᐕ߆ࠄዉߐࠇߡࠆߎߣ߇⚫ߐࠇߚࡉࡦࠝޔߚ߹ޕ ࠭ࡑࡦࠝࡉࠦࠕߣ߁ࠗࡦ࠲ࡀ࠶࠻ࠍᵴ↪ߒߚᏒ᳃ෳടᐲ߇᭴▽ߐࠇޔᣉ╷ߦ ߟߡᏒ᳃ߦࠃࠆ⒳߿⺰⼏ߩޘឭ᩺߇น⢻ߣߥࠆਛߢޔᏒ᳃ߩⴕߦኻߔࠆା㗬ᕈ߽ะ ߒߡࠆᣦߩႎ๔߇ߞߚᦨޕᓟߦޔಽᮭൻߦࠃࠅ᳃ਥਥ⟵߇⥄േ⊛ߦ⊒ዷߔࠆࠊߌߢߪ ߥߊޔಽᮭൻߩᡷ㕟ࠍᚑഞߐߖࠆߚߦߪޔᴦߩᒝࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻ࡊ࠶ࠪ࠳ޔ ߩᜬ᧚ੱޔ㐿⊒ߩታᣉ╬ߩദജ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆᣦߩᜰ៰߇ߥߐࠇߚߩߎޕႎ๔ߦኻߒޔ ᣇಽᮭߦଥࠆࡀ࠶࠻ࡢࠢߩ⁁߮Ꮢ᳃ߩ⸷⸩ᐲߦ㑐ߔࠆ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ BambangP.S.Brodjonegoro ቇㇱ㐳㧔ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㧕߆ࠄߪޔ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩᣇಽᮭᡷ㕟ߪޔԘᎺߢߪߥߊ⋥ޔធޔᏒߩࡌ࡞ߦኻߒਛᄩᐭ߆ ࠄಽᮭࠍⴕߞߚߎߣޔԙ㧞㧜㧜ਁੱ߽ߩ࿖ኅോຬ߇ᣇߦ⒖▤ߐࠇߚߎߣߦࠄࠇࠆࠃ ߁ߦޔᭂߡᛮᧄ⊛ߥ߽ߩߢߞߚߎߣ߇⚫ߐࠇߚߚߒ߁ߘޕਛߢޔᏒߪޔ2001 ᐕ ߩ⚂㧟㧠㧜߆ࠄ㧠㧣㧜ߣᄢߦჇടߒߡࠆߎߣޔᏒߩჇടߩ⢛᥊ߦߪޔᣇᐭᣂ ⸳ߦࠃࠆ⽷⊛ߥࡔ࠶࠻߿ᣇߩࠛ࠻ߩኂ߇ࠆ߇ޔ࿖ోߢࠇ߫㕖ല₸ߢ ࠅޔᣇᐭߩᢙߩჇടࠍࠦࡦ࠻ࡠ࡞ߒޔᣇᐭ㑆ߩදജࠍㅴࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆᣦߩᜰ ៰߇ߞߚޔߚ߹ޕ㧥㧜㧑ࠍ߃ࠆᣇᐭߢ੍▚✬ᚑ߇ᣂᐕᐲߦ㑆ߦวࠊߥߥߤߩ 㗴߇ࠆߎߣޔၞ⚻ᷣߩ⊒ዷߩߚߦല₸⊛ߥ੍▚ၫⴕࠍⴕߞߡࠆᣇᐭߪᔅߕߒ ߽ᄙߊߥߎߣޔᣇᐭߩᱦߩᄙߊ߇⡯ຬߩ⛎ਈ⾌ߦᒰߡࠄࠇߩࠬࡆࠨޔะ ߩߚߦᡰߐࠇࠆㇱಽߪᄙߊߥߎߣ╬߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߚߩߘޕߢߦࠬࡆࠨޔ㑐ߒ ⧰ᖱ↳ߒ┙ߡ߇ߢ߈ࠆ࠴ࡖࡦࡀ࡞ߠߊࠅ߿ᦨߩࠬࡆࠨޔૐၮḰߩ⸳ቯࡊ࠻ࠬࡌޔ ࠢ࠹ࠖࠬߩ⚫╬ࠍⴕ߁ᔅⷐ߇ࠅޔᣇᐭᐙㇱߩᬺ❣ࠍ⹏ଔߔࠆ⢻ജࠍၞ㧔᳃㧕 ߇ᜬߟࠃ߁ߦߥࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆᣦߩࠦࡔࡦ࠻߇ߞߚߩߎޕႎ๔ߦኻߒ⾗ޔ㊄ࠍਛᄩᐭ߆ ࠄᏒߦ⋥ធ⒖ォߔࠆᨒ⚵ߺ߮ᣇ⼏ળᣇߩ࠳ߦኻߔࠆ⹏ଔߩࠅᣇߦ㑐 ߔࠆ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߇ⴕࠊࠇߚޕ 㧔ᢥ⽿㧦ᧁବ㧕 7 1. Overview of the Keynote Address and Country Reports On March 5, 2006 (Wednesday), a symposium was held in the Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG), National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), on the subject of “Decentralization and Local Communities: Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance”. The symposium opened with greetings by Tatsuo Hatta, President of GRIPS, followed by a keynote address given by Wataru Oomori, Professor Emeritus of the University of “Decentralization Reform and Strengthening Local Governance”. Tokyo, entitled Next, researchers from the Philippines, China, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia, presented reports on the situation in their respective countries. An overview of the keynote address and the country reports is given below. Finally, after the 6 presenters had made their reports, they took part as panelists in a panel discussion. Details of the contents of which are given in a separate “Panel Discussion” section. 㨇Overview of the Keynote Address㨉 In his keynote address, Prof. Oomori began by explaining the background to the emergence of the term “governance”. He went on to say that the meaning of the term referred to “the way in which various organizational groupings such as the government and private-sector firms conducted themselves”, and that the concept focused on the way of conducting oneself and on the external appearance of conduct and was disseminated under the influence of experiments and case studies introduced from the U.K. Prof. Oomori went on to say that the term “collaboration” has been very rapidly disseminated in recent years, but then referred to the fundamental ordinance issued by Kawasaki City, which defines “collaboration” as a process whereby “the city and its citizens, with a view to realizing their common objectives, within a framework of recognition of their respective roles and responsibilities, show respect for their mutual standpoints and cooperating on the basis of equality”. He pointed out that realizing “collaboration” according to the terms of this definition would not be such an easy task. More specifically, hitherto, both central government and local governments had functioned within the framework of a vertical, hierarchical relationship, and it would not be easy to construct in place of this, a relationship of equals, operating on a horizontal (lateral) basis and seeking to realize common objectives. He pointed out that the historical significance of “collaboration” which prized lateral relationships was not inconsiderable, and that working to change the type of “vertical” management that had hitherto existed and promote citizen autonomy in decentralization reform, raised the question of the way in which citizen autonomy should be realized. 8 As a further issue, Prof. Oomori referred to the need for citizens to reevaluate their own mode of action in a context in which they make excessive demands on the administration and seem unaware of their own role as actors in constructing local governance, and to reform their relationship with local government. 㨇Overview of Country Reports㨉 Country reports were given in turn by representatives from the Philippines, China, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia. The first speaker was Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., Professor & Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines. Prof. Brillantes began by explaining that a certain degree of autonomy had long existed in the Philippines at the level of the villages (barangays). Subsequently, decentralization and the infrastructure for a system of autonomy were promoted by such means as the Maura Law at the time when the Philippines was a Spanish colony, the Malolos Constitution of 1898, and the Barrio-Charter in the period after World War II. However, the reality, Prof. Brillantes pointed out, was one of centralized authority. It was with the introduction of the Local Government Code of 1991 that decentralization began to be promoted in earnest. Authority, including regulatory authority, was transferred from the central government to local governments, close to 70,000 state officials were transferred to local governments, and efforts were made to encourage citizens’ participation in local planning and to strengthen local finances. Prof. Brillantes also explained how cooperation with the private sector was taken forward by such means as the Philippine BOT (build-operate-and-transfer) Law. As a successful example of citizens’ participation, he introduced the case of Naga City, where a Citizens’ Charter was established and plans to construct a golf course were overthrown because of opposition from local residents. As lessons to be learned from decentralization, the speaker listed the need for entrepreneurial aspects in local government, clarification of the importance of financial decentralization, promotion of citizen participation and cooperation between citizens and government, awareness of the need to change paradigms (concepts), awareness of internationalization, and promotion of the use of ICT. He indicated that there was a need for central government to confirm the quality of the level of the actions undertaken by local governments and the effectiveness of their service provisions. Following the presentation, points such as the improvement of service provisions accompanying the transfer of authority were raised in a Q & A session. The next speaker was Chu Songyan, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, China National School of Administration. Prof. Chu began by saying that 30 years after the start of the reform liberation policy in China, it was possible to identify 2 main aspects in decentralization: Ԙ from central government to local governments, and ԙ 9 from central government to the market and to civil society. She reported, however, that China was still at the stage of searching for the right set of policies to follow, that relations between central government and local governments were not regulated by law, and that the present reality was that many different kinds of experiments were being tried out in the government. Prof. Chu said that civil society existed in China too, and that although it was still not very strong, it was developing, and that since the reform liberation policies had been launched in 1978, NGOs were expected to play a role in linking the government with society. She explained that among registered NGOs, there were 3 types: social organizations, civil non-enterprise units, and foundations, but that in addition to these, there were a far greater number of unregistered NGOs. She went on to say that while there were examples of grassroots NGOs which cooperated with the government in the area of welfare projects for the elderly, problem issues were that Ԙ their relations with the government were not based on an equal footing, ԙ the environmental infrastructure and system within which they worked was inadequate, and Ԛ NGOs had little power. At the end of her address, Prof. Chu made the comment that the experience and examples of many countries would serve as useful points of reference for the future development of local communities in China. In the Q & A session that followed the country report, a question was raised as to whether NGOs functioned within a framework of market mechanisms. After the lunch break, the presentation of country reports continued with an address by Woothisarn Tanchai, Associate Professor & Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Thailand. Prof. Woothisarn began by explaining that the local governance system in Thailand has a two-tier structure, consisting of provincial administration as upper tier (equivalent to prefecture in Japan) and municipality tambon administration as lower tier. He said that after the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, decentralization was promoted, the share of government revenue occupied by local government revenue had been raised substantially, and transfer of central authority and the movement of central government officials to local areas had been carried out. However, the respective division of roles between central government and local governments was unclear, and the degree of independence and autonomy of local finances was inadequate. It was against the background of issues of this kind that in the new 2007 Constitution, regulations were established concerning such matters as the clarification of the administrative authority and responsibilities of local governments, the need for clear criteria concerned with the supervision of local governments, independent management of personnel and financial systems, participation in public matters by citizens, communities, and civil society, and the need to safeguard transparency in the political process. The speaker added that with specific reference to public participation by citizens, specific procedures could be identified covering 5 stages, 10 namely: Ԙ the provision of information by local governments; ԙ opportunities for consultation and discussion; Ԛ involvement and encouragement to participate; ԛ collaboration; and Ԝ empowerment. Prof. Woothisarn commented that what was important in the development of decentralization was to expand the participation of citizens who felt a sense of ownership, in other words, who felt that local government was something that belonged to them. Points raised in the Q & A session following the presentation related to devices to ensure that the opinions of the public were reflected in local assemblies from the point of view of participation by citizens in public matters, as well as to the relationship between the framework of community development and the framework of citizen participation. The next speaker was Ik-sik Kim, Professor, Dept. of Public Administration, Kyonggi University, Korea. Prof. Kim began by stressing that decentralization and citizen participation were indispensable elements in local governance. The military coup d’état of 1961 was, he said, a highly centralized phenomenon, but since the 1980s,respect had once again come to be shown for local autonomy, and under the government of President Roh Moo-hyun, participatory-type government was advocated, authority was devolved, and the decentralized reform of local finances was promoted. With regard to citizen participation, the Local Referendum Act was promulgated in 2004, and in 2005, the first local referendum was held on Jeju Island for a reorganization of local government. In addition, in 2007, a citizen recall system was introduced whereby local administrative chiefs could be suspended as a result of a recall vote by citizens, and from the previous year, 2006, a citizen lawsuit system was introduced with the aim of providing a check on the illegal use of public funds. In a further development, a citizen-participation system termed the Ombudsman of Korea was constructed by utilizing the internet, and within the context of discussions and suggestions being made by citizens about policy matters, the level of confidence in the administration shown by citizens has risen. At the end of his address, Prof. Kim said that democracy did not develop automatically as a result of decentralization. It was rather the case that requirements for the success of decentralization reform were a strong commitment to politics, the maintenance of leadership, and the investment of effort in the implementation of human resource development. In the Q & A session that followed, points were raised concerning the present state of networks concerned with decentralization and the use of the citizen lawsuit system. The next and final presenter was Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro, Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. Prof. Brodjonegoro began by saying that as could be seen from the fact that Ԙ decentralization had been not to provinces, but directly to districts and municipalities and ԙ around 2 million national public officials were transferred to local areas, decentralization reform in Indonesia was carried out in 11 an extremely drastic way. He indicated that against this kind of background, with the large increase that could be seen in the number of local governments, from about 340 to 470 in 2001, there were financial merits resulting from the newly established local governments and advantages for the local elite, but over the country as a whole, the system was inefficient, and there was a need to control the increase in the number of local governments and to promote cooperation between local governments. Further problems pointed out by the speaker were that over 90% of local governments failed to draw up their budgets in time for the new financial year, that the number of local governments which implemented their budgets efficiently in support of local economic development was not necessarily large, and that large expenditures by local governments were allocated to the salary payments of officials, while expenditures allocated to raising the level of public services were not large. In addition, there was a need to create channels for making complaints about public services, to establish criteria specifying minimum levels of public service and to introduce systems of best practice. In closing, the speaker also commented that there was a need for local areas (people) to have the ability to evaluate the achievements of local governments. In the Q & A session that followed the report, points were raised concerning the mechanism for transferring funds directly from central government to districts and municipalities, and concerning the way in which local assemblies and local leaders should be evaluated. (Text prepared by Shunsuke Kimura) (Translation by Maurice Jenkins & Makiko Tanaka) 12 㧞㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ ಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣၞ⥄ᴦߩᒝൻ 㧔Decentralization Reform and Strengthening Local Governance㧕 ᄢ ᒫ㧔᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ㧕 ߅ᚻరߦዋߒ㐳ᣣᧄ⺆ߩࡍࡄ߇ߏߑ߹ߔᦨޕೋ߆ࠄትવߢᕟ❗ߢߔ߇ޔ4 ߩᆎ ߦޡᄌൻߦᚢߔࠆ⥄ᴦࠍᧄ߁ߣޢ ߔࠆ੍ቯߢߔߩߘޕਛߩᐞߟ߆ߩ⺰ὐࠍࠨ ࡑࠗ࠭ߒߚ߽ߩ߇ޔ㈩Ꮣߒߚࡍࡄߢߔޕᄖ࿖߆ࠄ᧪ߚᣇߊߥ߇ࡄࡍߩ⺆⧷ߦޘ ߡ↳ߒࠊߌࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ ߎߩࡍࡄߪޔᣣᧄߩ⊝ߐ߹ᣇߦ߅⺒ߺߚߛߌࠇ߫᭴߹ߖࠎ߇ߦࡄࡍߩߎޔ ᦠߡߥߎߣࠍߒ↳ߒ߅ࠄ߆ࠇߎޔߍ߹ߔ⻠ߩ⑳ޔߌߛࠆ߈ߢޕṶએ㒠ߩฦ࿖ߩ ⼏⺰ߦ⽸₂ߒᓧࠆࠃ߁ߦ⧯ޔᐓᲧセ⊛ߥߎߣ߇⸒߃ࠆࠃ߁ߦ߅ߒ↳ߒߍߚߣᕁ߹ ߔߩ⑳ޔߒ߆ߒޕ㑐ᔃߪ߽ߞ߬ࠄᣣᧄߦࠅ߹ߔߩߢ⻉ޔᄖ࿖ߩߎߣߦߟߡߪࠃߊࠊ߆ ࠅ߹ߖࠎޕᓥߞߡޔᣣߪߏᏨߩ⻉ᄖ࿖ߩవ↢ᣇ߆ࠄߚߊߐࠎߩߎߣ߽ቇࠎߢᏫࠅߚ ߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄߩᢥ⣂ߢ߅ߒ↳ߒߍ߹ߔ⻉ࠈࠈޕᄖ࿖ߩะߥߤࠍ߹ߔߣޔᐞߟ߆㊀ⷐ ߥࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃࡔࡦ࠻ࠍߋࠆᄌൻ߇⸰ࠇߡࠆߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔ⇟৻ޕᄢ߈ߥᵹࠇߪޔ ࠺ࠖࡦ࠻࡚ࠗࠪࡦ㧔Decentralization㧕ߢߒߡߤ߶ࠇߘߪࠇߎޔ㔍ߒౝኈߢߪ ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߆ࠄޔᣣߪߎࠇߦߟߡߪ߹ࠅ⺆ࠄߥߎߣߦߒ߹ߔޕ ᣣߩ࠹ࡑߪޔᐭ㑆㑐ଥߩ߁ߜ⥄ᴦߦะ߆ߞߡޔ࿖ࠆߪਛ㑆ߩ⥄ᴦ߇ᜬߞ ߡࠆᮭ㒢ࠍߢ߈ࠆߛߌၮ␆⥄ᴦߩᣇ߳⒖▤ߔࠆߎߣߦߟߡߢߔߩߘޕ႐วߪޔ⒢ ߮⽷Ḯߦߟߡ߽േ߆ߔߣ߁ౝኈߢߔޕᣣߩ࠹ࡑߪ⥄ߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔᴦ߇ᜬߞߡ ࠆߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ࠰ࠬࠍߞߡࠄߚߞ߿߁ߤޔ᳃⥄ᴦߣ߁߽ߩࠍలታߢ߈ࠆ߆߇ὶὐ ߢߔߩߢࠆߋࠍࠇߘޔᐞߟ߆ߩ⺰ὐߦߟߡ߅ߒ↳ߒߍߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄߢߪ⥄ᴦߩㆇ↪ߦᄢ߈ߥ㧞ේೣ߇ࠅޔ㧝ߟߪ⥄ᴦ߇ⴕࠍㆇ༡ߔࠆ႐วߦߪޔ ޟ᳃ਥ⊛ߦⴕߥ߁ޕߔߢߣߎޠ㧞ߟ⋡ߪޟ⢻₸ࠃߊⴕߥ߁ߩߎޕߔߢߣߎޠ㧞ߟ⋡ߪߤޔ ߎߩ࿖ߦ߽ㅢߒߡ߹ߔޕ ޟ᳃ਥ⊛ߦⴕߥ߁߇ࠊޔߪߡߟߦߣߎޠ࿖ߢߪޟᖱႎ㐿ޟߣޠ᳃ෳ↹ߡߞࠃߦޠ ߶߷ᄢߩ᧦ઙᢛ߇ㅴࠎߛߣߡ߹ߔߛ߹ࠅࠃߣ߽ޕദജߩߪࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔᮡḰ ⵝߣ⸒ࠊࠇࠆ⒟ᐲߦ߹ߢߪߎߎޔᄢలታߒߡ߈ߚߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ⑳߇ᣇ⥄ᴦߩീᒝࠍߒߚߎࠈߪ߁߽ߪޔ߇ߚߒߢࠖ࠹ࡁࠗࡑߪ⺰⼏ߩߎߛ߹ޔ ᒰߚࠅ೨ߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚޕᓥߞߡޔ ޟ᳃ਥ⊛ߦㆇ༡ߔࠆ߁ߣޠ㕙ߦߟߡߪޔᣣᧄߢߪ⋧ ᒰ⒟ᐲㅴࠎߢࠆߣߪ⑳ޔ⠨߃ߡ߹ߔ⻉ޔߡߟߦࠇߎޕᄖ࿖ߩ⊝ߐ߹ᣇߣᬌ⸛ߒߚ ߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ 13 ޟ⢻₸⊛ߦⴕߥ߁⾗ߪࠇߎޔ߇ߔߢߣߎߩޠḮߩวℂ⊛ߥ㈩ಽߥߒᵴ↪ߩߎߣߢߔޕ ߎࠇߦߟ߈߹ߒߡ߽ᦨޔㄭ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢߪࠊࠁࠆࡕ࠺࡞ߢ⸒߹ߔߣޔ㧼㧰㧿ࡕ࠺࡞ߩ߁ ߜޔ㧿ࠍಽ⸃ߒ߹ߒߡޔ㧼㧰㧯㧭㧔check ޔaction㧕ߣ߁ߎߣߢోޔߣߒߡߪޔ╷ࠍ ડ↹┙᩺ߔࠆ㕙ࠃࠅ߽ ̆ߘߩ㕙ߪෳടߦᒝߊ⚿߮ߟ߈߹ߔ߇̆ ࠆ߿ᬺ ࠍⴕߥߞߚߣ߈ߦ⚿ߥ߁ࠃߩߤ߇ࠇߘޔᨐࠍ߽ߚࠄߒߡࠆ߆߁߁ߤޔᚑᨐࠍ߽ߚࠄߒ ߡࠆ߆ߩߤޔ⒟ᐲല₸ࠃߊߘߩ߇ⴕߥࠊࠇߡࠆ߆ߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔ㕙ߦὶὐ߇ᒰߡ ࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߒߡㅴߺᆎߡ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߪᚻᴺߣߒߡߪࠈࠈߣࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔോᬺߩ⹏ଔߣ߆ߌߛࠆ߈ߢޔዋੱᢙߩ ⡯ຬߢࠍⴕߥ߁ߣ߆ߪࠆޔᓟߢㅀߴ߹ߔ߇⥄ߢ߹ࠇߎޔᴦߩ⡯ຬ߇⋥ធᜂᒰߒ ߡߚࠍ᳃㑆ߦߒߡߢ߈ࠆߛߌല₸ࠃߊࠍⴕߥ߁߇ޔ᳃ࠨࡆࠬߪߥࠆߴߊ ਅߍߥߢታᣉߔࠆߣ߁ߩߎޔߢߜߚ߆ߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔ㕙߽ࠆ⒟ᐲㅴߺᆎߡ߹ߔޕ ߚߛ⥄ޔᴦߩ⡯ຬߪޔ ޟ⢻₸ࠃߊⴕߥ߁߽ߊߦߒߦ⊛⊒⥄߆ߥ߆ߥޔߪߣߎ߁ߣޠ ߩߢ⟵ࠍࠇߎߌߛࠆ߈ߢޔോߠߌ߹ߒߡޟޔᔅߕ⢻₸ࠃߊࠍߒߥߌࠇ߫ߌ߹ߖࠎߣޠ ߁ߎߣߢޔߩߣߎࠈⴕߥࠊࠇߡ߹ߔޕᓥߞߡޔോᬺ⹏ଔ߽⥄Ꮖ⹏ଔߦߥߞ ߡ߹ߔߩߘޕࠍᜂᒰߒߡࠆ⡯ຬ⥄ࠄ߇⥄ಽߩࡄࡈࠜࡑࡦࠬࠍ⥄ߕ߹ޔᏆ⹏ଔࠍ ߒߡߡߒߘޔᄖㇱߩ⋡ߦߐࠄߔߣ߁ᣇᑼߢㅴࠎߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᓥ߹ߒߡޔᴺᓞⷐ⺧ߐࠇߡࠆޟ᳃ਥ⊛߆ߟ⢻₸⊛ߦⴕߥ߁ߡߟߦߣߎ߁ߣޠ ߪߥࠈࠈߦࠅߥࠇߘޔᎿᄦߢㅴߺᆎߡ߹ߔ৻ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕㅪߩᵹࠇߩਛ߆ࠄޔታ ߪ⑳ߪ߹ࠅ⼏⺰ࠍߒߡߎߥ߆ߞߚߩߢߔ߇ޔᣣߩ࠹ࡑߢࠆ߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟ ⸒ᣇ߇⊓႐ߒᆎ߹ߒߚޕ ⸒߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟᣇߢߡߺ߹ߔߣޔ᳃㑆ડᬺߢߪࡃࠟ࠻ࡐࠦޟ ࠽ࡦࠬޕߔ߹ߡߞ⸒ߣޠ ޟㇺᏒ⚻༡ߩޠಽ㊁ߢߪ߹ߡߞ⸒ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟࡦࡃࠕޟ ߔޕᣣߩ࠹ࡑߩ߁߽ޔߪޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ࡞ࠞࡠޟዋߒ㒢ቯߔࠆߣࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦޟ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޕߔ߹ߡߞ⸒ࠍߣߎ߁ߣޠ ߘߩޔ߇ߔ߹ࠅߥߦߣߎ߁ߣ߆ߩࠆߡߒࠊࠍߣߎߥ߁ࠃߩߤޔߪߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟ 㧞ߟߩᗧวࠍࠎߢ߹ߔޕ㧝ߟߪߘࠇߙࠇߩ⚵❱߇ߤ߁ᝄࠆ⥰߁߆ߢߔޕᐭ߇ ߤ߁ᝄࠆ⥰߁߆ޔ᳃㑆ડᬺ߇ߤ߁ᝄࠆ⥰߁߆ߣ߁ߎߣߢߔ࠻ࡐࠦޟ߫߃ߣߚޕ ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔߪߩ߁ߣޠᴺࠍ߈ߜࠎߣㆩߒߡࠆ߆㧔ࠦࡦࡊࠗࠕࡦࠬ㧕ߣ߆ޔෂ ᯏߦㆣㆄߒߚߣ߈ߦߤ߁ኻಣߔࠆ߆ߣ߆ߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔౝኈߢ⼏⺰ߐࠇߡ߹ߔߩߢޔᩣᑼ ળ␠ࠍ᳃㑆ડᬺ߽ޕߔ߹ࠅ߇ߣߎ߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟ ᓥߞߡ❱⚵ߥ߹ߑ߹ߐޔߪߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟ㓸࿅ߩᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߩߎߣߢࠅ߹ߟޔᝄࠅ⥰ ᣇߩᣇޔᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߩᒻᘒߦ⌕⋡ߒߡࠆᔨߢࠅߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟࠍߣߎߩߘޔ ࠎߢ߹ߔޕᓥߞߡޔᐭߩ႐วޔਛᄩᐭߢ߽ᣇᐭߢ߽ߩߘޔᝄࠆ⥰ᣇ߇ߤ߁ ߥߞߡࠆ߆⌒⌕ߩߡߟߦߣߎ߁ߣޔὐ߇߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟᔨߢߔޕ ࠊ߇࿖ߢߎߩߩߣߎ߁ߣޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟᔨ߇ᕆㅦߦ᥉ߒߚ⢛᥊ߦߪޔୟ⊛ߦࠗ ࠡࠬߩታ㛎߿ታ߇ᓇ㗀ࠍ߷ߒߡࠆߣߡ߹ߔ߹߽ߡߟߦߣߎߩࠬࠡࠗޕ 14 ࠅߒߊߪࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇ᦨ߫߃ߣߚޔㄭߩࠗࠡࠬߢᦨ߽ࡐࡇࡘߥᔨߪ㧼㧼㧼 㧔Public Private Partnership㧕ߢߔߩߣߎޕㆇ߮ᣇࠍߣޠ߁ߥⴕߢࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄޟ ߁ߎߣߢߒߡޔᓟߢㅀߴ߹ߔ߇◲ߤ߶ࠇߘޔනߦߪ᧪ߥߎߣߢߔޕ㧼㧼㧼ߣ߁ߎߣ ߇⸒ࠊࠇᆎߡࠆߎߣߣ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢⴕߥࠊࠇᆎߡࠆߎߣ߇ߣࠬࠡࠗޔ㕖Ᏹߦࠃߊ ૃߡ߹ߔޔ߽ࠅࠃ߁ߣࠆߡૃޕᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌߚߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ߁߽ߩޠࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޟ㧝ߟߩᗧߪ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢᕆㅦߦ᥉ߒߚޟදޕߔߢߣߎ߁ߣޠ ߤߩࠃ߁ߦߒߡࠊ߇࿖ߦ PPP ߩ⠨߃ᣇ߇ߞߡ߈ߚ߆ߣ߁ߩߪޔߣ߁⸒ߢ⺆↪ߩ⪲⸒ޔ ᣣߩࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߩ࠲ࠗ࠻࡞ߦࠦࡏ࡚ࠪࡦ㧔collaboration㧕 ߣ߁⧷⺆߇ߟߡ ߹ߔ߇ߩ⺆⧷߁ߣࡦ࡚ࠪࡏࠦߩߎޔᣣᧄ⺆⸶ߪޟද߹ࠇߎޔ߇ߔ߹ߣޠ ߢ࿖⺆ߩㄉᦠߦタߞߡߥ߆ߞߚṽሼ߇᥉ߒᆎߡࠆߩߢߔޕ ᣣᧄߩ⊝ߐ߹ᣇߪޔ ޔߣ߁ߣޠ߁ߤ߁ࠂ߈ޟหߩหߩࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦޔᣣᧄ⺆⸶ ߩหߢߔߦޠޟࠅ߹ߟޕหߓߣᦠߊޟห߁߽ޔߣޠ㧝ߟߪදห⚵วߩදജߩޟදޠ ߦหߓߣᦠߊޟදหᦨޕߚߒ߹ࠅ߇ޠㄭ߹ߢᣣᧄߩ࿖⺆ߩㄉᦠߦߪޔදജߩޟදߣޠ ߊޔ ޟද߁ߣޠṽሼߪタߞߡߥ߆ߞߚߩߢߔߪࠇߎޕᕆㅦߦ᥉ߒᆎ߹ߒߚޕ ߎߩޟදߪߣߎ߁ߣޠࠍߒߡࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆ޕනߥࠆޠࡦ࡚ࠪࡐࠦޟ ߢߪߥߊߡࡦ࡚ࠪࡏࠦޟߡߒ߁ߤޔ㧔ද㧕 ߇ࠊ߇ߣߎߩߘޔ߆ߩ߁⸒ߣޠ࿖ߦ߅ߌ ࠆ⥄ᴦߦ႐ߩࠆ⒳ߩᄌൻߣ߁߽ߩࠍࠊߒߡࠆߣᕁ߃߹ߔޕ ߎߩޟද߽ࠇߎޔߣߎࠆߡߞ⸒ߣޠੑ㊀ߦߥߞߡ߹ߒߡޔ᳃㑆᳃㑆㑆ߩ㑐ଥ ߣ߽߁㧝ߟߪᓎᚲߣ᳃᳃㑆ߣߩ㑐ଥߩߎߣߢߔޕᏒ↸ߩᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߦߪ߁ࠃߩߤޔ ߦߒߡߎߩᔨ߇ߞߚ߆ߣ߁ߣߪࠇߎޔ⏕ߢߒߡࠎߐ⊝ޔᣇߩ߅ᚻరߩᣣᧄ⺆ߩࡍ ࡄߩ㧤ࡍࠫߦߩߎޔᔨ߇࿖ߩᐭߩᢥᦠߦᑼߦ⊓႐ߒߚ߽ߩ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕᄖ࿖ ߩ⊝ߐ߹ᣇߢߩࠎߖ߹ࠅ߇ࡄࡍߩ⺆⧷ޔᕟ❗ߢߔ߇ޔ㧤ࡍࠫߩߣߎࠈߦޔ2003 ᐕ ߦ╙ 27 ᰴߩᣇᐲ⺞ᩏળޔౝ㑑✚ℂᄢ⤿ߩ⻁ᯏ㑐ߩ⺞ᩏળ߇⊒ߒߚਛ㑆ႎ๔ߩਛߦ ࠅޔฬߦߥߞߡߘࠇએ㒠᥉ߒߚᢥ⸒㧔એਅ㧕ߢߔޕ 㧨ᢥ⸒㧪 ޟၞߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ࠨࡆࠬࠍᜂ߁ߩߪⴕޔߩߺߢߪߥޕಽᮭᤨઍߩၮ␆⥄ᴦߦ߅ ߡߪޔ᳃߿㊀ⷐߥࡄ࠻࠽ߣߒߡߩࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ⚵❱ޔ㧺㧼㧻ઁߩߘޔ᳃㑆ࠢ ࠲ߣ߽දߒ⋧ޔߦㅪ៤ߒߡᣂߒⓨ㑆ࠍᒻᚑߒߡߊߎߣࠍ⋡ᜰߔߴ߈ߢࠆޠ ߟ߹ࠅޔᣂߒၮ␆⥄ᴦߩᆫߣߒߡߩߎޔදߣ߆ᣂߒⓨ㑆ࠍߟߊࠆߣ߁ߎ ߣ߇ᄢߥછോߦߥߞߡࠆࠃ߁ߥት⸒ߣ߽ขࠇࠆᢥᦠ߇࿖ߩࡍࡄߣߒߡߡ߈߹ߒ ߚߩߘޕ⠨߃ᣇߩᓇ㗀ࠍฃߌ߹ߒߡ⥄ޔᴦߢߪࠈࠈߥ⹜ߺ߇ᆎ߹ࠅ߹ߒߚޕ ࠊ߇࿖ߩᦨㄭߩ⥄ᴦߢߪޔᣣߩ߅ߒߒߡࠆޟ᳃ෳ↹ߣޠㅪേߒߡޔ ޟදߣޠ ߁ߎߣߣߟߥ߇ࠅ߇ࠆࠃ߁ߦޔ ߇ߩ߽߁ߣޠ᧦ޟቯࠄࠇᆎߡ߹ߔ⋧ߪࠇߎޕ ᒰߩᄌൻߢޔᲧセ⊛ᣧᤨᦼߦޟᏒ᳃දផㅴ᧦╷ࠍޠቯߒߚߩߪޔጟጊᏒߢߞߡ 2001 ᐕߩ㧠ߦߎߩ᧦ࠍߟߊߞߡ߹ߔߩ᧦ߩߎޕਛߦޟද߁ߣޠᣂߒ⸒⪲㆜߇ 15 ߞߡ߹ߔޕ ߘߩᓟోޔ࿖ߩ⥄ᴦߢ⥄ޟᴦၮᧄ᧦߇ߩ߁ߣޠ᧦ࠅߊߠߜ߹ޟ߆ߣޠ᥉ߒ߹ ߒߚޕ ⥄ޟᴦၮᧄ᧦⥄ޔߣ߁ߣ߆ࠆߡࠇࠄߊߟߦ߁ࠃߩߤ߇ޠᴦࠍ᭴ᚑߔࠆߐ߹ߑ ߹ߥࠕࠢ࠲㧔᳃⥄ޔᴦޔ᳃㑆ᯏ㑐ޔၞ㧕߇⥄ಽߚߜߩၞ߿߹ߜߠߊࠅߦߤߩࠃ ߁ߥᓎഀࠍᨐߚߒߩߘޔᨐߚߔߣ߈ߩၮᧄ⊛ߥ࡞࡞ޔ㑐ଥߩ࡞࡞ߦߟߡቯߡࠆ ߽ߩߢߔޕ ߎࠇࠄߩ᧦ߪޔᄢૃߡ߹ߔ߇ޔ⏕ߦޟදࠍߣߎ߁ߣޠቯ⟵ߒߡࠆ߽ߩ߇ ࠅ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕᎹፒᏒ߇ 2004 ᐕߩ 12 ߦቯߚ⥄ޟᴦၮᧄ᧦ߩޠਛߦߪᰴߩࠃ߁ ߦޟදࠍޠቯ⟵ߒߡ߹ߔߩߘޕቯ⟵ߪޟᏒ᳃߮Ꮢ㧔ᎹፒᏒߩߎߣߢߔ߇㧕߇ㅢߩ ⋡⊛ࠍታߔࠆߚߩࠇߙࠇߘޔᓎഀߣ⽿છߩ߽ߣߢ⋧ޔߩ┙႐ࠍዅ㊀ߒޔኻ╬ߥ㑐ଥ ߦ┙ߞߡදജߔࠆߎߣࠍ⸒߁ޕߔߢޠ㐳ߢߔ߇߇ࠊߥ⊛ဳౖ߇ࠇߎޔ࿖ߩ⥄ᴦၮᧄ᧦ ߩਛߦቯࠄࠇߡࠆޟදߩ⪲⸒߁ߣޠቯ⟵ߦߥߞߡ߹ߔޕ ৻ߎߩࠃ߁ߥߎߣ߇◲නߦߢ߈ࠆ߆ߤ߁߆߇ᦨޔೋߩ⑳ߩ㗴ឭߢߔޕ㗴ឭࠍ ᐢߊߒߔ߉߹ߔߣ⼏⺰߇ᢔߒ߹ߔߩߢ⧯ᐓ㒢ቯ⊛ߢߔ߇߽ᦨޔᄢ߈ߊߎߩ㗴ࠍߣࠄ߃ ߡߺߡޔ߇ᄢ߈ߥ㗴ὐߢࠆ߆ޔࠍࠊࠇࠊࠇߪ⠨߃ߥߣߌߥߣ߁ߎߣߦߟ ߡ߅ߒ↳ߒߍ߹ߔޕ ᓥ᧪࠻ࡦࡔࡃࠟޔ㧔ਛᄩᐭޔᣇᐭ㧕ߩᝄࠆ⥰ᣇߪޔၮᧄ⊛ߦߪု⋥⊛ߩ❑ޔ⒎ ᐨߢޔߺ⚵ࠍߣߏߩ߽ޔታߔࠆߣ߁৻߁߁ߘޔ⒳ߩࡅࠛ࡞ࠠߩ᭴ㅧߦߥߞߡ ߹ߔޕᓥߞߡౖဳ⊛ߦߪ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߩ႐วߪޔᏒߢ⠨߃ࠆߣᏒ㐳ߐࠎޔᐙㇱ⡯ຬޔ⡯ຬ߇ਗ ࠎߢࠆߣ߁ߩဳ࠼࠶ࡒࡇ߁߁ߘޔ᭴ㅧߦߥߞߡ߹ߔ❱⚵ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕ㓸࿅߇ ࠆߎߣߦขࠅ⚵ࠎߢ⋧ޔߣ߁ߥⴕࠍߣߎࠆޔᒰ⒟ᐲߩߎߣ߇น⢻ߦߥࠅ߹ߔߩ❑ߩߎޕ ⒎ᐨߢ߽ߩߏߣࠍㆇ߱ߎߣߦߟߡߪ⹜ߐࠇߡ߹ߔ߇ߣߎߥ߹ߑ߹ߐޕน⢻ߦߥࠆߎߣ ߇⹜ߐࠇߡ߹ߔߩߎߤޕ࿖ߢ߽ߎߩࠃ߁ߢߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ㗴ὐ߽ࠅ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߦኻߒߡޔߪߩࠆߡߒ⚫߇⑳߹ޔ᳓ᐔ⊛ߥ㑐ଥࠍߟߊࠅߥ߇ࠄޔㅢߩ⋡⊛ ࠍታߔࠆߣ߁ߪࠇߎޔᮮߢੱ㑆ࠍߟߥߍࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡࠍߣߎࠆޔᚑߘ߁ߣߒߡ ߹ߔ◲ߪࠇߎޕනߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ ◲නߢߪߥߎߣࠍ⧯ᐓᐢߦ⠨߃߹ߔߣ⧯ߪࠇߎޔᐓ⸒⪲ㆆ߮ߩ߈ࠄ߇ࠆߩߢߔ ߇ޔߩᣣᧄ⺆ߩ࿖⺆ߩㄉᦠࠍᒁߡޟޔᮮ߁ߣޠṽሼߪߔߴߡࠃߊߥ⸒⪲ߦࠊࠇ ߡ߹ߔޕ ޟᮮޔᮮⴕޔᮮ⌕ޔᮮゞߥߤޠၮᧄ⊛ߦ⸒߃߫ోㇱᖡ⸒⪲ߢߔߣߎ߁ߣޕ ߪޔᮮߦੱ㑆ࠍߟߥߋߎߣߦߟߡߪᅑബߐࠇߡߥߣࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄߩᱧผߩਛߢޔ ޟᮮ߇ߣߎ߁ߣޠᅑബߐࠇߡޔᣣᧄߩ␠ળࠍᄢ߈ߊᄌ߃ߚᤨᦼ߇ ࠅ߹ߒߚޕᴦ⛽ᣂߩߎࠈߢߔޕᳯᚭ߆ࠄᴦߦ߆ߌߡߤ߁߁ߎߣࠍⴕߥߞߚ߆ߣ߁ ߣޔᣣᧄߩㄭઍ࿖ኅߩᚑ┙ᦼߢߒߚ߆ࠄޔ ޟᣣᧄ࿖᳃߇ޠ㧝ੱ߽ߥ߆ߞߚߣ߈ߦޔᣣᧄ࿖ ᳃ࠍഃߔࠆߣ߁ᬺࠍⴕߥߞߚ৻ㅪ৻⟲ߩਅ⚖ᱞ჻ߚߜ߇߹ߒߚߩߎޕਅ⚖ᱞ჻ߚ ߜߪޔᒰᤨߢ⸒߃߫ᨋ┙ߒߡߚ⮲ߊߚ߆ޔ㐽ߑߐࠇߡࠆ࠹࠻ߦ߹ߒߡ◲ޔන ߦᄖߩੱ㑆ߣ⼏⺰ߔࠆߎߣߪᱛߐࠇߡ߹ߒߚޕࠍ߆ߌߡߎߩ⁁ᴫࠍ⓭⎕ߒߚߩߢߔޕ 16 ߘߩᒰᤨ⸒ࠊࠇߚ⸒⪲ߪޟᮮ⼏ޕߔߢޠᮮߢ⼏⺰ߔࠆ߽߆ߒޕᮮߦേ߈߹ߔߩߢޔ ޟᮮⴕޠ ߣ⸒߁ߩߢߔޕᮮߦⴕ߈ޔᮮߦ⚿߮ߟߊߩߢޟޔᮮ⚿ߣޠࠎߢ߹ߒߚޕ ߎࠇߪ৻⒳ߩ㕟ㆇേߢߔ⊓߇ࠇߎޕ႐ߒߚߣ߈ߦޔᒰᤨߩࠕࡦࠪࡖࡦࠫࡓߪ㕖Ᏹ ߦᒝህᖡᗵ߇ࠅࠍࠇߎޔᱛߔࠆࠍߒߡ߹ߔޕᱛߔࠆߪޟᮮ⼏ᮮⴕߩ ߣޠ߫ࠇ߹ߒߚࠍࠇߎޕ߆ߌߡ⓭⎕ߔࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡޔᣂߒ␠ળ߇㐿ߌ߹ߒߚޕ ᓥߞߡޔᴦ⛽ᣂߩߎࠈߦ᳓ᐔ⊛ߦᔒࠍ߽ߣߦੱ㑆ࠍߟߥߍߡߊߣ߁⹜ߺ߇ᄢⷙᮨߢ ⴕߥࠊࠇߚߩߢߔޕ ߎߩᲧ༙ߢ߈߹ߔߣޔࠊ߇࿖ߢߎࠇ߶ߤޟද⥄ࠍߣߎ߁ߣޠᴦ߇⸒ᆎ ߡࠆߩߪޔ㐳㑆ߩ❑ޔ⒎ᐨߩਛߢㆇ߫ࠇߚߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ߿ࠅᣇߩ㒢⇇ࠍ⓭⎕ߒߚߣ ߁ᗧ࿑߇㓝ߐࠇߡߚߩ߆߽ߒࠇߥߣ⠨߃ࠆߣߩߺ⹜ߩߎޔᱧผ⊛ߥᗧ⟵ߪዋߥߊߥ ߣᕁ߃߹ߔ⹏ߦ߁ࠃߩߘޕଔߒߡ߽ߩ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖࠎޕ ߒ߆ߒޔߢߩߥߡࠇߐ⹜ߪࠇߎޔవ߶ߤߩቯ⟵ߩࠃ߁ߦޔ᳃⥄ޔᴦ㧔ⴕ㧕ޔ᳃ 㑆ડᬺ㧔༡ડᬺޔ㕖༡ડᬺ㧕ߘࠇߙࠇ߇ኻ╬ߢ߽߆ߒޔㅢߩ⋡⊛ࠍታߒߡߊߣ ߁ߩߪߣࠆߔߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔน⢻ߦߥࠆߩ߆ߪ◲ޔනߦ⸒߃߹ߖࠎޕ ․ߦ⸒߃ߥߩߪ⥄ޔᴦߩ⡯ຬ߇⠌ᾫߒߡࠆ߿ࠅᣇߪߦ߁ࠃߩߎޔ᳓ᐔ⊛ߦߟߥ߇ ߞߡߞߡߎߣࠍᚑߔ߿ࠅᣇߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޕၮᧄ⊛ߦߪߩ❑ޔ⒎ᐨߢേߡ߹ߔߩߢޔ ᣣᧄߩ⥄ᴦߩⴕߩᝄࠆ⥰ᣇࠍߩߎޔදߢᄌ߃ߡߊߣ߁ߎߣߦߥࠆߣޔౝߩࡑ ࡀࠫࡔࡦ࠻ߩࠅᣇࠍᄌ߃ߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎޕ ᄌ߃ࠆߚߦߪ⥄ޔᴦߪ᳃ޔ᳃㑆ᯏ㑐ޔၞߣߤߩࠃ߁ߦᣂߒ㑐ଥࠍ▽ߌ߫ࠃ ߆ࠍ⠨߃ࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕᓥߞߡߥߦߣߎ߁ߣ߆߁ߥⴕߦ߁ࠃߩߤࠍߺ⹜߁߁ߘޔ ࠅ߹ߔ߇⥄ߕ߹ޔᴦߢᅑബߒߡࠆߩߪޔ᳃ห჻ޔ᳃㑆ห჻߇ᮮߦߟߥ߇ߞߡࠆޔ ߎߣࠍᚑߘ߁ߣߔࠆߎߣߪ৻ᚲ ᔕេߢ߈߹ߔ߇ⴕޔߣ᳃㑆߇දߔࠆߣ߁ߩߪޔ ߘࠎߥߦ◲නߥߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ᳃㑆ޔਅᚻߦදߔࠆߣᔅߕᏎ߈ㄟ߹ࠇߡߒ߹ޔ ⴕߩਛߦ൮៨ߐࠇߡߒ߹߁น⢻ᕈ߇ࠅ߹ߔߩߢ⼊ޔᚓᔃ߇◲නߦ⸃㒰ߢ߈߹ߖࠎޕ ߽߁ዋߒ⸒߁ߣޔᓎᚲߪޟද߁ߣޠᣣᧄ⺆ߦኻߒߡࠗࡔࠫࠍᜬߞߡߡߺޔ ࠎߥ߇දജ⊛ߦߥࠆߩߢޔᛕ್߿⧰ᖱࠍ⸒ߞߚࠅߒߥߢදജ⊛ߢࠆߣ⠨߃߹ߔ߆ߒޕ ߽ޟߊ߁ߣޠሼߢߔ߆ࠄޔ᳨ࠍᵹߒߡߊࠇߡᤨޔ㑆ߣഭജ߽⾌߿ߒߡߊࠇࠆߩߢ⥄ޔ ᴦ߆ࠄߔࠆߣޕߔߢ⪲⸒߽ߡߣߪ⪲⸒ߩߎޔ ⸒⪲ߣᤋߞߡࠆ⢛᥊ߦߪ㧞ߟߩߎߣ߇⸒߃߹ߔޕᣣᧄߩ⥄ᴦߩ⽷ߪ⋧ᒰㅼㄼ ߒߡ߹ߒߡޔᓥ೨ߩࠃ߁ߥࠨࡆࠬࠍߎࠇએឭଏߢ߈ߥߒޔᓥ᧪ߩࠨࡆࠬࠍࠞ࠶ ࠻ߒߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎޕᓥߞߡޔ᳃߿᳃㑆߇ߢ߈ࠆߎߣߪࠄߜߘޔߢ߿ߞߡ߽ࠄߚ ߣ߁ᗧ࿑߇ߤߎ߆ߦ⸤ߐࠇߡࠆ↪⺆ߢࠅ߹ߔޕ⢛᥊ߩ㧝ߟߪ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߩ⥄ᴦߩ ⽷ㅼㄼߢߔޕ 㧞ߟ⋡ߪߪߣࠇߎޔᢥ⣂ࠍ⇣ߦߒ߹ߔ߇߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢ߽⋧ᒰ⒟ᐲಽᮭᡷ㕟߇ㅴࠎߢ߹ߔޕ ಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣ߁ߩߪ⥄ᴦߦߣߞߡߪ⚿᭴߈߮ߒߢߔޔߪߢ߹ࠇߎޕ ޟ࿖߇㊀ⷐߥߎߣ ߪࠆ߆ࠄ⥄ޔᴦߪߘࠇࠍࠃߊℂ⸃ߒߡࠍ߿ࠅߥߐߪߣߎߥࠄ߆ࠊޕ࿖ߦ⡞ 17 ߈ߥߐ߁ߣޠᵹࠇߢߒߚޕᕃߌ⠪ߩ⥄ᴦ⡯ຬߦߣߞߡߪߪࠇߎޔᭉߢߒߚ⥄ޕᴦ ߦኻߒߡޟડ↹┙᩺ߩᮭ㒢ߣࠍࠇߘޔㆇ↪ߔࠆ⾗Ḯࠍਈ߃ࠆ߆ࠄ⥄ޔಽߚߜߢ⠨߃ߥ߇ ࠄࠍ߿ࠅߥߐ⥄ޔߪߣߎ߁ߣޠᴦߦ⥄ಽߚߜߢ⠨߃ߡ⥄ޔಽߚߜߢ⽿છࠍข ࠆߎߣߦߥࠆ߆ࠄߢߔ⥄ޕᴦߛߌߢߪ᧪ߥߩߢޔᔅߕߤߎ߆ߢࠃࠅ৻ጀߩ᳃ෳ ↹ࠍⴕߥ߇ࠄޔࠍ߿ߞߡߊߴ߈߆⹏ߥ߁ࠃߩߤޔଔࠍฃߌࠆ߆ߥߤࠍ⠨߃ߡㅴࠆ ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕᓥߞߡޔᄢ߈ߥಽᮭᡷ㕟ߪᔅߕᐢᗧߢ᳃⥄ᴦࠍଦㅴߔࠆᣇะߦേ ߈߹ߔࠅ߿ߌߛࠇߤࠍߣߎߩߘޕಾࠇࠆ߆ߪ⥄ޔᴦߩᣇߩޘᗧ᰼ޔ⢻ജޔ߮ߘࠇߙࠇ ߩ⥄ᴦߩၞ߇ߤ߁ߥߞߡࠆ߆ߦଐሽߒߡ߹ߔޕ ࠄ߆ߦಽᮭᡷ㕟ߩ㧝ߟߩᓇ㗀ߪޔฦ⥄ᴦߢ⥄ޟಽߚߜߢᧄᒰߦᔅⷐߥߎߣߪߢ ࠆ߆ߢ߹ߒ߽ޕᔅⷐߢߥߎߣࠍ߿ߞߡߚߥࠄᧄޕߐߥ߿ࠍࠇߘޔᒰߦᔅⷐߥߎ ߣߦߟߡߣࠎߜ߈ޔ╷ࠍᛂߜ┙ߡࠅ߿ࠍࠇߘޔᛮߡ߈ߥߐ߁ߣޠᯏㆇࠍߟߊ ࠅߒߡߊߣ߁ߎߣߢߪޔಽᮭᡷ㕟ߪᗧࠍᜬߞߡ߹ߔߩߎޕ㧞ߟߩᄢ߈ߥᵹࠇߩ ਛߢޔ᳃⥄ᴦࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦታߔࠆ߆ߣ߁ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߦዋߒ⑳߇ᣣᧄߩߎߣߦߟߡ ᔨߒߡࠆߎߣࠍ߅ߒ↳ߒߍ߹ߒߡᦨޔೋߩ 㗴ឭߣߒ߹ߔޕ ߎߩࠃ߁ߦ⠨߃ࠆߣޔᡷߡ⥄ᴦ㧔ߎߎߢߪⴕߢ⚿᭴ߢߔ߇㧕߇ޔ᳃ޔၞޔ᳃ 㑆ᯏ㑐ߣߩ㑐ଥࠍ⠨߃ࠆ႐วߦᦨޔㄭߩᣣᧄߩ⽎ߩਛߦޔዋߒ ᔨߔߴ߈ะ߇ࠇᆎ ߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇߪޔ᳃㧔↪⠪ޔᶖ⾌⠪ߣ߽⸒߃߹ߔ߇㧕߇৻⥸⊛ߥ⊛ᯏ㑐㧔∛㒮ޔቇᩞߥߤ㧕 ߢࠨࡆࠬࠍฃߌࠆߣ߈ߦޔዊߐߥߎߣߦߟߡ㕖Ᏹߦᄢ߈ߥࠢࡓࠍߟߌࠆߎߣߦࠃ ߞߡޔኾ㐷⊛ߥࠍߒߡࠆੱߚߜ߇߿ߦߥࠅᆎߡ߹ߔޕኾ㐷⊛ߥࠍߔࠆੱ ߚߜࠍỗബߒߥࠃ߁ߥ৻ㇱߩ᳃ߩേ߈߇⊒↢ߒߡߡ߇ࠊ߫߃ߣߚޔ࿖ߩක≮႐߿ ᢎ⢒႐ࠍ㕖Ᏹߦᖡൻߐߖߡ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߪ⥄ᴦ⺰ߢ⸒߃߫⥄ޔᴦߣ߁ߩߪᓎᚲߛߌߢߪᚑࠅ┙ߚߥ߽ߩߢߔޕᐲߪ ᳃⥄りߩᝄࠆ⥰ᣇ߇㗴ߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕ᳃߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߦᝄࠆ⥰߃߫⥄ޔಽߚߜߩ⥄ᴦߪ ࠃࠅ߽ߩߦߥࠆߩ߆ߣ߁ߎߣࠍᡷߡޔᐢߊ᳃ߣᓎᚲߣߩ㑐ଥࠍౣ᭴▽ߒߥߣ ߌߥߩߢߔޕౣ⚿ᚑߒߥߣߌߥࠃ߁ߥ⽎߇ዋߒߕߟᆎߡߡߪࠇߎޔ᳇ ߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕ ߚߣ߃߫߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢߪߤߎߩዊቇᩞߢ߽ቇᩞ⛎㘩ࠍߒߡ߹ߔ৻ޕ⒳ߩࠨࡆࠬߢߔ ߇ޔᒰὼߥ߇ࠄቇᩞ⛎㘩ߦߟߡߪޔῳᲣ߇৻ቯߩ⚻⾌ࠍ⽶ᜂߒߡ߹ߔޕታߪቇᩞ⛎㘩 ⾌ߩᧂᛄޔṛ⚊߇ߎߞߡ߹ߒߡ⥄ޔಽߩሶߤ߽ߦቇᩞ⛎㘩ࠍ㘩ߴߐߖߥ߇ࠄߐߐޔ ߿߆ߥቇᩞ⛎㘩ߩ⽶ᜂ㊄ࠍᛄࠊߥߩߢߔޕᛄ߃ࠆߦ߽߆߆ࠊࠄߕޔᛄࠊߥߣ߁ੱߚ ߜ߇ᆎߡ߹ߔޔ߽߆ߒޕవ↢߇㗡ࠍਅߍߡߘߩᧂᛄߩቇᩞ⛎㘩⾌ࠍޟᛄߞߡߊߛ ߐߣޠ࿁ߞߡ߹ߔߥࠎߎޕᘒߪᦨ߇⑳ޔೋߦᣇ⥄ᴦࠍീᒝߒߚߣ߈ߦߪࠅ߹ߖ ࠎߢߒߚޕ߆߁ࠂߒߢߩߚߞߥ߁ߤޕ ߎࠇߪߟ߹ࠅޔ᳃߇ߺࠎߥ߅ቴߐࠎߦߥߞߡߡߣࠆ߃ࠄ߽ߡߞ߿߽ߢࠎߥޔ⠨߃ߡ 18 ߹ߔޔߣߥ߃ࠄ߽ߡߞ߿ޔ߽߆ߒޕዊߐߥߎߣߢ৻ᚲ ࠢࡓࠍߟߌࠆߣ߁ߩ ߪߥ߁ࠃߩߘޕ߆߁ࠂߒߢߣߎ߁߁ߤޔᘒ߇ㅴࠎߢߊߣޔᣣᧄߩ⥄ᴦߪ߽ߩߦ ߥࠇߥߩߢޔᡷߡ⥄ᴦࠍ᭴ᚑߒߡࠆฦࠕࠢ࠲ߩࠅᣇ߮ࠕࠢ࠲㑆ߩ㑐ଥߩ ࠅᣇߦߟߡߪ߽ߤ⑳ޔᡷ㕟ߩ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙ߒߡࠆߩߢߪߥ߆ߣᕁ߹ߔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕ ⑳⥄りߪߣࠄ߃ߡ߹ߔޕ ᦨೋߩႎ๔ߩਛߢߪޔಽᮭᡷ㕟ߩౝኈߦߟߡ߹ࠅ߅ߒ߹ߖࠎߢߒߚߌߤޔᣣᧄߩ ࠝ࠺ࠖࠛࡦࠬߩ⊝ߐ߹ߪ߅ࠊ߆ࠅߢߔߒࠄ߆ࠇߎޔ࿖ႎ๔߇ࠅ߹ߒߡߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ ࿖ߏߣߦಽᮭᡷ㕟ߩ⹜ߺ߇ߥߐࠇߡ߹ߔߩߢᤨ߅ߒ߽ޔ㑆߇ࠇ߫ޔඦᓟߩ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ ߢࠊ߇࿖ߩᡷ㕟ߦߟߡ߅ߒ↳ߒߍ߹ߔߩߎޕਛߦߪޔᏒ↸ว૬ߣߞߡޔᏂᄢߥ ᄢ߈ߥᄌൻ߽⸰ࠇߡ߹ߔߩߢߣ߫ࠇߌߛߚߡߖߐࠇ⸅߽ߡߟߦߣߎߩߘޔᕁߞߡ ߹ߔޕ ⍴ᤨ㑆ߢᕟ❗ߢߔ߇ᦨޔೋߩ㗴ឭߢߏߑ߹ߔޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޕ 19 2. Summary of the Keynote Address Decentralization Reform and Strengthening Local Governance Professor Emeritus Wataru Oomori University of Tokyo The title of my presentation is on decentralization and strengthening local governance, but my talk will mainly cover the second theme㧙issues of local governance 㧙in the Japanese context. In Japan, governments typically operate following two general principles of 1) governments should follow democratic procedures, and 2) governments should operate efficiently. As regards to democratic procedures, Japan has seen much progress by implementing information participation processes. disclosure practices and by incorporating public Regarding efficiency of government, the current trend in Japan focuses on outcome and output of government services, and how efficiently the outcome and output has been achieved. Approaches such as utilizing performance measurement, limiting staff members for a particular project, and outsourcing of government services are being used. Thus we have been experiencing a certain degree of progress for pursuing democratic procedures and efficiency of government. Related to these two rules of law, we frequently come across the term of “governance.” Although the term “governance” can be defined to have several meanings, I have defined it here as the conduct or day-to-day operations of an organization. When we use the word in a governmental organization context, it refers to the conduct of central / local government entities. Thus “local governance” would mean the conduct of prefecture and municipal government organizations. In Japan, the word “governance” became well known with the influence of the concept of “public private partnership” (PPP) which was introduced from the United Kingdom. PPP is typically used to mean that a task is carried out in partnership with one organization and another entity. At the timing when PPP was introduced to Japan, the new word of “collaboration,” which is written using the not typical kanji character in Japanese, became a popular term. In fact, the new term of “collaboration” brought about some changes in the conduct of local governments. In 2003, the Advisory Committee of the Local Government System Research Council produced an interim report using this term “collaboration.” After its release, “collaboration” or “creating a new public sphere” became an important new task for local 20 governments. In recent years, local governments are using participatory procedures, which is one form of collaboration with the public. In addition, local governments are enacting bylaws for collaboration. Such bylaws describe the role that various actors (citizens, community organizations, public sector, and private sector) can play for their community, and the rules and relations the actors should follow when pursuing particular tasks with collaboration. However, I believe that collaboration among various actors is not an easy task. In Japan, government organizations function and operate in a hierarchy or vertical form. The pyramid shaped government entities have operated well in pursuing governmental tasks. Therefore, what I am introducing here is a new operating system for local governance㧙horizontal form. Such attempt to change the vertical form of command to a horizontal form of collaboration was experimented once during the Meiji Restoration Era. As a result, at that time major societal change was seen in Japan. Currently, local governments are trying to pursue “collaboration” among various actors in communities. Reflecting back on history, the timing for the vertical line of command to be converted to a horizontal form may be coming. But in order for this to happen, the management system of local government needs to be transformed. In order to transform local governance, local government needs to create a new relation with citizens, community organizations, and private firms. This may be easy among citizens and among private firms themselves, but one between different entities such as local government and citizens or local government and private firms is difficult. For local government, the practice of collaboration is favorable in two aspects. First, fiscal deficit is evident in local governments. Thus, seeking cooperation of citizens and private organizations is desirable in reducing expenses. reason relates to decentralization. The second As decentralization reform is progressing, local governments are forced to take on the responsibility of making policies which was previously conducted by the central government. However, as local governments lack experience, they are incorporating participatory measures and confirming their policies to the public. Therefore, decentralization reform will create opportunities to strengthen local governance, which is eventually desirable for local government. Lastly, I would like to mention one anxiety as local governance is transforming in a new stage. Citizens are becoming an important actor in local governance. However, at times some citizens are getting aggressive in complaining about small aspects of public services (e.g. public hospital, public schools). Citizens need to realize that local governance is about all actors taking on a responsibility. Ultimately, all actors need to think through their role and the relations among actors for better governance. 21 㧟㧚ฦ࿖ႎ๔ 㧟㧙㧝㧚ࡈࠖࡇࡦ #NGZ$$TKNNCPVGU,Tࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳 Decentralization and Local Autonomy in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 years of Implementation (1) I Overview This paper provides a general overview of the status of decentralization and local autonomy in the Philippines. It has been seventeen years now since decentralization was implemented in the Philippines through the enactment of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) in 1991. The first part of the paper clarifies the notion of decentralization as implemented in the Philippines; the second part discusses the major issues and concerns pertaining to the implementation of devolution; and the third part presents the major lessons that can be drawn from the decentralization experiences of other countries and that of the Philippines. II Operationalizing the Notion of Decentralization In any discussion of decentralization, it is critical that we have relatively common terms of references in the usage of the term “decentralization” so as to be able to have a more meaningful and useful analysis of the process. Decentralization in the Philippines could be operationalized through three modalities: deconcentration, devolution and debureaucratization. Deconcentration is a limited form of decentralization since decision-making remains at the center with lower levels of government – in this case the filed offices of the national government agencies - largely limited to transmitting orders and implementing decisions of centrally based authorities. Deconcentration is also referred to as administrative decentralization. Devolution is political decentralization which essentially involves the transfer of powers and responsibilities from national government agencies to local governments as provided for in the Local Government Code. As provided for in Section – of the Code, these include the responsibility for the delivery of basic services including health, agriculture, social services and environment. Together with the transfer of responsbilities was the transfer of personnel to the local governments. It will be recalled that close to 70,000 national personnel were transferred (“devolved”) to the local governmemts during the initial years of devolution. The third type of decentralization has been referred to as “debureaucratization” that involves the harnessing the private sector and non-governmental organizations in the delivery of services through various modalities including contracting out, private-public partnership, and joint ventures, among other things. This modality of partnership is also provided for in the local government code where partnerships with the private sector, NGOs and POs are recognized and (1) Discussion paper presented at the International Symposium on Decentralization and Local Communities, Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance, GRIPS, Tokyo, Japan, 5 March 2008. It is based on the briefing paper prepared by Alex Brillantes, Jr. for DILG under ADB-TA 4778 Local Government and Fiscal Management Project, 30 January 2008. This briefing paper draws from the many studies and papers on decentralization prepared by various authors over the past 17 years. 23 even encouraged for the improved delivery of services as provided for in Section – of the Local Government Code. III Issues, Concerns and Trends in Local Governance This section discusses some of the major issues, concerns and trends as observed in the implementation of decentralization and local autonomy in the Philippines over the past seventeen years. These are in the following areas: (1) local government finances; (2) performance measures and indicators for local governance; (3) inter-local and inter-governmental cooperation; (4) harnessing civil society and private sector participation in local governance; (5) the evolving role of national government agencies; (6) the leagues of local government units; (7) federalism as the next logical step after devolution. These are drawn from our own personal observations and experiences, and also from the many studies that have been carried out over the past seventeen years. Local Government Finances A major issue as far as the implementation of devolution is concerned pertains to the critical role of financial decentralization. We have argued elsewhere that devolution without financial decentralization is not meaningful. In many cases, transferring financial resources to local governments is at the heart of the devolution process. This distinguishes the decentralization process commenced in 1991 to that of earlier decentralization processes. Indeed, decentralization in the Philippines is not unprecendeted considering that as early as 1983, the Philippines already had enacted a variation of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa 337) under Marcos’ authoritarian government. However, this was not accompanied by financial decentralization which is central to meaningful decentralization. Central to the devolution processes kicked off in 1991 was the transfer of financial resources to local governments through a mechanism called the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). Financial resources were transferred to local governments that factored in population, land area and equal sharing into the equation. While the financial resources of local governments (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) substantially increased to unprecedented levels, experience showed that the amounts transferred were not sufficient to generally cover the costs of devolution, especially at the provincial and municipal levels. It is within this context that a number of issues and concerns have been raised to remedy the situation and further improve financial decentralization. These include the need to re-examine the IRA formula and include other factors such as poverty and performance into the allocation formula. More specifically, this means considering the extent of poverty incidence in the allocation of the IRA: the more poor people in the area, more should be its share from the IRA. Additionally, there may be a need to consider the performance of the local government, especially in terms of its tax collection efficiency and ability to raise own source revenues: the allocation should be linked to performance. Apart from improving the formula for IRA distribution is the need to increase the allocation of local governments from the national budget. As it is, the shares of local governments are computed only on the basis of amounts raised from internally generated sources. This does not include the revenues generated from external sources, such as revenues from customs duties and fees. This will increase the size of the revenue pie and will therefore translate into increased shares for local governments. Additionally, there have been proposals to increase the share of the local governments from 40% to 50% of the national taxes. Again, this should be looked into. 24 Performance Measures for Local Governments and Indicators Measuring the performance of governments has been another emerging issue and concern in the discourse of governance in general and local governance in particular. The use of performance measures for local governments has become a central concern in the DILG through. This is manifested in the preparation of the Local Government Performance Measurement System (LGPMS). The LGPMS focuses on five major areas: governance, administration, social services, economic development and environmental services (GASEE). The outputs of the LGPMS are to serve as the basis of the state of local government reports to be prepared by the local governments, and would also serve as a guide in the design and implementation of development programs and projects of the local governments, including capacity building interventions and assistance. The LGPMS is currently under review. Hence while still relatively on its initial stages of development and improvement, the use of performance measurements and indicators by local governments is a major development in the field of local governance today that has to be further strengthened. It will be recalled that other successful international good and best practices in local governance (such as the Bangalore Report Card system that has been replicated in other parts of the world) has as it foundation a good, credible yet citizen friendly performance indicator system. Local governance in the Philippines would benefit from studying these other models and incorporating them in the improvement of our own performance systems Inter-local and Inter-governmental Cooperation Another major development in local governance in the Philippines is in the area of interlocal cooperation and its logical next step, that of formal amalgamation, in contra-distinction to fragmentation. Indeed, the Local Government Code provides that local government can enter into inter-local cooperation in the delivery of services and performance of functions that cut across political and administrative boundaries. It is within this context that we have seen how several local governments have entered into various modes of inter-local cooperation to address common concerns, ranging from traffic to solid waste management to common environmental and ecological concerns such as watershed and marine resources management, to inter-local health zones and trade-based agro-industrial zones. Nascent inter-local partnerships have been observed in the cases of Metro Naga, Baguio, La Trinidad Itogon, Sablan and Tuba (BLIST) in the Cordilleras, the Cagayan de Oro- Iligan Corridor, CAMANAVA (Caloocan-Malabon-NavotasValenzuela), CALA (Calamba, Lahguna), the various Provincial and Inter-municipal AgroIndustrial Initiative of municipalities in Davao, etc. Cooperation has been both horizontal and vertical. The challenge is how to sustain cooperation among local governments and sustain the gains from such arrangements. There also have been successful cases of political amalgamation, say that of the Island Garden City of Samal that saw the amalgamation of 5 municipalities in the island, and also Sorsogon-Bakon that saw the political merger of the city of Sorsogon and municipality of Bakon in Sorsogon Province. These cases should be carefully studied and documented, if only to stem the unfortunate trend among provinces that move in the opposite direction, that of fragmentation. Apart from being costly (creating new LGUs is a very serious matter considering the implications and tremendous administrative overhead involved), many of the proposals for fragmentation smack of a variation of gerrymandering. This trend should be resisted and instead, consolidation, inter-local cooperation and even amalgamation should be encouraged for more efficient, responsive and effective local governance. 25 Harnessing Civil Society and Private Sector Participation in Local Governance Another major dimension of decentralization in the Philippines pertains to the increased participation of civil society in local governance. Active civil society participation in local governance has led to a redefinition of the notion of governance in the Philippine context, one that goes beyond the formal structures and processes of governMENT. Over the past seventeen years, especially during the initial years of its implementation, many forums and consultations have been initiated and conducted by the NGO community to review the Code, make proposals to amend it, and study pending legislation on people participation and electoral reform. A survey by the Bureau of Local Government Development early on revealed that close to 16000 nongovernmental organizations and people's organizations accredited as members of local special bodies. The other venue for participation has been the appointment of sectoral representatives to the local law making bodes (sanggunian). However, participation in local governance may have reached a plateau considering that many local special bodies have not been convening regularly. Additionally, the election of sectoral representatives have not yet been called. These twin developments have caused frustration among certain sectors of the NGO/PO community leading them reexamine the strategies of participating in local governance and advocate more reforms at the local level if participation is to be meaningful. Tactical alliances with other sectors, such as the leagues of local governments, to advocate common causes have been entered into by the NGO/PO community. Operationalizing and further strengthening civil society participation in local governance especially in activating sectoral representation should further be looked into to demonstrate seriousness in harnessing civil society participation in local governance. One concrete good and best practice that we have see and should be examined at this point in time is the Gawad Kalinga model and approach to governance. This is an excellent example of civil society led governance in the delivery of shelter and housing at the local level. GK has successfully managed to bring the resources of government, business and civil society in addressing the major problem of squatting and homelessness at the local level. The GK model is indeed replicable by other local governments and should be supported. Harnessing the Private Sector Participation in Local Governance Largely because of the Local Government Code, here has been an increase in local government-private sector partnership. Where before, local governments tended to carry out development efforts on their own, now, they have become more open to seeking out partnerships with the private sector for effective governance. We have seen local governments privatize utilities, float bonds, enter into joint ventures with the private sector, enter into variations of the build-operate-transfer agreements, among other things. Innovative resource mobilization and revenue generation practices through such partnership arrangements have been carried out by many local governments in the country including the provinces of Bohol (privatization of water and electricity), Aklan (bond flotation), the cities of Mandaluyong, Makati, Quezon, and municipalities of Victorias, in Negros Occidental and Dingras in Ilocos Norte. And many have been successful. Local governments have likewise begun to explore alternative credit finance options, such as borrowing from banks. The challenge is how to encourage local governments to explore other innovative ways of revenue raising and resource mobilization schemes. The entrepreneurial trend among innovative local governments will definitely be a positive response to the first concern raised earlier, the imperative to strengthen local governance through financial decentralization. 26 The Evolving Role of National Government Agencies One area that also needs to be addressed within the context of devolution is the changing role of national government agencies, including the Department of Interior and Local Government, under a devolved set up. Within the context of the "steering vs rowing" philosophy, and in support of local autonomy, efforts could be made to emphasize its role in capacity development and institution building. Thus, efforts could be made to strengthen local level capacity building institutions, such as the centers of local governance, institutes of local government administration, local resource institutes and local schools of public administration, to enable them to meet the capacity building demands under devolution. Networking and partnering with local and international institutions, with the general goal of sustaining their work and transferring appropriate technologies when they would have pulled out, could also be another thrust of the Department. Providing the linkage between sectoral departments and LGUs (as it has say in the Oversight Committee) may also be another area where the DILG may play a contributory role. It is within this context that EO 366 on rationalization of the bureaucracy, and EO 444 on the conduct of a strategic review of decentralization should be carried to the next logical step of serious implementation. From Capacity Building to Capacity Development It will be recalled that one of the major sources of anxieties before the implementation of decentralization pertained to the perceived "lack of capabilities" of local government officials. It was felt that many of them lacked the so-called "absorptive capacities" after devolution. Hence efforts were made to develop and implement various training and capability building programs aimed at enhancing and improving the skills of individual local officials. These included skills ranging from bookkeeping to general financial management, skills in presiding over meetings to general techniques in local legislation. While these are altogether useful, it is imperative to expand "capability building and training" paradigms to general "capacity building" and “capacity development” that would go beyond developing individual skills to enhancing the local government institutions, structures and processes as a whole. It will be noted that the UNDP defines capacity development as broader than organizational development since it includes an emphasis on the overall system, environment or context within which individuals, organizations and societies operate and interact. Cohen says that capacity development is any system, effort or process … which includes among its major objectives strengthening the capability of elected chief executive officers, chief administrative officers, department and agency heads and program managers in general purpose government to plan, implement, manage or evaluate policies, strategies or programs designed to impact on social conditions in the community. It must be noted that with the guidance of the Local Government Academy, local government units are preparing their respective capacity development agendas. Ultimate capacity development therefore should be the logical goal of training interventions. The Leagues of Local Government Units Another major development in the field of governance that must be recognized is the emergence of the various leagues of local government units (Leagues of Provinces, League of Cities, League of Municipalities and Liga ng mga Barangay as provided for in the Code) that have played a key role in advocating the cause of local autonomy. Local officials at various levels have likewise organized themselves into their own leagues. Among these are the League of Vice 27 Governors, Vice Mayors League, Philippine Councilors League, National Movement of Young Legislators. Of late, they have consolidated their forces into the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP). There have been proposals to institutionalize the goals and processes set up by the ULAP by actually abolishing it, and instead create the National Council for Local Governments whose primary function will be to promote progressive local government administration. They have proposed major amendments to the Local Government Code including, reforms in the allocation of the IRA that would address the inequitable distribution and allocation of financial resources. The Leagues have been in the forefront of resisting unfunded mandates that tend to distort development efforts, including local planning and budgeting processes. The Leagues have likewise entered into strategic alliances with like-minded sectors of society, including the NGO/PO community. It must be note though, that as early as the late eighties, even before the enactment of the Local Government Code, the local government units have begun to organize themselves into strong advocacy groups pressing for the enactment of a code as mandated in the 1987 Constitution. The leagues have indeed gone a long way since then, with some of them able to support and sustain secretariats that provide professional support and assistance to the league members. Even as this briefing paper is being prepared (January 2008), the League of Cities are once more in the forefront in their advocacy in jealously protecting their internal revenue allotment shares that would be threatened with the proposed creation of more municipalities. The issue is obviously not yet settled, but is a sign of healthy democracy – with very assertive local authorities – and should be further encouraged. Policy papers, position papers etc. prepared by various sectors – including the leagues, the DILG, congress and the academe, among others – should be prepared to help enlighten all sectors within the paradigm of constructive debate and discourse. Federalism as the Next Logical Step to Devolution Federalism as an option should be considered to fully operationalize local autonomy and devolution in the Philippines. There are undergoing discussions, not only in the Philippines but in other Asian countries as well, on adopting the federal system. Some argue that federalism is the next logical step after devolution. In the Philippines, advocates of federalism believe that the structure of the federal system would respond to the geographical obstacle and differences caused by cultural diversity on governance because it allows fragmentation while at the same time promoting national interest. It is also claimed that the federal structure will accelerate the country’s development and end the internal conflicts brought by separatist movements in Mindanao. It is therefore noteworthy that the President recently issued an Executive Order to seriously study the federalism option. This should be seen as an opportunity to enlighten all sectors of Philippine society about the merits of federalism, and perhaps more importantly, how the adoption of a federal system will further strengthen local governments and thus enhance decentralization for the improvement of the delivery of basic services to the people. IV Devolution and Lessons Learned This section summarizes the lessons – prepared by various decentralization experts / writers based on their respective studies in various parts of the world. It might indeed be worthwhile to examine these lessons as we look back at our seventeen years of experience of decentralization. Indeed the decentralization lessons in other parts of the world might be instructive for us as we craft our decentralization strategy for the next few years. 28 Roy Bahl, arguably one of the pioneers in the study of decentralization in general and fiscal decentralization in particular, offers the following lessons for successful decentralization drawing from his experience in Latin America and Asia. x x x x x Establish National Decentralization Committee to monitor status of decentralization and local fiscal condition Clearly assign expenditure functions among levels of government Allocate adequate local revenues and enhance local collections Improve equalization impact of inter-governmental grants Develop local accountability Amar Siamwalla, a Thai expert on decentralization offers the following lessons: x x x x x x Prepare the process carefully Consult extensively Formulate the plans precisely Commit politically without reservation Implement quickly Finance adequately Terry MacDougal, who studied the Japanese decentralization experience extensively, offers the following lessons x x x x x x Meaningful decentralization cannot simply be legislated. Professional bureaucratic and fiscal systems are critical for effective governance at all levels The character of local-central relations and balance of initiatives change with new issue agendas Where local administrative capacity is inadequate to handle a nation’s policy needs, it can be nurtured The LG system can be useful for reducing regional disparities, experimenting with policies to address new issues, and incorporating new participants into the political process Shared growth, through redistributive measures and local responsiveness to diverse interests can help legitimate democracy Local democracy can promote governmental effectiveness by creating feedback channels to policy makers Leonardo Dayao, a long time development worker in the Philippines, offers the following lessons learned. x x x x x x x Stakeholder participation is a function of method not time Decentralization is more constrained by centralized model than by local capability. The “local” is responsive and capable Complex planning is overrated as a condition for success Conventional needs assessment tend to skew planning and analysis towards conventional solutions Expect that NGAs operate mainly on the basis of anecdotal information about local government. Emphasize organizational development not individual skills 29 x Governance is being redefined at the local level Finally, at the risk of being presumptuous, I would like to offer the following lessons learned based on my many years of studying decentralization and local autonomy not only as an academic in the University of the Philippines, but also as a former Director of the Local Government Academy of the DILG. x x x x x x x x Decentralization can only be meaningful if it is accompanied by financial decentralization. Capacity development should be a high priority not only in the agenda of local governments, but also among affected national government agencies as well. Local governments have to be more assertive and effective in articulating LGU concerns through their organized leagues. Local governments have recognized the value of inter-local cooperation for effective service delivery. Local governments have increasingly entered into partnership with civil society for effective service delivery. It is critical to develop performance indicators and benchmarks for good governance We are now ready to test the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction. There is no one size fits all in the implementation of decentralization. Each country should evolve, develop and design its decentralization strategy. 30 ฦ࿖ႎ๔ⷐ ࡈࠖࡦࡇࡦ 㧔Alex B. Brillantes Jr. ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇ ⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳㧕 ࡈࠖࡇࡦߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળ 1㧚 ᱧผ⊛⢛᥊ ࡈࠖࡇࡦߢߪࠬࡍࠗࡦߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃ᤨઍએ೨㧔1500 ᐕઍ㧕߆ࠄߣࠗࠟࡦࡃޔ߫ࠇࠆ ⥄ᴦ⊛ߥⴕන߇ሽߒߚࡦࠗࡍࠬߪࠗࠟࡦࡃޕᬀ᳃ᤨઍߦ߅ߡ߽ሽ⛯ߒޔ1893 ᐕߩࡑ࠙ᴺߦ߅ߡⴕߩ┵ᧃޔනߢࠆߣ⟎ߠߌࠄࠇߚߩߘޕᓟޔ1898 ᐕߩࡑࡠ ࡠࠬᙗᴺߢߪᣇಽᮭߦߟߡⷙቯߐࠇޔ21 ♿ߩ☨࿖ߩᬀ᳃ߦߥߞߡ߆ࠄ߽ޔታᘒߪ ߣ߽߆ߊޔᣇ⥄ᴦߣ߁ࠦࡦࡊ࠻ߪሽߒ⼂ߐࠇߡߚ ╙ޕ2 ᰴ⇇ᄢᚢᓟߦ⁛ ┙ߒߚ߇ޔ1959 ᐕߦߪ࿖ᴺ㧔ᣇ⥄ᴦࠍᒝൻߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦᎺࠍౣ✬㧕ޔ1960 ᐕઍೋ ߩࡃࠗࠝ࠴ࡖ࠲ᴺ㧔ᦨዊනߩᣇᐭߢࠆࡃࠝߦ⺖⒢ᮭࠍઃਈߒᒝൻ㧕 ޔ1967 ᐕߩᣇಽᮭᴺ㧔ᣇ߳ߩ⽷Ḯઃਈߣᮭ㒢ᒝൻ㧕ߥߤޔ᭽ߥޘᴺᓞ߇ࠄࠇߡ߈ߚ߽ߩߩޔ ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ߇㕖Ᏹߦㅴࠎߢߚߎߣ߆ࠄᧄޔᒰߩᗧߢߩᣇߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߇ߞߚߣߪ⸒ ߃ߥ߆ߞߚࠬࠦ࡞ࡑޕᮭ߇ 1986 ᐕߦୟߐࠇߚᓟޔ1987 ᐕߩᙗᴺߢߪᣇ⥄ᴦࠍ㓚ߔ ࠆౕ⊛ߥⷙቯ߇⋓ࠅㄟ߹ࠇߚߚߒ߁ߎޕਛߢޔ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥታᘒߦኻߔࠆᣇ⥄ᴦߩਇḩ ߦᔕ߃ࠆߚޔ1991 ᐕᣇᐭᴺ߇ቯߐࠇࠆߎߣߦߥߞߚޕ 2㧚1991 ᐕᣇᐭᴺ 1991 ᐕᣇᐭᴺ߇ቯߐࠇ 17 ᐕ߇⚻ㆊߒߚ߇߿ߪ߽ޔਛᄩᐭ߇ోߡࠍⴕߥ߁ߎߣ ߪਇน⢻ߢࠅޔਛᄩᐭ߇㊀ⷐߥᓎഀࠍᨐߚߔߴ߈ߢࠆޕ 1991 ᐕᣇᐭᴺߩ․⦡ߪޔᰴߩߣ߅ࠅߢࠆ ╙ޕ1 ߦޔᣇᐭߦኻߔࠆⴕࠨ ࡆࠬߩᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑ߢࠅޔஜᬺ╬ߩᮭ㒢߇ᣇߦᆔ⼑ߐࠇߚߦࠇߎޕ 㧣ਁੱߩ࿖ኅോຬ߇ᣇോຬߦ⒖ࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ৻ߚ߹ޔቯߩⷙᮭ㒢߽ᣇߦ⒖⼑ߐ ࠇߚ ╙ޕ2 ߦޔᏒ᳃ෳടߩᐲ⊛లߢࠅޔᣇ⥄ᴦߩᣇ⸘↹ᆔຬળߩࡔࡦࡃߩ 4 ಽߩ 1 ߪ NGO ߦഀࠅᒰߡࠄࠇޔᏒ᳃ߦࠃࠆࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߳ߩෳടࠍᅑബߒߡࠆ ╙ޕ3 ߦߪ⽷ޔ⾗Ḯߩᣇᐭ߳ߩഀᒰߡߩჇടߢࠅౕޔ⊛ߦߪ⒢Ḯߩᄢޔ࿖ኅ⋉ߩ ၞ߳ߩㆶరޔ࿖⒢߆ࠄߩಽਈߩჇടߥߤߢࠆ ╙ޕ4 ߦޔᣇᐭ߇ᬺኅ⊛ߦߥࠆߎ ߣߢࠅޔBOT ᣇᑼߩណ↪߿ᣇௌ⊒ⴕߥߤ߇ᅑബߐࠇߡࠆޕ ᰴߦߎߩᴺᓞߩታᣉߪ 3 Ბ㓏ߦಽߌࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ ╙ޕ1 ߪォ឵ᦼ㧔92~93 ᐕ㧕ߢࠅޔ ᮭ㒢ߩᆔ⼑ߣߣ߽ߦੱߩ⒖േࠍⴕߞߚᲑ㓏ߢࠆ ╙ޕ2 ߪ⒖ⴕᦼ㧔94~96 ᐕ㧕ߢޔ࿖ߩ ᐭᯏ㑐߽ᣇᐭ߽ޔᣂߚߥಽᮭ⊛ࠬࠠࡓߦㆡวߔࠆࠃ߁ߦᔅⷐߥ⺞ᢛࠍⴕ߁Ბ㓏ߢ ࠆ ╙ޕ3 ߇ቯൻᲑ㓏㧔97 ᐕ~㧕ߢࠅߩߎޔ㗃߹ߢߦߪᣇᐭ߇⢻ജࠍߟߌޔਛᄩ߇ ᔅⷐߥᛛⴚ⊛ᡰេࠍⴕ߁ᒻߦߥࠆߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇߡ߈ߚޕ 31 3㧚 ᣇಽᮭߩࡌࠬ࠻ࡊࠢ࠹ࠖࠬ ಽᮭൻߩಽ㊁ߣߒߡߪޔஜක≮ޔⅣႺ⼔ޔㄘᬺߥߤࠍߍࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆߒ߁ߎޕ ߚࠨࡆࠬߦߟߡߪᦨ߽᳃ߦㄭࡌ࡞ߢⴕߞߚ߶߁߇ᚻߊߊߎߣ߇␜ߐࠇߡ ࠆౕޔߚ߹ޕ⊛ߥᚑഞߪࠟ࠽ޔᏒߩࠤࠬ߇ߍࠄࠇࠆޕᣇᐭߩ᧦ቯߦߪ ⼏ળߩᛚߣၫⴕㇱߦࠃࠆࠨࠗࡦߦࠃࠆ߇ޔหᏒߢߪᏒ᳃ᙗ┨ࠍቯߡ߅ࠅߟߦ᧦ޔ ߡᏒ᳃߇ߣޠߥߊࠃߪࠇߎޟ⠨߃ࠇ߫ౝኈࠍᦠ߈឵߃ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆޕታ㓙ߦ⊒േߐࠇ ߚ߇ࠧ࡞ࡈࠦࠬߩᑪ⸳ߦ㑐ߔࠆࠤࠬߢࠅޔᏒ⼏ળ߽Ꮢ㐳߽ᑪ⸳ࠍᛚߒߚ߇ޔ Ꮢ᳃ߩኻߦࠃߞߡߎࠇ߇ⷒߞߡߒ߹ߞߚޕ ߹ߚࡉࠕޔᎺߢ⚵❱ߐࠇߚ CCAGG㧔The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance㧕ߣ߁ NGO ߪߩ࠻ࠢࠚࠫࡠࡊޔታᣉߩࡕ࠾࠲ࡦࠣࠍㅢߓߡޔᐭߣදജ ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦᐭߩ߿ࠅᣇߦኻ߽ߒߚߪߣߎߩߎޕᏒ᳃ߩⓍᭂ⊛ߥ㑐ਈߪᐭߣߩ㑆ߦ Ᏹߦ✕ᒛ㑐ଥ߇ߥߊߡߪߥࠄߥߎߣ߿ޔᏒ᳃ߩ㑐ਈ߇ࠨࡆࠬ߿ࠕࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲ࡆ࠹ࠖߩ ะߦߟߥ߇ࠆߎߣࠍ␜ߔ߽ߩߣ⸒߃ࠆޕ 4㧚 ಽᮭൻ߆ࠄᓧࠄࠇߚᢎ⸠ ᣇಽᮭ߆ࠄޔᰴߩࠃ߁ߥᢎ⸠ࠍᓧࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ ╙ޕ1 ߦޔಽᮭൻߦࠃߞߡᣇᐭ ߦᬺኅ⊛㕙߇᳞ࠄࠇޔPublic Personal Partnership ߇ᅑബߐࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡࠆޕ ╙ 2 ߦ⽷ޔḮߩಽᮭൻߩ㊀ⷐᕈ߇ࠄ߆ߦߥߞߚ ╙ޕ3 ߦᣇ⥄ᴦ߳ߩᏒ᳃ෳട߇ᒝߊ᳞ ࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥࠅޔᏒ᳃߇ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦෳടߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߚ ╙ޕ4 ߦᣇ ᐭ㑆ߩදജ߇ㅴዷߒߚ߫߃ޕᵩ᳓ኻ╷╬ߦߟߡ߽ᣇᐭ߇৻✜ߦขࠅ⚵ࠎߢࠆޕ ╙ 5 ߦޔਛᄩᐭߦߣߞߡߪಽᮭൻߩᨒ⚵ߺߩਅߢߩࡄ࠳ࠗࡓࠍౣ⠨ߒޔࠅ⋥ߐߥߊ ߡߪߥࠄߥߊߥߞߚ ╙ߚ߹ޕ6 ߦ᷷ᥦൻ߳ߩኻᔕߥߤޔᣇ⥄ᴦߦኻߔࠆ࿖㓙ൻߩᓇ 㗀ࠍ⼂ߔࠆߎߣߦߥߞߚ ╙ޕ7 ߦ ICT ߩ↪ࠍㅴߥߊߡߪߥࠄߥߊߥߞߚޕ ߎ߁ߒߚߎߣ߆ࠄ⠨߃ࠆߣޔਛᄩᐭߩᓎഀߣߒߡޔᣇᐭߦࠃࠆࠨࡆࠬଏ⛎ߩല ₸߿⾰ߦߟߡߩⴕേ᳓Ḱࠍ⏕┙ߔࠆᔅⷐᕈ߇ᒝߊߥߞߡࠆޔߚ߹ޕ⇇㌁ⴕ߿ࠕࠫࠕ 㐿⊒㌁ⴕߥߤߢࡦࡇࠖࡈޔᵴേߒߡࠆ࿖㓙ᯏ㑐߽ᣇᐭߩᓎഀࠍ⼂ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦߥ ߞߡ߅ࠅߩߎޔะߪ㕖Ᏹߦࠃߎߣߢࠆߣᕁࠊࠇࠆޕ (ᢥ⽿㧦ᧁବ) 32 㧟㧙㧞㧚ਛ࿖ ᧻ῆ ࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ Paper for Japan Symposium on Decentralization and Local Communities: Participation, Collaboration and Citizen-based Governance 2008 From Assistant to Partner? NGOs in China’s Local Community Development (draft) Dr. Chu Songyan Associate Professor, Department of Political Science China National School of Administration, P.R.C. Email: [email protected] 33 Chu Songyan, graduated from the School of Government of Peking University with a degree of Ph. D. in June, 2001 and now is an associate professor in China National School of Administration. She is a member of China Academy of Public Administration, member of Beijing Council of Community Administering System Reform, researcher of Centre for Civil Society Studies, Peking University. Her major research fields include political theory, Chinese Local government Innovation and NGOs. 34 Contents I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view 1. An emerging weak yet vivid civil society 2.Co-existence of decentralization and centralization 3. The imperative situation for government reform II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs 1. Collaboration between NGOs and local governments: two cases 2. Reflections on the relationship between local governments and NGOs III. From assistant to partner: some key factors 1. The sticking point: the central government’s judgment of the state-society relationship 2. The basic enabling environment: integrated and feasible institutional structure for NGOs to develop 3ˊThe social engine: the capacity building of NGOs 4. The exterior drive: demonstration of foreign experience 35 China has been withdrawn from totalitarianism step by step with the further economic development since 1978. With the market being stronger and stronger, people have more and more choices to realize different interest and meet various demands. Ever since middle 1990s, China, like many other countries, has been dramatically involved into the global tide of government reform targeting at good governance. The targeting process is still going on with its contrail showed in all previous resolutions especially from the new century. In 2002, all-round development of human-being was written in the report of the 16th National Conference of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for the first time, which marked China’s government began to pay attention to social development except economic development. In 2004, the resolution of the 3rd Session of the 16th National Conference of CPC put forward the concept of scientific development and called for the government function focusing on macroeconomic regulation, market oversight, social management and public services. The concept of socialist harmonious society proposed by the 4th Session of the 16th National Conference of CPC encouraged governments of each level to improve the structure of social management comprising Party committee leadership, government responsibility, nongovernmental support and public participation, and improve the system of social management at the primary level. And the resolution of the 17th National Conference of CPC emphasized the harmonious being created by the society as a whole and NGOs development and regulation should be pushed forward, which made it a clear signal of the state’s launching on social development or the reconstruction of the society. Therefore, the main theme of China’s reform is now focusing on the reshaping of some kind of new relationship between the government and the society, and decentralization and participation naturally become the two important aspects of the reshaping process. In this process, the central government is doing a familiar work with ease with the ultimate power of judging and choosing. Macro principled reform aims such as public-service oriented, accountable and rule-of-law government were set with no more concrete schemes, the local governments thus have enough room to innovate both at institutional and policy levels. But all in one question: how can the “social development” be developed by society? Or how the society can be reshaped itself in the process of collaboration with the government? This paper discusses this question from the perspective of relationship between NGOs and local governments based on certain practices of local government innovations. I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view The whole world has witnessed the huge transformation in China in 30 years. In the past 30 years, GDP has flied rapidly in China, the average GDP growth rate was 9.6% 36 per year from 1979 to 2004, and at the end of 2006, the total GDP reached 20940.7 billion Yuan, which was around 5.5% of the world’s GDP. The great economic success has not only brought China high GDP, but also made profound changes of social structure, diversification of social values, and deconstruction of the control of totalitarian ideology. However, social development has not simultaneously come together with the economic success. On the contrary, social development lags far behind the resplendence of GDP growth. This very contrast has stirred up pervasive dissatisfaction of the public, and the start-up of social development with the citizens’ participation has been regarded by China’s government to be the right key to solve the problem. 1. An emerging weak yet vivid civil society The omni-directional transformation has offered and still is offering larger and larger room for the civil society to grow. “One notable feature of the reform program sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),” Professor Saich (2000) pointed out, “has been the expansion of social organizations.” Before 1978, there were fewer than 100 national SOs, and only slightly more than 6,000 local SOs nationwide (Kang Xiaoguang, 1999) with the so-called label of GONGO (government-organized NGOs). In the 1980s, all kinds of NGOs emerged in nearly all spheres. However, due to the law absent and the government’s inertial control, the development of NGOs is not smooth. There are totally only 381,000 registered Non-government Organizations at the end of 2007, among which are 207,000 social organizations, 172,000 so-called civil non-enterprise units and 1,369 foundationsķ. Among the registered NGOs, the number of NGOs set by citizens is minority. For instance, there were only 39.2% of 2858 investigated registered social organizations set by their members instead of the governmentĸ. And if we count those “illegal” NGOs, i.e. unregistered NGOs and NGOs registered in form of company because of being unable to meet the high threshold of registration, the number will boom 10~20times of the registered onesĹ. ķ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Communique on Civil Affairs Development 2007, www.mca.gov.cn/accessory/200801/1201137990924.doc. ĸ To understand the development of social organizations in the PRC, we surveyed three provincial areas from 2002 to 2004. We sent out questionnaires to randomly selected social organizations in Beijing, Zhejiang, and Heilongjiang, and achieved an average response rate of 33.2%. We also did more than 100 interviews in this period. Zhejiang, where the private sector contributes more than 50% of GDP, represented the highly developed areas. Beijing, the capital, represented areas with moderate development, while Heilongjiang represented the poorer areas, where agriculture and decrepit state-owned enterprises are the engines of development. From the validated responses, it was evident that only 64 SOs, 2.5% of all the SOs surveyed, were established before 1978. Ĺ Professor Wang Ming of Tsinghua University estimated that there might be 200,000~270,000 unregistered NGOs. Dr. Xie Haiding estimated that the registered social organizations would be 1/12~1/20 of the factual ones based on his small scale investigation at the county level in Anhui Province and Shenzhen. See Xie Haiding, The 37 Figure 1: Growth of Registered NGOs since 1988 6RFLDO2UJDQL]WLRQV &LYLO1RQHQWHUSULVHXQLWV )RXQGDWLRQ 1XPEHURI5HJLVWHUHG1*2V <HDU Note: Before 1989, when the first Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations was passed, there were no statistics on the number of social organizations. Source: Statistics of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=20151&dictionid=2201. It is no doubt that the development of NGOs is a byproduct of the reform and openness. In 1980s, China wished to development “intermediary organizations” to link up the transformation of government functions, and act as assistants to the government and bridges to contact the government and the public. And this concept has been well accepted both by the government and the registered NGOs. Therefore, Growing under the watchful eye of government and with its encouragement, NGOs are now “playing the role the government wishes [them to play] in ways the government wishes” (Lu Jianhua 2000) in policy making and the management of social affairs. They are becoming an important bridge between government and the citizens. On the one hand, they are helping to democratize policy making by articulating the citizens’ interests. On the other hand, by conveying government’s policy intentions and wishes to their members and the public, NGOs are promoting understanding and communication. But NGOs are not always acting as good assistants. For instance, in the protection of Nujiang River against the local Legitimacy Dilemma of the NGOs in China, Research of Law, 2004, vol.2, p.20. 38 government’s decision of building water electricity station in 2003 and the protection of the water in Summer Palace in 2005, the environmental NGOs wan a lot and the local governments of Yunan and Beijing did felt defeated and angry. However, Compared to the mature civil societies such as the France, US, Japan, and the developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil an India, there are only 2.43 registered NGOs in 10,000 people. And their participation in the public policy is quite limited. A survey by the Zhejiang Bureau of Civil Affairs shows that only about 17% of business associations have actually influenced local government to stop or modify policies (Sun Jinxia 2005). Our survey question “Do you think that your organization is considered an important factor by the government and officials?“ drew a yes answer from 67.9% of respondent registered social organizations (SOs) in Beijing, 64.5% of those in Zhejiang, and 64.9% of SOs in Heilongjiang. But only 16.8% (411 of the 2,445 respondent social organizations surveyed said that they had strongly influenced government decision making. Therefore, the strength of the civil society is still very weak. Since the reform in China is dominated by the government, it is well accepted that the strength of the civil society also need to be reinforced through the efforts of the government, for instance, the supportable policies and laws are extremely needed to be made to broaden the space for NGOs to grow. 2. Co-existence of decentralization and centralization The Constitution regulates that “The division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.” However, there is no law or regulation on how to divide functions and powers between the central government and the local governments, which make the relationship between governments of different levels very elastic with the central government dominating the degree of tightness. The 30 years of reform and openness is also a process for the government to learn to deal with the relationship with the market. In late 1980s and early 1990s, the reform focusing on decentralization and interest concessions was essential to weaken the central government dominated plan and make local governments the dominant part in economic development. The market and local governments became the two engines driving the flying GDP after 1992, and the central government’s domination power in economy was further weakened. However, ever since the 1997-98 Southeast Asia financial crisis, the central government has been greatly strengthening its intervention in economy development. The strong domination in economy plans, programs and industrial policies of the 39 central government has made some economists worry about the reversion of the planning system (Yang Tao, 2007)ķ. The 30 years transformation has also brought new changes to the internal relationship within the government. One of the most important characters of China’s reform and openness is to give certain local governments favorable policy preference to do pilot, which means these local governments can try something new with little or no institutional restrictions other local governments have to follow. This pilot strategy help shape the institutional system of the whole nation, and the central government has got enough resources to support important national projects and balance regional gaps. The entering into WTO did not bring all local governments equal opportunities to form uniform market, and the motivation of local development connecting with the local government officials’ longing for personal promotion has made the competition among local governments even hotter and hotter. While the intense competition has been improving local people’s living standard on the one hand, it has also been constantly bringing complex social problems flaming the public’s anger, which get the central government into mediating local conflicts and pacifying the public. In the dealing of certain public affairs, the central government always is seen by local citizens as the representative of public interest, while the local governments are regarded as the invader of their interest, and the central government itself takes for granted too that it is the last resort to control the arbitrariness of local governments. Therefore, tight vertical supervising systems directly control by the central government have been set to deal with affairs such as environment protection, land and resources, which make the tension between the central government and the local governments much more strained and elusory. Ironically, in the mingled game of centralization and decentralization, the demands of the citizens are seldom considered by both the central government and the local governments as an important influential factor. 3. The imperative situation for government reform China is now in transformation with industrialization and informationalization mingled with globalization, which means that the risks produced by the market and government are more complex and unpredictable. Moreover, since the government has chosen developing economy first as a strategy to solve all the problems of China, the development of society, culture and many other fields have not been listed in the ķ Yang Tao (Vice Director of the Lab of Monetory Theory and Policy, Institute of Finance, China Academy of Social Science), 2008: One of the Greatest Risk is the Reversion of the Planning System, Yang Tao’s blog, http://yangtaoifb.blog.sohu.com/75016456.html. 40 government’s priorities. Therefore, inconsistent developing pictures show in nearly all social spheres. The government reform is now facing very challenging situation. Firstly, the developing gap between urban and rural area, the gap between different regions, and the income gap between the rich and poor are becoming larger and deeper. For instance, the average income rate of urban area to rural area was 1.82:1 in 1983, it turned out to be 2.8:1 in 1995 and flied to 3.23:1 in 2003. The government as the mediator has suffered a lot especially in recent years without exact schemes to get it done with the satisfaction of the public. Secondly, the reform of healthcare, education and housing are regarded to be failed. The increasing dissatisfaction of the public caused by the costly and unbearable burden on healthcare, education and housing has made the related policies difficult to implement. The three hot topics together are call the New Three Mountains compared to the Old Three Mountains of imperialism, bureaucratism and feudalism before the foundation of P.R. China. This has heavily defeated the public’s trust in the government. Though the government has tried to improve quality of related policies to cover more people, it is still not easy for the government to regain trust in the social policies concerning people's livelihood. Thirdly, the government is still far from a limited holistic public service oriented government. Since 1990s, influenced by the New Public Management Movement, conceptions of good governance such as transparency, accountability, participation have been adopted by the government. The delivery of public goods and services has been improved a lot. However, when facing the demands of citizens, the government departments are still familiar to the traditional regulating ways instead of citizen-based serving ways. The still blurring function boundaries among different government departments not only make the citizens angry, but also make the mediation among different government departments difficult and time-consuming, which in turn intensify the citizens’ complaints. II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs The growing civil society is one of the most important events in the change of political-social environment in China in the beginning years of 21st century. The de-political process of the society pushed by the development of market has not only challenged the legitimacy of the government, but also promoted the self-organizing degree of the society. Though the central government has proposed the harmonious 41 society as the goal of social development, according to the experience of the reform, it is mainly the local governments that to search how. In the real practice of local governance focusing on the dealing of public affairs, many local governments have explored rich and colorful models and procedures. For example, the “Democratic Discussion” of Wenling County Zhejiang Province began in 1999 has involved citizens discussing public affairs at the town level; the Jiudaowan Community of Beijing also has involved social groups within the community to deal with public affairs for several years. Though the participation of the NGOs in local public affairs is still quite limited, it is true that more and more NGOs are now joining in local public affairs such as healthcare, aging care, community correction, anti-AIDs, and environment protection. And some local governments have begun to search some kind of collaboration with the NGOs in certain fields. For instance, local governments now begin to think if they can make NGOs to participate in public policy making process and service delivery. In December 2005, Jiangxi province signed government procurement contract with 6 NGOs for poverty alleviation to improve the quality of service delivery (Nanfang Weekend, 2006)ķ, which is an active sign of the first cooperation between the government and the society. From the two cases below, we can draw some common characters of the relationship between local governments and NGOs in China. 1. Collaboration between NGOs and local governments: two cases Case 1: Government procurement of the NGO’s home-based care for the aged service in Haishu District, Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province Haishu District is the downtown area of Ningbo City facing serious aging problem with 63,000 people over 60 years old up to 17.1% of the whole population. At the same time, single and childless elderly, empty nest aged people has been 47.9% of the whole aged population, which has greatly weakened the function of family providing for the aged. To find a new way providing for the aged to make more and more aged people enjoy senectitude life has been a pressing task for the District government. It has been proved that the government cannot provide good service for the aged since the speed of the building of rest home is cannot catch that of the increasing of the aging population, and the enterprises chasing profit are reluctant to provide service for the aged since it brings little profit. The District government has to resort to the ķ News report: Duetto of Poverty Alleviation: The First Act of Local Government and NGOs, Nanfang Weekend, March 23, 2006. 42 society to solve the problem. To make experiments, the District government selected 17 communities as pilot spots to provide aged care at home in March 2004, i.e. the government began to offer one-hour’s home care service for free everyday for the more than 600 aged people over 80 years old with the standard of 2000yuan per person per year. However, the government does not directly offer the service itself. The government purchased service from an NGO, Association of Starlight Aged Care, with 1,500,000yuan among which 1,200,000yuan for the service and 300,000yuan for the Association’s running expenses. The operating flow is as following: when the budget reaches the association, the association transfers the amount for the social workers doing home care service salaries to the community residents committees two months earlier. The social workers will get the salaries from the community residents committees every month after service. The Association trains the social workers and supervises their service, if any social worker is found his or her service does not meet the standards, his or her salary will be deducted from the amount of the next transfer. If the aged people eat in the community’s day-care center, they only need to pay 200yuan per person per month, and it is the voluntary workers in the community to do service. The voluntary workers are mostly people just retired and their service hours can be saved in the “voluntary workers bank” for use, when they are old enough, they can apply for equal amount service. The experiments has been welcomed and supported by the whole society, especially the aged people. Therefore, on 12th May, 2004, the District government issued the No. 29 file proposing the directive opinion that a new type of socialized home-care system for aged people supported by the government, operated by NGOs and participated by the whole society for the aged should be built based on a new operating mechanism with the support of the government, operation by the NGOs and the participation of the society. The government file specifically pointed out that “As to the aged people who (nearly) cannot take care of themselves needing the service, with the family members not able to take care of them, the government should take care of them by procuring service.” Ever since September, 2004, the new home-care system for aged people has been implemented in 64 communities of the District. The pilot Haishu District is doing has five notable characters. Firstly, it involves high social participation. The capable individuals and enterprises can participate by subscribing for service, the unemployed can choose to be social workers, and other people can participate as volunteers, which has made the social resources well integrated. Secondly, it covers nearly all aged people. Aged people who meet the 43 government’s standard can enjoy one-hour service paid by the government for free ever day; aged people who do not meet the standard can enjoy volunteers’ service. Aged people can enjoy activities in the day-care center if they can walk, while those inconvenient at walk can choose to full-time nursery resthome. The single and childless aged people can also make one-key connecting call 81890 to ask for help in emergency. Thirdly, it relies on the communities, which not only solve the unemployed problem within communities by turning the unemployed into social workers, but also make the aged people feel at ease and safe since the social workers live in the same communities. Fourthly, the cost of the government on aged care has come down dramatically, and the government has also gained deep trust from the citizens. Compared to the nearly 40,000,000yuan expenditure under the traditional resthome aged care system, the 1,500,000yuan expenditure in procurement is very cheap. And the quality of aged care has been greatly improved, which make the public satisfied with the District government. Fifthly, the social capital has been increased and the social harmony has been improved. The new model has inspired the citizens’ participation in community affairs and promoted the self-governance capability of the society. Not only the number of community volunteers has dramatically increased, the aged people enjoying the new model also participate in the community affairs in different ways. In the policy, the support by the government is the key factor for the collaboration between the government and the Association. The government has set a leading group to construct the home-care system for aged people at the District-Subdistrict-Community level. The group director is a deputy head of the District, and the two deputy directors are the Chairman of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the District and the President of the Association of Starlight Aged Care, which means that the leader of the NGO is also a participant of the policy-making process. The Association of Starlight Aged Care was established under the support of the District government in 2003 specifically in concert with the coming home-care system for aged people, and its president Cui Dehai was the former Propaganda Department Director of the District. Cui Dehai regards the Association as the bridge between the government and the society, Cui Dehai put it in this way: “You cannot survive if you have no ‘color’, and you should serve for whom the ‘color’ you got from.” Therefore, the achievements belong to the government while the faults belong to the Association. “This will help to improve the government’s prestige. The operating mechanism solves the supervision of both money and service, which makes aged people happy, makes the community happy, and the government is also happy, 44 why not do it?” Though the new model has been enthusiastically welcomed, since there is only the Association joined the model as NGO, the new model only serves around 600 aged people being 1% of the whole aged population of the District. And it is true that the District government pays the Association for the service, yet institutional arrangements has not been established to keep the collaboration, e.g. there is no contract between the District government and the Association. Case 2: Resthome Entrust Management in Yuetan Subdistrict, Beijing For many years, to build and run resthome is one of the government’s functions. Though the companies are allowed to deliver aged care service at market prices, general people would rather choose public run resthomes with poor service quality than expensive private ones. As a grass-root NGO set up by citizens in 1995, Tianjin Hetong Welfare Association (Hetong) has tactfully integrated social and market resources to develop. Now Hetong has more than 200 paid employees and thousands of volunteers in 4 resthomes, 1 hospital, 1 school, 1 professional authentication institute, 1 Starlight Home for the Aged and 5 other related organs, which has formed a rudimental network covering professional aged care, voluntary actions, social fundraising, nursery training, catering for the aged, research on theories on aged care, etc., and the network has gained good reputation for Hetong in and out of Tianjin. The government of Yuetan Subdistrict of Xicheng District in Beijing established the Yuetan Resthome with the legal status of public institution in October, 2005. The Subdistrict government rented a receptional house from a company with 220,000yuan per year, and got 2,000,000 yuan from the Beijing Welfare Lottery Fund to change the receptional house into resthome for the aged. At the end of 2005, the Resthome was put into use. However, due to poor care quality and professional management, the occupation rate was very low. The Subdistrict government had not found a professional aged care organ until the functionary met Hetong on 11th March, 2006 at a National Exchange Conference on Aged Care Demonstration organized by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Hetong’s professional and standardized service on aged care drew the attention of the Subdistrict government, and the Subdistrict government actively invited Hetong to collaborate on aged care. After 9 months mutual review and consultation, Hetong began to operate the Yuetan Resthome on 8th December 1006 based on the contract of entrust management. According to the contract, the legal status and the legal representative of the Resthome does not change, the Subdistrict government sees to the investment finance 45 of the Resthome, Hetong does not appoint accountant to the Resthome and only takes charge of the operation and management of the Resthome. Hetong have the power to decide staff and service delivery independently, and the Subdistrict government supervises and evaluates the service Hetong offers. To improve the cooperation, the contract stipulates that Hetong should realize 90% occupation rate in 18 months, and the Subdistrict should reward Hetong 10,000yuan per month if Hetong realize the occupation rate in advance. If Hetong does not realize the occupation rate in 18 months, the Subdistrict government just pay 3% management fee of the total amount. The occupation rate had reached 100% with all occupants incapable of self-care in May 2007 with 13 months earlier and still many aged people were queuing up with Hetong’s professional management mechanism and diversified tailored service. Li hongbing, the Director of the Subdistrict government said, “if the 90% occupation rate can be realized, the subsidy and loss will be reduced. Without Hetong’s joining, we have to subsidize at least 200,000yuan for rent without social benefit, and we also have to pay staff and other cost.” The successful cooperation between Hetong and the Subdistrict government is based on their complementing each other's advantages. The government has huge financing and policy support and prestige on propaganda and mobilization with trust of the community residents, yet poor aged care experiences and management. While Hetong is quite good at management with professional aged care experiences and perfect standardized service in details. The mutual complementation has gained the Subdistrict government firmer trust and Hetong good reputation for future development in a much broader area. 2. Reflections on the relationship between local governments and NGOs Surely nowadays more and more NGOs and local governments are finding ways to cooperate with each other, and the two cases mentioned above are just prominent ones. In the first case, the Association of Starlight Aged Care was established by the government and has strong government background and monopolist status of service delivery with its fund totally and solely coming from the District government. It is true the Association is the only social organizations the government can resort to and no competition formed though there are 4 private run aged care organs with low return rate in the District. The sole Association can offer service for only 1% of the whole aged population of the District without unified professional standards and assessment standard. And the potential danger is the Association would have little or 46 no motivity to improve service quality since it’s the only NGO offering aged care established by the government. In the second case, due to the scarcity of NGOs delivering aged care service, the Subdistrict government at last found an NGO in Tianjin to cooperate. As an NGO without government background, though Hetong has professional care experiences and high-quality service, the working staff still feel they are in inferior position facing the Subdistrict government. And the promised rewards have not been given to Hetong until today. Therefore, generally speaking, though the two cases mentioned above shows that some kind of collaboration is in shaping, the status of the governments and the NGOs are not equal. So under the control of the government, the NGOs are in the process of turning from assistants to partners yet far from being partners to the government. Firstly, the NGOs participation in local governance is quite limited. The local NGOs have to keep their social legitimacy by focusing on public well-being since the government’s control in certain fields is still strong or even much stronger. And the public’s trust in the government is much higher than the government’s trust in the public due to the long tradition and the totalitarian planned economy. The contemporary dilemma for the collaboration between the government and the NGOs is the construction of mutual trust. Since the government is dominant in local community development and participation, it is the government that has the power to judge what is citizen-oriented service and who can participate. Therefore, China is not going on the way of corporatism, no matter state corporatism or social corporatism, the society in China is a governed society with the civil society’s growing under the government’s care and fostering as a tactic of political absorbability. Under this situation, the NGOs are more assistants than partners to the government. It is true that the society’s adherence to the government is increasingly weakening, yet it is also true that the civil society in China is far from relatively independent from the perspective of the society’s self-organizing degree. The two associations in the cases have the same strategy of development: to develop themselves by cater to the government’s inclination in service delivery in the communities. To this degree, the two associations do have some complementary functions to the government, yet they cannot play the role of catalyst or reformers by being equal partners to the government in community development. Therefore, though the community development should be considered both by the government and the citizens as residents, the citizens’ voice is hardly heard due to the lack of self-organizing of the society. And the NGOs have to skillfully finding ways to prove their value by meeting both the government and the citizens’ demands. 47 Secondly, NGOs functions have been constrained by the contemporary institutional environment. In the two cases, both the local governments and the associations admit that NGOs are so few that the government had little or no choice on collaborateurs. The Haishu District of Ningbo City Zhejiang Province even had to create an NGO to purchase service. The Yuetan Subdistrict government could not find the right organs in Beijing, Hetong in Tianjin then was chosen. The scarce of NGOs operating in welfare area is the result of the stern institutions on NGOs. For instance, The Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations passed in 1998 sets dual management system and high registration threshold for social organizations. If an organization wishes to be registered, it first should have a government organ or public body to be its professional supervision organ, and it should have at least 50 personal members or 30 organizational members, at least 30,000yuan for activity, and other conditions. Then it has the qualification to apply to the civil affairs department for registration. Moreover, the present management system is still focused mainly on the registration of NGOs, and a complete institutional framework for the management of NGOs such as tax preference system has yet to be established. Though the government has called for building a structure of social management comprising Party committee leadership, government responsibility, nongovernmental support and public participation, and improving the system of social management at the primary level, the NGOs are not listed on the government procurement list of public service deliverers while for-profit companies fill in the list. China is now still in the process of transformation and the administrative system reform has to consider NGOs in civil society as the undertakers of the functions the government gives back. Therefore, the institutional environment for NGOs to develop needs to be improved. Thirdly, the NGOs have not been strong enough to be equal partners in local governance. Since most NGOs were established after 1978, the institutional environment for NGOs is also in growth. As government on the one hand wishes the NGOs to carry on the functions the government is to give back to society yet on the other hand controls the NGOs severely, many NGOs are incapable of fundraising, interest expression, service delivery and offering employment opportunities. Our survey shows that 60.6% of the investigated registered social organizations never get fund from the government, and in the social organizations got fund from the government, the fund only occupies about 22.15% of the social organizations’ total income. Most of the surveyed social organizations depend on the membership fee, but the rate of the members who can pay the membership fee is only 52.7% for individual members and 59.2% for unit members. The short of fund directly influences the 48 NGOs operation and activities. As a result, most of the NGOs are trapped into seeking money instead of offering service and doing capacity building. And the standard of weighing whether a leader of an NGO is successful or not is the money he or she can earn for the NGO. In the cases mentioned above, the Association of Starlight Aged Care in Haishu District need not worry about the fund, and its president is a former official with enough governmental resources. The leader of Tianjin Hetong Welfare Association, Mr. Fang Jiake is a devoted doctor with innovative thoughts paying much attention to keeping good relation with the governments of different level in different administrative areas, and the professional and warm service has gained Hetong good reputation, so Hetong can get support or at least avoid encumbrance from the government. Even so, Fang Jiake admitted that Hetong still need to take up with professionalism and continuous capacity building. In China, the character of the society is now being molded by both the government and the citizens in China, and the functions of the NGOs has not been clearly recognized by the government. Therefore, the related policy on local governance has no clear goals lacks operational mechanism or measures, which makes the decentralization process very slow and citizens’ participation passive since the government still overburdened with heavy responsibilities. However, since the civil society has the inherent character of citizens’ bottom-up self-organizing and the typical experience of China’s reform—pilot—has set enough room for local government to innovate governance models at primary level, the experiences drawn from pilot local governments is also forming a cycle of local pilot—local institution arrangement—national institution revision, this in turn keeps challenging the unitary top-down administrative model and some kind of mutual inserting model between the government and civil society is in shaping in China. III. From assistant to partner: some key factors China has learned from the 30 years reform and openness that the cooperation of each field is the foundation for development and harmony. Though the civil society is still weak, NGOs is becoming the third sector besides the market and the state, and the three sectors now is weaving a modern polycentric governance network. Like many other countries, China is now in the process of government-NGOs relationship paradigm transformation from adversaries to partners, some kind of collaboration to decrease social conflicts and increase the welfare is being searched by governments of each administrative level. 49 From the transformation track of 30 years, decentralization is the inevitable tendency and good mutual trust between the government and the society is the goal of harmonious society building. Therefore, the transformation of government-society relation has developed in three stages. The first stage lasted from 1949 to 1978 with totalitarianism being the character, the state absorbed the society, and the society was entirely controlled by the state. The second stage lasted from 1978 to 2006 with the deconstruction of totalitarianism being the main theme. The market was renewed and all kind of NGOs began to develop greatly no matter admitted by the government or not. The state regarded NGOs as assistants and was recognized by the NGOs. However, from 2004 on, the government began to pay much more attention to NGOs since society construction has become the important task the government has to face up. The saying in government files of NGOs as assistants began to change to bridges. Generally speaking, NGOs has got enough social legitimacy, and the political legitimacy is slowly increasing. The third stage starts from 2006 and is far from ending. The state-society relationship is facing path choice. At the local level, the government is searching different ways for collaboration with NGOs. No matter it is formal or substantial, the collaboration itself is a good sign of the transformation effort of state-society relationship, because once the process is started, it gets the character of irreversibility same to the reform and openness. However, some key factors may influence the process, and even the direction of the transformation. 1. The sticking point: the central government’s judgment of the state-society relationship It is well-known that the reform and openness is dominated by the central government. China has two key changes of the concept of development: the first is the focusing on economic development in 1978. However, the over-emphasis on economic development led to the inconsistence of economy, society and environment. The reflection making for the second key change is the concept of scientific development attaching importance both to speed and quality of the development. Similarly, the vivid developing of civil society also bases on the retreat of the government from the society. Though the central government has expressed that the participation of citizens in various ways should be encouraged in social management, due to path dependency, the government still regards NGOs as potential challengers to the existed social-political system and does not trust the NGOs, especially those getting fund from abroad. The government has recognized the NGOs advantages on adjusting industrial development, intermediating of conflicts and public service 50 delivery, but the government has not yet realized that some problems cannot be solved by both government and market can only be solved by NGOs. Therefore, the government’s attitude to NGOs is always in conflict, on the one hand, the government wishes NGOs carry on the functions the government giving back to society to join in social management by offering service, expressing demands and regulating behaviors, on the other hand, the government takes thought for the NGOs being so strong that they may become the troublemakers to social stability and the making and implementation of public policies. The inconsistent attitude of the government shows that the mutual trust between the government and the society has yet been established, and the key is still in the hand of the government. The pilot and innovation of local governments will help the central government to accumulate experiences in the future period of time for decision. And once the central government demonstrably admits the NGOs to be the main body of social management, the collaboration paradigm of state-society will be confirmed rapidly. 2. The basic enabling environment: integrated and feasible institutional structure for NGOs to develop Generally speaking, for NGOs to function properly—for them to represent capably the shared interests of their members, collaborate in social governance, and enhance and preserve social welfare, complementing the state-market-society allocation of social resources and risks—an integrated institutional structure for establishing, registering, governing, regulating and supervising, raising funds, obtaining preferential tax treatment, etc., for NGOs should be built up step by step. NGOs are freedom of association in practice, and they take various forms. A registered, legal entity is only one such form. A large number of NGOs in all countries do not meet the registration standards. But registered NGOs do have easier access to tax benefits and government contracts, and derive legitimacy from legislation. The contemporary institution arrangements for in China are not enough to offer NGOs enabling environment since there is no laws or acts regulating NGOs all activities, and the existed regulations are just for registration. Therefore, the building of institutional structure for NGOs needs to clear up the existed institutional barrier and at the same time set down related feasible institutions. Firstly, the institutional arrangements should foster the NGOs while regulate them. Comparing to the state and the market, the civil society in China now is in its infancy time. To keep the balance of state, market and civil society, the rigid regulations should be softened and inclusive to cover all kinds of NGOs. For instance, the dual 51 management system may change into registration and record system. At the same time, institutional arrangements should reflect the demands of citizens and balance the public interest and private profit to avoid the NGOs being the tool for chasing private profit. Secondly, some kind of feasible social inspiring mechanism should be developed to encourage more citizens to engage in NGOs and their public-interest oriented activities. The existence of NGOs is part of the public life, and it can train citizens democratic behaviors since the NGOs embody people’s self-organizing spirit. Such mechanisms as setting conjunction between employment and voluntary activities etc. may not only improve employment but also increase social capital. 3ˊThe social engine: the capacity building of NGOs Whether the NGOs can play more important roles in local governance is partly decided by the capacities of the NGOs besides the government’s attitude. NGOs in China cannot meet the requirements of social construction. Though NGOs such as the two associations mentioned in the two cases do are capable to meet the government’s requirement and the residents’ demands, most of the NGOs in China cannot understand their functions well. What the NGOs have done decides the NGOs position in the society. Thus the NGOs need to do capacity building when asking for more enabling institutional environment. The first important capacity the NGOs now need to develop is the internal governance. Since the history of free association in China is so short, most leaders of the NGOs are former officials in the government or public body quite familiar to the flow of bureaucratic operation but strange to equal consultation. Hence many NGOs operate just as the “second government” with no close connection with their members and the public. A democratic internal governance structure is required by the regulations and really needed for the NGOs to get recognition from their members and the public. Then the second important capacity the NGOs need to develop is to keep close relation with the public and the media. As mentioned before, NGOs not only need political legitimacy, i.e. admitted by the state, but also need social legitimacy, i.e. recognition by the citizens. Most NGOs in China rely on government for existence with the result of more than 1/3 of the registered NGOs just pacing up and down the survival line. Without deep connection with the public, they lost the essential reason for existence. To this degree, the most important capacity for the NGOs to develop is to build effective connection with the public and the media to get understood and trust from the society. Hence the NGOs can be real bridges equally connect the government and the society instead of a bridge put out 52 from the government but never reach the citizens. A good news for the NGOs to catch up with the social recognition is that more and more people are joining in the procession of volunteers in public welfare, which means that the NGOs can attract people to participate their projects and activities. 4. The exterior drive: demonstration of foreign experience Harmonious society calls for an organized society. NGOs in developed country has not only been partners to the government in public service delivery, but also contributed to the economic development and employment promotion. Institutional partnership between the government and the NGOs sector has been established in countries such as the U.K., U.S.A., Japan, India, etc. to improve mutual understandings, which has been proved quite useful to keep the society creative and the state competitive. Moreover, NGOs are playing more and more important roles in international relations and global governance, the lack of the voices from China’s NGOs are unthinkable. In one word, the successful cooperation examples of foreign countries and the international pressure has become the outside drive for the China government to develop collaboration with NGOs. References: Saich, Tony. 2000. Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China. The China Quarterly, no. 1, pp.124-141. Kang Xiaoguang. 1999. Social Organizations in Transforming China. China Social Science Quarterly 28, pp.1-14. Xie Haiding, The Legitimacy Dilemma of the NGOs in China, Research of Law, 2004, vol.2, p.20. Lu Jianhua. 2000. The Rising of Social Organizations in Mainland China: Case Study on Three Green Social Organizations in Beijing. China Social Science Quarterly, no. 32, p.117-131. Sun Jinxia. 2005. Social Organizations: The Participants of Harmonious Society. Academic Associations, no. 6, p.22. Yang Tao, 2008: One of the Greatest Risk is the Reversion of the Planning System, 2007, http://yangtaoifb.blog.sohu.com/75016456.html. 53 ฦ࿖ႎ๔ⷐ ਛ࿖ 㧔 ᧻ῆ ਛ࿖࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ㧕 ਛ࿖ߩၞ⊒ዷߦ߅ߌࠆ NGŎ̆ࠕࠪࠬ࠲ࡦ࠻߆ࠄࡄ࠻࠽߳ 㧝 ਛ࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆ࿖ኅߣ␠ળߣߩ㑐ଥ ࠕ Ꮢ᳃␠ળߩ ਛ࿖ߩ⚻ᷣߪ ߩߎޔ30 ᐕߩ㑆ߦᄢ߈ߥ⊒ዷࠍㆀߍߚ߇⚻ޔᷣߩᚑഞߦᲧߴࠆߣ␠ળߩ ⊒ዷߪㆃࠇߡࠆޔߢ߆ߥߚߒ߁ߎޕਛ࿖↥ౄ 17 ࿁ో࿖ઍᄢળߩቯߢ߽ᒝ⺞ߐࠇߚ ࠃ߁ߦޔᐭߣ␠ળߣߩᣂߒ㑐ଥߩ᭴▽ޔᣇಽᮭߣෳട߇ᡷ㕟ߩ㊀ⷐߥ⺖㗴ߣߥߞߡ ࠆޕ ਛ࿖ߢߪޔ2007 ᐕᧃߢ 38.1 ਁߩ㧺㧳㧻߇⊓㍳ߐࠇߡࠆ߇ޔᏒ᳃⥄りߦࠃߞߡ⸳┙ߐ ࠇߚ㧺㧳㧻ߪᄙߊߥ⊓ޔߚ߹ޕ㍳ߐࠇߡߥᄙߊߩ㧺㧳㧻߇ࠆߣࠊࠇߡࠆޕ㧺 㧳㧻ߪޔᐭߣᏒ᳃ࠍ⚿߱㊀ⷐߥ㨬᨞ߌᯅ㨭ߣߥߞߡ߈ߡࠆ߇ޔࠞࡔࠕޔᣣᧄߥߤᚑᾫ ߒߚᏒ᳃␠ળࠍᜬߟ࿖ߣᲧߴࠆߣޔ㧺㧳㧻ߩ╷ᒻᚑߦ߅ߌࠆෳടߪ㒢ࠄࠇߡ߅ࠅޔ ਛ࿖ߩᏒ᳃␠ળߩജߪ߹ߛ߹ߛᒙߣ߃ࠆޕ ࠗ ᣇಽᮭߣਛᄩ㓸ᮭߩሽ ਛᄩᐭߣᣇᐭߩᓎഀಽᜂ߿ᮭ㒢ࠍⷙቯߔࠆᴺᓞ╬߇ߥߎߣ߇ޔਛ࿖ߩᐭ㑆㑐 ଥࠍᦌᤒߥ߽ߩߣߒߡࠆޕ1980 ᐕઍᓟඨ߆ࠄߩᣇಽᮭߣ⋉ኈࠍਛᔃߦߒߚᡷ㕟ߪޔ ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߦ߅ߌࠆᣇᐭߩᓎഀߩᄢࠍ߽ߚࠄߒߚ߇ޔ1997 ᐕߩ᧲ධࠕࠫࠕߩ㊄Ⲣෂᯏ એ㒠ޔਛᄩᐭߪౣ߮⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߦኻߔࠆࠍᒝൻߒߡࠆޕ ၞ⊒ዷࠍߋࠆỗߒ┹ߪੱ↢ߩޘᵴ᳓Ḱߩะߦነਈߔࠆ৻ᣇޔ᳃ߩᔶࠅࠍ ߊࠃ߁ߥ㗴߽⊒↢ߒߡࠆߚߒ߁ߘޕਛߢ⋥ޔធਛᄩᐭߦࠃࠆ⛔ޔ㗴⸃߇ⴕࠊ ࠇࠆࠃ߁ߥ႐วߦߪޔᣇᐭߣߩ㑆ߦ✕ᒛ߇↢ߕࠆߎߣ߽ࠆޕ ࠙ ᐭᡷ㕟ߩᔅⷐᕈ ߎࠇ߹ߢ⚻ޔᷣߩ⊒ዷ߇ఝవߐࠇࠆߥ߆ߢޔฦಽ㊁ߢߩ⊒ዷߪࡃࡦࠬ߇ߣࠇߚ߽ߩߣ ߥߞߡߥޔߢ߆ߥߚߒ߁ߘޕԘㇺᏒၞߣㄘၞߣߩᩰᏅߩᄢޔԙஜᐽ㧔▤ℂ㧕 ޔ ᢎ⢒ޔቛߦኻߔࠆ࿖᳃ߩਇḩߩჇᄢޔԚⷙ㊀ⷞߩࠬ࠲ࡦࠬ߿ฦᐭ㧔ㇱዪ㧕ߩᮭ㒢 ᓎഀ߇ਇ⏕ߣߞߚ⺖㗴߇ࠅޔᐭᡷ㕟߇ਇนㆱߣߥߞߡࠆޕ 㧞 ᣇᐭߣ㧺㧳㧻ߣߩ㑐ଥ ߹ߛߘߩᢙߪ㒢ࠄࠇߡࠆ߇ޔஜᐽ▤ℂޔ㜞㦂⠪ޔⅣႺ⼔ߥߤߩၞߩ⊛ߥ ᓎോߦ㧺㧳㧻߇ෳടߔࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡ߈ߡࠆޕ ࠕ ᵽᳯ⋭ካᵄᏒߩ ᵽᳯ⋭ካᵄᏒߩㇺᔃߦࠆᶏᦍߢߪޔᷓೞߥ㜞㦂ൻ㗴ߦኻಣߔࠆߚޔ2004 ᐕ߆ࠄ 80 ᱦએߩ㜞㦂⠪ߦኻߔࠆ⼔ࠨࡆࠬࠍ㧺㧳㧻ߣㅪ៤ߒឭଏߒߡࠆޕԘ᳃ߩ␠ળෳ ടߩଦㅴޔԙ㜞㦂⠪ߩ࠾࠭ߩల⿷ޔԚ⾌↪ߩᷫߩ⾰ޔะߥߤߩലᨐ߇߇ߞߡࠆ ߇ߩࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏࠍฃߌࠆ㜞㦂⠪߇㒢ቯߐࠇߡࠆߣߞߚ⺖㗴߽ߺࠄࠇࠆޕ 54 ࠗ ർ੩Ꮢߩ ർ੩Ꮢߩსߢߪࠅࠃߦࠕࠖ࠹ࡦࡏޔ⠧ੱࡎࡓ╬ߩ▤ℂࠍⴕߥߞߡࠆ㧺㧳㧻 ߣᆔ⸤ᄾ⚂ࠍ✦⚿ߒޔ2006 ᐕ 11 ߆ࠄ⠧ੱࡎࡓߩㆇ༡ࠍⴕߥߞߡࠆ⚿ߩߘޕᨐޔ⠧ ੱࡎࡓߩዬ⠪߇Ⴧടߒޔഥ㊄ߩᷫ߇น⢻ߣߥࠆߥߤหߩ⽶ᜂ߽ᷫዋߒߚޕ ᳃ߩା㗬⽷ޔജߣߞߚᣇᐭ߇ᜬߟ㐳ᚲߣޔNGO ߩࡁ࠙ࡂ࠙ኾ㐷⍮⼂ࠍ߁߹ߊ⛔ วߒߚὐߦߎߩข⚵ߺ߇ᚑഞߒߚℂ↱߇ࠆޕ ࠙ ᣇᐭߣ㧺㧳㧻ߩ㑐ଥ ਛ࿖ߩ㧺㧳㧻ߪޔᐭߩ⛔ߩ߽ߣߢኻ╬ߥࡄ࠻࠽߳ߩ⒖ⴕࠍ⋡ᜰߒߡࠆ߇ߘޔ ߩߪ߹ߛ߹ߛ㆙ߩߘޕℂ↱ߩ৻ߟߦޔၞࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߳ߩ㧺㧳㧻ߩෳട߇㒢ࠄࠇߡ ࠆߎߣ߇ࠆ╙ޕੑߦߩⴕޔᐲ߇㧺㧳㧻ߩᯏ⢻ࠍ⚂ߒߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠆ╙ޕਃߦޔ ᄙߊߩ㧺㧳㧻ߪ⽷ޔḮߩ⏕ߩࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏޔᗧߩޔ㓹↪ߩឭଏߦ߅ߡචಽߥ ⢻ജࠍߒߡߥߣ߁㗴߇ࠆޕ 㧺㧳㧻ߩᓎഀ߇⏕ߦ⍮ߐࠇߡߥߥ߆ߢޔᔅߕߒ߽ਛ࿖ߩᏒ᳃ෳട߇⋓ࠎߢࠆ ߣߪ߃ߥ߇ޔᣇᐭߩ⒳ߩޘᡷ㕟ߩ⹜ߺߥߤߦࠃࠅޔᗧਅ㆐ߩⴕࡕ࠺࡞ߪ⋥ ߐࠇߟߟࠆߣ߃ࠆޕ 㧟 ࠕࠪࠬ࠲ࡦ࠻߆ࠄࡄ࠻࠽߳ ਛ࿖ߩ࿖ኅߣߩ␠ળߩ㑐ଥߪ 3 ߟߩᤨઍߦಽߌࠆߎߣ߇᧪ࠆ ߩᦼ৻╙ޕ1949 ᐕ㨪78 ᐕߦߪ␠ޔળߪ࿖ኅߩ⛔ߩਅߦߞߚ╙ޕੑᦼߩ 1978 ᐕ㨪2006 ᐕߦߪޔᏒ႐߇ౣ↢ߐ ࠇࠆߣߣ߽ߦᄙ᭽ߥ㧺㧳㧻߇⊒ዷߒߚ╙ޕਃᦼߩ 2006 ᐕએ㒠ߦߪޔ᭽ߥޘᒻߢߩ㧺㧳㧻ߣ ߩද߇ᐭߦࠃߞߡᬌ⸛ߐࠇߡࠆޕ ࠕ ࿖ኅ␠ળ㑐ଥߦኻߔࠆਛᄩᐭߩᘒᐲ ਛᄩᐭߪޔ㧺㧳㧻߇⋉ߢࠆ৻ᣇޔ╷ታᣉߥߤߢ㗴ߣߥࠆน⢻ᕈ߽ࠆߣ⠨߃ ߡࠆޕਛᄩᐭ߇㧺㧳㧻ߩᓎഀࠍ⏕ߦࠇ߫ޔ࿖ኅߣ␠ળߣߩදߩ㑐ଥ߇⏕┙ߔ ࠆߎߣߦߥࠆߣᕁ߁ޕ ࠗ 㧺㧳㧻߇⊒ዷߔࠆߚߩᐲ 㧺㧳㧻߇ㆡಾߦᯏ⢻ߔࠆߚߦߪ⊓ޔ┙⸳ޔ㍳ޔㆇ༡ߥߤߦ㑐ߔࠆ✚ว⊛ߥᐲࠍ᭴▽ ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߩߘޕ㓙ߦߪޔԘ㧺㧳㧻ߩⷙߣߣ߽ߦߘߩ⢒ᚑޔԙᏒ᳃ෳടߩଦㅴޔ ᵴേߩᅑബߦ⇐ᗧߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆޕ ࠙ 㧺㧳㧻ߩ⢻ജะߥߤ ካᵄᏒ߿ർ੩Ꮢߩߩࠃ߁ߦޔᐭߩⷐ᳞߿᳃ߩ࠾࠭ߦ╵߃ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ㧺㧳 㧻ߪᄙߊߥޕ㧺㧳㧻ߦߪޔ᳃ਥ⊛ߥㆇ༡ࠍⴕߥ߁ߣߣ߽ߦౝㇱ▤ℂߩ⢻ജ߿᳃߿ࡑࠬ ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕߣ⦟ᅢߥ㑐ଥࠍ⛽ᜬߢ߈ࠆ⢻ജ߇᳞ࠄࠇߡࠆޕ వㅴ࿖ߩ㧺㧳㧻ߪޔනߦࠨࡆࠬឭଏߩ㕙ߛߌߢߥߊ⚻ޔᷣ⊒ዷޔ㓹↪ଦㅴߩ㕙ߢ ߽⽸₂ߒߡ߅ࠅ⻉ޔᄖ࿖ߩᚑഞߥߤࠍቇ߱ߎߣߪޔਛ࿖߇ᐭߣ㧺㧳㧻ߣߩදࠍㅴ ࠆߢ⋉ߢࠆޕ 㧔ᢥ⽿㧦Ꮉ ඳ㧕 55 ３－３．タイ Woothisarn Tanchai キング・プラジャディポック研究所准教授 Directions of Local Government under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) BY Assoc.Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok's Institute 57 Directions of Local Government under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 Assoc.Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok's Institute Essentially, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) evolves around four major directions, that is, firstly, protection, promotion, and extension of civil rights and liberties; secondly, curtailment of the state’s monopolistic power, extension of civil power, and enhancement of decentralization; thirdly, implanting transparency, integrity, and ethics in politics; and fourthly, ensuring that oversight bodies are autonomous and robust so they can function efficiently. The provisions concerning local government and decentralization to local government organization appear in two essential chapters, that is; Chapter 5 Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies; Part 3 Directive Principles of State Administration Policies (Section 78); Part 4 Directive Principles of Religion, Social, Public Health, Education, and Culture Policies (Section 80); as well as Chapter 14 Local Government (Section 281-290). The essence of local government in the Constitution is divided into five vital parts, that is, firstly, extension of local government organization’s duties and powers to be more explicit and comprehensive; secondly, striking balance between supervision of local government organization and its independence; thirdly, development of operational and administrative systems for local government organization; and fourthly, providing public space for people, community, and civil society so they can jointly participate in local administration with local government organization; fifthly, implanting transparency in local politics. Details are as follows: Firstly, extension of local government organization’s duties and powers, thus making their roles more pronounced and broader in perspectives. Notably, Section 781 constitutes a guarantee that the state will modify administrative and relationship system between central, regional, and local authorities so that their duties and powers are clear-cut. Moreover, local government organization must be encouraged to perform its roles and fulfill its duties in provision of various public services to local people. Additionally, this section also prescribes that the state sector’s administrative system must be geared towards development of quality, integrity, and ethics of public officials and the administrative system, thus enhancing its operational efficiency. Furthermore, the state shall focus on adherence to good governance principles. It is also further elaborated that the state shall provide public services to people in speedily, efficiently, and transparently and such services must be subjected to examination and public participation, entailing fast, quality, and transparent public services which are jointly engaged by people. To ensure that directive principles of fundamental state policies meet stipulated targets, several detailed aspects are prescribed to establish administrative guidelines for state agencies and local 1 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 78 58 government organization, for example, administrative guidelines for the state’s religious, social, public health, educational, and cultural affairs2. Furthermore, Chapter 14 Local Government also stipulates that local government organization is a principal body that provides public services and partakes in decision-making process to resolve local issues3. Such distinct prescription constitutes a guarantee that the state shall promote and support local government organization as a principal body through decentralization which constitutes a vital mechanism. To achieve concrete results, Section 2834 was stipulated thereby contains a provision to specify that local government organization is responsible for supervision and provision of public services and empowered to autonomously determine its administrative, public service, and personnel management as well as financial and fiscal policies. Moreover, local government organization should be nurtured and supported to strengthen its independent administrative capacities and develop its fiscal system to accommodate comprehensive public services, thus enabling it to establish by itself or jointly establish a mandated public service organization. Furthermore, the constitutional provision also stipulates the advent of a decentralization law in order to specify division of duties and powers and allocation of revenue from central, regional, and local authorities as well as allocation among local government organizations by reckoning increased decentralization according to respective capacities of each form of local government organization. To secure and sustain revenue stream, it is stipulated that local revenue law be implemented to increase sufficient local government organization's revenue for provision of public services. Lastly, this section also designates duties and powers and revenue allocation of local government organization, stipulating that a committee is to be set up to review such matter periodically no more than five years, and essentially increased decentralization of local government organization will be scrutinized in such review. As mentioned above, specific roles of local government organization5 are prescribed, encompassing duties and powers pertaining to preservation of valuable local arts, tradition, wisdom, or culture; the rights to administer education and vocational training as deemed appropriate and consistent with the needs in locality; participation in administration of educational and training programs of local government organization; as well as participation in administration of the state’s educational and training programs by pursuing conformity with the national educational system and standards. Essentially, local government organization still retains its mandate on promotion and preservation of environmental quality6, whether it be management, maintenance, and utilization of natural resources and environment in localities; participation in conservation of natural resources and environment in surrounding area of localities, especially incidents which may affect local people’s sustenance; as well as participation in deliberation on any project and program initiative outside locality 2 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 80 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 281 4 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283 5 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 289 6 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 290 3 59 which may adversely affect environmental quality or general health of local people in the area. This signifies participation of local community. Furthermore, to encourage local government movements, especially for decentralization, it is stipulated that two local government laws be drafted, that is, the law stipulating decentralization plan and steps which encompass three vital issues, including separation of powers and duties between central, regional, and local authorities; revenue allocation between central, regional, and local authorities as well as among local government organizations; and monitoring, examination, and evaluation of decentralization to local government organization7; as well as local revenue law which is a new law applicable to local government affairs in Thailand. Such local revenue law prescribes duties and powers pertaining to collection of tax revenue and other types of revenue of local government organization. Essentially, local government organization must collect sufficient revenue to cover expenditure incurred from the exercise local government organization’s mandate8. In terms of details regarding deliberation of both laws, it is stipulated that a review will take place periodically no more than five years to determine suitability of duties and powers and revenue allocation by principally contemplating on extended decentralization for local government organization9. It can be discerned that the 2007 Constitution places emphasis on surveillance and strict enforcement of various constitutional provisions. Therefore, to ensure that local government laws will be put into effect, Section 303 (5)10 of the 2007 Constitution stipulates that relevant laws concerning stipulation of implementation plan and steps for decentralization to local government organization, local government organization establishment law, and local official law and other laws shall be drafted or revised within two years after promulgation of the 2007 Constitution. Moreover, stipulation of these provisions under the transitory provisions constitutes a guarantee and catalyst to impel other concerned authorities to expedite improvement, amendment, disposition, and development of relevant laws. Such changes will push forward decentralization and make it more active than in the past. Secondly, in the 2007 Constitution, there were efforts to resolve problems stemming from a lack of balance between supervision and independence of local government organization. Consequently, it is clearly stipulated that supervision is conducted as deemed necessary by applying distinct criteria, methods, and conditions conforming and suitable with forms of local government organization11; disposition of various standard options for local government organization to choose from; as well as different approaches, methods, and strictness of supervision, depending on types of local government organization and robustness of the civil sector. 7 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283, Paragraph 3 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283, Paragraph 4 9 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283, Paragraph 5 10 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 303 (5) 11 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 282, Paragraph 1 8 60 Besides, there are additional provisions on an organization designated to perform supervisory roles by extending the roles of the civil sector in the oversight of local government organization’s operations. In this regard, Section 282 adds new organizations designated to perform supervision, that is, “people.” The state must provide oversight mechanism to examine local government organization’s affairs by the people, meaning from now on local government organization must operate under surveillance, oversight, and supervision by three principal bodies, that is, central authorities, regional authorities, and people12. Thirdly, this concerns development of operational and administrative systems of local government organization that ensures alignment between missions covering added responsibilities for local government organization and various changing trends. Principally, local government organization must operate independently, whether it be independence in determining its policies, administration, provision of public services, and personnel management as well as financial and fiscal management13. Essentially, personnel management approach of local government organization must have aligned standards and it is also stipulated that local officials may be developed together or rotated among local government organizations14. Also, central personnel management for local government organization will be set up to conduct local personnel management and create a system to safeguard integrity and ethics in local personnel management. In addition, an organization will be set up to safeguard the integrity system of local officials15. The development of the fiscal system is crucial for the advancement of local government organization. Therefore, local government organization is offered an opportunity to develop a local fiscal system so that they can administer public services efficiently and fully as mandated. Aside from development of such fiscal system, they also have an opportunity to institute or jointly establish an organization responsible for provision public services or so-called “multi-disciplinary.”16 The 2007 Constitution allows local government organization to develop an internal administrative system by stipulating that local government organization is composed of two branches i.e. local council and executive for the general form of local government organization. Furthermore, it also permits a special form of local government organization to have an internal administrative structure which is different from that of the general form of local government organization17. Such stipulation can expedite and streamline development programs for local people and areas in accordance with the “special form of local government organization” which is set up with specific objectives. Fourthly, this concerns opening up public space for engagement of people, communities, and civil society in joint management of a locality with local 12 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 282, Paragraph 2 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283, Paragraph 1 14 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 288, Paragraph 1 15 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 288, Paragraph 2 16 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 283 17 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 284 13 61 government organization. Essentially, eligible voters in a locality can exercise their voting rights by signing a petition to impeach a local council member or executive board18. To propose a local ordinance, similarly eligible voters can sign up to submit a local ordinance for deliberation. The prescription of such provision is similar to Section 285, that is, there is no prescription of a required number or proportion of people in the Constitution but the requirement will be further prescribed in additional laws19. Besides, the Constitution also grants people the rights to participate in management of local affairs which are conducted by local government organization and means of public participation must be defined. Section 287, Paragraph 1 stipulates that local people have the rights to participate in management of local affairs conducted by local government organization. Essentially, local government organization must provide a mean for public participation in such manner. Such prescription impels local government organization to provide people with an opportunity to participate, ranging from problem definition, determination of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, joint management with local government organization, monitoring results, and being joint beneficiaries. Essentially, the provision stated in such manner will urge local government organization to take initiatives in creation of various mechanisms and avenues for public participation. Additionally, Section 287, Paragraph 2 also prescribes relationship between local government organization and local people particularly in terms of local government organization’s conducts that affect lifestyles and livelihood of local people20. Such prescription serves as a good reminder to local government organization that before conducting any project, a thorough study on advantages and disadvantages of potential impacts must be undertaken. In regard to such impact study, people must have an opportunity to jointly assess potential impacts with local government organization. If it is known that such implementation may pose any negative repercussion or damage to local people, local government organization is obligated to inform the people in advance. Furthermore, to prevent local government organization citing that people have already been informed (even though it is a very short notice), it is succinctly prescribed with wording “…within a suitable period of time,” meaning local government organization must inform the public with a suitable lead time whatever the case may be. Additionally, the same paragraph also stipulates that in some case, as deemed appropriate, or if local government organization is petitioned by people, local government organization is obligated to hold a public hearing or arrange a referendum to resolve a direction prior to actual implementation. Based on these conditions, however we must wait for more detailed prescription in a relevant law. Additionally, Section 287, Paragraph 321 stipulates that local government organization must dutifully report its conducts to the public on annual basis, whether it be budgeting, budget expenditure, or operating results. Even though these 18 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 285 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 286 20 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 287, Paragraph 2 21 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 282, Paragraph 3 19 62 requirements constitute a burden for local government organization but the measure becomes a tool that local government organization can use to demonstrate its transparency. Moreover, reporting of operating results also serves as a good public relation tool for disseminating information about its performance, particularly those of executive members, administrators, and local council members. It also fosters good understanding between local government organization and people in locality. On the contrary, these requirements enable local government organization to work more readily and efficiently. Besides, people do not have to constantly request for information or pose questions because from now on local government organization must dutifully report to the public on continuous and regular basis. Fifthly, this concerns implanting transparency, integrity, and ethics in local politics. Section 284, Paragraph 10 stipulates that “provisions in Section 265, 266, 267, and 268 shall be enforced upon local council members, local executive members, and local administrators whatever the case may be mutatis mutandis.” After close examination of each of these sections, it was found that Section 265-268 are present in Part 2 Acts Constituting Conflicts of Interest. Section 26522 prohibits local administrator or official from accepting, intervening or meddling in concession; or entering into agreement as a contractual party with the state, government office, state agency, or state enterprise, either directly or indirectly. Local administrator or official is barred from accepting money or other benefit from any government office, state agency, or state enterprise under any special circumstance, except those benefits granted by government office, state agency, or state enterprise under normal business conditions. Moreover, they are also barred from serving as a partner or shareholder in a partnership or company that involves in mass media or acting as a contractual party with such partnership or company. Such prescription will help promote transparency in local politics because it shuts off avenues for any direct or indirect collusion between local executive member, administrator, and official and contractual party, thus inducing conflict of interest in politics. Furthermore, such prescription allows local executive, administrator, and official to perform official duties to the best of their abilities, for example, pricing negotiation and job inspection and approval will be done primarily to serve public interest. Besides, application of the content in Section 26623 to local executive board, administrator, and official can also ensure integrity and ethics in local politics. In effect, these individuals are prohibited from exercising their official positions or status to intervene or meddle in affairs for interests of themselves, others, or any political party, either directly or indirectly, for example, intervening or meddling in any official duty or conduct of official, employee, or temporary staff of a government office is prohibited; intervening or meddling in appointment, transfer, rotation, promotion, salary adjustment, or removal from office of official, employee, temporary staff of a government office is prohibited. Essentially, the provision in this section induces virtuous and ethical conduct and administration and it can significantly and directly prevent intervention in deliberation and operational system of relevant individuals, a group of individuals, or government office. Furthermore, it can assure 22 23 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 265 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 266 63 that any individual, irrespective whether they are civil servants, state officials, temporary staff of a government office, or local officials, shall be safeguarded and protected under the “integrity system.” Aside from aforementioned changes in the essence of local administration, it was discerned that there was attempt to change general circumstances which constitute a vital factor in developing local administration and localities to foster development of local government. In regard to Chapter 13 Ethics of Political Incumbent and State Official, a new chapter was included and it stipulates disposition of ethical standards of each category of political incumbent, civil servant, or state official, thus instituting ethical norms for such group of individuals and individuals. The prescription in this chapter creates a frame of reference for virtuous and ethical conducts for local politician and official, signifying virtues that local executive board, administrator, and official must strictly adhere to. If virtuous and ethical standards are not complied, it may be considered a ground for impeachment. Such prescription can influence performance and administration of local executive board, administrator, and official, and mandate these individuals to perform their duties within the scope of virtuous and ethical conducts and primarily focus on quality and efficient provision of public services in locality. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 constitutes a reinforcement to local government organization, whether they are “financial resources,” “human resources,” and “intellectual resources,” and notably it increases decision-making power in various aspects of local administration. This signifies a pivotal moment that will enhance local development processes through collaborative processes between local government organization and the people. Eventually, local government will become a solid foundation for further democratic development in the future. 64 APPENDIX Directions of Local Government under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 Supplements for Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Thailand 1. Key to Success in Decentralization and Problem Issues The factors that can be seen as keys to success in decentralization are as follows. Ԙ The aspect of local finances (under the regulations of the Constitution, laws concerned with local revenue have to be established within 2 years; ԙ Development of local government ability (regulating the roles of “local administration” and “local government”); Ԛ Expansion of citizen participation (positive participation by citizens who are aware of being actors in the governance process); and ԛ A guarantee of the quality of administrative services (as a first phase, constructing a legal framework and transferring authority. In the second phase, from this year onwards, making plans to strengthen and raise the level of ability in local governments). Looking next at the decentralization process, the first issue is that of providing a guarantee of efficiency. When thinking about the efficiency of local governments, it is necessary to think about cost versus benefits and about the satisfaction of the people. The next perspective needed is a policy of enabling local governments to engage in decision making on their own initiative. Under the new law, devices are introduced to enable citizens to participate and monitor local government expenditure decisions prior to decision making. Under the concept of decentralization, it is not necessary for one uniform criterion of efficiency to be applied to every local government, but for minimum levels to be decided in respect of, for example, standards of service. The second issue is that of the election system. It is necessary for central government and local governments to carry out examinations of a better election system that will make it possible to obtain the best-qualified people. Next is the issue of transparency, which has become an important key word in terms of enabling the people to have confidence in local government. There is also the issue of internal reform of local governments. The success of municipal mergers in Japan is supported by the long history of local governments. In a country like Thailand, however, where the history of local government only goes back for one decade, it is necessary to balance the expansion of economies of scale and the weakening of ties among citizens. The key word that runs through all these issues is that of citizen participation. By constructing a stronger mechanism of citizen participation, it is more likely that local government administration will follow a correct course and that within 2 years, new changes will arise as a result of new laws. 76 2. Case Studies in Citizen Participation Public participation by citizens has a stronger impact if the following procedure is followed: Ԙ the provision of information by local governments; ԙ opportunities for consultation and discussion; Ԛ involvement and encouragement to participate; ԛ collaboration; and Ԝ empowerment. In terms firstly of the provision of information, the presumption is that objective information is presented by the local government, and that understanding of the issues and policies aimed at solutions is obtained. The next stage is one of consultation and discussion, carrying out an analysis of the feedback received from the public as a result of opinions from focus groups, public hearings, and so on. This is followed by efforts to understand the concerns and aspirations of the public, obtained through workshops aimed at encouraging participation and similar means. The next stage, that of collaboration, involves partnering with representatives of the public, working through the decision-making process, examining alternatives and so on. For example, in the case of Phethaburi Municipality, 2 kinds of maps, one a map of land usage and one of natural resources, were compiled within the framework of citizen participation. The final stage is empowerment, the handover of authority. In another example, in Khon Khen Municipality, within the framework of a Town Council Meeting, the device use was that before the formal decision-making took place, there was an informal meeting, at which problems were presented and a consensus was reached. 3. Future directions Under the new Constitution, at least 4 laws have to be implemented (revisions of the Local Autonomy Law, the Decentralization Promotion Law, and the Local Government Personnel Administration Law; and enactment of the Local Finance Law). With regard to the mechanism of citizen participation, this is incorporated into the Local Finance Law. Looking at the future outlook for democracy and decentralization reform in Thailand, the problem that is currently being faced is that a greater degree of political will and commitment are indispensable. The local government system is guaranteed by the Constitution, but it is necessary for a strong belief in decentralization to be maintained. What is indispensable from now on is to strengthen participation in the political process by practicing empowerment at grassroots level. (Text prepared by Shunsuke Kimura) (Translation by Maurice Jenkins) 77 ฦ࿖ႎ๔ⷐ㩷 䉺䉟㩷 䋨㪮㫆㫆㫋㪿㫀㫊㪸㫉㫅㩷 㪫㪸㫅㪺㪿㪸㫀㩷 䉨䊮䉫䊶䊒䊤䉳䊞䊂䉞䊘䉾䉪⎇ⓥᚲ ಎᢎ䋩㩷 㩷 䉺䉟䈮䈍䈔䉎ᣇಽᮭ䈫ၞ␠ળ㩷 㩷 䋱䋮ᣇᐲ䈱ⷐ㩷 ⴕ᭴ㅧ䈲䇮㽲ਛᄩⴕ䇮㽳ᣇⴕ䇮㽴ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈱䋳⒳㘃䈎䉌ᚑ䉎䇯䈖䈱䈉䈤䇸ᣇⴕ䇹䈲䇮 ࿖䈱ౝോ⋭䈎䉌䈧䈭䈏䉎వᯏ㑐䈱䊤䉟䊮䈪䈅䉍䇮⋵䊶䊶䉺䊛䊗䊮䊶䈱䋴ጀ䈎䉌ᚑ䉎䇯䉁䈢䇸ᣇ ⥄ᴦ䇹䈮䈲䇸ᣇⴕ䇹䈫ห䈛ၞ䈮㊀ⶄ䈚䈢⚵❱䈏ሽ䈚䇮䈋䈳⋵䈮⋧ᒰ䈜䉎⚵❱䈫䈚䈩⋵⥄ ᴦ䋨㪧㪘㪦䋩䈏䇮䉁䈢䉺䊛䊗䊮䈮⋧ᒰ䈜䉎䊧䊔䊦䈮䈲䉺䊛䊗䊮⥄ᴦ䋨㪫㪘㪦䋩䈏⟎䈎䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䇸 ᣇ⥄ᴦ䇹䈮䈲䈖䈱ઁ䈮ㅢᏱ䈱⥄ᴦ䈫䈚䈩䊁䊷䉰䊋䊷䊮䋨㪤㫌㫅㫀㪺㫀㫇㪸㫃㫀㫋㫐䋩䈏䈅䉎䇯䈭䈍⋵䈱䊃䉾䊒䈲 ⍮䈪䈅䉍ౝോᄢ⤿䈮છ䈘䉏䉎䈏䇮⋵⥄ᴦ䈱䊃䉾䊒䈲᳃䈮䉋䉎⋥ធㆬ䈪ㆬ䈳䉏䉎䇯㩷 䉺䉟䈱ᣇⴕᐲ䈱㗴ὐ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮એਅ䈱ὐ䈏䈕䉌䉏䉎䇯㽲ᐭ㑆䈱ᯏ⢻䊶ᓎഀಽᜂ䈏ਇ ⏕䇮㽳ਛᄩᐭ䈮䉋䉎ⷙ䈫⥄┙䈱⒟ᐲ䈱㗴䇮㽴ᣇ⽷䈱⥄┙ᕈ䋨ᣇ⒢䈲ᱦో䈱 ⚂ 㪈㪇㩼䇯ઁᣇ䇮ਛᄩᐭ䈎䉌䈱ഥ㊄䈲⚂ 㪋㪇㩼䇯䋩䇮㽵ᣇ䈱ⴕᐭ䈫⼏ળ䈫䈱㑐ଥ䋨ో䈩䈱ᣇ ⴕ䈱㐳䈏ㆬ䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮⼏ળ䈫䈱 㪺㪿㪼㫂㩷㩽㩷㪹㪸㫃㪸㫅㪺㪼 䈏⺖㗴䋩䇮㽶Ꮢ᳃ෳട䈱㗴䋨ಽᮭൻ䈮 䉋䉎Ꮢ᳃䈱ᴦෳട䈲ਇචಽ䋩䇯㩷 㩷 䋲䋮䉺䉟䈮䈍䈔䉎ಽᮭൻ䈱䊒䊨䉶䉴㩷 㪈㪐㪐㪎 ᐕᙗᴺ䉕〯䉁䈋 㪈㪐㪐㪐 ᐕ䈮ᣇಽᮭផㅴᴺ䈏ቯ䈘䉏䇮㪉㪇㪇㪇 ᐕ䈮䈲 㪌 ᐕ䈗䈫䉕ᦼ㑆䈫䈜 䉎ᣇಽᮭ⸘↹䇮㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ䈮䈲ฦ⋭ᐡ䈎䉌䈱ᮭ㒢⒖⼑䈮㑐䈜䉎 㪘㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷 㪧㫃㪸㫅 䈏ቯ䉄䉌䉏䈢䇯หᴺ 䈲䇮㽲ᣇ䈻䈱ᮭ㒢⒖⼑䇮㽳ᣇ䈱ᱦჇട䇮㽴ਛᄩᐭ䈎䉌䈱ੱຬ⒖⼑䈱ၮḰ䈫ᚻᲑ䈱 ⏕ൻ䇮㽵ᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑䈮ଥ䉎ᴺᡷᱜ䈫䈇䈉䋴䈧䈱⋡ᮡ䉕ቯ䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮㪘㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷 㪧㫃㪸㫅 䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮 㽲㪉㪇㪇㪉 ᐕ䉁䈪䈮 㪈㪌 ⋭ 㪌㪎 ዪ䈱ᜬ䈧 㪉㪋㪌 ോ䉕⥄ᴦ䈮⒖⼑䇮㽳ᣇᱦ䉕 㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ䉁䈪䈮✚ᱦ 䈱 㪉㪇㩼એ䈮䇮㪉㪇㪇㪍 ᐕ䉁䈪䈮 㪊㪌㩼એ䈫䈜䉎䇮㽴ಽᮭផㅴ䈮ะ䈔 㪍㪋 ᧄ䈱ᴺ䉕ᡷᱜ䇮㽵ਛᄩ ᐭ䈎䉌⥄ᴦ䈮ੱຬ䉕⒖⼑䈫䈇䈉ౝኈ䈏ቯ䉄䉌䉏䈢䇯㪉㪇㪇㪏 ᐕ 㪉 ᤨὐ䈱ㅴ⁁ᴫ䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮 㪈㪏㪈 ോ䈏⒖⼑䈘䉏䇮㪋㪃㪌㪐㪐 ੱ䈱ੱຬ⒖⼑䈏ᷣ䉖䈪䈇䉎䇯⽷㕙䈪䈲䇮หᴺቯ೨䈲 㪏㩼䈪䈅䈦䈢 ᣇᱦ䈱ഀว䈏 㪉㪌㪅㪉㩼䈮䈚䇮ᴺᓞᡷᱜ੍ቯ 㪌㪍 ᧄ䈱䈉䈤 㪊㪇 ᧄ䈏ቢੌ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋳䋮㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕᙗᴺ㩷 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕᙗᴺ䈪䈲ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈮㑐䈚䈩䋵䈧䈱䉣䉾䉶䊮䉴䈏ⷙቯ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䉁䈝╙䋱䈮䇮ਛᄩᐭ䇮 ᣇⴕ䇮ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈱Ⴚ⇇䇮ᮭ㒢䇮⽿છ䉕⏕䈮䈜䉎䈫䈫䉅䈮䇮䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ਥ䈢䉎ឭଏ⠪䈫䈚 䈩䈱⥄ᴦ䈱ᓎഀ䉕ᒝൻ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䋨ᙗᴺ䋸䋱᧦䇮䋲䋸䋱᧦䋩䇯╙䋲䈮䇮⥄ᴦ䈱⋙〈䊶ⷙ䈫 ⥄ᴦ䈱⥄┙䈮䈧䈇䈩䇮ਔ⠪䈱䈱䊋䊤䊮䉴䉕⏕䈜䉎䈢䉄⥄ᴦ䈮ኻ䈜䉎⋙〈╬䈲ᔅⷐ䈫䈘䉏 䉎㒢䉍䈮䈍䈇䈩䇮⏕䈭ၮḰ䉇᧦ઙ䈱ਅ䈮ⴕ䈭䉒䉏䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䈭䈬䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䋨ᙗᴺ 㪉㪏㪉 ᧦╬䋩䇯 78 ╙ 㪊 䈮䇮ⴕၫⴕ䈱⥄ਥᕈ䈮㑐䈚䈩䇮ੱ䊶⽷䉲䉴䊁䊛䈱⥄┙⊛䈭ㆇ↪䈭䈬䈮䈧䈇䈩ⷙቯ䈘䉏 䈩䈇䉎䋨ᙗᴺ 㪉㪏㪊 ᧦╬䋩䇯╙ 㪋 䈲䇮᳃䉇䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞䇮Ꮢ᳃␠ળ䈱ಽ㊁䈻䈱ෳട䈮䈧䈇䈩䈪 䈅䉎䇯ᙗᴺ䈲䇮᳃䈏ᛩ䈮䉋䉍⼏ળ䈱⼏ຬ䉇ၫⴕᯏ㑐䈱䊜䊮䊋䊷䉕⸃છ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇮᳃ 䈲⥄ᴦⴕ䈮ෳട䈜䉎ᮭ䈏䈅䉍䇮⥄ᴦ䈲᳃䈱ෳടᚻᲑ䉕↪ᗧ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈭䈬 䈱ⷙቯ䉕⸳䈔䈩䈇䉎䋨ᙗᴺ 㪉㪏㪌 ᧦䇮㪉㪏㪎 ᧦╬䋩䇯䈠䈚䈩╙ 㪌 䈲䇮ᴦㆊ⒟䈱ㅘᕈ䈱⏕䈮㑐䈜䉎 ⷙቯ䈪䈅䉎䋨ᙗᴺ 㪉㪏㪋 ᧦䇮㪉㪍㪌 ᧦╬䋩䇯㩷 㩷 䋴䋮ᣇಽᮭᚑഞ䈱䉦䉩㩷 ಽᮭᚑഞ䈻䈱䉦䉩䈫䈭䉎䊐䉜䉪䉺䊷䈲ᰴ䈱䋴ὐ䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯䉁䈝䇮╙ 㪈 䈮䇮ᣇ⽷䈱㗴䈏䈅䉎 䈏䇮䈖䈱ὐ䈮䈧䈇䈩 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕᙗᴺ䈪䈲ᣇᱦ䈮㑐䈜䉎ᴺᓞ䉕䋲ᐕએౝ䈮ቯ䈜䉎ᣦⷙቯ䈚䈩䈇 䉎䇯╙ 㪉 䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈱⢻ജ㐿⊒䈪䈅䉍䇮䇸ᣇⴕ䇹䈫䇸ᣇ⥄ᴦ䇹䈱ᓎഀ䉕䈬䈱䉋䈉䈮ⷙቯ䈚䇮⚵❱ 䈱ㆇ༡䇮䊥䊷䉻䊷䉲䉾䊒䈱ะ䉕䈬䈉࿑䉎䈎䈫䈇䈦䈢⺖㗴䈪䈅䉎䇯╙ 㪊 䈮䈲䇮᳃ෳട䈱ᄢ䈱 㗴䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮ᒰ⠪ᗧ⼂䉕ᜬ䈦䈢Ⓧᭂ⊛䈭᳃ෳട䈱ଦㅴ䈏㊀ⷐ䈫䈭䉎䇯╙ 㪋 䈫䈚䈩䇮ⴕ䉰䊷 䊎䉴䈱⾰䈱⏕䈱㗴䈏䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋵䋮᳃ෳട䈱䉬䊷䉴䉴䉺䊂䉞㩷 ᳃䈮䉋䉎ෳട䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮㽲ᖱႎឭଏ䇮㽳ද⼏䊶⋧⺣䇮㽴ෳ↹ଦㅴ䇮㽵ද䇮㽶ᮭ㒢ઃਈ 䈫⛯䈐䇮䈖䈱㗅ᐨ䈪䉟䊮䊌䉪䊃䈏ᒝ䈒䈭䈦䈩䈇䈒䇯䉁䈝ᖱႎឭଏ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈏ቴⷰ⊛䈭ᖱ ႎ䉕᳃䈮ឭଏ䈚䇮⺖㗴䉇⸃╷╬䈱ℂ⸃䈮ᓎ┙䈩䉎䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯Ფ䈲ඨᲤ䈮⥄ᴦ 䈎䉌ฦᏪ䈮ᐢႎ䉕ㅍઃ䈜䉎ข⚵䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯ᰴ䈇䈪䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞䊶䊚䊷䊁䉟䊮䉫䇮⺰ ⺞ᩏ䇮䉶䊚䊅䊷䈭䈬᳃䈎䉌䈱䊐䉞䊷䊄䊋䉾䉪䉕ᓧ䈩ಽᨆ䉕ⴕ䈉ද⼏䊶⋧⺣䈱Ბ㓏䈪䈅䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮ෳ ↹ଦㅴ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭 ᔨ䉇ⷐᦸ䈏᳃䈮䈅䉎䈱䈎䉕ᵞ䈇䈚䇮䊗䊤䊮䍡䉞䉝䉕⏕䈜䉎䈖䈫 䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈋䈳䇮䊅䊛䉰䉟⸘↹䋨✛䈅䈸䉏䉎ㆇᴡ䉕ഃ䈜䉎⸘↹䋩䇮⥄ォゞ䈱ᬌᩏ䇮⧯⠪ 䉇ሶଏ䈮䉋䉎ⅣႺ䉼䉢䉾䉪╬䈱䊗䊤䊮䊁䉞䉝䈱䈏䈅䉎䇯ᰴ䈮䇮ઁ䈱ㆬᛯ⢇䈱ᬌ⸛䈭䈬ᗧᕁቯ 䈱ฦᲑ㓏䈮䈍䈇䈩᳃䈫䈫䉅䈮⠨䈋䈩䈇䈒䈱䈏ද䈪䈅䉎䇯䊕䉺䊑䊥䊷䋨㪧㪿㪼㫋㪿㪸㪹㫌㫉㫀䋩Ꮢ䈪䈱 ↪䉇ᄤὼ⾗Ḯ䈱࿑䈱᳃ෳടဳ䈱ᚑ䉇䇮Ⓧᭂ⊛䈭⚊⒢䈮ኻ䈜䉎ႎఘ䈱䈏䈅䉎䇯ᦨᓟ 䈱Ბ㓏䈲䉣䊮䊌䊪䊷䇮ቯᮭ㒢䈱ઃਈ䈪䈅䉎䇯䉮䊷䊮䉬䊮Ꮢ䈪ⴕ䉒䉏䈢 㪫㫆㫎㫅㩷㪚㫆㫌㫅㪺㫀㫃㩷㪤㪼㪼㫋㫀㫅㪾 䈱 ข⚵䉂䈪䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈱ᗧᕁቯ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䉎೨䈮䉟䊮䊐䉤䊷䊙䊦䈭䉺䉡䊮䊚䊷䊁䉞䊮䉫䈪㗴䉕ឭ ᩺䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䉋䉍䉮䊮䉶䊮䉰䉴䉕ᓧ䉎ข⚵䉂䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䇯㩷 㩷 㩿ᢥ⽿䋺ᧁବ㪀㩷 79 㧟㧙㧠㧚㖧࿖ ㊄ ⋉ᬀ ੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ pG z G G k¡G G sG jaG wSG jG G iG nSG tG \SG jG yOXmPSG nypwzG iSG pG G jG zG G sG nSGuGnGpGGw GzOnypwzPSG{ SGqUG G G k¡GGj¡GwGGzGraG yGkGGGyGtTo GhOYWWZTW^PG G G pTGrSGwUGkG Or G| PG G G pUGpG G j G G G ˄¡NG G G G G G G G G G G G UG oSG G G G G G ¡aG SG G ¡G G G G G G bG SG ¡G G G G G G G UG mG G G G G ¡G G G G GGG GGGGGGSGiGGGG G G G G G G G G G G ¡GGGTGOiSGX``WPUG 81 pG G G G G G G ¡SG iG G UOX``^PG Gr¡ OYWW\PGGG GGG¡GaGOPG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G OPG G G ˅G G G G G SG G G ¡G G OPG G G SG G G G OPG G G G G G G OPG G¡˅G GGGGGUG {G yG tTo G hG G zG rSG G G G Iw G nISG G G G G ¡G G G G G G GGUG{GGSGGGGGwGjGG nG pG G k¡OwjnpkPSG G G G wjnpkG G G lG jG G k¡OljkPG G G ¡GyGGGGUGpGq GYWW[SGG zG hG G k¡G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G uG h G G ¡G G G G G G UG pG uG YWW[SG G ljkG G ¡G G G G G G G G G G w G nG G G G mT G jG k¡G wG G G G G G G ¡G G G GUG G hGGSGG¡GGGG GGGG G G G G G G G G SG ¡G SG¡GGGGUGoSGGGGGSG 82 GSGGGGGGGGGSGGG G G SG G TG G SG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G GOhSGYWW\PUG {G G G G G G G ¡G G ¡G G G G G G G yG tTo G hUG {G G SGGGGGGGGGG¡GGG zG rUG uSG G G G G G G G yG G G UGm SGGGGGGGrGUG G ซUGk¡GGG GrG G G XUG{GXGGYGyGOX`[_¥X`]XPG G G hGGhG GGGSGrGGGXG yGGX`[_UGhG GGGGGGGGG GGGGGrG UGoSGrGGGG G G G G G G G G qG G UG pG G G G G rG ~OX`\W¥X`\ZPG G G jG ~G UG {G G GG G G G G UG {G G G G G G G SG G G G G G ¡G G G G G G G UG lG G G SG 83 rG G G G G TG G G G ¡G UGoSGGGGG GGUG G {GYGyGGGGGGGGGGhGX`SGX`]WUGpG G GG G G GG GrG GG G G G G G UG {G G G G GGGYGyGGGGGGG G UG G G YUGwGjTGhGOt GX`]X¥vGX`^`PG G G {G G G G wG jTG G G G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G G G G G G G G G UG pG G G G G G G G G G ˅G G UG oSG G G G G G G G G G G ¡G G X`^WSG G G G G G G G G G GGGGGG GGGGGGG GUG G G ZUGjGkTGhGOt GX`_W¥m GX`__PG G G {GGGG GGjGkTGGGGX`_WGG G G G G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G G G G G G G G 84 UG j˅G G G G G UG pG G GGGGUG G G [UGyG{TGhGOm GX`__¥m GX``ZPG G G hG G G G G G G yG {TG G G G SG G G G G G G G G ˅GGG UG{GGGGyGGGG G G ¡G G G G G UG hG G G G G G G G G G G G GGGGGGGGGGG GGGGGGGUG G G \UGrGTGhGOm GX``Z¥m GX``_PG G G pG G G SG wG rG TG G G G G G G G IG IUG sG G G G GrGGGGGGUG{GGGG ˅G G G G G G G G G G G G ¡GUG G G G G 85 ]UGrGkTGhGOm GX``_¥m GYWWZPG G G wGrGkTGGGG ˈGGGGˉG GGUG{GGGGrGkTG˅GGGG ¡G G G G G G G G G G G TUG pG G G G G NNG G G G G G G G ¡G G G G UG pG GGGGGGGaGGGG G G G G G G G G G G G UG pG G G G G G TG G G G G GGGGGG UG G G ^UGyGtTo GhGOtGYWWZ¥m GYWW_PG G {G w G nG G G G ¡G G GGGGG GGGGUG G mSG G G G G ¡G SG yG G G GaG G XUGkG¡G GGG¡GGUG G YUG wG G G ¡G G G G G G G G G G SG G G G GGGGUG G 86 ZUG{G¡GG GGGSGGGG G SGGGG¡G GG UG G [UGlGGG SGGG GGGSGG GGG UG G \UG lG G G G G G G G G G GGGUG zSG G G G G G SG yG G G GaG G XUGzGGGGGGGGGGG GGG GGGGGSGGGG GG GGGUG YUGzGGGGGGGGG GG G G G G GG SG ¡GG SG G¡GG UG G ZUG jG G G G G G G G G G G G TGGGGGGGUG G [UG iG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G SG G G SG GTGGG UG G G G G G 87 pppUGtGG GGG G {GGGGTSGGGGGGG GGGGGGGUG{GGSGGGG G G G G G G G G G G UG mG GSG GG G G G GGG SG ¡GSG¡GSGTGSGGGUG G OXPGsGyG G G sGGGGGGGGGGGGGG UG{GGGGGG GGaGGG G G ¡G G G G G G G G G G G GGGGGGGGbGGGGGGG G G G G bG G G G G G G G G G GGGG¡UG G {G rG kTG hG G G G G G G G G G G G XWWG G G G G UG oSG G G G G YWWWSG G G ¡G G G G G G G SG G G G G G UG iG G G GGYWWYSGGGGTUGpGYWWXSGGjGz G hG G G G G ZWWG G G G G G G G G sG h G hG G G G G G G G G YWWYUG pG 88 GGGGGGGGGGG GGG G G G G G SG G G G G G G GGGGGGGGGGGGG UG G vGq GY`SGYWW[SGGsGyGhGGGGGsG yGzGyGGGGGGGG G GGG SG GGGGGGGGGGq G ZWGGG XPUG {G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G SG G G G G G G lVt VkYPGSGGGGGG GGGGG G¡UG{GGGGGGGGGGYWGGGG GGGG¡UG {G G G G GG G aG G ¡SG G G XVYWG G G G XV\G G G G G G G GG G G G G G G G G G G bG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G bGGGGGG GGGGGG GGG SGGGGGGGGG GGG G G SG G G G G G G G G bG G G G G G G G G G G GGGGGGG GGGG UG G 89 pG YWW\SG G G G G G G G qG G G G ¡GGTGGGZPUGiGGGG G G G G G G SG G G G iG G G G G UG hG G G G G G G jG GGjG GGGGzGY`SGYWW\UG G oG G [G TG G G SG qG G G G G G lVt VkG G G G G G G U[PG pG G G G G G G G G G G lVt VkG G G G G G G NG G G G G G G yG zTnG jG G G lVt VkUG pG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G OvG MG wSG X``^PSG G G G G GGG G G G G ¡OiSG G USGX``[bG rG G SG YWW\PUG {SG G G G G G IG ¡IG G G G G G G G G GGUG sG G G G G G G G G G VG UG pG G G G G G G G ¡UG hG G G G G G G G TG G G G G G G SG G G G G G GGG GGGGGGGGGSG G SG G G G G G G G G G G G 90 UG mG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G TG G G G GGUG G G OYPGj¡GyG G G hG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G ¡G SG G G G G G GGGGGG GGG GG G G G G G G UG {SG ¡G G G G G G G G G G SG G G G G G GGGGGGGGGGG¡SG G GGGGGGUG {Gj¡GyGhGGG GGuGh GGt GYWW]SGG GGGGt GYWW^UG{G GGGG¡GGGG G ¡G G G G G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G G G G G aG G G G G G G G G G G GGGXWVXWWGGGbGGGGG SG GGGG GX\VXWWbGGGGGSGSG SGG GGG GYWVXWWUG G 91 pGGGGGGG¡GSGGGGGGG G G G G G G SG G G \VXWWWWG G G G XWVXWWWG G G GGGGGGGGGGGGG GG GGGGGZGSGGGUGmGG GGGG G G SG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G lSG t SG kG G G G UG~G G GG˅G G G G G GG G SGG G ¡GGGGUG G j¡GGGG GGGGGGGGGGG G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G G GGGGGGGGGGGGSGGG GGGGGGG GGSGG GGGG GGUG G G OZPGj¡GsG G j¡G sG z G G G G G G G G G G G G G G ¡UG pG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G UGoSG¡GGGG G GGG¡G G G G G G G G G G G SG G SGGGGGSGGGGSG G G G G G G UG j¡G G G SG 92 SG G G G G SG G G G GG SGGGGGUG{GGGGGGSG G G G G G G G G G G G G GG¡GGGUG G zG G GGG G YWW]SGG G \PG GG G G G hG YWW^UG j¡G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G ¡G G G UG G G O[PGvTGwGwG G G pG YWW[SG G iwyVpzwOiG wG yVpG z G wPG G G G G G G G G G SG G G G G G G G G aG G SG G SG G G UG iG G SG G G G G YWW[SG G G G G G G G t G G jG G {SG iG oG G vG G vSG G G G G G GGGGTG UG G mG hG YWW\SG GTG GG G iG oG G G pG zSG pG vOG G PSG w˅G w G OG G G G G G TPG G G vG G vOG G G G G PG G G G G vGGrOUUUPUG G 93 {G G G G G G G G UG {G G G G G G GG TGGG G G [[G G G YYG SG G G G G G UG pG SG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G vG G vG G G GSGGG GGGUG G {G vG G rG G G G vG vG G vG G G G T G G G G G G G GGGG TUGpGGGGGGG G G G G G G G SG G SG G G G G G G jG wG jUG ~G G GGGGGG˅GGGGG G SG G G G jG wG jG G G GG G S]PG G GG G T GG ¡G GGG GGGG TGUGj¡G G GGGGGGGGGGGG Gw GkGUGtSGjGwGjGGGG ¡GGG GGGGGGGGG GGGGGGGGGGGUG G G pGYWW]SGGGGGGGGGGGG TG G G G G G G G G G G G G G G UG | G G G G G G G ¡G G G G G SG G G TG G UG pG 94 SG G G G G G G G G G TUG mSG G G G G G ¡G G G GGGGGG TGGGUG G G p}UGjaGzGGGrGG G pG G G YXG SG G G G G G G G UGwGGGGGGGGGG GGGG G G G G G UG jG G G G SG G ¡G G G ¡G G G G G GGGGGGUGkGGG G¡GG¡GGUGnSG ¡GGGGG GUG G hG ¡G G G G G G G G G G SG G G G SG G G SG G G G SG G G G G G G G G OzSG X`_\bG iG G USG YWWZbG uSG YWW]PUG pG G G ¡G G ¡G G G G bG G G G SG G G G G UG pG G G G ¡G G G G SG G G G G G G G G G G G G G SG G SGGGGGG TGG GG UG G 95 hGGG GGGt GYWW\G GGt GGnG hG G oG hOtvnhohPSG \`LG G G ^W^G G SG GG¡GGGGGG¡GGG GGGyGGG UG G iG G ¡G G G ¡G G G G G G G UG pG G G G G ¡G G G SG G G G G G G G G TUG hG G G G G G G G G G ¡G G G G UG j¡G G GSGG SGG G ¡G G NG GGGGGG OsSGYWW[PUG G G ylmlylujlzG G G hSG zToUG OYWW\PUG k¡G G waG sG G zG lGOrPUGzaGkUG G iSG jUG jUG G UG OX``^PUG kG k¡UG hG G G G G|zhpkGGGpxjGGk GGnUG G 96 iSG yUG qUG OX``WPUG k¡SG pG yG G taG {G G wT~G hfG pG yUqUG iG OlUPSG k¡SG sG nGGtUGvaGjGwUG G iSGqUGGUGOYWWZPUGsGsGGk¡aGhGsGyUG mSGz¡aG{GpGGmGGG| GGmUG GG iSG kUG G UG OX``[PUG {G wG G k¡aG y¡G sG k UGsaGtUG G mSG qUG OYWWYPUG {G wG G jUG taG | G G tGwUG G r¡ SG qTt UG OYWW\PUG k¡aG wG G wSG k G G kUG kwhktG kG wG G G G |G uG kGGlGGzGhUG G rSG o TrG MG o TzG UG OYWW\PUG pG mG G y˅G wG G j G v¡G G G G jG l G OrPUGrGz GGwGhGX]OXPaGZ[^TZ^]UG G G sSGkUGOYWW[PUGhG{ GGsGnGOrPUGzaGiUG G G 97 sSG zTjUG OYWW^PUG yGk¡GjG GraG ySG y GGyUGpGyGGwGhUGXXOYPaGX\T Y^UG GG uSGwUGuUGOYWW]PUGk¡GGhaGsGGzGGmG G G mG hG jUG hG G G G G Y_G hhwhtG hG yG jG G hSG {¡G G [T_G kUG G G G vSG kUG MG wUG wUG OX``^PUG iG i UG ySG tUaG hG~ GsUG G zSG iUG jUG OX`_\PUG k¡aG {G {G kG G G zUG saGnGhGMG|UG G GG G G XPG Y [`G G G G G G G G G G G YWW\G G nTGGGzUG G G YPG {GGTGG OzPGG OnPGUG G G ZPG hG G G G G G qG G Y^G q G YWW\UG pG G G G G G G G G G G G [G TG G 98 G OYG G G YG PG G G G G qG UG {G G G G G G G G \^G LG G OG G G G G Z^LPG G G UG hG G SG G [G TG G G G SGGYGGGGGGGGGUG G G [PG {G ¡G G G lVt VkG G G G G G G G G TG GGGGGUGpG SG lVt VkG G G G GTGGGGGG GGGTGG G GG\½X]G GGG GX`]WUG G G \PG ̱G ~G G G G SG zG j SG n G wG Ot G Y\SG YWW]PG G G G G ̱G ~GGGGG GGSGn Gj SG G G G G G G G n GwGOq GY[SGYWW]PG G G G G ̱G ~GGSGzGj SGzGjGwGOhGZXSGYWW]PG G G G G ̱G ~GGSGi TSGpGtGj GOzG\SGYWW]PG G G G G ̱G ~GGSGzTSGzGtGnGOzGXZSGYWW]PG G G G G ̱G ~GGSGj Tj SGzGjGwGOhGX]SGYWW^PG G G ]PG hG G t G YWW]SG G YWWG jG wG jG G G G GG¡GUG G G 99 ฦ࿖ႎ๔ⷐ 㖧࿖ 㧔㊄ ⋉ᬀ ੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ㧕 㖧࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߣᏒ᳃ෳട 㧝 ⋝ᱞ㋚ᮭߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭᡷ㕟 2004 ᐕ 1 ߦᣇಽᮭ․ᴺ߇ቯߐࠇޔ2004 ᐕ 12 ߦߪᣇಽᮭၫⴕᆔຬળ㧔㧱㧯 㧰㧕ߦࠃߞߡ 5 ᐕ㑆ߩ✚ว⊛ߥᣇಽᮭൻ⸘↹߇╷ቯߐࠇߚߩߎޕᣇಽᮭൻ⸘↹ߩߥ߆ ߢޔᏒ᳃ෳടߦ㑐ଥߔࠆ㗴߇ขࠅߍࠄࠇޔ᳃ᛩᐲߥߤ߇ዉߐࠇߚޕ 㧞 㖧࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߣᡷ㕟ߩᱧผ ࠕ ╙৻╙ޔੑ࿖ᤨઍ㧔1948 ᐕ㨪1961 ᐕ㧕 1948 ᐕߦ╙৻࿖߇᮸┙ߐࠇߚ߇ޔ1950 ᐕߦߪᦺ㞲ᚢ߇ഺ⊒ߒޔ಄ᚢᤨઍߦߞ ߚޕ1960 ᐕߦ╙ੑ࿖߇ᚑ┙ߒޔಽᮭ⊛ߥᣇ⥄ᴦᐲ߳ߩᡷ㕟߇ⴕߥࠊࠇߚޕ ࠗ ᧉᱜᾊᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔1961 ᐕ 5 㨪1979 ᐕ 10 㧕 1961 ᐕߩァࠢ࠺࠲ߦࠃࠅᣇ⥄ᴦᐲߪᭂߡਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣߥࠆޕ1970 ᐕઍߦߪਛᄩࠛ࠻ߩᮭജ߇ᄢߒޔᏒ᳃ߩ⥄↱߇㒢ߐࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߚޕ ࠙ ోᾔᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔1980 ᐕ 5 㨪1988 ᐕ 2 㧕 ᐭߪޔല₸ᕈߩะߦദࠆߣߣ߽ߦ߿▸ⷙޔᱜߐࠍᒝ⺞ߒⴕޔߦࠃࠆⷙ߇㊀ ⷞߐࠇߚޕ ࠛ ⋝ᵏᗱᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔1988 ᐕ 2 㨪1993 ᐕ 2 㧕 ᳃ਥൻࠍଦㅴߔࠆߚߩⴕᡷ㕟ᆔຬળ߇⸳⟎ߐࠇޔਛᄩᐭߣᣇᐭߣߩ㑐ଥߥߤ ࠍౣቯ⟵ߔࠆᡷ㕟᩺߇߹ߣࠄࠇߚޕ ࠝ ㊄᳗ਃᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔1993 ᐕ 2 㨪1998 ᐕ 2 㧕 㧠⒳㘃ߩᣇㆬߩታᣉࠍㅢߓᣇ⥄ᴦ߇㖧࿖ోߢታ〣ߐࠇޔ᧪ߩᣇಽᮭ߳ะߌ ߡߩᐲ⊛ၮ␆߇↪ᗧߐࠇߚޕ ࠞ ㊄ᄢਛᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔1998 ᐕ 2 㨪2003 ᐕ 2 㧕 ᳃㑆߳ߩࠍᦨዊ㒢ߦߒޔ㘈ቴᔒะࠍ⋡ᜰߔߣߣ߽ߦޔਛᄩᐭ⚵❱߇ᣇᐭߦ⒖ ▤ߐࠇߚޔߚ߹ޕᐭߪᣇ⽷ߩᡰេᐲࠍᡷༀߒޔᣇ⥄ᴦߩ⥄ᴦ⢻ജࠍะߒࠃ ߁ߣߒߚޕ ࠠ ⋝ᱞ㋚ᄢ⛔㗔ᤨઍ㧔2003 ᐕ 2 㨪2008 ᐕ 2 㧕 ಽᮭ⊛ߥⴕࠍ⏕┙ߔࠆߚޔ᳓ᐔ⊛ߥⴕᢥൻ㧔㘑㧕ߩ᭴▽ੱޔ▤ℂߩಽᮭൻޔ ⴕᮭ㒢ߩᣇ߳ߩ⒖ォޔᣇ⽷ᐲߩ⏕┙ߥߤߦദߚޔߚ߹ޕෳടဳⴕࠍ᭴▽ߔ ࠆߚߦޔ㐿߆ࠇߚᐭߩଦㅴ߿⋥ធ᳃ਥਥ⟵⊛ଔ୯ߩᒝൻ⽷ޔᖱႎߩ㐿ޔല₸⊛ߥ ෳടࠪࠬ࠹ࡓߩ᭴▽߇ㅴࠄࠇߚޕ 㧟 ෳടဳࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ એਅߦㅀߴࠆࠃ߁ߥᏒ᳃ෳടᐲ߇ዉߐࠇߚޕ ࠕ ᳃ᛩ㧔ࡈࠔࡦ࠳ࡓ㧕 100 2004 ᐕ 1 ߦ᳃ᛩᴺ߇Ꮣߐࠇޔ2005 ᐕᧃߦߪ߶߷ోߡߩ⥄ᴦߢ᳃ᛩ᧦ ߇ᛚߐࠇߚޕ᳃ᛩߩኻ⽎ߣߥࠆߩߪޔฦ⥄ᴦߩᮭ㒢ߦዻߔࠆߎߣߢ᳃ߦᄢ߈ߥ ᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ࠆ㊀ⷐߥ㗄ߢࠆޕ20 ᱦએߩ᳃㧔࿖᳃㧕ߩ߶߆ޔ20 ᱦએߩ৻ቯߩᄖ࿖ ੱߦ߽᳃ᛩߦෳടߔࠆᮭ߇ࠆޕ ᳃ᛩߩ⺧᳞ߪޔ᳃ߩ߶߆ޔᣇ⼏ળ⥄ޔᴦߩ㐳߇ⴕߥ߁ߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆޕ2005 ᐕ 7 ߦޔᷣᎺፉߢ⥄ᴦߩౣ✬ߦ㑐ߒᦨೋߩ᳃ᛩ߇ⴕߥࠊࠇޔ4 ߩၮ␆⥄ᴦ߇ᑄᱛߐ ࠇߚޕ ࠗ ᳃ࠦ࡞㧔᳃ถ༐㧕 2006 ᐕ 6 ߦޔ᳃ࠦ࡞ᴺ߇࿖ળࠍㅢㆊߒޔ2007 ᐕ 5 ߆ࠄᣉⴕߐࠇߚޕ ࠦ࡞ߩኻ⽎ߣߥࠆߩߪᣇ⥄ᴦߩ㐳ߣ⼏ຬߢࠆ߇ߩ࡞ࠦޔታᣉߦᔅⷐߥ⟑ ฬᢙߪࠦ࡞ߩኻ⽎⠪ߦࠃߞߡ⇣ߥࠆ㧔⍮ 10㧑એޔᏒ㐳 15㧑એ⼏ޔຬ 20㧑એ㧕ޕ ߹ߚޔฦ⥄ᴦౝߦ߅ߡ৻ቯߩ⟑ฬᢙ߇৻ቯߩၞߏߣߦᔅⷐߢ߽ࠆޔߪ࡞ࠦޕ ᮭ⠪✚ᢙߩ 3 ಽߩ 1 એߩᛩߣലᛩ✚ᢙߩㆊඨᢙߩ⾥ᚑߢ⏕ቯߔࠆޕ ࠙ ᳃⸷⸩ ᳃⸷⸩ߪޔᣇᐭߩ㆑ᴺߥળ⸘ಣℂߩᤚᱜࠍ࿑ࠆߚ್ⵙޔᚲߩ್ᢿ㧔㧕ࠍ᳞ ࠆ߽ߩߢࠆޕ2006 ᐕߦ᳃⸷⸩ᐲ߇ዉߐࠇߡ߆ࠄ 2007 ᐕ 4 ߹ߢߦ 6 ઙߩ⸷⸩ ߇ឭߐࠇߡࠆ߇ޔᐲߩ↪ࠍଦㅴߔࠆߚߦߪޔᏒ᳃߇ൎ⸷ߒߚ႐วߦ⸷⸩⾌↪ߩ ⽶ᜂࠍᣇᐭߦ⟵ോઃߌࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠈ߁ޕ ࠛ ࠝࡦࠗࡦߦࠃࠆᏒ᳃ෳട 2004 ᐕᧃߦਛᄩ⋭ᐡߩ 5 ᯏ㑐ߩ⛔วࠝࡦࠗࡦࠪࠬ࠹ࡓߩ⹜㛎ㆇ↪߇ⴕࠊࠇޔ2005 ᐕ 4 ߆ࠄߪޔ㕍ⅽบߩ⧰ᖱޔឭ᩺╬ߦ㑐ߔࠆㇱ㐷ߩࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ߇ࠝࡦࡉ࠭ࡑࡦࠝࡉࠦࠕ 㧔Ombudsman of Korea㧕ߣߒߡ⛔วߐࠇߚ⺧ޔߢ߆ߥߚߒ߁ߎޕ㗿ߩಣℂᤨ㑆ߩ⍴❗ߥߤ ߇ⴕࠊࠇⴕޔ߳ߩା㗬ᕈ߇ะߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᏒ᳃ߦ╷ᒻᚑߦෳടߔࠆᯏળ߇ឭଏߐ ࠇࠆߎߣߣߥߞߚޕ᧪⊛ߦߪోᣇᐭߢߩࠝࡦࠗࡦࠪࠬ࠹ࡓߩㆇ↪߇ᦼᓙߐࠇߡ ࠆࠍࡦࠗࡦࠝޕㅢߓߚᄙߊߩᏒ᳃ෳട߇ⴕࠊࠇޔᄙ᭽ߥᏒ᳃ߩᗧߩᵴ↪߇น⢻ߣߥࠈ ߁ޕ 㧠 㖧࿖ߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄቇ߽߱ߩ ᣇಽᮭ߇ోߡߩ⊒ዷࠍ㓚ߔࠆ߽ߩߢߥ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߪ␠ળߩ⊒ዷ╬ߦਇนᰳߢ ࠆޕᡷ㕟ࠍᚑഞߐߖࠆߚߦߪޔᒝᴦߩࠦࡒ࠶࠻ޔലᨐ⊛ߥ࠳ࠪ࠶ࡊޔᡷ㕟⊛ ߥⅣႺ᧚ੱޔ⢒ᚑ߇㊀ⷐߣߥࠆޕ 2005 ᐕ 5 ߩ⺞ᩏߦࠃࠇ߫⋝ޔᱞ㋚ᮭਅߢߩᏒ᳃ෳടߩᄢߪḩ⿷ߊ߽ߩߢߞߚ ߣ 59㧑ߩോຬ⎇ⓥ⠪Ꮢ᳃߇࿁╵ߒߡࠆޕᣇಽᮭߣᏒ᳃ෳടߪㅪ៤ߒߡផㅴߔࠆ ᔅⷐ߇ࠅޔਛᄩᐭߩ⛔ߪᏒ᳃ߦࠃࠆ⛔ߦ⟎߈ᄌ߃ࠄࠇࠆߴ߈ߢࠆޕᏒ᳃ෳടߪޔ ⛔㕙ߦ㒢ࠄߕޔၞߩ⊒ዷ߿᳃ਥൻߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ߩ⢻ജ⢒ᚑޔᵴᕈൻߦ߽ነਈߔࠆߣ ߃ࠆޕ 㧔ᢥ⽿㧦Ꮉ ඳ㧕 101 㧟㧙㧡㧚ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕ $CODCPI25$TQFLQPGIQTQ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳 DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA AND ITS IMPACTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITY Bambang P.S Brodjonegoro Professor and Dean, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, Jakarta It has been 8 years since the “big-bang” decentralization was declared on the January 1 2001. Based on the law 22 and 25 that had been ratified in 1999, Indonesia was trying to implement something that had not been successfully implemented in the past especially during a very centralized and authoritarian Soeharto regime. It was called a “big-bang” decentralization since the preparation was only 1 year and the degree of decentralization was extreme and massive. A very strong central government was decentralized directly to the second level of local government, districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kota). Except for five authorities (monetary and fiscal affairs, religion, judicial system, foreign affairs, and national security), all of government authorities have been delegated to local government. All of sudden, the bupati (head of district) and mayor became very powerful people and the authorities of central government became limited. In 8 years period, the positive and negative impacts of decentralization have been apparent. Some complained that the decentralization is just a political move without clear economic benefit and obvious welfare improvement. Some others complained that decentralization lowers the quality of local public services and hence, they ask for recentralization consideration. Tug of war between central and local government is not a strange thing during the 8 years of decentralization and it also became clear that some parts of central government, especially line ministries, are reluctant to the decentralization. Despite all kind of problems, central government seriously keeps the strong commitment to enhance the decentralization process. Albeit slow, they are trying very hard to produce many legal products and directions to manage the decentralization process. One of obvious results was the ratification of law 32 and 33 in 2004 to amend the law 22 and 25 in 1999. 103 One phenomenal progress in Indonesian politic history may be the implementation of local direct election as mandated in law 32 2004. Governors, bupatis, mayors, and local parliament members have to win the popular votes in order to get elected and rule for 5 years. Similar to what happened at national level, the local direct election is surprisingly quite safe throughout Indonesia. There were some legal actions by some loosing parties that may hinder the transition of local government but in general, the election process is peaceful. The success of direct local election is really a shortcut for local community greater involvement in local politics, and furthermore in local governance and local economic development. Money politics will not work at local level and given the better level of people education, only elected officials with good performance will be acceptable for the local voters. Few elected officials at few region has already proven that they can be reelected easily with landslide majority by showing their good performance during their first 5 years. Since decentralization in Indonesia is point of no return, majority of people should consider decentralization as a success, not a failure. To be successful, decentralization has to produce clear benefit for their major recipients, the local community or local people. Clear benefits should be translated into free political rights, better local economic performance, less unemployment, better local basic public services, higher personal income, and better welfare. Without those, decentralization will benefit only local elites especially local executives and legislatives. The question would be why decentralization is more on decentralization of government affairs than decentralization of public needs. To discuss current situation of local community involvement in Indonesia decentralization, this paper will focus on three current, but critical, issues namely local government formation, local economic development, and local basic public services. The paper will not discuss only issues but also some suggestions to make decentralization beneficial for local community everywhere in Indonesia. New Local Government Formation An article in law 22/1999 and also in law 32/2004 gives the opportunity for the formation of new local government, separated from its original (and larger) local 104 government. From democracy point of view, this article basically wants to acknowledge the local community or local people rights in determining what kind of local government most appropriate for them. There could be some cases where it is better to divide a local government into two, one is the original and another is the new one, both for political and economic reasons. Since Indonesia is relatively still vulnerable of horizontal local conflicts, it will be strategic to create new local governments as long as it is effective in avoiding conflicts. However, many parties in Indonesia especially local elites misused that article. They simply abused the article by proposing so many new local governments. The common reasons used for proposing new local governments are to overcome large area, to make government closer to people, to avoid horizontal conflict, to have more transfer from central government, and to accommodate growing urbanized area. Nothing is wrong with those reasons but some local elites tend to simplify those reasons and make the proposals of new local government immediately once they feel they find good reasons. As a result, a lot of new local government proposals came to ministry of home affairs and national parliament. During the first years, the central government seemed to be powerless in rejecting the proposals and hence, every proposal became reality or became new district or municipality. Tabel 1 demonstrates the growth of new local government in Indonesia and also by province. Most of the new formation occurred outside Jawa, especially new districts while in Jawa was dominated by new municipality. The current total of local governments in Indonesia is 470 local governments, compared to around 340 during the first year of decentralization in 2001. Due to the weakness in evaluation process of new local government proposal, economic feasibility of those new regions was rarely touched or reviewed. Most of new local governments then used either political or social reasons for justification, and presumed that economic and financial reasons have been automatically taken care by central government. This presumption was clearly against the basic idea of decentralization where the local governments should be more responsible in managing their local economic development. The evaluation system itself was clearly the mess with both 105 ministry of home affairs and regional autonomy council were trapped in populist way by simply approving most of new local government proposal. The national parliament even worsened the case when they were very active in proposing new laws, every single law of new local governments. The fact indicated that the only legal products initiated by national parliament are laws on new local governments. The other initiatives came from the executive. At the end, it is combination of few local elites interest, money politics, weak evaluation system at parliament and central government, and budget commitment to support the formation of new regions. This combination is certainly a recipe for disaster and almost no benefit for local community who should be benefited from smaller local government that is closer to them. Since economic and financial reasons were not that important in formation of new local government, most of new local government right away became the member of poor and underdeveloped regions. Table 2 revealed that 80% of new local government had GRDP per capita lower than the national average, and in that group, most of them had economic growth lower than the national average. This stunning picture immediately concludes that rapid growth of new local government formation is a new burden for Indonesian economy that already has many other burdens. The picture becomes gloomier when the economic data combined with the local public financial data. The emergence of new local governments only make more local governments heavily dependent on the general allocation fund (DAU), the main intergovernmental transfer instrument. The role of local own revenue (local taxes and charges) became minor since most of new local government do not have any potential for their local taxes and charges revenue. Osterman (2007) did the estimation of cost and benefit of new local government formation. As expected, the components of benefit side in this study were much less than the cost components. Using the 2001-2005 data on new local government formulation, the estimated benefit was around 1.3 trillion Rp while the estimated cost reached around 9.1 trillion Rp. The net cost of new local government formation in Indonesia then became 7.8 trillion Rp. In 2005 alone, the estimated cost of new local government formulation was around 4.8 trillion Rp. The estimation might not be 100% accurate but 106 the message is clear that the weak system of new local government formation evaluation costs significantly to the nation. This study should be a warning to the central government to stop more local government formulation. Currently, the application is still piling up and there are pressures to both executive and legislative from the respective local elites to move on with the approval. If new local government formulation costs significantly to the economy, there have to be solutions to avoid increasing inefficiency. There are two possible solutions, amalgamation of local governments and inter local government cooperation. The amalgamation seems to be a logical solution to reduce the number of local governments. From economic and financial point of view, the central government could offer incentives for neighboring local governments to merge into one local government. The incentives could be in the form of additional transfer to merging local governments. So far, the government does not have that kind of incentive. Instead, the central government provided incentives for the formation of new local governments through special allocation fund (DAK). In 2007, the amount reached 500 billion Rp. With that kind of amount, it is not surprising if there are many formations of new regions while there was zero amalgamation. Study conducted by Brodjonegoro and Nurkholis (2006) concluded that the optimal number of local governments in Indonesia, based on economic and financial capability, is only 110 local government or less than 25% of existing local governments. If economic and financial factors are the only consideration, then the amalgamation process will take place when every 4 local governments merges into one new and bigger local government. However, from political and social point of views, this kind of amalgamation is very risky and almost impossible. Interregional cooperation might be the more appropriate answer to reduce inefficiency caused by too many local governments or jurisdictions. Currently, this cooperation is more voluntary than obligation so that only a few local cooperations has been implemented. If the government plans to force amalgamation through five years evaluation process, the government can also issue more detailed guideline for interregional cooperation. The ultimate goal of interregional cooperation is 107 to promote efficiency of public service delivery at local level and to improve the economic scale of regional economies. To some extent, this goal is similar to the idea of amalgamation, but without political consequences. Local community should be the main driver behind the interregional cooperation since they will be the major beneficiaries through better quality of local public services. Private companies could also be a part of interregional cooperation like in the case of garbage disposal management among 4 districts and municipalities in Bali. Those 4 neighboring local governments are responsible in transporting garbage in the area to the garbage processing facility, owned by a private company. The company then has the right to sell the processed garbage to the market so they can accumulate profit. The local residents also benefit due to intensive efforts by their respective local government in removing the garbage to the processing facility. Local Economic Development One proof that central government commitment to do better decentralization is the increasing amount of intergovernmental transfer. The general allocation fund (DAU) is certainly the main indicator of the successful fiscal decentralization process. The DAU formula and allocation has improved significantly beginning 2008 with the enactment of no hold harmless provision. In other words, DAU has performed much better as fiscal equalization component. However, better DAU formula and allocation is just the beginning of good governance in local public finance. A more crucial step that needs good governance at local level is the expenditure plan in local budget. Ideally, the budget should be spent for any local economic activities that benefit most of local community. Local budget should also help stimulating the local economy. The importance of budget spending at local level unfortunately is not really shared by many local governments. They are more interested to argue with central government regarding the intergovernmental transfer itself, especially in asking for more transfer to the revenue side of their budget. No doubt that many local governments feel that they should receive more transfer but given the size of Indonesia and limited economic capacity, every local government and also central government will also share the concern 108 for more money. Fairness in distribution should no longer be the issue, instead the focus should be on the expenditure side. Local community should be the main beneficiary of local budget spending, especially through the quality of basic public service delivery. However, many local governments frequently ignored the local community rights in formulating the budget as well as in allocating the budget. There were many criticisms that local government misinterpreted the budget as local government budget rather than local budget. The earlier term simply means that the budget is exclusively for the local bureaucracy operation, while the later term means that the budget is not only for local bureaucracy operation but also for providing services for people as well as stimulating local economy. When the budget is mostly dedicated for government operation, there is not much left in the budget for public investment such as infrastructure. Local community will hardly enjoy the positive impact of the budget. Local community should be well represented when the budgeting process starts to ensure that their interests are reflected in the budget allocation. Once the fiscal year starts, local community should have the right to monitor the governance of budget spending. Transparency and accountability are the key words in involving local communities. Currently, there are two big issues in local budgeting that do not favor the local community at all. First is the delay in local budget approval, especially due to the conflict between local executive and legislative. Ideally, the budget is approved prior to the beginning of fiscal year so that the spending can be done without any problem. If the budget has not yet been approved while the fiscal year already begins then the local government can only spend the routine spending such as salary but cannot spend for nonroutine or investment activities. If the budget is approved too late then there is a risk that any public investment might not be completed toward the end of fiscal year. This is worsened by the fact that Indonesia has not adopted the multi years budgeting scheme so the public investment activities might get interrupted at every beginning of fiscal year. In 2007, only 6% of local budget approved prior to the beginning of fiscal year. Additional 18% approved at the first month of fiscal year (January) and 27% approved even after March. With this kind of indiscipline and careless behavior, it is no surprise when many 109 local governments declare that they have quite significant budget surplus at the end of fiscal year. Although that surplus can be carried over to the next fiscal year, the spending still has to wait the budget approval of the respective fiscal year. The main reason for budget approval delay is mostly the long argument between local legislative and executive. The argument sometimes is for the interest of local community, but in many cases the long argument simply reflects each of their own interests and sets aside the local community needs. The second problem of local budget spending is the tendency of local government to deposit the money in the commercial bank rather than spending it for local economic activities and improving public service delivery. This tendency was well reflected in 2007 when suddenly regional banks (banks owned by provincial government) invested much more money in the central bank certificate that is originally intended to control money supply in Indonesia. It is no secret that the local governments are the captive market of those banks and the money deposited at regional banks are from their local budget. There are some reasons why this irregular action has been executed. The delay of budget approval is one of them since the local government feels that they do not have enough time to do spending activities before the fiscal year ends. Another reason is the behavior of local government apparatus to stay away from anti corruption charges by simply not doing any budget spending activities that require bidding activities like procurements. This reason might be acceptable given the fact that the anti corruption movement impacts more the apparatus who are involved in bidding process. Another reason is low quality of development planning itself at local level. Poor planning leads to poor execution that leads also to delay of program or projects completion. Whatever happened to the imperfection of local budget spending, local community will be the main victims especially if the local governments do not do much in improving local community welfare. There are few local governments, however, that should be the role model for others due to their success in improving public services, generating local economic growth and jobs, and improving people welfare despite their limited amount of budget. What they do is basically emphasizing efficiency in budget spending through the 110 principle that the budget is mostly for local community, not for local apparatus. This efficiency is combined with provision of good investment climate since they realize that the private sector is more dominant than the local government in the local economy. The combination then leads to better quality of basic public service delivery such as free basic education or higher quality of public health services and increasing inflow of investment to the local economy. Basically what they are doing is optimizing local budget that will result in better access and quality of basic public service delivery and in higher quality of local economic growth that leads to lower unemployment and higher real personal income. Local community in this case is main beneficiary of this good behavior, and in those best practices regions, local community gets what they need, transparency and accountability of local budget. Local Public Services A world bank survey conducted after the enactment of decentralization revealed that 50% of respondents (local residents) felt that the quality of public services improved after local government is taking charges the public service delivery at local level. It implicitly meant that the other 50% felt that the quality is the same or lower than before decentralization. This figure should alarm both central and local government in Indonesia since the success or failure of decentralization will lie on the quality of public service delivery at local level. The central government should have completed their unfinished homework in setting up national minimum standard of basic public service delivery, especially in basic education, health, and infrastructure. The national standard is very crucial in guaranteeing local community everywhere in Indonesia that they will not receive less than national standard in their local public service delivery. As briefly mentioned above, the higher the quality of public services, the higher the real income of local community. The central government, however is still struggling to set up the standard even until today. Rather than starting with more general standard, they are trapped in discussion of detailed and technical standards that will take a long time to complete. With more delay in setting up the standard, it will be harder for local government to focus their budget for improving 111 public services and also more difficult for central government itself in evaluating the performance of local government. Setting up national standard should be given top priority rather than some efforts by line ministries to involve more in local public service delivery. That involvement will only create dualism of authorities that will only create inefficiency and confusion at local level with no significant impact to local community. In the 8th year of decentralization, it is important to emphasize that the local basic public service delivery should be one of the main components of local government evaluation. Improving basic public service delivery is the only way for Indonesia to accelerate the improvement of human development index (HDI) that grew very slowly during the decentralization era. Local community in one hand should be able to voice their concerns or complains regarding the local public service delivery through appropriate channels. Currently, similar to Indonesia consumers in general, the consumer right is very weak and local community sometimes has no clue in delivering their dissatisfaction on public services. Concluding Remarks After 8 years of decentralization, the local community has not yet felt the positive impacts of decentralization. They feel more as a second class and most of the decentralization benefits fall to the limited local elites who misinterpret that decentralization is only government matter not public matter. Since there are few local governments in Indonesia that has done best practices in managing local economy and empowering the local community, local community should be more aware of the importance in electing the right local leaders who are committed to put local community first above the local elite interests. That kind of commitment will avoid unnecessary moves such as formation of new local government and inappropriate local budget management. Formation of new local government in Indonesia is clearly for the interest of limited local elites and is very costly for the national economy itself. The inappropriate local budget management only makes local community suffer with no impact to local economy itself. As a fundamental move, the central government should set up the national minimum standard of basic public services soon and the local 112 government should adopt that standard that also becomes the yardstick of their performance. It is crucial to keep reminding all the parties that the ultimate success of decentralization will rely on the local welfare improvement through sufficient level of basic public services. Local community should be the one who decides if the decentralization benefits them, not the very few local elites. References Brodjonegoro, Bambang and Nurkholis (2006),”Optimal Size of Local Government in Indonesia”, Final Report prepared for Ministry of Home Affairs, unpublished Osterman, Andre (2007),”Benefit and Cost of Pemekaran in Indonesia”, Draft Final Report for Decentralization Support Facility, unpublished 113 Table 1. New Local Government Formation by Province 1999-2008 No. Province 1 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2 North Sumatera 3 West Sumatera Initial Number 10 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 3 0 2 5 1 2004 -2006 0 19 0 0 1 0 5 14 1 0 1 3 6 0 0 0 0 Addition 13 End Number 23 3 0 9 28 0 0 0 5 19 0 0 0 6 11 2007 2008* 2 0 0 0 4 Riau 5 5 Riau Island 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 6 6 Jambi 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 7 South Sumatera 7 0 0 3 1 3 0 1 0 8 15 8 Bangka Belitung Island 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 7 9 Bengkulu 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 9 10 Lampung 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 11 11 DKI Jakarta 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 12 Banten 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 13 West Java 21 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 5 26 14 Central Java 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 15 D.I Yogyakarta 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 16 East Java 37 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 38 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 7 14 17 West Kalimantan 7 18 Central Kalimantan 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 14 19 South Kalimantan 10 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 13 20 East Kalimantan 7 5 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 7 14 21 North Sulawesi 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 4 0 8 13 22 Gorontalo 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 4 6 23 Central Sulawesi 5 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 10 24 South Sulawesi 20 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 23 25 West Sulawesi 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 5 26 Southeast Sulawesi 5 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 7 12 27 Bali 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 28 West Nusa Tenggara 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 9 29 East Nusa Tenggara 13 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 7 20 2 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 6 9 30 Maluku 3 31 North Maluku 2 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 6 8 32 Papua 10 0 0 0 9 1 0 1 6 17 27 3 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6 9 33 West Papua Number of Regencies/Municipalities 301 40 0 14 114 40 45 0 25 6 170 471 Table 2. New Local Government Economy by GRDP per Capita and Economic Growth (in %) Quadrant* 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 I : Low GRDP per Cap and Low Growth 50.00 41.46 45.28 47.78 57.55 44.60 II : Low GRDP per Cap and High Growth 23.08 31.71 26.42 27.78 22.30 36.69 III : High GRDP per Cap and Low Growth 3.85 4.88 11.32 13.33 12.95 12.23 IV : High GRDP per Cap and High Growth 23.08 21.95 16.98 11.11 7.19 6.47 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Total Regency/Municipality *) Based on national GDP per Capita and Growth in each year (Constant Value, 2000=100) 115 ฦ࿖ႎ๔ⷐ㩷 䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝㩷 䋨Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro㩷 䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝ᄢቇ ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳䋩㩷 㩷 䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝䈱ᣇಽᮭ䈫䈠䈱ᓇ㗀㩷 㩷 㩷 㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ䈱ᣇಽᮭ䊎䉾䉫䊋䊮䈎䉌䋸ᐕ㑆䈏⚻ㆊ䈚䇮ᣇಽᮭ䈏䉅䈢䉌䈚䈢ᓇ㗀䈏䉌䈎䈮䈭䈦䈩 䈐䈩䈇䉎䇯䉴䊊䊦䊃ᮭ䈱ਛᄩ㓸ᮭ䈱ਅ䈪䈲䈭䈎䈭䈎ታ䈪䈐䈭䈎䈦䈢ᣇಽᮭ䈱ข⚵䈲䇮 Ḱᦼ㑆䈏䈎䋱ᐕ㑆䈪ታᣉ䈘䉏䇮䈎䈧䇮ᄢ⢙䈭ᣇಽᮭ䉕ⴕ䈉ౝኈ䈭䈱䈪㵬䊎䉾䉫䊋䊮㵭䈫䈳 䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯ᣇಽᮭ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲⾥ุਔ⺰䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮ਛᄩᐭ䈲䇮ᣇಽᮭ䈱䊒䊨䉶䉴䉕ᒝൻ䈜䉎 䈢䉄䈱ข⚵䉕⌕ታ䈮ⴕ䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯䈠䈱ౖဳ䈏 㪉㪇㪇㪋 ᐕ䈮ቯ䈚䈢ᴺᓞ╙ 㪊㪉 䈶 㪊㪋 ภ䈪䈅䉎䇯 䉟䊮䊄䊈䉲䉝䈱ᴦ䈱ᱧผ䈱ਛ䈪䇮․╩䈘䉏䉎䈼䈐ㅴᱠ䈲䇮㪉㪇㪇㪋 ᐕ䈎䉌ᐲൻ䈘䉏䈢ᣇ⋥ធㆬ 䈪䈅䉎䇯⍮䇮㐳䇮Ꮢ㐳䇮ᣇ⼏ຬ䈲䇮䋵ᐕ㑆䈱⡯䉕ᓧ䉎䈢䉄䈮ㆬ䈮ൎ䈢䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌 䈭䈇䈖䈫䈫䈘䉏䈢䇯㩷 㩷 ᣇಽᮭ䉕ᚑഞ䈘䈞䉎䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮ᣇಽᮭ䈏ၞ␠ળ㩿㫃㫆㪺㪸㫃㩷 㪺㫆㫄㫄㫌㫅㫀㫋㫐㪀䉇ၞ䈱ੱ䇱䈮䈫䈦 䈩⏕䈭⋉䉕↢䉂䈜䉅䈱䈪䈭䈒䈩䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯⏕䈭⋉䈫䈲䇮⥄↱䈭ᴦ⊛ᮭ䇮ၞ䈪 䈱᥊᳇ᶋ឴䇮ᄬᬺ䈱ૐਅ╬䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䉌䈏䈭䈔䉏䈳ᣇಽᮭ䈲ᣇ䈱䉣䊥䊷䊃䈱䉂䈮⋉䉕䉅 䈢䉌䈜䉅䈱䈮䈭䈦䈩䈚䉁䈉䇯㩷 㩷 䋱䋮ᣂ䈢䈭ᣇᐭ䈱✬ᚑ㩷 㩷 㪈㪐㪐㪐 ᐕ䈱ᴺᓞ 㪉㪉 ภ䇮㪉㪇㪇㪋 ᐕ䈱 㪊㪉 ภ䈲䇮ᣢሽ䈱ᣇᐭ䈎䉌ᣂ䈢䈭ᣇᐭ䉕ಽ㔌✬ᚑ䈜䉎 ᯏળ䉕ਈ䈋䈩䈇䉎䇯ၞ␠ળ䉇᳃䈏⥄䉌䈮ㆡ䈚䈢ᣇᐭ䉕ㆬᛯ䈪䈐䉎ᮭ䉕䉄䉎⿰ᣦ䈱 ᐲ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮䈖䈱ᐲ䈲Ử↪䈘䉏䇮㕖Ᏹ䈮ᄙ䈒䈱ᣇᐭ䈏ಽ㔌✬ᚑ䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫 䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ䈱ᣇಽᮭ䈏㐿ᆎ䈘䉏䈢ೋᐕᐲ䈮䈍䈇䈩⚂ 㪊㪋㪇 䈪䈅䈦䈢ᣇᐭ䈲 㪋㪎㪇 䈮䉁 䈪Ⴧട䈜䉎⚿ᨐ䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯ᣂ䈢䈭ᣇᐭ䈱ಽ㔌✬ᚑ䈱ឭ᩺䉕ክᩏ䈜䉎ㆊ⒟䈏⣀ᒙ䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䈎 䉌䇮ᣂ䈢䈭ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎⚻ᷣ⊛⥄┙䈱น⢻ᕈ䈲ᱴ䈬㘈䉂䉌䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈖䈱䈢䉄ᣂ⸳䈘䉏䈢ᣇ ᐭ䈲䇮䈇䈐䈍䈇⽺࿎䈭ၞ䈫䈭䉍䇮ᣂ⸳䈘䉏䈢࿅䈱 㪏㪇㩼䈲䇮৻ੱᒰ䈢䉍䈱ၞౝ✚↢↥㗵䈏ో ࿖ᐔဋએਅ䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 㪦㫊㫋㪼㫉㫄㪸㫅 䈏ᣂ⸳ᣇᐭ䈱䉮䉴䊃䊔䊈䊐䉞䉾䊃⹏ଔ䉕 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ䈮ⴕ䈦䈢䈫䈖䉐䇮੍ᗐ䈘䉏䈢䈫䈍䉍䇮 䊔䊈䊐䉞䉾䊃䈱᭴ᚑⷐ⚛㩿㪈㪅㪊 ళ䍷䍩䍽䍏䋩䈲䉮䉴䊃䈱᭴ᚑⷐ⚛㩿㪐㪅㪈 ళ䍷䍩䍽䍏䋩䉋䉍㆔䈎䈮ዋ䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈮 ᣂ⸳ᣇᐭ䈏⚻ᷣ䈮䈫䈦䈩⽶ᜂ䈮䈭䉎䈱䈪䈅䉏䈳䇮㕖ല₸ᕈ䈏Ⴧ䈜䈖䈫䉕ㆱ䈔䉎䈢䉄䇮ᣇ ᐭ䈱ว૬䈎หಣℂ䉕ታᣉ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏⸃╷䈫䈭䉎䇯㪙㫉㫆㪻㫁㫆㫅㪼㪼㪾㫆㫉㫆 䈫 㪥㫌㫉㫂㪿㫆㫃㫀㫊 䈱⎇ⓥ䋨㪉㪇㪇㪍 ᐕ䋩䈲䇮ᣇᐭ䈱ᦨㆡ䈱ᢙ䈲䇮㪈㪈㪇 ࿅හ䈤⁁䉋䉍 㪉㪌㩼ዋ䈭䈇࿅ᢙ䈫䈇䈉⚿⺰䉕䈚䈩䈇 䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋲䋮ၞ䈱⚻ᷣ㐿⊒㩷 㩷 ਛᄩᐭ䈏䉋䉍⦟䈇ಽᮭ䈱䈢䉄䈮ข䉍⚵䉖䈪䈇䉎ᚑᨐ䈫䈚䈩䈕䉌䉏䉎䈖䈫䈲䇮ਛᄩᐭ䈎䉌 116 ᣇᐭ䈻⒖ォ䈜䉎⾗㊄䈱Ⴧᄢ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮ၞ䊧䊔䊦䈪䈱੍▚ᡰ䈮䈧䈇䈩䇮ਇᐘ䈭 䈖䈫䈮ᄙ䈒䈱ᣇᐭ䈏ታ⾰⊛䈮㑐ਈ䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇䈱䈏ታ⁁䈪䈅䉎䇯ᄙ䈒䈱ᣇᐭ䈲䇮੍▚㈩ಽ 䉕ⴕ䈉䈖䈫䈫ห᭽䈮੍▚✬ᚑ䈮䈍䈔䉎ၞ␠ળ䈱ᮭ䉕䈚䈳䈚䈳ήⷞ䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯ᣇᐭ䈲䇮䈖 䉏䉁䈪੍▚䉕ၞ␠ળ䈱䈢䉄䈱䉅䈱䈪䈲䈭䈒⥄ಽ䈢䈤ቭ䈱䈢䉄䈱䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䈫⺋⸃䈚䈩䈇䈢䈫 ᛕ್䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䈏ᄙ䈎䈦䈢䇯ၞ␠ળ䈲䇮ᐭ䈱੍▚ᡰ䉕⋙ⷞ䈜䉎ᮭ䉕ᜬ䈧䈼䈐䈪䈅䉍䇮䈠 䈱ᗧ䈪䇮ၞ␠ળ䈮䈫䈦䈩䇮ㅘᕈ䈫⺑⽿છ䈲䉨䊷䊪䊷䊄䈫䈭䉎䈼䈐䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 ㄭᤨ䇮ᣇᐭ䈮䈫䈦䈩ᅢ䉁䈚䈒䈭䈇䋲䈧䈱ᄢ䈐䈭㗴䈏↢䈛䈩䈇䉎䇯╙৻䈮ᣇᐭ䈱੍▚ᛚ 䈱ㆃᑧ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲․䈮ၫⴕᯏ㑐䈫⼏ળ䈫䈱ኻ┙䈮࿃䈜䉎䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮 ળ⸘ᐕᐲ㐿ᆎ೨䈮ᛚ䈘䉏䈢੍▚䈱ഀว䈲䈎 㪍㩼䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯╙ੑ䈱㗴䈲ᣇᐭ䈏੍▚䉕 ၞ䈱⚻ᷣᵴേ䉇䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱䈢䉄䈮ᡰᑯ䈞䈝㊄Ⲣᯏ㑐䈮⾗㊄䉕㗍㊄䈜䉎ะ䈏䈅䉎䈖䈫䈪 䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱䉋䈉䈮੍▚䈱ၫⴕ䈏චಽⴕ䉒䉏䈭䈇䈖䈫䈱ᦨᄢ䈱‶†⠪䈲ၞ␠ળ䈪䈅䉍䇮․䈮ᣇ ᐭ䈏␠ળ䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕ⴕ䉒䈭䈇႐ว䈮䈠䈱ᓇ㗀䈲ᷓೞ䈭䉅䈱䈫䈭䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋳䋮ၞ䈱䉰䊷䊎䉴㩷 㩷 ⇇㌁ⴕ䈱⺞ᩏ䈮䉋䉏䈳䇮ၞ᳃䈱 㪌㪇㩼䈲䇮ᣇᐭ䈏䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ឭଏ䉕ᜂ䈉䉋䈉䈮䈭 䈦䈩䈎䉌䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱⾰䈏ᡷༀ䈘䉏䈢䈫ᗵ䈛䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䈱䈖䈫䈲䇮ᱷ䉍 㪌㪇㩼䈱᳃䈲䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱⾰ 䈏ᣇಽᮭ೨䈫ᄌ䉒䉌䈭䈇䈲ૐਅ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈫ᗵ䈛䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䉕␜䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䈱ᢙሼ䈲䇮ਛᄩ䊶 ᣇᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎⼊๔䈫䈚䈩ฃ䈔ᱛ䉄䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯䈭䈟䈭䉌䇮ᣇಽᮭ䈱ᚑุ䈲䇮ᣇ䊧䊔䊦䈮 䈍䈔䉎䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱⾰䈮ଐ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ਛᄩᐭ䈲䇮䉰䊷䊎䉴䈮䈍䈔䉎ో࿖⊛䈭ᦨૐ᳓Ḱ䉕⸳ቯ䈚䈩䈍䈒䈼䈐䈣䈏䇮ᣣ䈮䈍䈇 䈩䉅ᢎ⢒䇮䇮䉟䊮䊐䊤╬䈱ో࿖⊛䈭᳓Ḱ䈱⸳ቯ䈮⧰ഭ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䈱䉋䈉䈭᳓Ḱ䈱╷ቯ䈏䈖䉏 એㆃ䉏䉏䈳䇮ᣇᐭ䈲䉰䊷䊎䉴ᡷༀ䈱䈢䉄䈮੍▚䉕㊀ὐൻ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏৻ጀ࿎㔍䈫䈭䉍䇮 ਛᄩᐭ䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅ᣇᐭ䈱ⴕၫⴕ䉕⹏ଔ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏৻ጀ࿎㔍䈮䈭䉎䇯䈖䈱ో࿖᳓Ḱ䉕╷ቯ 䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏䇮㑐ଥฦ⋭䈱ᦨఝవ䈱⺖㗴䈫䈭䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯䉁䈢䇮ᣇಽᮭ㐿ᆎ䈎䉌䋸ᐕ⋡䉕ㄫ䈋䇮 ᣇ䈱ၮᧄ⊛䈭䉰䊷䊎䉴ଏ⛎䈏䇮ᣇᐭ䈮ኻ䈜䉎⹏ଔ䈱ਥⷐ䈭᭴ᚑⷐ⚛䈫䈭䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅 䉎䈖䈫䉕ᒝ⺞䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏㊀ⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋴䋮⚿⺰㩷 㩷 ၞ␠ળ䈲䇮ᧂ䈣䈮ᣇಽᮭ䈱Ⓧᭂ⊛ᗧ⟵䉕ᗵ䈛䉌䉏䈭䈇⁁ᴫ䈮䈅䉎䇯ၞ⚻ᷣ䉕ㆇ༡䈚 ၞ␠ળ䈮ജ䉕ਈ䈋䉎䈖䈫䈮䈍䈇䈩䊔䉴䊃䊒䊤䉪䊁䉞䉴䉕ታ䈚䈩䈇䉎ᣇᐭ䈲䈎䈪䈅䉍䇮䉣䊥䊷 䊃䈱⋉䉋䉍䉅ၞ␠ળ䈱䈢䉄䈮⽸₂䈜䉎ㆡಾ䈭䊥䊷䉻䊷䉕ㆬ䈪ㆬ䈹䈖䈫䈱㊀ⷐᕈ䉕⼂䈜䈼 䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䉁䈢䇮ਛᄩᐭ䈲䇮ၮ␆⊛䉰䊷䊎䉴ಽ㊁䈱䊅䉲䊢䊅䊦䊶䊚䊆䊙䊛䊶䉴䉺䊮䉻䊷䊄䉕ㅦ䉇䈎䈮ቯ 䉄䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉍䇮ᣇᐭ䈲䇮䈠䈱䉴䉺䊮䉻䊷䊄䉕⥄䉌䈱ⴕ⋡ᮡ䈫䈚䈩ណ↪䈜䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭ 䈏ᦨ⚳⊛䈮ᚑഞ䈜䉎䈎ุ䈎䈲䇮䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱චಽ䈭᳓Ḱ䈱㆐ᚑ䉕ㅢ䈛ᣇ䈪䈱䉕ะ䈘 䈞䉎䈖䈫䈮䈎䈎䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩿ᢥ⽿䋺ᧁବ㪀 117 ++ ȑȍȫȇǣǹǫȃǷȧȳ žЎೌ҄ƷɦƴƓƚǔȭȸǫȫȷǬȐȊ ȳǹƷӼɥƷƨNJƴſ Panel Discussion “To Make Better Local Governance in the Decentralization Era” 㧝㧚ࡄࡀ࡞࠺࡚ࠖࠬࠞࠪࡦ ޟಽᮭൻߩਅߦ߅ߌࠆࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะߩߚߦ㧔6Q/CMG $GVVGT.QECN)QXGTPCPEGKPVJG&GEGPVTCNK\CVKQP'TC㧕ߩޠⷐ ޣᣣᤨޔෳട⠪╬ޤ ᣣᤨ㧦2008 ᐕ 3 5 ᣣ㧔᳓㧕 14:55㨪17:00 ႐ᚲ㧧╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ 㧝㓏ળ⼏ቶ ࡄࡀࠬ࠻㧦 ᄢ ᒫ㧔᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ㧕 Alex B. Brillantes Jr.㧔ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳㧕 ᧻ῆ(Chu Songyan)㧔ਛ࿖࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦቇᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ㧕 Woothisarn Tanchai㧔ࠠࡦࠣࡊࠫࡖ࠺ࠖࡐ࠶ࠢ⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ㧕 ㊄ ⋉ᬀ (Ik-sik Kim)㧔੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ㧕 Bambang P. S. Brodjonegoro㧔ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳㧕 ࡕ࠺࠲㧦Ꮉ ඳ㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ᚲ㐳㧕 ߩࡦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄޣⷐޤ ฦ࿖⎇ⓥ⠪ߦࠃࠆᣇಽᮭߣၞ␠ળߩ⁁╬ߦߟߡߩႎ๔ߦᒁ߈⛯߈ޔ ޟಽᮭൻߩਅ ߦ߅ߌࠆࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะߩߚߦⴕ߇ࡦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄߦࡑ࠹ࠍޠ ߥࠊࠇߚޔߪߢࡦ࡚ࠪࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄޕၮ⺞⻠Ṷ⠪ߢࠆᄢᒫᢎߣฦ࿖ႎ๔ࠍⴕߥߞ ߚࡈࠖࡇࡦޔਛ࿖ޔࠗ࠲ޔ㖧࿖⎇ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔⓥ⠪ߦࠃߞߡޔᎹඳᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ ࡦ࠲ᚲ㐳ߩมળߩ߽ߣޔฦ࿖ߩᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടߩ⺖㗴ࠍࠄ߆ߦߔࠆ ߣߣ߽ߦߘߩ⸃╷ߩࡅࡦ࠻߿᧪ߩㅢߒࠍᓧࠆߎߣࠍ⋡⊛ߦᵴ⊒ߥ⼏⺰߇ⴕߥࠊࠇߚޕ ߘߩⷐߪޔએਅߩㅢࠅߢࠆޕ 㧔ᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴㧕 ߹ߕޔೋߦᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടޔ᳃ߣߩදߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴ߦߟߡ⼏⺰ ߇ߥߐࠇߚޕ ᄢᢎߪޔᣣᧄߢߪᏒ↸ว૬߇ㅴዷߒޔ90㧑ㄭ࿖᳃߇ޟᏒߦޠዬߔࠆߥ߆ߢޔ ㄘጊㇱߩ⁁ᴫߪ෩ߒߊޔㄝၞߩᵴജ⛽ᜬߦߪᄢ߈ߥ࿎㔍߇ࠆߣޔᜰ៰ߒߚޔߚ߹ޕ Ꮢ↸ߩၞࠃࠅ⁜ၞ 㧔߃߫ว૬೨ߩᏒ↸ߩၞ㧕ࠍනߦၞ⥄ᴦࠍഃ⸳ߒޔ ᳃⥄ᴦߩలታࠍ࿑ࠆേ߈߽ࠄࠇࠆ߇ޔᓟߩേะߪᭉⷰ᧪ߥੱޕญ߇ᄢߦᷫዋ ߒᄕᒛᏒߪ⽷⎕✋ߔࠆߎߣߣߥߞߚ߇ࠄ߆ࠇߎޔᣣᧄߩੱญ߇ᄢߦᷫዋߔࠆߥ߆ߢޔ ᣣᧄߩᣇߩ᧪ߪߤ߁ߥࠆߩ߆㧫უṌ⊛ߥᛂ᠄ࠍฃߌߥࠃ߁ࠪࠬ࠹ࡓࠍౣ᭴▽ߔࠆᔅ ⷐ߇ࠆߩߢߪߥ߆ߩߣޔ㗴ឭࠍⴕߥߞߚޕ ᰴߦ ߩࡦࡇࠖࡈޔBrillantes ቇㇱ㐳ߪޔ᳃ߩறⷰ⠪߆ࠄਥ⊛ߥᏒ᳃߳ߩᄌൻߦߟ ߡㅀߴࠆߣߣ߽ߦࡃ࡞ࠕޔᎺߢ╷╬ߩ࠴ࠚ࠶ࠢࠍⴕߞߡࠆᏒ᳃ࠣ࡞ࡊߩࠍ⚫ ߒߚޔߚ߹ޕԘၞߦ♖ㅢߔࠆߥߤ㧺㧳㧻߇ߘߩ⢻ജߩะࠍ࿑ߞߡߊᔅⷐ߇ࠆޔ 121 ԙ⥄ᴦ㑆ߩදജ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆޔԚኻ┙ߪ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩ࠳ࠗ࠽ࡒ࠭ࡓߢࠆޔԛਛᄩᐭߪ 㧺㧳㧻ߩᵴേⅣႺࠍᢛߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣޔㅀߴࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔԘᏒ᳃ෳടߩᒻ㧔ࠅᣇ㧕 ߪ࿖ߦࠃߞߡ⇣ߥࠆޔԙ࠳ࠪ࠶ࡊ߇㊀ⷐߢࠆߥߤߩᜰ៰ࠍⴕߥߞߚޕ ⛯ߡ ޔᢎߪޔ3 ᐕߏߣߦⴕߥࠊࠇࠆਛ࿖ߩ᳃ᆔຬળᆔຬߩㆬ߿ᐭߦኻߔ ࠆᓇ㗀ജ߇ᒝߊߥߣߐࠇࠆ㧺㧳㧻ߩ⁁ᴫߦߟߡ⺑ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᏒ᳃ෳടޔᏒ᳃ߣ ߩදߩ㗴ࠍᡷༀߔࠆߚߦߪޔԘോຬߩᗧ⼂ᡷ㕟߇ᔅⷐߢࠆޔԙᣇࡌ࡞ߢߩ ౕ⊛ߥෳടߩ⚵ߺࠅ߇ᄢಾߢࠆޔԚ⡬ળߩ㐿߇⟵ോઃߌࠄࠇߡߥߥߤߩ ᐲ⊛㧔ᴺᓞߩ㧕㗴ࠍ⸃ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ Woothisarn ಎᢎߪߩࠗ࠲ޔᣇಽᮭߦߟߡ ╙ޔ1 Ბ㓏ߢߪᴺ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺߩᢛ߿ ᮭ㒢⒖⼑߇ㅴࠄࠇޔᐕ߆ࠄߩ╙ 2 Ბ㓏ߢߪ⥄ᴦ߿࠳ߩ⢻ജะ߇㊀ⷞߐࠇߡ ࠆߣޔㅀߴߚޔߚ߹ޕหಎᢎߪޔᣇಽᮭߦኻߔࠆᴦ⊛ᗧᕁߩᰳᅤߥߤߩ㗴ࠍᜰ ៰ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔԘ⽷ㆇ༡ߦ߅ߌࠆല₸ᕈߩ⏕ޔԙㆡછ⠪ࠍᓧࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆㆬ ᐲߩታޔԚㅘᕈߩ⏕߿ౝㇱ⚵❱ߩᡷ㕟ߥߤߩ⺖㗴ߦߟߡㅀߴޔᏒ᳃ߩෳടෳ↹ ߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍᒝ⺞ߒߚޕ 㖧࿖ߩ㊄ᢎߪޔਛᄩᐭߩࠛ࠻ߦߪᮭ㒢⒖⼑߳ߩᛶ᛫ᗵࠆ৻ᣇޔᣇᐭߩ ߦߪਛᄩᐭ߳ߩଐሽ⾰߇ࠆޔߚ߹ޕᏒ᳃ߩߦߪޔᣇᐭߦኻߔࠆή⍮߿ή㑐ᔃ ߣߞߚ㗴߇ࠅߩޘੱߚߒ߁ߎޔᗧ⼂߇ᣇಽᮭࠍផㅴߔࠆߢߩ㓚ኂߣߥߞߡࠆ ߣㅀߴߚޔߚ߹ޕᣇಽᮭߩ㗴ߣ㚂ㇺ⒖ォ߿࿖ߩᣇవᯏ㑐߳ߩᮭ㒢ᆔ⼑ߢࠆᣇ ಽᢔߩ㗴ߣࠍᷙหߒߡߪߥࠄߥߣᜰ៰ߒߚޕ Brodjonegoro ቇㇱ㐳ߪߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔᣇᐭߦ⋥ធㆬ߇ዉߐࠇߚߎߣࠍⓍᭂ⊛ ߦ⹏ଔߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦ⺑ޔ⽿છ߿ㅘᕈࠍ⏕ߔࠆߢᣇ⒢ߩ⋥ធ⚊⒢߇㊀ⷐߢࠆߣ ㅀߴߚޔߚ߹ޕౄࠃࠆ㗅ઃߌߦࠃࠅᔅߕߒ߽ᣇ⼏ળ߇ၞߩᗧᕁࠍㆡᱜߦઍߒߥ ߣ߁㗴ߥߤࠍᜰ៰ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔ470 ߣ߁Ꮢ㧔㧕ߩᢙߪੱߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔญ ⷙᮨࠍ⠨߃ࠇ߫ᄙߊߥ߇ޔ Ꮢߩੱญⷙᮨߦߪᄢ߈ߥᩰᏅ߇ࠆߣߩ⺑ࠍⴕߥߞߚޕ 㧔ᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળߩ᧪⺖ޔ㗴⸃ߩᣇ╷㧕 ᰴߦޔᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ␠ળޔ᳃ෳടߦߟߡߩߘޔ᧪߿⺖㗴⸃ߩᣇ╷ߥߤࠍ ߋࠅ⼏⺰߇ⴕߥࠊࠇߚޕ ࠲ࠗߩ Woothisarn ಎᢎߪޔᣂᙗᴺߩਅߢዋߥߊߣ߽ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺߥߤ㧟ᴺᓞߩᡷᱜߣ ᣇ⽷ᴺߩቯ߇ᔅⷐߣߐࠇߡࠆߣ⺑ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᓟߩᣇಽᮭߦ㑐ߔࠆᴦ ⊛ᗧᕁ߇ਇㅘߢߪࠆ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߪ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩߚߩᛩ⾗ߢࠅߩ⨲ޔᩮࡌ࡞ߢߩ ᮭ㒢ߣෳടࠍలታߒߡߊᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ 㖧࿖ߩ㊄ᢎߪޔၞߦ߅ߡ⊛ߥᓎഀࠍᜂߞߡࠆᏒ᳃ࠍනߦ㘈ቴߣࠆߛߌߢ ߪਇචಽߢࠆߣߒߡޟ㘈ቴਥ⟵ࠍޠᛕ್⊛ߦ⹏ଔߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᄙ᭽ᕈޔഃㅧജ߇᳞ ࠄࠇࠆࠣࡠࡃ࡞ൻߩᤨઍߦ߅ߡޔᣇಽᮭߩㅴዷࠍᱛࠆߎߣߪ᧪ߕޔฦ࿖ߩਛᄩ ᐭ߇ઁߩ࿖ߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄቇ߱ߴ߈ߢࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ Brodjonegoro ቇㇱ㐳ߪޔᴦⴕߩಽᮭൻ⽷ޔߩಽᮭൻ߇ታᣉߐ 122 ࠇߚᓟߪޔၞ㑆ߩ┹ߣදജߦࠃࠆ⚻ᷣߩಽᮭൻ߇㊀ⷐߢࠆߣᜰ៰ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔ ᣇಽᮭࠍㅴࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡ⚛◲ߩ❱⚵ޔൻ߿ੱຬᷫߥߤࠍⴕޔᐭߩല₸ะࠍ࿑ ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ ᄢᢎߪޔᣣᧄߩಽᮭᡷ㕟ߩᓟߦߟߡ෩ߒㅢߒࠍ␜ߒߟߟ߽ࠄ⥄ޔડ↹┙᩺ޔ ቯߒޔᚑᨐ߇↢߹ࠇࠆߥ߆ߢޔ᳃ߪෳടߩᗧ⟵ࠍ⼂ߔࠆߩߢࠅߚߒ߁ߘޔข⚵ߺ ߇Ⴧടߔࠆߎߣߦࠃࠅᣇ⥄ᴦߪ⊒ዷߔࠆޕᓟߣ߽ᣇಽᮭߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍਥᒛߒ⛯ߌࠆߎ ߣ߇ᄢಾߢࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ ࡈࠖࡇࡦߩ Brillantes ቇㇱ㐳ߪޔ᳃ߩ࠾࠭ߩㆡ⏕ߥᛠីߦᏒ᳃ෳടߪ㊀ⷐߢࠆޕ 㧺㧳㧻ߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߳ߩෳട߿ᣇಽᮭߩᮨ▸ߣߥࠆ߽ࠄࠇࠆ߇ޔᣇಽᮭࠍ⊒ዷ ߐߖߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟޔะࠍ࿑ߞߡߊߚߦߪࠆࠃߦࡊ࠶ࠪ࠽࠻ࡄ࡞ࠦࠗޔᏒ᳃␠ ળߣߩද߇ᄢಾߢࠆߣᜰ៰ߒߚޕ ᢎߪޔਛ࿖ߢߪᐭޔᏒ႐␠ޔળ߇ߘࠇߙࠇߩᓎഀࠍᮨ⚝ߒߡࠆᲑ㓏ߦࠆޕ ਃ⠪ߩᓎഀಽᜂࠍࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔਛᄩᐭߣᣇᐭߣߩ㑐ଥ߽⏕ߦߒߡߊ ᔅⷐ߇ࠆޔߚ߹ޕᐭߦࠃࠆ㧺㧳㧻ߩᅑബߩ߶߆⽷ޔᖱႎߩ㐿߿ᬺ❣⹏ଔ߽ᣇ ᐭߢ৻ㇱታᣉߐࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡ߈ߡࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ 㧔ࡈࠔࠗ࠽࡞ࡑࠢ㧕 એߩ⼏⺰ߦ⛯߈ޔฦࡄࡀࠬ࠻߆ࠄ⍴⊒⸒㧔ࡈࠔࠗ࠽࡞ࡑࠢ㧕߇ߥߐࠇߚޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ Brodjonegoro ቇㇱ㐳ߪޔԘฦ࿖ߩᣇಽᮭ߿ၞ㑆┹㧔⚻ᷣ⊒ዷ㧕ޔ ԙၞ╷ߩ㕟ᣂ߿ఝవ㗅ߩቯߦߟߡᲧセ⎇ⓥߔߴ߈ߢࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ 㖧࿖ߩ㊄ᢎߪޔᣇಽᮭផㅴߩߚߩࠕࠫࠕฦ࿖ߩㅪᏪࠍឭ໒ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᣇ⥄ ᴦߩᔅⷐᕈߦኻߔࠆᏒ᳃ߩℂ⸃ߣᣇ⥄ᴦߦ㑐ߔࠆᢎ⢒ߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍᜰ៰ߒߚޕ ࠲ࠗߩ Woothisarn ಎᢎߪޔᣇಽᮭ߇Ꮢ᳃ෳടࠍࡌࠬߦㅴࠄࠇࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢ ࠅޔᣇಽᮭߪᣇᐭߦജࠍਈ߃᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩၮ⋚ߣߥࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ ਛ࿖ߩ ᢎߪޔฦ࿖ߪ߇⇣ߥߞߡ߽หߓ⋡ᮡࠍ⋡ᜰߒߡ߅ࠅ࠽ࡃࠟ࡞ࠞࡠޔ ࡦࠬߩะߦߟߡ߅ߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄቇ߱ߎߣ߇ᄢಾߢࠆߣㅀߴߚޕ ࡈࠖࡇࡦߩ Brillantes ቇㇱ㐳ߪޔ㐳ߊਛᄩ㓸ᮭ߇⛯ߚߥ߆ߢߩ‛ޟᣇࠍޠォ឵ߔ ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠅޔᣇಽᮭߩᚑᨐߪ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥⷞ㊁ߢ⹏ଔߐࠇࠆߴ߈ߢࠆߣᜰ៰ߒߚޕ ߹ߚޔᄢᢎߪࠕࠫࠕޔߡ߃߹〯ࠍ⺰⼏ߩߢ߹ࠇߘޔฦ࿖߇ቇ߮߁ߎߣߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍ ᜰ៰ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦޔᣣᧄߣࠕࠫࠕߩᏒ᳃ᵴേ߇࿖㓙⊛ߥㅪ៤ࠍㅴࠆᤨઍࠍㄫ߃ߟߟࠆ ߣㅀߴߚޕ ᦨᓟߦߩ࠲࠺ࡕޔᎹᚲ㐳߇ޔᓟ߽Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ߢฦ࿖ߩᣇ⥄ ᴦߦߟߡቇ߮ળ߁ᯏળࠍឭଏߒߡ߈ߚߣㅀߴޔඦᓟ 5 ᤨߦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄޔ ࡦߪ⚳ੌߒߚޕ 㧔ᢥ⽿㧦Ꮉ ඳ㧕 123 㧝㧚Overview of Panel Discussion: To Make Better Local Governance in the Decentralization Era Date & Time, and Participants Date & Time : Wednesday, March 5, 2008 from 2:55 to 5:00 pm Place: Conference Room on First Floor at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Panel Members: Wataru Oomori, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo Alex B. Brillantes Jr., Professor & Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Chu Songyan, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, China National School of Administration Woothisarn Tanchai, Associate Professor & Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Ik-sik Kim, Professor, Dept. of Public Administration, Kyonggi University Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro, Professor & Dean, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia Moderator: Hiroshi Ikawa, Professor & Director, Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies [Overview of Panel Discussion] Following the country reports from the speakers of the various Asian countries on the current situation on decentralization and local communities, a panel discussion on theme “To Make Better Local Governance in the Decentralization Era” was held. The participants of the panel discussion included keynote speaker Prof. Emeritus Wataru Oomori, researchers who presented work in the prior session from Philippines, China, Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, and Prof. Hiroshi Ikawa, Director of the Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance. The objective of the panel discussion was to exchange views on the challenges of decentralization and local communities, and citizen participation, and find clues for solving issues and prospects for the future. The summary of the panel discussion will follow. [Challenges for Decentralization and Local Communities, and Citizen Participation] First, the discussion covered topics on decentralization and local communities, 124 citizen participation, and collaboration with citizens. Prof. Oomori explained that in Japan merger of municipalities has been promoted, and at present 90 percent of citizens live in municipalities of “cities.” This has produced a stringent situation in the farming and mountain areas, and difficulties to maintain vitality in the rural region. Prof. Oomori mentioned the making of “local autonomy district” for areas that are smaller than municipalities (e.g. such as municipal areas before the merges occurred) and activities to strengthen autonomy of residents have been implemented, but the situation allows little room for optimism. Expansive depopulation triggered the financial bankruptcy in Yubari City (located in Hokkaido), and as the declining population trend continues in Japan, what will be the severe situation in the rural areas? There is need to rebuild a new system to avoid a devastating situation. Prof. Brillantes from the Philippines described how the role of citizens changed from a passive viewer of local governance to active participants, and introduced the case of Abra Province where citizens monitor policies of local government. In addition, he explained (1) need for local NGOs to build their capacity, (2) need for inter-local cooperation among local governments, (3) realization that conflict is the dynamism of democracy, and (4) need for the central government to create an environment for NGOs to grow. Furthermore, he noted that each country has its own mode for engaging citizens, and the importance of leadership for local governance. Prof. Chu spoke next, and explained the so-called villagers’ committee election held every three years and how little influence NGOs in China have towards government. She also discussed in order to improve participation or cooperation between the government and citizens the following three issues need to be resolved which are (1) need to change the mindset of local officials, (2) need to create concrete mechanisms for participation at the local level, and (3) need to change the system (e.g. enactment of laws) in order to guarantee opportunities for participation such as public hearings, etc. Prof. Woothisarn reported that during the first phase of decentralization in Thailand the legal framework was used to transfer power to local governments. In the second phase of decentralization which starts this year, he explained that Thailand will emphasize strengthening the capacity of local governments and leaders. He continued on to describe the issue of lack of political will for decentralization in Thailand. He stressed the following three challenges for decentralization which are (1) efficiency in terms of public finance, (2) election system to select qualified candidates, (3) transparency and administrative internal reform. 125 Lastly, he spoke about the importance of citizen participation and engagement. Prof. Kim from Korean explained that there is reluctance on the central government side to transfer power to the local governments. On the part of local governments he described that they were accustomed on depending on the central government. Regarding the citizens, ignorance and unconsciousness about local governance was a concern. The thoughts of the three parties are becoming the barrier for decentralization. He also brought up the different concept of decentralization and concentration, and emphasized that the two should not be confused. Decentralization is a power phenomenon and concentration is a geographical issue such as the relocation of the capital city and government organizations. Prof. Brodgonegoro greatly evaluated the introduction of the local direct election system, and stressed the importance of paying local tax directly to local governments for accountability and transparency. But he explained at times the election system does not always profit representatives since some of the local parliament members are elected determined according to the ranking defined by the political party. He continued on to explain that 470 local governments (districts / municipalities) is not a big number when you consider the population of Indonesia, and that there is a big gap between the sizes of local governments. [Challenges and Prospects on Decentralization and Local Communities] The discussion continued on to the prospects and problem solving methods for decentralization and local communities, and citizen participation. From Thailand, Prof. Woothisarn described that under the new constitution, Thailand needs to revise three laws on local autonomy and enact one law on local finance. The political commitment for decentralization is still unclear, but he believes that decentralization is an investment for democracy that there is need to transfer power and promote participation at the grassroots level. Prof. Kim from Korea explained that people who can play a role for the interest of the public realm should not only be seen as clients of local government, and he criticized the concept of citizens as clients. He mentioned that diversity and creativity is needed in the era of globalization, and that the central governments of various countries should learn from the experience of other countries as decentralization is inevitable. Prof. Brodjonegoro from Indonesia pointed out that after political (local direct election) & administrative decentralization and financial decentralization is implemented, the next important step would be economic decentralization through interregional competition and cooperation. 126 By promoting decentralization, he explained this will lead to streamlining government structure and reducing the number government of employees, and result to efficiency of government. Prof. Oomori described that the prospect he has towards decentralization in Japan as being quite difficult. In order for citizens to realize the benefits of participation, citizens need to plan, implement, and see the results by themselves. It is through the accumulation of these experiences that local governance will advance. He mentioned the importance of continuing the call for decentralization. Prof. Brillantes from the Philippines explained that to understand the needs of citizens, participation is crucial. He pointed out he has seen increased participation of NGOs in governance processes, and among these cases some are best practices. In order for decentralization to penetrate and lead to advancement in local governance, he mentioned that equal partnership between local government and local communities will become important. Prof. Chu described the situation in China that government, market, and the society are at the stage of exploring their respective roles. As the role of each party becomes more evident, the relationship between the roles of central government and local governments will need to be clarified. In addition, she explained some governments are encouraging the activities of NGOs, and furthermore some local governments are releasing information on public finance and conducting performance measurement. [Final Remarks] Following the discussion on challenges and prospects on decentralization and local communities, the panelist presented their final remarks. Prof. Brodjonegoro from Indonesia mentioned the need for a comparative study on the themes of (1) decentralization among various countries and interregional competition (economic growth), and (2) local innovation and local economic priorities. Prof. Kim from Korea pointed out that he seeks to propose an Asian solidarity for decentralization, and stated the importance of citizens to understand the need of local governance and civic education on local governance. Prof. Woothisarn from Thailand described the importance that decentralization process should be based on empowering citizens for active citizen participation. Decentralization will provide local governments with strength which is the basic foundation for democracy. Prof. Chu from China mentioned she felt various countries are striding towards the same goal in different ways. She thought it was important to learn from different 127 experiences on how to advance local governance. Prof. Brillantes from the Philippines pointed out the need to change the “mindset” away from the centralization which continued for a long period of time, and evaluate the results of decentralization after considering a certain time span 㧙it would be unfair to say decentralization is not working from a short time perspective. Considering all of the comments from other speakers, Prof. Oomori noted the importance of learning from other Asian countries, and noted that with activities of grassroots level in Japan and Asian countries, we have entered an era of international cooperation. Lastly, the moderator of the panel discussion, Prof. Ikawa, mentioned he will provide other opportunities to learn about local governance of various countries at the Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance. The panel discussion concluded at 5 pm. (Japanese text prepared by Hiroshi Ikawa) (Translation by Makiko Tanaka) 128 㧞㧚ࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ ޟಽᮭൻߩਅߦ߅ߌࠆࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩะߩߚߦ 㧔To Make Better Local Governance in the Decentralization Era㧕ޠ 2008 ᐕ㧟㧡ᣣ㧔᳓㧕14㧦55 ~ 17:00 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ 㧝㓏ળ⼏ቶ ࡄࡀࠬ࠻㧦 ᄢ ᒫ㧔᧲੩ᄢቇฬᢎ㧕 Alex B.Brillantes Jr.㧔ࡈࠖࡇࡦᄢቇⴕࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬቇㇱ㐳㧕 ᧻ῆ㧔Chu Songyan㧕㧔ਛ࿖࿖ኅⴕቇ㒮ᴦᢎ⎇ㇱᢎ㧕 Woothisarn Tanchai㧔ࠠࡦࠣࡊࠫࡖ࠺ࠖࡐ࠶ࠢ⎇ⓥᚲಎᢎ㧕 ㊄ ⋉ᬀ㧔Ik-sik Kim㧕㧔੩⇰ᄢቇᩞⴕቇ⑼ᢎ㧕 Bambang P.S.Brodjonegoro㧔ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱ㐳㧕 ࡕ࠺࠲㧦 Ꮉ ඳ㧔╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ᚲ㐳㧕 ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ߩᚲ㐳ߩᎹߢߔࡦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄޕ ߩࡕ࠺࠲ࠍോߐߖߡߚߛ߈߹ߔޕ ඦ೨߆ࠄඦᓟߦ߆ߌ߹ߒߡޔฦࡄࡀࠬ࠻ߩవ↢ᣇ߆ࠄޔฦ࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߩㅴߺ ౕว⺖ࠆߌ߅ߦߎߘߪࠆޔ㗴ߪߦࠄߐޔ᳃ෳടࠆߪ᳃ߣߩදߦߟߡߩ 㗴ὐߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛ߈߹ߒߚᤨޕ㑆߇ߘࠇߙࠇߢ 30 ಽߣ߁ߎߣߢޔචಽߏ⊒⸒ߢ ߈ߥ߆ߞߚㇱಽ߽ࠈ߁߆ߣᕁ߹ߔޔߪߢࡦ࡚ࠪ࠶ࠞࠬࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄߩࠄ߆ࠇߎޕඦ೨ਛ ߦචಽ߅ߒߢ߈ߥ߆ߞߚㇱಽޔ᳃ෳടߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴ࠄ߆ࠇߘޔᓟߩㄟߺ⸃ޔ╷ ߦߟߡ⼏⺰ࠍߐࠄߦᷓߡ߈ߚߣᕁߞߡ߅ࠅ߹ߔޕ ᦨೋߦၮ⺞⻠Ṷࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚᣣᧄߩᄢవ↢߆ࠄ߅ߊߒࠈࠃޔ㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ ߔޕ ٨ᄢ ᒫ ᳁㧦ߤ߁߽ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߔޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߢߪ⥄ᴦ߇㑆㆑ߞߚᣇะߢߟߊࠄࠇߡࠆߘ߁ߢߔ߇ޔᣣᧄߢ߽ᕟࠆߴ ߈ߎߣ߇㆑ߞߚᗧߢⴕߥࠊࠇߡ߹ߔߏߩߘޕႎ๔ࠍߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄ⺆ߩࡍࡄߦߪᦠ߆ࠇߡ߹ߖࠎ߇ޔᣣᧄߢߪ 1965 ᐕ߆ࠄ 10 ᐕනߢ․ߥᴺ ᓞࠍߟߊࠅޔᏒ↸ࠍว૬ߐߖࠆേ߈ࠍ⛯ߌߡ߹ߔᤨߪ✲⚻ޕ㑆߇ߥߩߢㅀߴ߹ߖࠎ ߇ޔ1999 ᐕߦߪߎߩᴺᓞࠍᒝൻߒߦࠄߐޔᏒ↸ว૬ࠍㅴߡ߹ߔࠊߪ߆⸶߁߁ߤޕ ߆ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇߇ࠊޔ࿖ߩว૬ߩฬ⒓ߦߪᄤ⊞ภࠍߟߌߡޔᴦߩᄢว૬ޔᤘߩᄢว૬ޔ ᐔᚑߩᄢว૬ߣ⸒ߞߡ߹ߔޕ ᐔᚑߩᄢว૬߇ 1999 ᐕࠍὐߦߒߡޔߤ߁ߥߞߡࠆ߆ߣ߁ߣޔ2008 ᐕߩ㧝 Ბ㓏ߢ 1799 ߦỗᷫߒ߹ߒߚޕ1999 ᐕߩߣ߈ߦߪᏒ↸ߩᢙ߇ 3232 ߢߒߚޕᣣᧄߢߪߤࠎ ߤࠎᷫߞߡ߹ߔޔߜ߁ߩߘޕᏒ↸ߩᏒߣ߫ࠇࠆㇺᏒ⥄ᴦߩᢙ߇ 788 ߢߔߩߢ ޔ800 129 ߦㄭߠߡ߹ߔߣ↸ޕ߫ࠇࠆ⥄ᴦߩᢙ߇ 1017 ߢߔߩߎޔߒ߆ߒޕ㑆ߣ↸ޔ߫ ࠇࠆዊⷙᮨߩ⥄ᴦ߇⚂ 1500 ᶖ߃߹ߒߚޕ ߘߩ⚿ᨐߤ߁ߥߞߡࠆ߆ߣ߁ߣޔᣣᧄੱߩੱญߩ 88.8㧑߇ޟᏒߣޠ߫ࠇࠆ⥄ᴦ ߦࠄߒߡ߹ߔࠆߡࠇࠊ⸒ߣޠ↸ޟࠆࠁࠊޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕၞߦࠄߒߡࠆੱ ญ߇ߚߞߚ 11.2㧑ߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚޕᣣᧄߪޟᏒߣޠ߫ࠇࠆߣߎࠈߢࠄߒߡࠆੱߚߜ߇ ୟ⊛ߥᄙᢙߢߔޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕᴦߪޟᏒޔߡߒߦ࠻࠶ࠥ࠲ࠍߜߚੱࠆߡߒࠄߦޠ ᚢ⇛ࠍ⚵ࠎߢߊߣ߁ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔߩߢ⋧ޔኻ⊛ߦㄘጊㇱߪߟࠄߊߥࠆน⢻ᕈ߇ ࠆߣ⸒ߞߡ㑆㆑ࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ ታߪว૬ߘࠇ⥄り߇㗴ߥߩߢߔ߇ޔว૬ߒߡߚߊߐࠎߩᏒ↸߇৻✜ߦߥࠆߣޔਛᔃ ߩߣߎࠈߪߩߢߔ߇߫߃⸒ߦ⊛⥸৻ޔㄝ߇ߐ߮ࠇ߹ߔޕ ోޔ࿖ࠍ࿁ߞߡ߹ߔ߇⋧ޔᒰߐ߮ࠇᆎߡ߹ߔߦߚߥߖߐࠇ߮ߐߊߴࠆߥޕ ߪޔว૬ߒߚᓟੱޔญ߽㕙Ⓧ߽ᄢ߈ߊߥࠅ߹ߔ߆ࠄ߫ࠇ߈ߢޔว૬ߔࠆ೨ߩ↸ߣ߁ዊ ߐනߩߣߎࠈߦޔᣣᧄߩᴺᓞߩ⸒⪲ߢޟၞ⥄ᴦ߫߃ߣߚޔ߇ߔ߹⸒ߣޠᏒߩ႐ วߢ⸒߁ߣޔᏒ㐳ߐࠎߩᜬߞߡࠆᮭ㒢ߩ৻ㇱࠍ৻ቯߩၞߦਈ߃ࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡߩߘޔ ၞߢ‛߇ㆇ߱ࠃ߁ߦᄌ߃ߚࠄߤ߁߆ߣᕁ߹ߔߪࠇߎޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕᐢ㕙ߢ⸒߃߫ޔ ಽᮭߩ߆ߚߜࠍၞߢታ㛎ߔࠆߣ߁⊓߇ߩ߽߁߁ߘޔ႐ߒᆎߡ߹ߔߛ߹߇ࠇߎޕ ⛘ኻዋᢙᵷߢߔ߇ࠊޕ࿖ߢߪߥ߆ߥ߆Ⴧ߃߹ߖࠎޕ ᓟ߇ࠊޔ߇ࠎߖ߹ࠅ߆ࠊߪ߆ࠆߥ߁ߤ߇ࠇߎޔ࿖ߢߪ߽߁㧝ߟޔᏒ↸ߩ⡯ຬߩᢙࠍ ᷫࠄߒߡ߹ߔ⽷ߪࠇߎޕᄢᄌߛߣ߁ߎߣ߽ࠅ߹ߔޔ߇ࠈߎߣޕᏒ↸ว૬ࠍߒ ߚߣ߈ߪޔᣥว૬ߒߚߣ߈ߩ⡯ຬߪోຬ㚂ߦߥࠄߥߩߢߔోޕຬᣂߒ⥄ᴦߩ⡯ຬߦ ߥࠇࠆߩߢߔޕ㕖Ᏹߦᒝりಽ㓚ࠍਈ߃ߡ߹ߔޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕᣂߒߊ⺀↢ߒߚ⥄ᴦ ߩ⡯ຬߩᢙߪߤߎߢ߽ᄙߩߢߔޟࠍࠇߎޕㆊ߉ߚࠆຬޔㆊຬ߃ߣߚޕߔ߹ߡߞ⸒ߣޠ ߫ޔᄢဳߢว૬ߒߚߣߎࠈߪ 300 ੱߋࠄߩㆊຬ߇ࠆߩߢߔޕ ߎࠇࠍᓟߤ߁ߔࠇ߫߆ߣ߁ߣޔᷫࠄߒߡߊߎߣߦߥࠆߩߢߔޕ㗴ὐߣߒߡޔ ಽᮭ⊛ߥၞࠍਥߦߒߚ⥄ᴦߩ⚵ߺࠍߟߊࠆߎߣߪߩߢߔ߇߇ੱߥ߁ࠃߩߤޔᱷ ࠅ߇ੱߥ߁ࠃߩߤޔ߇ߢ߈ࠆߩ߆ޔ᳃ߣߩ㑐ଥߪߤ߁ߔࠆߩ߆ߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ᧪ࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣޔ⡯ຬߩᢙ߇ᷫߞߡ߈߹ߔޕ ߘ߁ߔࠆߣޔනߥࠆవᯏ㑐ൻߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇චಽࠅ߹ߒߡޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޔၞࠍන ߦߒߚᣂߒ⥄ᴦޔ᳃⥄ᴦߩേ߈߇৻ᣇߢߡ߈ߡ߹ߔ߇߈ⴕߩߎޔవߪෂߥߣ ߁ߎߣߢߔ߁߁ߘޔߒߛߚޕᣂߒ߽ߩ߇ᴺᓞࠄࠇ߹ߒߚߩߢࠆߪࠇߎޔ⒳ߩ ೨ㅴߛߣ⠨߃ߡߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄੱߩ⊝ߐࠎᣇߪߏሽߓߢߔ߇ޔᤓᐕޔർᶏߩዊߐᏒ߇⽷⎕✋ߒߡޔ࿖ߩ⋥ ធ⛔ߦࠅ߹ߒߚޕᄕᒛߣ߁㋶ߩ↸ߛߞߚߩߢߔ߇⽷߇↸ߩߎߡߒ߁ߤޔ⎕✋ ߒߚߩ߆ߣ߁ߣߥࠈࠈޔℂ↱߇ࠅ߹ߔ⽷ޕㆇ༡߭ߤߎߣࠍߒߚߣ߆ޔ୫㊄ ߒㆊ߉ߚߣ߆ߪࠅ߹ߔ߇⇟৻ޔᄢ߈ߥේ࿃ߪޔᏒ߇৻⇟ߚߊߐࠎߩੱญ㧔11 ਁߋࠄ㧕 ࠍᜬߞߡߚߣ߈߆ࠄੱޔญ߇ᷫࠅ߹ߒߡޔ㧝ਁ 2000 ߋࠄߦߥߞߡ߹ߔ߇ޔ10 130 ਁࠍ߃ߚߣ߈ߦߟߊࠅߍࠄࠇߡࠆߐ߹ߑ߹ߥࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ߇㧔ⴕࠨࡆࠬߩࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ ࠆߪᓎᚲߩࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ㧕 ੱญ߇ᷫࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡ⛽ᜬߢ߈ߥߊߥߞߚߦ߽߆߆ࠊࠄߕޔ ⛽ᜬߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚߎߣߢߔ⚿ޕዪߢࠇߘޔ⎕✋ࠍߚߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚޕ ߎࠇߪࠍᗧߒߡࠆ߆ߣ߁ߣޔᣣᧄߩੱญߪᷫࠅᆎߡ߹ߔࠄߘ߅ࠄ߆ࠇߎޕ ߊ 2030 ᐕߩᲑ㓏ߢഭੱญ߇ޔߩ߹߹ᚻࠍᛂߚߥߣޔ1000 ਁᷫࠅ߹ߔޕ2050 ᐕߦ ߪߣޔᲧセߔࠆߣ⚂ 2000 ਁએᷫࠅ߹ߔߩߘޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕᲑ㓏ߢᣂߒ╷ࠍᛂߚߥ ߣޔᣣᧄߩᣇߪუṌߒ߹ߔ᧲ޕ੩ߩࠃ߁ߥᄢㇺᏒߪੱญ߇ᒛࠅߟߡ߹ߔ߆ࠄ ߌߤޔᣣᧄߩᣇߪუṌߔࠆࠃ߁ߥ⁁ᘒ߇ᗐቯߢ߈߹ߔޕ ߒߚ߇ߞߡੱߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔญ᭴ㅧߩᄢỗᄌ߇߈ߚ႐วߩ⥄ᴦߩ⚵ߺߪ৻ޔߤ߁ ߥࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆ޕ᧪ࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣޔᣂߒࠪࠬ࠹ࡓࠍߤ߁߿ߞߡౣ᭴▽ߔࠆ߆ߣ߁ޔ ᦨᄢߩ㔍㑐ߦᣣᧄߪ⋥㕙ߒߡࠆߩ߇ᦨߩ⑳ޔೋߩ⊒⸒ߢߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߔޕ ޟၞ⥄ᴦ߁ߣޠᣂߒᐲߩߏ⚫ߥߤߩ ߶߆ޔᓟᣣᧄߩੱญߩേะࠍ⠨߃ߚ႐วߦߪߣߞ߽ޔᄢ߈ߥ࠹ࡑ߇ࠆߩߢߪߥ߆ ߣ߁ߏᜰ៰ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇߢߪᰴߦޔ㗅⇟ߦᓥ߹ߒߡޔAlex B.Brillantes Jr. వ↢ߦ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ Brillantes వ↢߆ࠄߪޔඦ೨ਛߦࡈࠖࡇࡦߩᱧผ╬ࠍ〯߹߃ߡෳടߩࠍߒߡߚߛ߈߹ ߒߚ߇ޔ࿁ߪ⁁ߩࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦޔᴫߣޔ᳃ߣߩදߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴ߦߟߡ߅ߒ ߚߛߌߚࠄߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Alex B.Brillantes Jr. ᳁㧦ࡈࠖࡇࡦߦ߅߈߹ߔᣇಽᮭߩታᣉߣ߁ߎߣߢߪޔᏒ᳃ෳ ടࠍ߽ߞߣะߐߖࠆߣ߁ⷞὐߣޔⓍᭂ⊛ߥᏒ᳃ߩ㑐ਈޔෳട㧔engagement㧕ߣ߁ⷞ ὐߢࠆߴ߈ߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕએ೨ߪறⷰ⠪ߢߞߚᏒ᳃߇ߢߪਥ⊛ߥࠬ࠹ࠗࠢࡎ࡞࠳ ߦߥߞߡࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ߆㑆㆑߇ߞߚߣ߈ߦߪ⽿ߩߘޔછߪ⥄ಽߦ߽৻࿃ ߇ࠆߣ߁ࠍࠖ࠹ࡆ࠲ࡦ࠙ࠞࠕޔផㅴߔࠆ৻ຬߦᏒ᳃߇ߥߞߡࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ వ߶ߤࠨࡆࠬߩឭଏࠍߤ߁ᡷༀߔࠆ߆ޔᡷༀߒߚ߆ߣ߁⾰߇ࠅ߹ߒߚޕ㧺㧳㧻ޔ Ꮢ᳃ෳട߇ࠇߎޔ㊀ⷐߢࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ߹ߔߩࡦࡇࠖࡈޕർㇱߢߪޔఝ⦟㧔good practice㧕 ߩࡦࡇࠖࡈޕߔ߹⸒ߊࠃࠍߣߎ߁ߣࠬࠖ࠹ࠢࡊ࠻ࠬࡌޔർㇱߪ߇⑳ޔ りߩጊጪᏪߢߔ߇ޔConcerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG)ߣ߁ ዊߐߥࠣ࡞ࡊ߇ߢ߈߹ߒߚޕAbra ߣߪޔᎺߩฬ೨ߢߔߪࡊ࡞ࠣߩߎޕⓍᭂ⊛ߦࡊࡠࠣ ࡓ߿ࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߩታᣉࠍࡕ࠾࠲ࡦࠣߒ߹ߒߚߡߒߘޕᐭߣදജߒ߹ߒߚޔߒ߆ߒޕ CCAGG ߪᤨߦߪᐭߩ߿ࠅᣇߦኻߒߡޔኻߒኻ┙߽ࠅ߹ߒߚߩࡃࡦࡔޕ߇ෂ㒾ߦ ߐࠄߐࠇࠆߎߣ߇ߞߚޔߢߣߎ߁ߣޕᏒ᳃ߩⓍᭂ⊛ߥࠛࡦࠥࠫࡔࡦ࠻ߣ߁ߎߣߪޔ ⚿ዪޔᏱߦ✕ᒛ㑐ଥ߇ᐭߣߩ㑆ߦߥߣޔะߒߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ߎߩዊߐߥ㧺㧳㧻ߪޔ᥉ㅢߩᏒ᳃ߢ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ߹ߔ߇ޔTransparency International ߆ࠄᓆࠍฃߌ߹ߒߚޕⓍᭂ⊛ߥᏒ᳃ߦࠃࠆࠛࡦࠥࠫࡔࡦ࠻ߪߩࠬࡆࠨޔะߦߟߥ ߇ࠆߒ ߚ߹ޔ2 ߟ⋡ߩࡐࠗࡦ࠻ߢࠆ⺑⽿છ㧔accountability㧕ߩะߦߟߥ߇ࠆߣ߁ ߎߣ߇⹏ଔߐࠇ߹ߒߚޕ 131 㧟ߟ⋡ߩࡐࠗࡦ࠻ߪ⢻ജߩะߢߔޕ㧺㧳㧻ࠍ߹ࠅㆊᄢ⹏ଔߒߡߪߌߥߣᕁ߹ ߔޕ㧺㧳㧻ߪోߊ㆑߁⇇߆ࠄ᧪ߡࠆߩߢޔᐭߩࡄ࠻࠽ߣߥߞߡ߽ޔNGO ߇ℂ⸃ ߢ߈ߥߎߣ߇ᄙߊࠅ߹ߔޔߢߎߘޕ⢻ജߩะ߇ᄢಾߦߥߞߡ߈߹ߔޕᣇᐭߩ⢻ ജࠕ࠶ࡊ߇ᔅⷐߢߔߒޔਛᄩᐭߦߟߡ߽ߘߩ⢻ജะࠅ߹ߟޔᗧ⼂ࠍᄌ߃ߥߣߌ ߹ߖࠎߣࠇߘޕห᭽ߥߎߣ߇㧺㧳㧻ߦߟߡ߽⸒߃߹ߔޕ ࡈࠖࡇࡦߩ႐วߦߪޔ㧺㧳㧻߇ᐭߦኻߒߡޔ ߇ߎߎޟᖡ߇ߎߘޔᖡޔߡߞߣޠ 㕖Ᏹߦ⁛ༀ⊛ߦߥࠅ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕታߪࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߦߟߡߒߊ⍮ࠄߕߦൎᚻߥߎߣࠍ ⸒ߞߡࠆߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔ⋙ޕᩏᆔຬળߩᓎഀ߿ㅘᕈߩᔅⷐᕈߥߤޔ㧺㧳㧻ߩ⇇ߢߪ ⴕߥࠊࠇߡߥߎߣ߇ࠅ ࠍࠇߎޔNGO ߽ℂ⸃ߒߥߣߌߥߩߢߔޕ⢻ജߩะ ߣߞߚߣ߈ߦߪޔ㧺㧳㧻ߩ⢻ജะ߽߹ࠇࠆߩߢߔޕ ᦨᓟ㧔4 ߟ⋡㧕ߦޔၞ㑆දജ㧔inter-local cooperation㧕߿ว૬ߩߎߣߢߔޕవ߶ߤ Bambang P.S.Brodjonegoro వ↢߽߅ߞߒ߾ߞߡߚࠃ߁ߦ⚦ޔಽൻߔࠆߣ߁࠻ࡦ࠼߇ ࠅ߹ߔߩࡦࡇࠖࡈޕ႐ว߽ߘ߁ߢߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ ޟදജޔࠍߣߎ߁ߣޠᚒߪޘ╷ߣߒ ߡਥᒛߒߡ߹ߔޕႺ⇇✢ࠍ߃ߡ߫߃ߣߚޔᶏᵗ⾗Ḯࠍోߔࠆࠃ߁ߦޔදജߒ߹ߔޕ ᶏᵗ⾗Ḯߩోߩߚߦࡉ࡞ⅣႺޔ᳓⾗Ḯߩ⏕ߩߚߦࠣࡦⅣႺࡉࠄ߆ࠇߘޔ ࠙ࡦⅣႺߣ߁ߎߣߢߺߏޔಣℂߥߤ߽߈ߜࠎߣߔࠆߎߣࠍ߮߆ߌߡ߹ߔ࠻ࡦࠗࡐޕ ߪޔᐭߛߌߢߥߊᏒ᳃ߩⓍᭂ⊛ߥෳ↹߇ࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ߎߎߢ߽ኻ┙ߪࠅ߹ߔޕ㧺㧳㧻߇ߚߣ߃߫᳓Ḯߩ⼔ࠍߒࠃ߁ߣᕁߞߡޔ Brodjonegoro వ↢߽߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚࠃ߁ߦޔ ᤨߦߪ NGO ߩ࠳߇ᴦኅߦߥࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔ ߇⁓ࠊࠇߚߣ߆Ვߐࠇߚߣ߁߽ࠅ߹ߔޔߢߣߎ߁ߣޕ㧺㧳㧻߇᧪ࠇ߫ߔߴߡࡃ ⦡ߣ߁ࠃ߁ߥ↞⠨߃ߢߪߌߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕᏱߦኻ┙ߪࠅ߹ߔ߇߇ࠇߘޔ ᳃ਥᐲߩ࠳ࠗ࠽ࡒ࠭ࡓߢߔޕ ߣ߁ߎߣߢޔਛᄩᐭߩᓎഀࠍ߽߁৻ᐲ⋥ߔᔅⷐ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕએ೨ߪਛᄩᐭ߇ࠨ ࡆࠬߩឭଏߦ៤ࠊߞߡ߹ߒߚ߇ޔޔਛᄩᐭߦߪࡄࡈࠜࡑࡦࠬࠬ࠲ࡦ࠳࠼ ࠍߟߊࠅޔNGO ߇ଥࠊࠇࠆࠃ߁ߥⅣႺߩᢛ߇᳞ࠄࠇߡ߹ߔ⋥ࠬࠦ࡞ࡑޕᓟޔ㧺㧳㧻 ߪᏱߦᛥߐࠇߡߡޔᐭ߇⣣ᢌߒߡߚߩߢ߇ࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦޔෳടࠍߔࠆߩߪ㔍ߒ ߆ߞߚߢߔޕNGO ߪ⎕უ⊛ߣߥߐࠇߡ߹ߒߚ߇ޔ᳃ਥ⊛ߥ⠨߃ᣇ߇ᐢ߹ࠅ߹ߒߚࠄޔ NGO ߇ෳടߔࠆߩߪᒰߚࠅ೨ߣߥࠅ߹ߒߚޕ ᦨᓟߦ↳ߒߍߚߩߪ߽ߢߦߎߤޔᒰߡߪ߹ࠆࠃ߁ߥਁ⢻⮎ߪߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߪ⥄࿖ߦߞߚᏒ᳃ෳടࠍߺߟߌ߹ߒߚߩ߆߶߹߹ߩߘޕ࿖ߦ߽ᜬߜㄟࠆ ߣ߁ߎߣߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޔߪߣߎࠆ߃⸒ߛߚޕᣇಽᮭߣ߁ߩ߇ᄢ߈ߥᨒ⚵ߺߢߔޕ ߒ߆ߒߩߘޔ࿖ߦ․ߥᢥൻ߇ࠅ߹ߔߒ⥄ޔߢߩࠆ߽ࠈߎߣࠆࠃߦ࠳ޔ࿖ߦ ߞߚ߽ߩࠍᤨ㑆ࠍ߆ߌߡࠆߎߣߢߔޕ Brodjonegoro వ↢ߩ⸒⪲ࠍᒁ↪ߒߡ߹ߔߣ߇ࡊ࠶ࠪ࠳ࠅߪ߿ޔᄢಾߛߣ߁ߎ ߣߢࠅ߹ߔ߽ࡦࡇࠖࡈޔ߇ߔߢ߁ࠃࠆߢ߁ߘߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޕหߓߢߔࡦࠖࡈޕ ࡇࡦߢ NGO ߩ࠳߇ᴦኅߦߥࠆߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔᒰㆬߒߡ߆ࠄ⥄ಽ߇ߤ߁ߒߡ 132 ᴦኅߦߥߞߚߩ߆ࠍ߷߿ߊߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔߊߚߞ߹ޕ㆑⇇ߢࠆߎߣߦᓟߦߥߞߡ᳇ ߇ߟߊߩߢߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ߤ߁߽ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚ߇ࡊ࠶ࠪ࠳ޕᄢߢࠆޔ᳃ෳ ട߿දജߩࠅᣇߪฦ࿖ߦࠃߞߡ㆑߁ߥߤߣߞߚߏᜰ៰ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇߢߪޔਛ࿖ߩ ᧻ῆవ↢ߦ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔߪࠄ߆ࠎߐ ޕฦ࿖ႎ๔ߢ㧺㧳㧻 ߦߟߡ߆ߥࠅߒߏႎ๔ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚౕޕ⊛ߦુߚߩߪޔਛ࿖ߩฎߊ߆ࠄ ࠆࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣߏ⻠Ṷߚߛߚᣂߒ࠲ࠗࡊߩ NGO ߣߩ㑐ଥߦߟߡߒࠍ߅ޔ ߡߚߛߌࠇ߫ᐘߢߔޕ 䃂 ᧻ῆ㧔Chu Songyan) ᳁㧦⑳߇↳ߒߍߚߎߣߪᦨޔㄭߩਛ࿖ߩ⊒ዷߣߩ㑐ଥߢ ߔ߇ߏޔሽߓߩࠃ߁ߦ 30 ᐕ೨߆ࠄޟෳടޔߒ߆ߒޕߚߒ߹ࠅߪޠᒰᤨߩෳടߣ߁ߩߪޔ ࠊ߫ή⒎ᐨߥᄢⴐㆇേߢߒߚޕߪ㧞ߟߩࡌ࡞ߩෳട߇ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ㧝ߟ⋡ߪ ੱߦࠃࠆෳടߣ৻߁߽ޔᣇߪ⑳߇ᦺߏႎ๔ߒߚ⚵❱ൻߐࠇߚෳടߢߔޕ ㄭᐕߩਛ࿖ੱߪࠈࠈߥෳടߩ࠴ࡖࡦࡀ࡞߇ࠅ߹ߔߪߟߣ߭ޕㆬߢߔ߫߃ߣߚޕ ㆬߩߣ߈ߦߪޔㄘㇱߪోੱญߩ 7 ഀࠍභߡ߹ߔ߇ޔ㧟ᐕߏߣߦࠊࠁࠆ᳃ᆔຬ ળߩㆬ߇ⴕࠊࠇ߹ߔޕㇺᏒㇱߢߪޔ᳃ߦࠃࠅ᳃ᆔຬળߩࡔࡦࡃ߇ㆬߐࠇ߹ߔޕ Ꮢ᳃ߪޔᚻ⚕߿㕙ળߦࠃߞߡޔᐭߦ↳ߒ┙ߡࠍⴕ߁ߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔޕ㓞࿖ߩ㖧࿖ߣห᭽ޔ Ꮢ᳃ߪᐭࠍ⸷߃ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔޔߚ߹ޕ⡬ળߩ႐߿㔚ࠍ߆ߌߡޔᏒ᳃ߪᏒ㐳߿ ၞߩ࠳ߦ㒸ᖱߔࠆߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕᣂߒᐭߪޔᏒ᳃߇ⴕߩ࠙ࠚࡉࠨࠗ࠻ߦࡔ ࠶ࠫࠍᱷߖࠆࠃ߁ߥขࠅ⚵ߺ߽ߒߡ߹ߔޕ NGO ߩෳടߣ߁ߎߣߦ㑐ߒߡߪ␠ߚ߃╵ߦ࠻ࠤࡦࠕޔળㆇേߦ៤ࠊߞߡࠆ NGO ߩౝ ߩߚߞߚޔ16.8 㧑ߛߌ߇⥄ಽߚߜߩᵴേ߇ᐭߦኻߒߡᒝᓇ㗀ജ߇ࠆߣ࿁╵ߒߡ ߹ߔޟޔߒ߆ߒޕᐭߦኻߒߡ⥄ಽߚߜߩᵴേߪ㊀ⷐߢࠆߣ⠨߃ࠆ߆㧫⾰߁ߣޠࠍ ᛩߍ߆ߌࠆߣޔ60㧑એߩ࿁╵⠪߇߽ߡߣޟ㊀ⷐߛߣᕁߞߡࠆ⹏ࠍࠄ⥄ߦ߁ࠃ߁ߣޠ ߒߡࠆߩߪޔᅱߢߪߥ߆ߣᕁ߹ߒߚޕ ߤߩࠃ߁ߦᐭߣᏒ᳃ߩදജࠍᡷༀߒߡߊߩ߆ߣ߁ߎߣߦ㑐ߒߡߪ ߕ߹ޔ1 ߟ⋡ߣ ߒߡ߃ࠆߎߣߪᐭᓎੱ߇⥄ಽߚߜߩᗧ⼂ࠍᄌ߃ࠆߎߣߢߔޕታ㓙ߦᄙߊߩᣇോຬ ߪ߆ߥࠅᗧ⼂߇ᄌࠊߞߡ߈ߡ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕᳯ⯃⋭(Jiangsu)ߢߪ⽺ޔ࿎ߩ㗴⸃ߩߚ ߦޔਛ࿖ߩ NGO ߛߌߢߪߥߊޔ࿖㓙⊛ߦᵴേߔࠆ NGO ࠍࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߦෳ↹ߔࠆࠃ߁ ߦ߮߆ߌ߹ߒߚޕ 㧞ߟ⋡ߢߔ߇ޔෳടߔࠆ࠴ࡖࡦࡀ࡞߇ߚߊߐࠎࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔᏒ᳃߇㗴ߥߊෳടߢ߈ࠆ ࠃ߁ߥౕ⊛ߥ⚵ߺߠߊࠅࠍߒߡ߆ߥߊߡߪߌ߹ߖࠎߟޔ࡞ࡌߥ࡞ࠞࡠߦ․ޕ ߹ࠅࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣ߁ࠃ߁ߥ৻⇟Ꮢ᳃ߦㄭࡌ࡞ߢߘ߁ߢࠅߪࠇߎޔㄘㇱㇺ Ꮢㇱߩᣇߦ߅ߡ⸒߃ࠆߎߣߢࠅ߹ߔޕ 㧟ߟ⋡ߢߔ߇ޔNGO ߿Ꮢ᳃߇ෳടߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߔࠆߚߦߪࠈࠈߛ߹ޔขࠅ㒰ߊߴ ߈㓚ო߇ࠅ߹ߔޔ߫߃ߣߚޕਛ࿖ߦ߽㊀ⷐߥ╷┙᩺ᤨߩ⡬ળߦ㑐ߔࠆᴺᓞ߇ ࠅ߹ߔޕਛ࿖ߩᤐ▵⑂ߩᤨᦼߦߥࠆߣޔ㋕ᢱ㊄߇߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔ⡬ળߪߎࠇ߹ߢ 1 ᐲ 133 ߒ߆㐿߆ࠇߡ߹ߖࠎޕ⠉ᐕߦߥࠅޔᢱ㊄ߩ୯ߍ߇ߥߐࠇࠆߣޔᏒ᳃ߪ⡬ળ߇ߥ߆ߞ ߚߎߣߦኻߒߡᐭࠍᛕ್ߒ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕᤓᐕߪ⡬ળ߇ߞߚߣ㋕⋭ߪ⺰ߒޔᲤ ᐕޔ㐿ߊᔅⷐᕈߪߥߣਥᒛߒ߹ߔߩߎޕᴺᓞߪ⼏ޔળ߇⡬ળࠍ㐿ߒߡ⦟㧔may㧕ߣ ⷙቯߒޔᏒ᳃ߦኻߒߡߔߴ߈㧔should㧕ߣߪⷙቯߒߡߥߩߢߔޔߢߩߔߢޕmay ߢߪ ߥߊߡ should ߣ߁ࠃ߁ߦⷐ᳞ߔࠆࠃ߁ߥᢥ⸒ߢᴺᓞࠍᦠߌ߫⁁ᴫߪᄌࠊࠆ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖ ࠎޕ ᦺޔ㖧࿖ߩ⚻㛎߿ࡈࠖࡇࡦߥߤߩႎ๔⠪߆ࠄߩࠍ⡞߈ޔᄙߊࠍቇ߮߹ߒߚޕᣣ ߪޔᗧ឵ࠍⴕߥ߁⦟ᯏળࠍਈ߃ࠄࠇߚߣᕁߞߡ߅ࠅ߹ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦వ߶ߤ߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚᢙሼߩᗧߦߟߡ⏕ߒߚߩߢߔ߇ޔ60㧑ߩ NPO ߩੱ⥄ߪޘಽߚߜ߇ᄢߛߣ߁ࠃ߁ߦ⹏ଔߒߡࠆ߇ޔ16.8㧑ߣ߁ߩߪޔ᥉ㅢߩ Ꮢ᳃߆ࠄࠆߣ 16.8㧑ߒ߆⹏ଔߒߡߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߒࠂ߁߆ޕ 䃂 ᧻ῆ ᳁㧦⑳ߩ⺰ᢥߩਛߢޔᵈ⸥ߣ߹ߔ߆ޔ⠨㧔6 ࡍࠫ㧕ߢ⸥タߐࠇߡࠆ ߣᕁ߹ߔ⺞࠻ࠤࡦࠕߩߎޕᩏߪ 2002 ᐕ߆ࠄ 2004 ᐕߦ߆ߌߡⴕࠊࠇߚ߽ߩߢޔർ੩ 㧔Beijing㧕߆ࠄ㤥┥ᳯ⋭㧔Heilongjiang㧕ߣᵽᳯ⋭㧔Zhejiang㧕ߢ⊓㍳ߐࠇߚ␠ળᵴേࠍ ߒߡࠆ NGO ߦㅍࠅ߹ߒߚޕ2858 ߩ࿅ߦࠕࡦࠤ࠻ࠍㇷㅍߒޔ࿁₸ߪ 33.2㧑ߢޔ1 ࡩᓙߞߡޔ16.8㧑ߩ࿅߇⥄ޟಽߚߜߩᵴേ߇ᐭߩᗧᕁቯߦᒝߊᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ߡࠆޠ ߣ߁࿁╵ࠍᓧ߹ߒߚ␠ޕળᵴേࠍߒߡࠆ NGO ߪ߹ߛᣂߒ⚵❱ߢߔޕᏒ᳃߿㕖༡⚵ ❱㧔non-enterprise units㧕ߪߩޔ⋉ࠆߪߩ⋉ߦነਈߔࠆ㧔pubic benefit organizations - PBO㧕࿅ߣߥߐࠇߡࠆޕPBO ࠍഃ⸳ߒߚ⽷࿅߽ߘ߁ߢߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ ߎࠇࠄߩ࿅ߩታᘒࠍ⺞ߴࠆߩߪኈᤃߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎ᧪ޕᐕߩ 2 ߦౣ⺞ᩏࠍߔࠆ߆߽ߒ ࠇ߹ߖࠎ ߩߎޕ16.8㧑ߣ߁ᢙሼߪࠆޔၞߦ߅ߌࠆࠕࡦࠤ࠻⺞ᩏߢߞߚߩߢߎޔ ࠇ߇৻⥸⊛ߥਛ࿖ߩ NGO ߩ⸃ࠍ␜ߔ߽ߩߣߪ⸒߃ߥߢߒࠂ߁ޕߩਛ࿖ߦߪޔ㕖ว ᴺߣ߫ࠇࠆᄙߊߩ NGO ߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ߪࠇߎޔਛ࿖ߢߪ⊓㍳ߐࠇߡߥ NGO ߩߎߣߢ ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ߤ߁߽ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߔޕ ߘࠇߢߪ Woothisarn వ↢ߦ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕඦ೨ਛޔᙗᴺߩ߅ࠍࠈࠈ ߒߡߚߛ߈߹ߒߚ⥄ߏޕり߽ᙗᴺᡷᱜᬺߦෳടߐࠇߡࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔ߇ޔታ㓙ߩ ᳃ෳടߩ࠲ࠗߩ⁁ᴫࠍ〯߹߃߹ߒߡޔ᳃ෳട߿᳃ߣߩදߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴ߦߟߡ߅ ߒߚߛߌࠇ߫ᐘߢߔޕ ٨Woothisarn Tanchai ᳁㧦߶߆ߩ⊝ߐࠎߩ߅ࠍ⡞ߡޔಽᮭߦߟߡߪㅢὐ߇ࠆߣ ᕁ߹ߔߒߚ߹ޔㅢߩ㗴ߦ߽⋥㕙ߒߡࠆߣᗵߓߡ߹ߔߩߤޔߒ߆ߒޕ࿖߽ߘࠇߙ ࠇߩ⇣ߥࠆ␠ળ⁁ᴫޔᱧผ߇ࠅ߹ߔޔߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗ߫߃ߣߚޕ1999 ᐕߦᣇಽᮭ߇ ᆎ߹ࠅޔᴦ⁁ᴫࠍ〯߹߃ߡޔߩ㓏ጀ㧔⥄ᴦ㧕ߢߪߥߊ 2 ⇟⋡ߩ㓏ጀ㧔⥄ᴦ㧕ߦ ᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖ߔߎߣߦߒ߹ߒߚߣࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦ߽ࠗࠗ࠲ޕหߓᐕߩ 1999 ᐕߦᣇಽᮭࠍᆎߡ ߹ߔ⥄ߪߦ߈ߣߩߘޕᴦߦߘߩḰߢ߈ߡࠆ߆ߣ߁㗴߇ࠅ߹ߒߚ߇⑳ޕᣇ ಽᮭߩࡊࡦࠍ╷ቯߒߚߣ߈ޔᄙߊߩੱ߇߹ߛᣇಽᮭߩḰ߇ߢ߈ߡߥߣ⸒ߞߡ 134 ߹ߒߚޕḰᘒ߇ߢ߈ߡࠆ߆ߤ߁߆ߣ߁㗴ߪࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔታ㓙ߦ߿ߞߡߺࠆ߁ߜ ߦḰᘒ߇ᢛ߁ߣ߽⸒߃߹ߔ⥄ޔࠄ߆ߔߢޕᴦߩḰ߇ߢ߈ߡࠆ߆ߣ߁ߎߣߪޔ ⛘ኻ⊛ߦ⸒߃ࠆߎߣߢߪߥߊ⋧ޔኻ⊛ߦ⠨߃ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ࠲ࠗߢߩᣇಽᮭߩ╙㧝ࡈࠚ࠭ߢߪޔᴺᓞࠍቯ㧔ၫⴕ㧕ߒ㧔ߘߩᨒ⚵ߺࠍߞߡ㧕 ታᣉߒ߹ߒߚߣࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗ߿ࡦࡇࠖࡈޕห᭽ޔᄙߊߩᬺോᮭ㒢ੱޔຬ⾗ޔ㊄ࠍ⥄ᴦ ߦ⒖ߒ߹ߒߚઁޕ࿖ߣห᭽ޔㅘᕈ↪⾌ޔଢ⋉ޔᡰߩല₸ᕈߥߤߩ㗴߽⚻㛎ߒ߹ߒߚ ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߣ߁ߩߪታ〣ࠍㅢߒߡቇ߱ࡊࡠࠬߛߣᕁ߹ߔࠍࠬࡠࡊޕㅢߒߡ⊒ዷ ߒ߹ߔޕታᣉࠍߔࠇ߫߿ࠞࡔࠕޔᣣᧄߢߘ߁ߢߞߚࠃ߁ߦޔᣇ⥄ᴦࠍ⦟ߊߔࠆߔ ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔޕ ࠲ࠗߢߩᣇಽᮭߩ╙㧝ࡈࠚ࠭ߢߪޔᎺᐭߩᓎഀࠍ⥄ᴦߦ⒖ߒ߹ߒߚޕᐕ߆ࠄ ᆎࠆ╙㧞ࡈࠚ࠭ߢߪ⥄ޔᴦߩ⢻ജߩะ⥄ߡߒߘޔᴦᐙㇱߩ⢻ജߩะߦജࠍ ࠇ߹ߔߩ߆ߟߊߪߢࠗ࠲ޔߒ߆ߒޕ⚂߇ࠅޔਛᄩᐭߩⴕᯏ㑐ߢࠆࠪߩޠ⋵ޟ ࠬ࠹ࡓࠍᑄᱛߔࠆߎߣߪ߽ߜࠈࠎߢ߈߹ߖࠎޕ࿖ࡌ࡞ߢߺࠆߣޔ㚂⋧ߪޔㆬߦࠃࠅ ㆬߐࠇࠆ⍮ࠃࠅޔਛᄩᐭߦࠃߞߡછߐࠇࠆ⍮ࠍᅢߺ߹ߔޕᣇಽᮭߩᵹࠇߪ ࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔ࿖ࡌ࡞ߢߪߐ߹ߑ߹ߥߎߣ߇ߎࠆߢߒࠂ߁ޕ ߹ߕ߃ࠆߎߣߪޔᣇಽᮭ߳ߩᴦ⊛ߥᗧᕁߩᰳᅤ߿ᣇಽᮭ߳ߩᴦ⊛ߥࠦࡒ࠶࠻ ࡔࡦ࠻߇ᰳᅤߒߡࠆߣ߁㗴߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ࿖ࡌ࡞ߩᴦኅߪޔᙗᴺߢឝߍࠄࠇߡ ࠆߩߢᣇಽᮭߩߎߣࠍ⸒߹ߔ߇ᧄޔᔃ߆ࠄ⾥หߒߡࠆࠊߌߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎߒޕ ࠈ⢿ᆭߦߥߞߡ߹ߔޕ ࠲ࠗߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߩ⺖㗴ߪ ╙ߕ߹ޔ1 ߦല₸ᕈߢߔ⽷ޕ⊛ߥല₸ᕈߢߔޕ೨ߦㅀ ߴ߹ߒߚࠃ߁ߦޔᡰߩല₸ᕈࠍ⠨߃ࠆߢߪߣ↪⾌ޔଢ⋉ߩᲧ₸ߣᏒ᳃ߩḩ⿷ᐲࠍ⠨߃ ߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎޕᏒ᳃ߩḩ⿷ᐲߛߌࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣߣ↪⾌ޔଢ⋉ߩᲧ₸ࠍᔓࠇߡߒ߹߹ߔޕ ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߢߔߩߢޔቯ㊂⊛ߣቯᕈ⊛ߣߩࡃࡦࠬࠍߣߞߡല₸ᕈࠍ⠨߃ߥߌࠇ߫ߌ߹ߖ ࠎޕ ߽߁㧝ߟߩല₸ᕈߪ⥄ޔᴦ߇⦟ᗧᕁቯࠍߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߔࠆߦߪߤ߁ߔࠇ߫߆ ߣ߁ߎߣߢߔߪߢࠗ࠲ޕᓟ⋙ᩏ㧔post-audit㧕ࠅ߹ߟޔᡰࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦߞߚ߆ࠍ࠴ ࠚ࠶ࠢߔࠆߣ߁ᣇᴺࠍᏱߦ↪ߡ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ೨⋙ᩏ㧔pre-audit㧕 ▚੍ޔᡰࠍ ቯߔࠆ೨ߦᏒ᳃߇ෳടߔࠆߣ߁ߎߣߪߒߡ߹ߖࠎޕᣂߒᴺᓞߢߪ߇ࠇߎޔዉߐ ࠇ߹ߔߚߒ⺰⼏ࠍߣߎߩߎߪ⑳ޕᆔຬળߦෳടߒߡ߹ߔ⥄ޕᴦ߇ࠃᗧᕁቯࠍߔࠆ ߦߪޔ೨⋙ᩏ߇ᔅⷐߢߔߩࠬࡆࠨࠎࠈߜ߽ޕឭଏ߿ߘߩኻᔕߦߪല₸ᕈ߇᳞ࠄࠇ߹ ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕᣇಽᮭߩℂᔨߪ⥄ޔᴦߩ⥄ᓞ⊛ߥᗧᕁቯࠍน⢻ߦߔࠆߎߣߢߔߡోޕ ߩ⥄ᴦߦㆡ↪ߔࠆࠃ߁ߥ߭ߣߟߩၮḰࠍߟߊࠆߎߣߪߢ߈߹ߖࠎ⥄ޕᴦߩቯࠍฃߌ ࠇࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߩߢߩࠬࡆࠨޔၮḰ⸳ቯߦߟߡߪోޔ࿖৻ᓞߩၮḰߢߪߥߊ⥄ޔᴦ ߇ⴕ߁ߴ߈ᦨૐ㒢ߩࠨࡆࠬߩⷙቯࠍ⸳ߌࠆߴ߈ߢߔޕ ࠲ࠗߦ߅ߌࠆ 2 ߟ⋡ߩ⺖㗴ߪㆬᐲߢߔ⋥ޕធㆬࠍዉߒޔ⠪߇ࠃߊߥߞߡ ߈ߡ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕᏒ㐳߇⦟ᢎ⢒ࠍฃߌߡ߅ࠅޔᬺߩ⚻༡⠪߆ࠄᏒ㐳ߦߥߞߚࠃ߁ 135 ߥࠤࠬ߇ࠅ߹ߔ৻ߩߘߒ߆ߒޕᣇޔᏒ㐳߿ TAO ߩ㐳ߦߥߞߚ⠪ߢ߹ࠅࠃߊߥ ੱ߽߹ߔޕㆬߢㆡಾߥੱࠍㆬߴࠆࠃ߁ߦߔࠆߚߦޔᣇࡌ࡞ߢ߽࿖ࡌ࡞ߢ߽ߤ ߩࠃ߁ߦㆬᐲࠍᡷༀߔߴ߈߆ࠍ⠨߃ߡ߆ߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎޕ 3 ߟ⋡ߩ⺖㗴ߪㅘᕈߢߔߩࠗ࠲ޕᣇᐭߦࠆ৻⇟ᄢ߈ߥᛕ್ߪㅘᕈߣᳪ⡯ߩ㗴 ߦ㑐ߒߡߢߔ⺞࠻ࠤࡦࠕޕᩏ㧔constitutional survey㧕ࠍߔࠆߣޔᄙߊߩᏒ᳃ߪᣇಽᮭ ߩℂᔨߦߟߡߪḩ⿷ߒߡ߹ߔޕᣇಽᮭߦࠃߞߡߢ߹ࠇߎޔਛᄩᐭߣⴕ߁ᔅⷐ߇ ߞߚ㧔ᤨ㑆ࠍⷐߒߚ㧕߿ࠅขࠅ߇⋥ޔធߢᣧߊߥࠆߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕᏒ᳃ߪⴕ ߇߿ࠆߎߣࠍା㗬ߪߒߡߥߩߢߔޕ ޟᐭߩା㗬ޟ߆ߣޠᣇᐭߩା㗬߇ߩ߁ߣޠ ࠠࡢ࠼ߢࠅޔㄭ᧪ߩߎޔὐߦߟߡ․ߦജࠍࠇߥߣߌߥߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 4 ߟ⋡ߩ⺖㗴ߪⴕ⚵❱ߩᡷༀߢߔߩߎޕὐߦ㑐ߒߡޔᣣᧄߩว૬߇ෳ⠨ߦߥࠆߣߩ߇ ࠅ߹ߔ߇ߒ↳߇⑳ޔߍࠆߚߩߪޔᣣᧄߪว૬ߢ⥄ᴦߩᢙࠍᷫࠄߖߚߩߪޔᣣᧄߦ ᣇ⥄ᴦ㧔ಽᮭว૬㧕ߦ㑐ߒߡ㐳ᱧผ߇ࠆߎߣߢߔ ߪߢࠗ࠲ޕ10 ᐕ೨ߦᆎߚ߫߆ ࠅߢߔⷙޕᮨߩ⚻ᷣߣ߁ߎߣߢޔᣇ⥄ᴦߩࠨࠗ࠭ࠍᄢ߈ߊߒ߹ߔߣੱޔ㑆ห჻ߩߟ ߥ߇ࠅ߇ᄬࠊࠇ߹ߔ߇ࠬࡦࡃޕᔅⷐߢߔޔߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗ߫߃ߣߚޕ㧠ߟࠍ㧝ߟߦߒ ߚߎߣߢޔᏒ᳃ෳട߇⋥ធ⊛ߢߪߥߊߥࠅࠆߌ߅ߦࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦ߿ޘੱޔ㑐ଥ߿ࠦࡒࡘ࠾ ࠤ࡚ࠪࡦ߇ᄬࠊࠇ߹ߔޕ ᔅⷐߥߣ߈ߦߪᢿࠍߒߥߌࠇ߫ߌ߹ߖࠎ߇ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔవ↢߇߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚࠃ ߁ߦޔว૬ࠃࠅߪၞ㑆දജ㧔inter coooperation㧕ߣ⸒ߞߡ߹ߒߚ߇⾥߽⑳ޔᚑߢߔޕ ࠲ࠗߩᣇಽᮭߩㅢߒߦߟߡߪ╙ߕ߹ޔ㧝ߦߪ⑳ޔ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦Woothisarn వ↢ޔᣇಽᮭߩㅢߒߦߟߡߪޔᓟ߶ߤ߅ߚߛ߈ߚ ߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Woothisarn Tanchai ᳁㧦ߎߩ⺖㗴ߩࠠࡢ࠼ߪޟᏒ᳃ߩㅴᱠޔᏒ᳃ߩෳടޠ 㧔people advance and people participation㧕ߢߔޕᴦኅߪߎߩߎߣߦߟߡߪߊࠃࠅ߹ޔᕁߞ ߡ߹ߖࠎ߇ޔߣࠆߡࠇߐⷞ⋙ߦࡒࠦࠬࡑ߿ੱޔᴦኅߪ⦟⼂ࠆⴕേࠍߣࠄߥߣ ߌ߹ߖࠎޕᣇᐭߦ߅ߡ߽หߓߎߣ߇⸒߃߹ߔޕᏒ᳃ߩෳടࠍଦㅴߔࠆࡔࠞ࠾࠭ࡓࠍ ߟߊߞߡߊߣⴕޔ⡯ຬߪ߈ߜࠎߣߒߚⴕേࠍߒߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎࠄ߆ࠇߎޕ㧞ᐕ߶ߤ ߢߦࠄߐޔᄌൻ߇ࠆߢߒࠂ߁ޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦Woothisarn వ↢ ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޔല₸ᕈޔㅘᕈࠆޔ ߪㆬᐲߥߤߩ࠲ࠗߩᛴ߃ࠆ⺖㗴ߦߟߡ߅ߚߛ߈߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇߢߪᰴߦ㊄వ↢ߦޔ㖧࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖㗴ߦߟߡ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨㊄ ⋉ᬀ㧔Ik-sik Kim) ᳁㧦ߎߎߢߪߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ࿖ߢᣇಽᮭࠍㅴࠆߢ⺖ޔ㗴߿㓚 ኂߦߟߡ⼏⺰ߐࠇߡ߹ߔޕWoothisarn వ↢߇߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚࠃ߁ߦߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ࿖ߦ⇣ ߥࠆ␠ળ⁁ᴫ߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔㅢᕈࠆߪ㘃ૃᕈ߽ࠅ߹ߔޕ 1991 ᐕ߆ࠄ㖧࿖ߢᣇಽᮭࠍផߒㅴߡ߈ߚ⑳ߩ 15 ᐕߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄ↳ߒߍࠄࠇࠆߩߪޔ ࠊࠇࠊࠇ߇ᣇಽᮭࠍㅴࠆ߁߃ߢᦨ߽ᄢ߈ߥ⺖㗴ߣ߁ߩߪࠆࠁࠊޔ╷߿ታോ⊛ ߥ㗴ߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޔߡߊߥߪߢ߁ߘޕᔃℂ⊛ߥ㗴㧔ᗧ⼂ߩ㗴㧕ߢߔޕ 136 ᣇಽᮭߦ߆߆ࠊߞߡࠆหߣࠍߒߡޔਛᄩ߆ࠄᣇߪࠆޔቭ߆ࠄ᳃߳ߩᮭജ ߩ㈩ಽࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦߔࠆ߆ߣ߁ߎߣߢߪߥߊߡޔᮭജߩ⒖⼑ߦ߁ᔃℂ⊛ߥ㗴ߢࠅޔ ਛᄩᐭޔᣇᐭޔ᳃ߩ߇ߎߩὐࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦฃߌࠇࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ߆ߣ߁ߎ ߣߢߔߪߩߚ⸒߇⑳ޕਛᄩᐭߩࠛ࠻ߪޔᣇᐭߦᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖⼑ߒߚߊߥߩߢ ߔ⛘߁߽ޕኻߦߘࠇߪߒߚߊߥߩߢߔߩߤߪࠇߎޕ࿖ߢ߽หߓߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕਛᄩᐭ ߢߊࠛ࠻ߦኻߒߡߣߞ߽ޟᮭ㒢ࠍᣇߦ⒖⼑ߒߥߐޔߣ߁⸒ߣޠᔅߕޔ ߎߥࠎߘޟ ߣࠍߒߚࠄޔ߇߈ߜࠎߣߢ߈ߥ⸒ߣޠߒ߹ߔޕᣇᐭߪ߈ߜࠎߣࠍߎߥ ߖߥߩߢޔᣇߦᮭ㒢⒖⼑ࠍߔࠆߎߣߦᄢ߈ߥᛶ᛫ᗵ߇ࠆߣ⸒߹ߔ⇟৻߇ࠇߘޕᄢ ߈ߥసߔߴ߈㗴ὐߣ߁ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕ ᣇᐭߩߢߔ߇ޔਛᄩᐭଐሽߩ⾰߇᧪߇ߞߡࠆߣ߁㗴߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ ਛᄩᐭߦଐሽߔࠆߣ߁ߎߣ߇ቯ⌕ߒߡ߹ߔޕਛᄩ߆ࠄᣇ߳ߩᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖⼑ߔߴ߈ߢ ࠆߣ⸒߁ߣޔᣇᐭߪޕߔߢߩ߁ߣޠ߫ࠇ߃ࠄ߽߃ߐࡀࠞ߅ޕߥࠄⷐޟਛ ᄩᐭ߆ࠄߩᜰ␜ࠍᓙߞߡࠆߩߢߔޕ ᣇᐭߢߊ⡯ຬߦኻߒߡߪߣߞ߽ߗߥޔᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖⼑ߒߡ߽ࠄ߁ᔅⷐ߇ࠆߩ߆ࠍℂ ⸃ߒߡ߽ࠄ߁ߣ߁ߎߣ߇ᄢಾߢߔ⥄ޕᴦߢߪޔᮭ㒢߇⒖⼑ߐࠇ߹ߔߣޔ߇Ⴧ߃ ߡߒ߹߁ߣ߁ߎߣߢޔህ߇ߞߡࠆࠊߌߢߔޔ߽ࠅࠃࠇߘޕਛᄩ߆ࠄᜰዉ߿ᵈᢥ߇ߡ ߊࠆߩࠍޔᓙߟߛߌߩ߶߁߇ᭉߥߩߢߔޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄᏒ᳃ߢߔ߇ޔ㖧࿖ߢ߽ߘ߁ߢߔ߇ޔή㑐ᔃߢࠆߊࠃߪࠆޔ⍮ࠄߥߣ ߁ߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕᣇᐭߢ߇߈ߡࠆߩ߆ޔ⍮ࠄߥߒޔ㑐ᔃ߽ߥߩߢߔޕᛩ ߦ߽ⴕ߈߹ߖࠎޕή⍮ޔή㑐ᔃ߇᳃ߩߦࠆߣ߁ߎߣ߽㗴ߢߔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕᔃ ℂ⊛ߥ㗴ޔଐሽᕈޔή⍮ή㑐ᔃߪ߇ࠄࠇߎޔᣇಽᮭࠍⴕ߁ߢߩ㓚ኂߣߥߞߡ߹ ߔޕ ߽߁㧝ߟ↳ߒߍߚߩߪޔᔨ⊛ߥ㗴ߢߔޕ㖧࿖ߢߘ߁ߢߔߒ߽ߢࡦࡇࠖࡈޔ ࠆࠃ߁ߢߔ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߣ㓸ਛ㧔ಽᢔ㧕ߩᔨࠍᷙหߒߡ߹ߔޕᣇಽᮭߣ߁ߩߪਛ ᄩ߆ࠄᣇ߳ߩᮭ㒢ߩ⒖⼑ߢߔߦࠇߘޕኻߒߡ㓸ਛߣ߁ߩߪߊ߹ߢ߽ℂ⊛ߣ߁߆ ႐ᚲߩߎߣߢࠅޔᣇᐭߣ߆ਛᄩᐭߩ㗴ߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎ᧲ޕ੩ߣ߁ߣޔਛᄩ ᐭߩߎߣࠍᜰߔߣ⠨߃߇ߜߢߔ߇ޔਛᄩᐭߪ⏕߆ߦ᧲੩ߦࠅ߹ߔ᧲ޕ੩ㇺߣߞߚߣ ߈ߦߪޔᣇᐭߢࠆߣ߁ߎߣ߇߁߹ߊℂ⸃ߐࠇߡߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ㚂ㇺᯏ⢻ ߩ⒖ォߣࠄ߆ࠇߘޔਛᄩ㓸ᮭ߆ࠄᣇಽᮭ߳ߩ⒖ⴕߣ߁ߩߪ㆑߁ߣ߁ߎߣࠍℂ⸃ߔࠆ ᔅⷐ߇ࠅ߹ߔ┙ޕ႐ᚲߣᮭ㒢⒖⼑ߩ㗴ࠍಽߌߡ⠨߃ߥߣߌߥߩߢߔޕ ᣇಽᮭࠍㅢߒߡ⥄ޔᴦߦࠃࠅᄙߊߩᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖⼑ߒޔᣇᐭߪᔃℂ⊛ߥ㗴㧔ᗧ⼂ ߩ㗴㧕߿ᔨ⊛ߥ㗴ࠍਸ਼ࠅ߃ߥߣߌߥߢߔߩ⑳ޕ㖧࿖ߢߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄߩⷰኤߒ ߚߎߣߢߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚޕᣇಽᢔ㧔㓸ਛ㧕ߣᣇಽᮭߣߩ㆑ࠆޔ ߪਛᄩᐭࡌ࡞ޔᣇᐭࡌ࡞ߪࠆޔ᳃ࡌ࡞ߢߩᗧ⼂ߩ㗴ޔᣣᧄߩ⁁ᴫ ߣ߽ૃߚߣߎࠈ߇ࠆ⺖㗴ߩߏᜰ៰ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚޕ 137 ߘࠇߢߪࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ Brodjonegoro వ↢߆ࠄޔᣇಽᮭ߫ࠇ߈ߢޔ᳃ෳടߩㇱಽߦ ὶὐࠍᒰߡߡ⺖ޔ㗴╬ߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛߌࠇ߫ߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᦺߩ߅ࠍ⡞ߡ⑳߇ᗵߓߚߎߣߢߔ߇ޔᣣᧄߩ႐วߢߔߣޔᄢవ↢ߩ߅ߦࠅ ߹ߒߚࠃ߁ߦޔว૬߇ㅴࠎߢ߹ߔޕవ߶ߤ߅ߒࠅ߹ߒߚࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ⚂ 500 ߣ ߁㧔࠺ࠖࠬ࠻ࠢ࠻㧕ߩᢙߣᲧߴࠇ߫ޔᣣᧄߪ߹ߛᄙޕߦࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩੱญ߇ 㧞ంࠅޔ߇ 500 ߛߣߔࠆߣޔ㧝⥄ᴦᒰߚࠅߩੱญߪ 40 ਁࠍ߃ࠆᗵߓߦߥࠅ߹ߔ ߇߁߁ߘޔਛߢ᳃⥄ᴦߩⷰὐ߆ࠄ߅ߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔ⠨߃ߢߔ߆㧫 ٨Bambang P.S.Brodjonegoro ᳁㧦߹ߕᏒ᳃ෳടࠆߪరࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩෳടࠍଦߔ ߎߣ߆ࠄߒ߹ߔޕၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣᣇᐭߘߩ㚂㐳ߣߩ㑐ଥ߆ࠄߡ߆ߥ ߣߌߥߣᕁ߹ߔޔࠄ߆ࠇߘޕၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣరߩ⼏ળߣߩ㑐ଥߣ߁ߩ߽ ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߢߪዋߥߊߣ߽⋥ធㆬ߇ᣇᐭߢߥߐࠇߡ߹ߔߪࠇߎޕၞࠦࡒࡘ ࠾࠹ࠖߩෳടࠍଦㅴߔࠆߦߪࠃ᧦ઙߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄޔၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣᣇᐭߣߩ㑐ଥߢߔ߇ޟߪ࠼ࡢࠠޔᐭޠ ⦟ޟ ᐭߣߛޠᕁ߹ߔ⦟ޕᐭߩⷐ⚛ߣ߁ߩߪ⺑ޔ⽿છ㧔accountability㧕ߣㅘᕈ 㧔transparency㧕ߢߔޕ ߢߪᣇᐭߪ߇ߢ߈ࠆߩ߆߇ࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦߪࠆޔᣇᐭߦࠍⷐ⺧ߢ߈ࠆ ߩ߆ߣ߁ߣ⺑ߕ߹ޔ⽿છߣㅘᕈࠍᜂߔࠆߎߣߢߔ⺑ޕ⽿છߣ߁ߩߪޔᣇ ᐭ߇ⴕߥߞߡࠆ߽ߩߔߴߡߦߟߡ⺑ࠍⴕ߁ߎߣࠍᗧߒ߹ߔߪࠇߘޕᮭ⠪߇ᮭജ ࠍਈ߃ߡࠆߩߛ߆ࠄޔᮭ⠪ߦኻߔࠆ⽿છ߇ࠅ߹ߔࠄ߆ߛޕၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩ ᳃ߣኻߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠅ߹ߖࠎ⋥ޕធㆬࠍⴕߞߡࠆ႐วߦߪޔᏒ᳃ෳടߪᔅ㗇᧦ઙߣ ߥࠅ߹ߔޕ ⥄ᴦࡌ࡞ߢߩ⺑⽿છࠍ᳞ࠆ႐วߦߪ⋥ޔធߩ⺖⒢ߦⵣઃߌࠄࠇߡࠆߎߣ߇ᅢ ߹ߒߢߒࠂ߁ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޕ႐วޔᣇߩ⋥ធㆬ߇ࠆߩߦޔ⒢㊄ߪ⥄ᴦߦኻߒ ߡ⚊⒢ࠍߒߡࠆ⸶ߢߪߥߩߢޔၞ߇ᴦኅߦᢥฏ߿ⷐᦸࠍ⸒ߦߊ⚵ߺߦߥߞߡ ߹ߔޕ࿕ቯ⾗↥⒢ࠍߦߣࠆߣߩߎޔ⒢㊄ߪ࿖ߦ⚊ߡࠆߩߢࠅ⥄ޔᴦߢߪࠅ ߹ߖࠎࠄ߆ߛޕၞߩᏒ᳃߇ਇḩࠍ⸒߁ߣޔၞߩᴦኅߪߦࠇࠊࠇࠊޟኻߒߡ⚊⒢ߒߡ ࠆߩߢߥߩߢޔਛᄩߩᴦኅߦ⸒ߞߡߊࠇ⚵ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕߔ߹ࠅߥߦߣߎ߁ߣޠ ߺࠍᡷༀߒޔၞߦ߅ߌࠆ⺑⽿છ߇᳞ࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߔߴ߈ߢߔޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄㅘᕈߪޔ㗅⺞ߦㅴࠎߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔ⒁ߪߩ߁ߣ▚੍ޕኒⵣߦ߹ࠆߎߣ ߪߥߊ✬▚੍ޔᚑߩㆊ⒟߇ᆎ߹ࠆᐲߦޔၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߪዋߥߊߣ߽ᣇะᕈࠍቯࠆ ߎߣߦߪ߆߆ࠊࠅ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕታ㓙ߦ⼏ળߣᣇᐭ㧔ⴕߩߎߣ㧕ߩᷤ߇ᆎ߹ࠆߣޔ ၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩᓎഀߪᶖ߃ߡߒ߹߹ߔޔࠄ߆ߛޕᣇᐭߣၞࠦ࠾ࡘ࠾࠹ࠖ ߩ㑐ଥߩᡷༀࠍߒߞ߆ࠅ⠨߃ࠆߴ߈ߢߔޕ ၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߣ⼏ળߢߔ߇⼏ޔળߪࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩᗧะࠍઍߔߴ߈ߢߔߎޕ ߩߎߣߪ㑆㆑ߩߥߎߣߢߔߩࠇࠊࠇࠊޔߒ߆ߒޕ࿖ߩࠪࠬ࠹ࡓߪᔅߕߒ߽ߘ߁ߪߥߞ 138 ߡ߹ߖࠎ⼏ޕળࡔࡦࡃߩᄙߊߪޔᏒ᳃ߩᗧะߦᴪߞߡ⋥ធㆬߐࠇߡࠆࠊߌߢߪߥ ߩߢߔޕၞߩᮭ⠪ߪᅢ߈ߥੱߦᛩߢ߈߹ߔ߇⼏ޔળߩ✬ᚑߦߥࠅ߹ߔߣޔౄౝ ߩࡦࠠࡦࠣߦࠃࠅᏀฝߐࠇ߹ߔޕᴦኅ߇චಽߥࠍ㓸ࠄࠇߥ႐วߪ⼏ޔᏨࠍ₪ᓧ ߢ߈ߥߎߣߦߥࠅ⼏ߩੱߩߘޔᏨߪౄ߇␜ߒߚੱߦࠃߞߡၒࠄࠇࠆߣ߁ߎߣߦߥ ࠅ߹ߔࠄ߆ߛޕᔅߕߒ߽ၞߩᛩࠍቢోߦઍߒߡࠆࠊߌߢߪߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ၞࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߪࠅࠃޔᒝജߦ⼏ળߦ߈߆ߌࠍߒߡ⥄ޔಽߚߜߩᗧะ߇ᤋߐࠇࠆ ࠃ߁ߦߔߴ߈ߢߔޕ ৻⥸⊛ߦ⸒ߞߡޔߪࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔ㘈ቴߩᮭ㒢ߣ߁ߩߪᒙߣ߁ߎߣ߇⸒߃߹ߔߩ ߢࠅߪ߿ޔ㘈ቴߩᮭ㒢ࠍ߆ߦᒝൻߔࠆ߆߇߭ߣߟߩ⺖㗴ߢߔ߁⸒ߢߎߎޕ㘈ቴߪޔ ࠨࡆࠬࠍฃߌߡࠆᏒ᳃ߩߎߣߢߔޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄޔදജߣ߆⥄ᴦߩว૬ߦߟߡ↳ߒߍ߹ߔޕᣣߩઁߩႎ๔⠪ߩࠍ⡞ ߚࠅߒߡޔዋߥߊߣ߽ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩ႐วߪߘ߁ߢߔ߇ޔᴦ⊛ߥ⢛᥊߆ࠄ⍴ᦼ⊛ߦߪ⥄ ᴦߩว૬ߪ㕖Ᏹߦࠦࠬ࠻߇߆߆ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ࿖᳃ߩဋ⾰ᕈߣ߁ߎߣߢޔᣣᧄߩ႐ว ߣߪዋߒ㆑߁ߣᕁ߹ߔߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޕ႐วߪߥࠈࠈޔ᳃ᣖ߿ቬᢎ߇ᷙߒߡࠆ ࿖᳃ᕈ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄᣇᐭ߳ߩࠗࡦࡦ࠹ࠖࡉߥߤᣇ⥄ᴦߩว૬ࠍㅴ ࠆߚߦᔅⷐߥࠦࠬ࠻ࠍޔᣣᧄߩࠤࠬ߆ࠄቇ߱ߴ߈ߢߔޕว૬ߩࠦࠬ࠻ߪᄢ߈ߊ⥄ޔ ᴦ㑆ߩදജ߇ࠃࠅታ⊛ߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔ߇ߩઁޔ࿖ߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄቇ߮⻉ࠕࠫࠕ᧲ߦ․ޔ ࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆࡌࠬ࠻ࡊࠢ࠹ࠖࠬࠍ⚻ߩߘߢ⊝ޔ㛎ࠍߔࠆߎߣ߇ᄢಾߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᰴߦ 40 ਁੱ߇߭ߣߟߩ㧔࠺ࠖࠬ࠻ࠢ࠻㧕ᒰߚࠅߩੱญߣ߁ߦߟߡߢߔ߇ޔ ⚂ 40 ਁߣߪࠅߥ߆ޔᄢ߈ߥੱญߢޔᐔဋߢߘߩੱญߦߥߞߡࠇ߫ޔߨߢ߽ߢ߈ࠆߩ ߢߪߥ߆ߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕታ㗴ߣߒߡߪࡢࡖࠫޔፉߣߘࠇ߆ࠄࠫࡖࡢፉએᄖࠍߣߞ ߡ߽ᄢ߈ߥᩰᏅ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ ߚߣ߃߫ᦨߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔᄢߩੱญࠍᜬߟߩߪࡃࡦ࠼ࡦߢߔࡦ࠼ࡦࡃޕߩ႐ วߪޔᄢ 500 ਁੱߋࠄߩੱญߢߔߩߟߣ߭ޕߢ 500 ਁੱߩੱญࠍᛴ߃ߡ߹ߔޕ ᦨዊੱญߢ߹ߔߣࠆߩࠕࡊࡄޔߪ߅ߘࠄߊ㧝ਁੱࠍಾߞߡࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ㧝ਁ ੱߩߣ 500 ਁੱߩ߇หߓࡌ࡞ߢߔࠄ߆ߛޕᣂߒᣇ⥄ᴦߩᒻᚑࠍ㒖 ߩߪߩߎޔℂ↱߽ࠅ߹ߔޕᣂߒ⥄ᴦߪߢ࡞࠲࠻ޔࠇ߹↢ߢࠕࡊࡄ߇ߤࠎߣ߶ޔ ߹ߔߣ 200 ਁੱߒ߆✚ੱญ߇߹ߖࠎ߆ࠄޔ㧝ߟߩᎺ㧔ࡄࡊࠕ㧕ߪࡢࡖࠫޔፉߩ㧝ߟߩ ࠃࠅ߽ዊߐߣ߁ߎߣߢߔࠎߐߊߚޕ߇↢߹ࠇࠆߣ߁ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔߣޔ㧝ਁ ੱߩ߇ߚߊߐࠎ⺀↢ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔੱޔࠄ߆ߛޕญߩಽᏓ߇ဋ৻ߢߥߣޔℂᗐ ⊛ߥᢙࠍߪߓ߈ߔߩߪ㔍ߒߢߔޕᣣᧄߩ႐วߪ᧲ࠎࠈߜ߽ޔ੩ߩੱญኒᐲߪᴒ✽߿ർ ᶏࠃࠅ߽㜞ߩߪࠊ߆ߞߡ߹ߔ߇ߤ߶ࠬࠤߚߒ߇⑳ޔᭂ┵ߢߪߥߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߦ⥝߽ߡߣߦࠬࠤߩࠗ࠲ޔࠍᜬߜ߹ߒߚߩࠗ࠲ޕవ↢ߩߢߪޔਛᄩᐭߣࡃ ࡦࠦࠢߩᮭਈౄ߇㆑߁ߣ߁ߎߣߢߒߚ߽ࠬࠤߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޕᒰߡߪ߹ࠆ߆ߤ߁߆ ߪࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔ႐วߪ⼏ળߣᄢ⛔㗔߇ᷙߒߡ߹ߔߩߢޔ㕖Ᏹ ߦ✭ㅪ┙ࠍ⚵ࠎߢ߹ߔޔߢߩߔߢޕਛᄩᐭࡌ࡞ߩㅪ┙ߪޔᣇᐭࡌ࡞ߩㅪ┙ 139 ߣߪ㆑߹ߔޕ㕙⊕ߎߣߦޔਛᄩᐭࡌ࡞ߢߪ㕖Ᏹߦᄢ߈ߥࠗࠬࡓᢎౄߪࠠࠬ ࠻ᢎౄߣߪㅪ┙ᮭߪ⚵ߺ߹ߖࠎߩઁߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔߒ߆ߒޕၞߢߪ߁߹ߊㅪ┙ࠍ ⚵ࠎߢޔㆬߦൎߞߚߣ߁߇ࠅ߹ߒߚޕ ਛᄩߣᣇߩኻ┙ࠍ㒐߉ᓧࠆᣇ╷ߣߒߡߪޔ㕖Ᏹߦ✭߿߆ߥᨵエߥㅪ┙ࠍ⚵ߣ߁ߎ ߣ߇߭ߣߟߩ⸃ߦߥࠆߩ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖࠎޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߦߪੱޔญߩᐔဋ߇㧠㧜ਁੱߣߞߡ߽ޔ㕖Ᏹߦዊߐߥ⥄ ᴦ߹ߢߘߩⷙᮨߦᄢ߈ߥᩰᏅ߇ࠆߎߣ߇ࠃߊࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߒߚޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޕ ߎࠇ߹ߢࡄࡀࠬ࠻ߩ⊝ߐࠎ߆ࠄߪಽᮭൻߦ߁㗴ὐߪࠆޔ᳃ෳടߦ߅ߌࠆ⺖ 㗴ߦߟߡߒߡߚߛ߈߹ߒߚߪࠄ߆ࠇߎޕዋߒ⼏⺰ࠍㅴ߹ߒߡޔᓟߩಽᮭൻߦ߅ ߌࠆ᳃⥄ᴦߩలߩㅢߒߪࠆޔ᳃⥄ᴦࠍలታߒߡߊߚߦߪߤ߁ߒߚࠄ ߩ߆ߚߞߣޔὐߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛߌࠇ߫ߣᕁ߹ߔ ߩࠗ࠲ޕWoothisarn వ↢߆ࠄࠃ ࠈߒߊ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Tanchai Woothisarn ᳁㧦 ᓟߩㅢߒߢߔ߇ߩࠗ࠲ߕ߹ޔ႐วޔᣂߒᙗᴺߩ߽ߣߢޔ ዋߥߊߣ߽㧠ߟߩᴺᓞࠍᣉⴕߒߥߌࠇ߫ߌ߹ߖࠎޕ㧝ߟ߇ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺߩᡷᱜߢߔࠇߎޕ ߪ࠲ࠗߩᣇ⥄ᴦߩᐲࠍᡷ㕟ߔࠆߩߦ⦟ᯏળߛߣᕁ߹ߔߩߘޕᡷ㕟ࠍߔࠆߚߦߪޔ ᣇ⥄ᴦߩ࠳㧔㚂㐳ᴦኅ㧕߳ߩᓇ㗀ࠍ⠨߃ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠅ߹ߖࠎޔߚ߹ޕᡷ㕟 ߦࠃࠅ⥄ᴦߦኻߒߡ⚻ᷣ⊛ߦߪᣂߒࠕࠗ࠺ࠕࠍᝌߢ߈ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 㧞ߟ⋡ߪޔᙗᴺߦၮߠߡᣇಽᮭᴺࠍᡷᱜߒߥߌࠇ߫ߌ߹ߖࠎߪࠇߎޕᣇᐭ߳ ߩⷙࠍ✭ߒߡࠍ┙⥄ߣߞ߽ޔଦߔߣ߁⋡⊛ߢⴕ߹ߔޕᲑ㓏⊛ߦฦᣇᐭ߇⥄┙ ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦㅴࠆߴ߈ߢߒࠂ߁ޕ 㧟ߟ⋡ߪޔᣇߩੱⴕߦ㑐ߔࠆᡷᱜࠍⴕߥ߹ߔޕᣇᐭࠍ߽ߞߣല₸ࠃߊߔࠆ ߚߢߔޕᣇᐭߢߡࠆੱߚߜ߇ਛᄩᐭߢߡࠆੱߚߜߣหߓ⢻ജࠍᜬߡ ࠆࠃ߁ߦߢ߈ࠇ߫ޔᣇᐭߦߣߞߡߪߎߣߥߩߢࠍࠇߎޔᡷᱜߒ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߩὐߪޔ ޟᣇ⽷ߦޠ㑐ߔࠆᣂߒᴺᓞࠍቯߔࠆߎߣߢߔߡߞࠃߦࠇߎޕ⒢ᐲޔ ਛᄩᐭߣᣇᐭߣߩ㑆ߢߩ⽷Ḯߩಽᜂࠍᡷᱜߒ߹ߔ⾗ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ㊄ࠍᔅⷐߣߒߡࠆ ᣇߩੱߚߜⷐߩߘޔ᳞ߦᔕ߃ࠆߚߢࠅ߹ߔޕవ߶ߤ⸒߹ߒߚࠃ߁ߦޔᣇߩ ߩ 9㧑߇ᣇ⒢߆ࠄߢޔ90㧑ߋࠄ߇ਛᄩᐭ߆ࠄߩഥ㊄ߥߤߢߔߪࠇߎޕ⒢ߩਛᄩᐭ ߣᣇᐭߩ㑆ߩ㈩ಽᐲ߇ߘߩࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡࠆ߆ࠄߢߔޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄᏒ᳃ෳടߢߔ߇ࠍߺ⚵ߩߘޔᣇ⥄ᴦᴺߦ⋓ࠅㄟߺ߹ߔޕએ೨ߣߪ㆑ޔᏒ ᳃ෳടߩᣂߒ⚵ߺࠍᄙߊᣇ⥄ᴦᴺߩਛߦࠇ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߦ↳ߒߍߚߩߪߩࠗ࠲ޔ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߣᣇಽᮭߩᓟߩㅢߒߢߔߪߜߚ⑳ޕ ᴦ⊛ߥᗧᕁޔᴦߩᗧᕁ㧔commitment㧕ߦਇㅘᕈ߇ࠆਛ߽ࠄ߆ࠇߎޔ࿎㔍ߦ┙ߜะ߆ ߁ߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕవ߶ߤࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߩឭ᩺ߢࠁࠆ߿߆ߥㅪ┙ߣ߁߇ࠅ߹ߒߚ߇ޔ ࠲ࠗᐭ߇ߘࠇࠍฃߌࠇࠆ߆ߤ߁߆ߪࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ೨ߩ㚂⋧ߪޔᒝᮭ㒢ࠍᜬߞߚ㚂 㐳߇⦟ߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ߒߚߩߢޔCEO ⍮ᐲࠍណ↪ߒ߹ߒߚޕCEO ⍮߽ GRIPS ߢ⎇ ୃࠍฃߌߚ⚻㛎߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ 140 ⥄ᴦߪޔᴦ⊛ߥᗧᕁ㧔commitment㧕ߢߪߥߊޔᙗᴺߩ㓚߇ࠆߩߢᣇಽᮭࠍ⛮ ⛯ߢ߈߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕᣇಽᮭߩᗧ⟵ࠍ⏕ାߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕవ߶ߤ߽⸒߹ߒߚࠃ ߁ߦޔᣇಽᮭߪࠆ⒳ߩቇ⠌ߩࡊࡠࠬߢࠅޔ᳃ਥਥ⟵ߩߚߩᛩ⾗ߩࠃ߁ߥ߽ߩߢ ߔߩ⨲ޔߡߒߘޕᩮߩࡌ࡞ߢߘࠇࠍℂ⸃ߒޔജࠍᜬߚߥߣޔ᳃ਥਥ⟵㧔⊒ዷ㧕ߩ߇ ߢ߈߹ߖࠎߩ࡞ࡌޕዊߐߥන㧔unit㧕߇᳃ਥਥ⟵㧔⊒ዷ㧕߳ߩ╵߃ߢߔޕ ᓟߩ࠲ࠗߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃ਥਥ⟵ࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣޔౄ⼏ޔળޔ⚵❱ߢߪߥߊߩ⨲ޔᩮࡌ ࡞߇ᴦෳടߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦޔᓐࠄߩߘߩᜬߡࠆജࠍᒝ⺞ߔߴ߈ߢࠅ߹ߔޕએ೨ߦ↳ߒ ߍߚࠃ߁ߦޔᴦኅߪᏒ᳃ߦ⋙ⷞߐࠇߡߥߣⴕ⦟ޔേߪߣࠇߥߩߢߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦Woothisarn వ↢ߩࠗ࠲ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޔᣇಽᮭߩㅢߒߣ ᣇಽᮭߩ⨲ޔᩮࡌ࡞ߢߩ⥄ᴦߪޔ᳃ਥਥ⟵߳ߩᛩ⾗ߢࠆߣߞߚ߅ࠍߚߛ߈߹ ߒߚߪߢࠇߘޕ㊄వ↢ߦ߽หߓߎߣ㧔ᓟߩಽᮭൻߦ߅ߌࠆ᳃⥄ᴦߩలߩㅢߒߥߤ㧕 ߦߟߡ߅ࠍ⸒⊒ޔ㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨㊄ ⋉ᬀ ᳁㧦ߎߎߢߪᏒ᳃ࠍ㘈ቴߣߒߡࠆߣ߁ࠦࡦࡊ࠻ߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߣ ᕁ߹ߔޕᐭߣ߁ߩߪ⊖⽻ᐫߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎߒޔᏒ᳃ߪ⊖⽻ᐫߦຠࠍ⾈ߦⴕߊ߅ ቴߐ߹ߢߪߥߩߢߔߪ⑳ޕᏒ᳃ࠍ㘈ቴߣߒߡ⟎ߠߌࠆߣ߁ᣇ߇߹ࠅᅢ߈ߢߪ ࠅ߹ߖࠎޕᏒ᳃ࠍ㘈ቴߣߒߡᝒ߃ࠆᔅⷐߪߥߣᕁ߹ߔࡊ࠶ࠪࡦ࠭ࠖ࠹ࠪࠈߒޕ 㧔citizenship㧕ࠍᜬߞߚᏒ᳃߇ᔅⷐߢࠅޔߣ߁⸒ߣ߆ߣߎ߁߁ߤߪࠇߘޔᕈߦኻ ߔࠆᗧ⼂ࠍᜬߜޔᏒ᳃ߦߣߞߡߩࠍ⠨߃ࠄࠇࠆੱߢߔࠅ߹ߟޕᐭߣᏒ᳃ߩ߿ࠅߣࠅ ߪຠߩᄁ⾈ߢߪߥ⠨߃ᣇߢߔޕ ᓟߩᣇಽᮭߣ߁ߎߣߢߪߩߤޔ࿖ߢ߽ࠈࠈߥ㓚ኂࠍਸ਼ࠅ߃ߡ߆ߥߊߡߪ ߥࠄߥ߇ޔਛᄩᐭ߇ߎߩ࠻ࡦ࠼ࠍᱛࠆߎߣߪߢ߈ߥߣᕁ߹ߔࠍࠇߎޕ㒖ᱛߒޔ ᱛࠆߣ߁ߎߣߪߢ߈߹ߖࠎޔ߫ࠄߥߗߥޕ21 ♿ߦ߅ߌࠆ࿖ߩ࿖㓙┹ജࠍࠆⷐ ⚛ߪ࿖ߩ⛔৻ᕈ㧔uniformity㧕ߢߪߥߊߡޔᄙ᭽ᕈ㧔diversity㧕߿ഃㅧജ㧔creativity㧕ߢ ߔޕਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥ⛔ᴦߪޔᄙ᭽ᕈ߿ഃㅧജࠍ⢒ߡࠆᅹߍߦߥࠅ߹ߔޕਛᄩᐭ߇ᣇ⥄ᴦ ߢ߇߈ߡࠆ߆ࠍ߈ߜࠎߣࠊ߆ࠆߪߕ߇ߥߩߢߔޕฦ࿖߇࿖㓙ൻᖱႎൻߩᤨઍ ߦ┹ࠍൎߜᛮ߈⊒ዷߔࠆߦߪߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ࿖߇ᄙ᭽ᕈࠍᜬߜޔᣇ⥄ᴦ߇㊀ⷐߢࠆߣ ߁ߎߣߦߥࠆߢߒࠂ߁ޕਛᄩᐭ߇ߔߴߡࠍⴕߥ߁ߎߣߪࠅ߃ߥߎߣߢߔޕ㊀ⷐߦ ߥߞߡߊࠆଔ୯ⷰߪޟᄙ᭽ᕈޟ߿ޠᣇ⥄ᴦޔߢޠ ৻⛔ޟᕈޟ߿ޠਛᄩᐭߖ߹ࠅߪߢޠ ࠎޕ ࿖㓙ൻߩᤨઍߦߪᐢⷞ㊁ߢⷰኤߒࠍࠬࡦࡃޔൊ᩺ߒၞߣߩ❬߇ࠅࠍ⠨߃ࠆߎߣ߇ ᳞ࠄࠇߡ߹ߔޕ ޠࡦ࡚ࠪࠗࠞࡠࠣޟ 㧔glocalization㧕ߣ߁ㅧ⺆߽ߢ߈ߡ߹ߔޕ ߘࠇߪ㕖Ᏹߦฬߥࠠࡖ࠶࠴ࡈ࠭ߢޟ⊛ⷞ㊁ߢ⠨߃ၞߢᵴേߖࠃ”ޠthink globally and act locally”ߣ߁ߎߣߢߔ࡞ࡃࡠࠣߩࠄ߆ࠇߎޕൻᤨઍߦߪޔਛᄩᐭߪઁ ߩ࿖ߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄቇ߱ߴ߈ߢߒࠂ߁ޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦㊄వ↢ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅ߽߁ߤޔ ޟ㘈ቴ⸒߁ߣޠᣇߦኻߒߡ ዋߒᛕ್⊛ߥߏᗧࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚᦨޕㄭޔᣣᧄߢ߽㘈ቴਥ⟵ޔ㘈ቴᔒะߣ߁ߎߣ߇ 141 ࠃߊ⸒ࠊࠇࠆ߹ߔ߇⚻ޔᷣቇ⠪ߩ┙႐߽〯߹߃߹ߒߡ ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔBrodjonegoro వ↢ ߆ࠄ⺰ߩߎޔὐ߽ߡߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔᣇಽᮭߩᓟߩㅢߒߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛ ߌߚࠄߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Bambang P.S. Brodjonegoro ᳁㧦ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߦ߅ߌࠆᓟߩᣇಽᮭߩㅢߒߪ⚻ޔ ᷣಽ㊁ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭ߇ᚑഞⵣߦㅴ߆ߦ߆߆ߞߡࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޔߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޕ ᣇߦ߅ߌࠆ⋥ធㆬᐲߩዉߢᴦ⊛ߥಽᮭൻࠍታߒޔᣇ⥄ᴦߦᮭ㒢ࠍ⒖⼑ߒ ߡⴕ⊛ߥಽᮭൻ߇ㅴߺߡߒߘޔᣇ⥄ᴦߦ⽷Ḯࠍ⒖⼑ߒ⽷⊛ߥಽᮭൻࠍⴕ߹ߒߚޕ ߎߩ㧟ߟߩᲑ㓏ࠍ⚻ߡޔᰴߪ⚻ᷣ⊛ߥಽᮭൻߛߣᕁ߹ߔ⚻ߛߚޕᷣ⊛ߥಽᮭൻߦవ┙ ߞߡޔၞౝߣၞ㑆ߩ┹߇㊀ⷐߦߥߞߡߊࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ┹ߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔ ߣ߁ⷰᔨ߇⥄ᴦ㑆ߦߪߥߢߔ✬▚੍ޕᚑ߇⚳ࠊࠇ߫߁ࠃߚߞߊ߹߁߇ߡߴߔޔ ߥ⠨߃ᣇߢߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ㊄వ↢߇వ߶ߤ߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚࠃ߁ߦޔ⊛ⷞ㊁ߢ⠨߃ࠆߎߣߢ ߔ߇ޔ࿖ౝߩၞ㑆ߩ┹߇ߥࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߦ߅ߡࠣࡠࡃ࡞ൻᤨઍߢᚢߞߡߊߔ ߴ߇ߥߩߢߔߪߕ߹ޔࠄ߆ߛޕ࿖ౝߩၞ㑆ߢ┹ߖߑࠆࠍᓧߥߣ߁ߎߣߢߔߎޕ ࠇߪၞ㑆ߩදജߣᷙหߒߡߪߌߥߢߔߩߎޕ㧞ߟߩᔨߪߣ߈ߦߪหᤨߦߎࠅ߁ ࠆߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔߩߘޕㅧ⺆ߢޟදജ⊛┹ޠ 㧔coopetition㧕ߣ߹ߔ߇ߪࠇߎޔਔ┙ߔ ࠆߎߣ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ ߭ߣߟߩࠍߍ߹ߔ߇ߣࡦ࠻ࠬࡏޕߔߢࡦ࠻ࠬࡏߩࠞࡔࠕߊߥߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔ ߘߩㄭធߔࠆᏒ↸ߪ⒢߇߶ߒߩߢޔ⒢₸ߢ᳃⺃⥌ࠍ┹ߒ߹ߔ৻ߩߘޕᣇߢࡏࠬ ࠻ࡦߣߘߩㄝߩ⥄ᴦ߇৻✜ߦߥࠅߩߟߣ߭ޔㇺᏒࠍᒻᚑߒޔߩㇺᏒ߫߃ߣߚޔ ࠕࡔࠞߩ࠾ࡘ࡛ࠢߣߤߥࡦ࠻ࠬࡘࡅޔࠬ࡞ࡦࠨࡠޔ㑵߹ߔ৻ߪߦ߈ߣࠆޕ ✜ߦߥࠅߚ߹ޔߩߣ߈ߦߪ┹ߒ߇ࠇߘޔਔ┙ߔࠆࠊߌߢߔࠅ߿ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕᣇ߇น⢻ ߢࠆߩߢޔᣇಽᮭࠍ⠨߃ࠆߢ ╙ߩߘޔ1 ᱠߦߥࠅ߁ࠆߩߢߔޕ ⚻ᷣߩಽᮭൻ߇ߥߗᔅⷐߢߒࠂ߁߆⚻ޕᷣ߇ಽᢔൻߐࠇ߹ߔߣޔᛩ⾗ኅߦߣߞߡᛩ⾗Ⅳ Ⴚ߇ࠃߊߥࠅޔᣇߩਛ↥㓏⚖ߣ߁ߩ߇↢߹ࠇߡ߈߹ߔߩߤޕవㅴ࿖ߢ߽ޔᒝਛ↥㓏 ⚖ߪᔅⷐߢߔޕਛ↥㓏⚖ߩੱญ߇ᄙߊ␠ޔળߩਛߢജࠍᜬߞߡࠆߣޔᏒ᳃ෳടߣ߆ࠦࡒ ࡘ࠾࠹ࠖߩ㗴ߪࠃߊߥࠅ߹ߔޔߪߩ߁ߣޕਛ↥㓏⚖ߩੱߚߜ߇ⴕޔ߿⼏ળࠍ߈ߜ ࠎߣ⋙ⷞߔࠆ߆ࠄߢߔޕ ߎ߁ߞߚਛ↥㓏⚖ߣ߁ߩߪ⁛┙ߒߚጀߢߔޔߢߩࠆߡߒ┙⁛ޕᓐࠄߪ߁߽ޟᐭ ߪⷐࠅ߹ߖࠎޔߒߔ߹߃⸒ࠍߣߎ߁ߣޠᐭߪਇᔅⷐߣߐࠇߡࠆߣᕁ߹ߔߣߪ߿ޔ ࠅᝄࠆ⥰ࠍᄌ߃ࠆ߽ߩߢߔޕਛ↥㓏⚖ߩጀࠍߟߊࠆߚߦߪ⚻ޔᷣߩಽᮭൻߪߣߡ߽㊀ ⷐߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߦޔㄭ᧪ޔಽᮭൻߦࠃߞߡ⥄ᴦ⡯ຬߩ⢻ജࠍߍߡޔല₸ࠕ࠶ࡊࠍᨐߚߔߴ ߈ߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔ⥄ޕᴦߦߪ⡯ຬߩᢙ߇ᄙߔ߉ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔⴕߚ߹ޕ⚵❱ߩല₸ൻ ߽࿑ࠆߴ߈ߢߒࠂ߁߇❱⚵ޕᄢ߈ߊߥࠅߔ߉ߡߡޔᯏ⢻ߒߡߥߣᕁ߹ߔࠕࠫࠕޕ ߩ⥄ᴦߪ⚵❱ࠍࠬࡓൻߒޔ⡯ຬߩᢙࠍᷫࠄߔߴ߈ߢߔޕ ࠫࡖࠞ࡞࠲ߩࠍ⚫ߒ߹ߔߣߪ࠲࡞ࠞࡖࠫޔ㚂ㇺߢ᧲ޔ੩ߦࠢࠦࡦࡃޔ࡞࠙࠰ޔ 142 ᢜߒ߹ߔߦߛ߹ޔߪߢ࠲࡞ࠞࡖࠫޕ㋶ᬺᐡߦኻߒߡ੍▚㈩ಽ߇ߥߐࠇߡ߹ߔࠞࡖࠫޕ ࡞࠲Ꮢౝߦߪ߽߁㋶ᬺߪߥߩߢߔ߇ޔ߆㗴߇߈ߚߣ߈ߩߚߦᜂᒰߔࠆㇱዪ߇ ߞߡ੍▚߇㈩ಽߐࠇߡ߹ߔ߇▚੍ߦߣߎߥ߁ࠃߩߎߡߒ߁ߤޕ㈩ಽߐࠇߡࠆ߆ߣ⇼ ߦᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ߎࠇ߹ߢߩฦ࿖ߩࡄࡀࠬ࠻߆ࠄߩࠈࠈߥᗧ߽〯߹߃ߡޔᣣᧄߩ ᓟߩಽᮭߩࠅᣇߪࠆޔ᳃⥄ᴦߩలታߩࠅᣇߦߟߡޔᄢవ↢߆ࠄ߅ߒ ߚߛߌߚࠄߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨ᄢ ᒫ ᳁㧦߁߹ߊ߹ߣࠄࠇࠆ߆ߤ߁߆ࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇ߏޔሽߓ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖࠎ߇ޔ ዊᴰߐࠎ߇ 6 ᐕㄭߊ✚ℂᄢ⤿ࠍ߿ࠅ߹ߒߡޔᡷ㕟ߦᰴߋᡷ㕟ࠍ߿ߞߚߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ߹ߔޕ ߘߩᓟޔߐࠎ߇✚ℂᄢ⤿ߦߥߞߡޔㆬߢᢌࠇ߹ߒߡ✚߇ࠎߐ↰߹ޔℂࠍߒߡ ߹ߔ߇ߐࠊ߁߁ߣ߆ߥߪߢߩࠆ߿߁߽ߪࠎߐ↰ޕᵹࠇߡ߹ߔޕ ᣣߪࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߣ⸒ߞߡ߹ߔ߇ޔᣣᧄߩਛᄩᐭߩࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߇⋧ᒰഠ ൻߒߡ߹ߔߩߘޔߒߛߚޕᒁ߈วߢ߆߁ߤ߆ߤ߶ࠇߘ߇ࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ࡞ࠞࡠޔ ߦߟߡߩ⹏ଔߪ⥄ା߇ߥߢߔ߇ߣߎߩߘޕᣣᧄߩಽᮭᡷ㕟߇ߥ߆ߥ߆೨ߦㅴ߹ߥ߭ ߣߟߩ⢛᥊ߢߔޕ ႐ߪߘࠇ߶ߤߦᦸࠎߢ߹ߖࠎߒޔਛᄩ⋭ᐡߪ⺕߽ಽᮭߪ߿ࠅߚߊࠅ߹ߖࠎ߁ߘޕ ߔࠆߣᱷߞߡࠆߩߪ⛔ޔᴦ⢻ജࠍዋߒᄬ߆ߌߡࠆౝ㑑߇߿ࠇࠆ߆ߤ߁߆ߢߔ╙ޕ㧞 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣ߫ࠇߡ߹ߔ߇ޔㅢߒߪ┙ߚߥߩߢߪߥߢߒࠂ߁߆ޕ వ߶ߤ⼏⺰߇ࠅ߹ߒߚࠃ߁ߦᄢቇߩవ↢ߪ৻⥸⊛ߦࡑࠗࡁ࠹ࠖߢߔ߇ޔಽᮭ⾥ห ᵷ߇ᄙߢߔޔࠅ߹ߟޕ㑆ߩߎߣ߇ࠃߊࠊ߆ࠄߥߩߢ ↢৻ޔಽᮭᡷ㕟ࠍ⸒ߞߡ ࠆߩߢߔ߇ޔᣣᧄߦ߅ߌࠆಽᮭᡷ㕟߇ߎࠇએㅴ߆ߤ߁߆ࠅ߹ࠎߪ⑳ޔᭉⷰ⊛ߢߪ ࠅ߹ߖࠎޕ ߚߛߒޔᣣߣߡ߽ශ⽎⊛ߢߞߚߩߪޔ1980 ᐕઍޔ90 ᐕએ㒠ޔฦ࿖ߢಽᮭᡷ㕟߇ㅴߺ ߹ߒߚߪࠇߎޕ⇇⊛ߥầᵹߛߣߡߢߔޕฦ࿖ߏߣߦ߆ࠊ߆ߊⴕߢ߹ࠄߋߩߤޔ ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇ޔಽᮭߩᄢ߈ߥᵹࠇߪุቯߢ߈ߥߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ߽߁߭ߣߟޔᓟߩㅢߒߦߟߡ⸒߁ߣ߇߽ߤ⑳ޔታ㓙ߦᣇ⥄ᴦߩീᒝߢޔ႐ߩ ᳃ߩㄭߊߦⴕߞߡ⇟৻ߣߔߣੱߥࠎࠈޔ಄ߚᣇߣ߁ߩߪޔߪࠬࡆࠨޟޔ ࿖߇߿ࠈ߁߇ޔㇺᐭ⋵߇߿ࠈ߁߇ޔᏒ↸߇߿ࠈ߁߇߿߇⺕߫ࠇࠇߊߡߞ߿ߣࠎߜ߈ޔ ߞߡߊࠇߡ߽߁߁ߘޔ߁ߣޠჿ߇ᗧᄖߣᒝߩߢߔޕ ߢ߽৻ߪ⑳ޔᔕޔᣇ⥄ᴦ⺰⠪ߢߔ߆ࠄᧄޕߔ߹⸒ߣߥߪߣߎߥࠎߘޔᒰߦၞߦ ᔅⷐߥ࠾࠭ߪᧄ߇ߜߚੱࠆߡ߈↢ߢߎߘޔᒰߦࠊ߆ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ㆙ਛᄩᐭߩੱ ߚߜ߇ࠊ߆ࠆߪߕߪߥᧄޕᒰߦ⥄ಽߚߜߩᔅⷐߥ࠾࠭ߦߟߡߦࠇߘޔᔕ߃ࠆߚߦ ߪ⾗ߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔḮࠍ߃߫߆⇟৻ޕല₸ࠃߊ⾗Ḯࠍ߃ࠆߣ߁නࠍ᳞ࠆߣޔ ߿ߪࠅߘࠇߪりㄭߥᐭߢߪߥ߆ߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕ႐ߦⴕߊߣએᄖߣ߈ߟ ᛕ್߇߹ߔޕ ޟᄢᄢቇߩవ↢ߥࠎߡޔߡߊߥࠄ߆ࠊ߇ߩ߽ޔℂᔨ⊛ߥߎߣ߫߆ࠅ⸒߁ߩ ߢߪߥߢߔ߆ࠅߪ߿߽ߢࠇߘޕߔ߹ߡࠇࠊ⸒ߣޠᣇಽᮭߪᄢߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 143 ࠈࠎߥ⹜ߺࠍߡ߹ߔߣޔၞߢ᳃ߩੱߚߜ߇ߣޠߥߪࠇߎޟᕁ߁ߩߪޔ ⥄ᴦߣ߆⺕߆߇ߤߎ߆ߢߚߎߣࠍޔᏒ᳃߇ᚻ⿷ߦߥߞߡ߿ࠆߣ߁႐วߢߪߥߩ ߢߔޔ߽ߢߣߎߥ߆߿ߐߐޕ᳃ߢડ↹┙᩺ߒߡ᳃ߢᜂߞߡᚑᨐ߇ࠇߡߊࠆߣ߈ߦޔ ᳃ߪෳടߒߡࠃ߆ߞߚߣᕁ߁ߩߢߔޔ߇ߣߎ߁ߣ߆ࠆࠇ߿ߡߞ߿߁ߤࠍߺ⹜ߩߘޕ ᧪⊛ߦ⥄ᴦࠍ⊒ዷߐߖࠆߚߦߪᔅⷐߛߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄߦߪࠈࠎߥ⹜ߺࠍࠬࠤ߁߁ߘޔߡߒ߹ࠅࠎߐߊߚ߇ࠬࠤޔ㓸ߡߊߣ ዷᦸߪ㐿߆ࠇࠆ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖࠎ߇✚ߪࠬࠤ߁߁ߘޔᢙߢߺࠆߣࠅߪ߿ޔዋᢙᵷߛߣᕁ ߞߡ߹ߔޕ ߚߛߒޔዋᢙߢࠆߣ߁ᗧ߿ឭ᩺߇ޔ20 ᐕవߦታߒߥߣ߽㒢ࠅ߹ߖࠎ⑳ޕ ߪീᒝߒᆎߡ 30 ᐕ೨ߦ⸒ߞߚߎߣ߇ޔᒰᤨߪ⛘ኻዋᢙᵷߢߒߚࠎߣ߶ߪߢޔߒ߆ߒޕ ߤ߇ᒰߚࠅ೨ߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚߪࠆޔࠆߌ⛯⸒ࠄ߆ߛޕỗബߒ⛯ߌࠆߩߢߔ⑳ޔߛߚޕ ߪ㑆߽ߥߊ 70 ᱦㄭߊߥࠅ߹ߔߩߢᤨߩ⑳ޔઍߪ⚳ࠊࠅ߹ߔ⧯ޕᣇࠍ࠴࠶࠲ࡦ࠻ࡃ߇ޘฃ ߌߡߊࠇߡߕߖ⤪ޔᔒࠍᜬߞߡ⥄ᴦߩ⊒ዷߩߚߦ㗎ᒛࠆߣ߁એᄖߦߪߥߣ߁ߩߢޔ ߈ࠂ߁ߪߘߩㆮ⸒ࠍㅀߴߦ߈߹ߒߚޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ᄢవ↢ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅ߽߁ߤޔᄢవ↢߆ࠄߪᣇಽᮭߩ ᔅⷐᕈࠍਥᒛߒ⛯ߌࠆߎߣ߇ᄢߢࠆߣߞߚ߅ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇߢߪࡈࠖࡇࡦߩ Brillantes వ↢߆ࠄޔ ߎࠇ߹ߢߩ⊝ߐࠎ߆ࠄߩ⊒⸒ࠍ〯߹߃ߟߟޔ ࡈࠖࡇࡦߦ߅ߌࠆᓟߩಽᮭޔ᳃⥄ᴦలታߩㄟߺߪࠆޔᣇ╷ߦߟߡ߅ߒ ߚߛߌߚࠄߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ٨Alex B. Brillantes Jr. ᳁㧦ࡈࠖࡇࡦߢߪޔᣇಽᮭߦߟߡቯᦼ⊛ߦߘߩലᨐߦߟ ߡߩ⹏ଔࠍߒߡ߈ߡ߹ߔޕዋߥߊߣ߽ࡈࠖࡇࡦߢߪޔᓟᚯࠅߪߢ߈ߥߣᕁߞߡ߹ ߔ⹏ߩߘޕଔࠍߔࠆߣ߈ߦߪޔ᳃ਥൻޔᏒ᳃ෳടߩᅑബߣ߁ᨒ⚵ߺߢߺࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠅ߹ ߔࠄ߆ߎߘޔ߇ߚߒ߹ࠅ߽߇ߜ߹ࠎࠈߜ߽ޕቇߴࠆߎߣ߽ࠈࠈߣࠆ⚿ޕዪߪᓧ ࠆ߽ߩ߇ᄢ߈ߣᕁ߹ߔޕᮭ㒢ઃਈ㧔empowerment㧕߿Ꮢ᳃ෳടߪߦߐ߹ޔ᳃ਥൻߩਛ ᩭߢࠅ߹ߔޕ వ߶ߤ߽⸒ߞߚࠃ߁ߦޔ㊀ⷐߥߩߪ␠ળ⁁ᴫࠍൊ᩺ߒߡ⠨߃ࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔޕᬀ᳃ ߩᤨઍߪᄢᄌਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥᐭߢߒߚࠬࠦ࡞ࡑޕᮭᤨઍߪࠈࠈߣࠅ߹ߒߚߌߤਛ ᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߢߒߚޕ ᳃ਥ⊛ߥᐲߩ߽ߣߢߪᧄޔᒰߦᄙߊߩὐ߇ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕᏒ᳃ෳടࠍㅢߒߡᏒ᳃ ߩ࠾࠭ࠍࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔޕᄢవ↢߇߅ߞߒ߾ߞߚࠃ߁ߦޔᏒ᳃એߦᏒ ᳃⥄りߩ࠾࠭ࠍ⍮ࠆੱߪߥߩߢߔߩ⦟߽ᦨޕ㧝ߟߪޔਛᄩᐭ߇࠳ࡓ߿〝߿ ᯅ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆߣ⠨߃ࠍߒઃߌࠆߎߣߢߔޔ߇ߔߢࡓ࠳߫߃ߣߚޔߒ߆ߒޕవવ᧪ߩ ߦߟߊࠈ߁ߣߒߚࠅߒߡࠆߩߢరߪࠄߥߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ㌁ߪᄙߊߩ߅㊄ ࠍߢࡦࡇࡦࠖࡈޔ࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ߣදജߒߢ࠳ࡓᑪ⸳ࠍߒࠃ߁ߣߒ߹ߔ߇ޔᏒ᳃ෳടߩᯏ ળࠍ⸳ߌߕߦ⸘↹߇ㅴࠄࠇߡߒ߹߁ߩߢᏒ᳃ߪኻߒߡ߹ߔޕ ᣣᧄߩᯏ㑐߽ߡޔᄙߊߩ࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ߩ㐿⊒ࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻߇ߎߩ⦟ߢߔޕᓐࠄߪޔ 144 ᳃ߩෳട߽ᓧߥߢ߅ޟ೨ߚߜߦ߇ޘᔅⷐߛ߇ޘੱޔߢߩ߁⸒ߣޠኻߒޔᄬᢌߔࠆߩ ߢߔ߇ޘੱޕෳടߒߦ࠭࠾ߩޘੱޔၮߠ߈ㅴࠆߴ߈ߢߔޕᣇಽᮭࠍㅢߓߡ╷ࠍㅴ ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 㧺㧳㧻ߩෳടߦߟߡߢߔ߇ޔᣇಽᮭߩផㅴߦޔᄙߊߩ NGO ߇╷ቯࡊࡠࠬ ߦෳടࠍ᳞ߡ߹ߔޕ1 ਁ 6000 ࠍ߃ࠆ㧺㧳㧻߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔෳടߒߚߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ ߔ ߩࡊ࡞ࠣߥࠎࠈޕNGO ߇ࠅ߹ߔౕޕฬࠍߍࠆߣߥ࠭ࠧࡦࡒޔ࠭ࠧࡦࡆޔ ߤߢߔ߇ޔNGO ߣ߁ߩߪᣂߒߊ᧪ߚ߆ߣᕁ߃߫ޔᵴേࠍ߿ߡߒ߹߁߽ߩ߽ࠅ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߪޔ᳃ਥਥ⟵␠ળ߇ᯏ⢻ߒߡࠆߎߣࠍ⽎ᓽߒߡ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߪޔNGO ⥄り߇⥄Ꮖⷙࠍⴕߥ߁ߴ߈ߣ߁㗴ߣ㑐ㅪߒߡ߈߹ߔޕ⣣ᢌߒߚ NGO ߇ሽߒ߹ߔߩߢޔNGO ⥄りߦࠃࠆ୶ℂⷙቯ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ⣣ᢌߣ߁ߩߪޔᐭߩኾᄁ․ ⸵ߢߪߥߩߢߔޕNGO ߩ⇇ߢ߽ࠅ߹ߔࠆޔ߫߃ߣߚޕᎺ⍮߇⪭ㆬࠍߔࠆࠆߔޕ ߣ NGO ࠍ⸳┙ߒߡߦࡊ࠶࠻ߩߘޔᐳࠆࠊߌߢߔ ࠄ߆ߛޕNGO ߩ⇇ߢ߽⥄ಽߚߜߢⷙ ࠍߒߡߊߣ߁ߎߣ߇ᔅⷐߢߒࠂ߁ޕ ᰴߦߩ߆ߟߊޔၮᧄ⊛ߥ㗴ߦ┙ߜߞߡߺࠆߎߣ߇ᄢߢࠆߣ⠨߃߹ߔߒ߁ߤޕ ߡᣇಽᮭࠍㅴࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆㧫ߤ߁ߒߡ NGO ߦࠃࠆෳട߇ࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆㧫Ⓧᭂ ⊛ߥᏒ᳃ෳടޔㅘᕈ⺑ޔ⽿છ߇ᶐㅘߔࠆࠃ߁ߦㅴࠆߚߢࠅߣࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ⦟ޔ ߪߎߩࠃ߁ߥߎߣࠍᜰߒߡ߹ߔߩߎޕㇱደߢࠊࠇࠊࠇߪߪߣࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ⦟ޔ߆ߣ ߁ߎߣࠍᤨޔ㑆ࠍ߆ߌߡ⼏⺰ߒߡ߈߹ߒߚߩߘޕਛߢޔᏒ᳃ෳടࠍᅑബߔࠆߎߣߪᄢߢ ࠅ⚿ޔዪޔᏒ᳃⥄り߇⥄ಽߚߜߦᧄᒰߦᔅⷐߢࠆ߽ߩࠍ৻⇟ࠊ߆ߞߡࠆ߆ࠄߢߔޕ ᓟߩዷᦸߣ߁ߎߣߢߔ߇ޔᄙߊߩࡌࠬ࠻ࡊࠢ࠹ࠖࠬ߇ࠅ߹ߔ߆ࠄߘߎ߆ࠄቇ ߴࠆߢߒࠂ߁߫߃ߣߚޕవ߶ߤߩભᙑߩߣ߈ߦ⡞ߚߩߢߔ߇ ߩߎޔGRIPS ߩߔ߫ࠄߒ ᑪ‛ߪޔ࿖(ᄢቇߩ)ߦ᳃㑆ડᬺߦࠃߞߡᑪߡࠄࠇߚߘ߁ߢߔޔߪߢࡦࡇࠖࡈޕ㘃 ૃߩ߿ࠅᣇ߇ࠅޔᄙߊߩᣇ⥄ᴦߪࠍᜬߞߡࠆ߇⾗ޔ㊄߇ߥߩߢߩޔ႐ ᚲ㧔㧕ࠍឭଏߒޔ᳃㑆ㇱ㐷ߦᑪ‛ࠍᑪߡߡ߽ࠄ ߡߒߘޔ20 ᐕᓟߦᚲᮭ߇᳃㑆ߦ⒖ ߔᐲ߇ࠅ߹ߔࠅ߿ߥ߁ࠃߩߎޕᣇߪਛᄩ㓸ᮭߩߢߪ᧪ߥ߆ߞߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ⦟ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬޔᣇಽᮭ⚿ޔዪߘࠇߪࡄ࠻࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߢߔࡦ࠲ࠬࠪࠕޔߜࠊߥߔޕ ࠻ߢߪߥߊޕߔߢߣߎ߁ߣࠆߥߦ࠽࠻ࡄ࡞ࠦࠗޔᐭ߇߽ߜࠈࠎਥዉ⊛ߦⅣႺࠍ ᢛߒߡߊᔅⷐ߇ࠅ߹ߔ߇ߡߴߔޔᐭߦ㗬ߞߡߡߪߥࠄߥߩߢߔޕᐭߛߌߦ 㗬ߞߡࠆߣޔએ೨ߩࠃ߁ߦᄬᢌߦ⚳ࠊࠅ߹ߔޕᣇಽᮭߩᨒ⚵ߺߩਛߢ߿⇇ࠬࡀࠫࡆޔ Ꮢ᳃␠ળߣߩࡄ࠻࠽ࠪ࠶ࡊߢߥߣ㚝⋡ߢߔޔࠄ߆ߛޕᣇಽᮭߣ߁߽ߩࠍ߈ߜࠎ ߣℂ⸃ߒߡ߅߆ߥߣߌߥߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ߔޕ ⑳ߪᄢᄌߞߚᣇࠍߒߡࠆ߆߽ߒࠇ߹ߖࠎ߇ޔᚒ߇࿖ߢᣣߩ࿎ᖺߒߚ⁁ᘒ߆ࠄᛮ ߌߔߦߪߕ߹ޔਛᄩᐭ߇ఝߒࠃ߁ߣߔࠆᘒࠍᡷༀߒߥߣߌߥޕਛᄩᐭߩ ߎߣߪ⟎ߡ߅ߊߪߦᤨޕਛᄩᐭ߇㓚ኂߦߥߞߡࠆ߆ࠄޔᣇᐭߦᵈ⋡ߔߴ߈ߢ ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕᏒ᳃߇Ⱜญࠍ߭ߨࠆߣ᳓߇ߡߊࠆࠊߌߢߔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕၮᧄࠨࡆࠬߪ ߊ߹ߢ߽ޔᣇᐭ߇ឭଏߒޔਛᄩᐭ߇ⴕ߁ࠊߌߢߪߥߩߢߔޕ 145 ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚߪߢࠇߘޕᰴߦਛ࿖ߩ ᧻ῆవ↢߆ࠄ߅㗿ߒ߹ ߔޔߡ߃߹〯ࠍ⸒⊒ߩߢ߹ࠇߎߩࠎߐ⊝ޕਛ࿖ߦ߅ߌࠆᣇಽᮭߣࠇߘޔ᳃ෳടߩ᧪ ߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛߌࠇ߫ߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 䃂 ᧻ῆ ᳁㧦᧪ߩᆫߪ⺞ޔࠆ␠ળࠍࠆߚᐭޔᏒ႐ޔᏒ᳃␠ળ߇ߞߒࠂ ߦදജޔදߔࠆߣ߁ߎߣߢߔߩߘޕታߦߪޔᐭޔᏒ႐ޔNGOs ߩദജ߇ᔅⷐߛߣ ᕁ߹ߔޔߒ߆ߒޕਛ࿖ߪ࡞ࡃࡠࠣߛ߹ޔൻޔᎿᬺൻޔᖱႎൻޔ᳃ਥൻ߆ࠄߩォ឵ᦼߦ ࠅ߹ߔߩߎޕォ឵ᦼߦ߅ߡޔਛ࿖ᐭޔᏒ႐ޔᏒ᳃␠ળߪߘࠇߙࠇߩޟႺ⇇✢ࠍޠត ߞߡ߹ߔޕઍߩਛ࿖ߢߪޔᐭߣᏒ᳃␠ળߩ㑐ଥߦ߅ߡߛ߹ޔ⍹ᯅࠍณߡᷰࠆࠃ ߁ߥ⁁ᘒߢߔޕ 㐳ᦼ⊛ߦߪᮭജߦኻߒߡ߇ࠬࡦࡃ࠼ࡦࠕࠢ࠶ࠚ࠴ޔᯏ⢻ߒߥߣߌߥߢߔޕ ߚߣ߃߫ਛᄩᐭߣᣇᐭߩ㑐ଥߦߟߡᴺᓞࠍቯߒޔᣇᐭ߇ߔߴ߈ߎߣ߈ߢޔ ࠆߎߣࠍ⏕ߦߔߴ߈ߢߔޔߪߩ߁ߣޕᐭߪ㧠ߟߩಽ㊁㧔ᯏ⢻㧕ߦ㓸ਛߔߴ߈ߢࠆ ߣࠊࠇߡࠆ߆ࠄߢߔ⚻ࡠࠢࡒޔߪࠇߘޕᷣߩⷙޔᏒ႐ߩ⋙ⷞ␠ޔળߩ▤ℂࠨޔ ࡆࠬߢߔ(⋵ޕcounty)ߩᐭ߇ࡒࠢࡠ⚻ᷣߩⷙ߿Ꮢ႐ߩ⋙ⷞࠍߔࠆߎߣߪㅢᏱߪ⠨߃ࠄ ࠇߥߢߔ৻ߩߘޕᣇޔᏒ᳃ߦㄭ㧔primary level㧕ᐭߢߪ␠ߣߞ߽ޔળߩ▤ℂ߿ ࠨࡆࠬࠍⴕ߁ߴ߈ߢߔ␠ޔߚ߹ޕળߩ▤ℂࠪࠬ࠹ࡓࠍ߈ߜࠎߣ᭴▽ߔߴ߈ߢࠆߣਛᄩ ᐭ߇ᒝ⺞ߒߡ߹ߔ߇ߣߞ߽ޔߪߦࡓ࠹ࠬࠪߥ߁ࠃߩߎޔᐭߩㅘᕈࠍჇߔᔅⷐ߇ ࠅ߹ߔޕޔᖱႎ㐿␜ߦߪ㒢߇ࠅ߿▚੍ޔ߫߃ޔᡰߦߟߡߪᏒ᳃ߦ⍮ࠄߐࠇ ߡߥߩߢߔ߿▚੍ࠄ߆ߛޕᡰߦߟߡߚ߹ޔਈౄߩᖱႎߦߟߡ߽㐿␜ߔߴ߈ߢߔޕ 㧞ߟ⋡ߪⴕ⹏ଔߦߟߡߢߔ߇ߦ․ޔᣇ⥄ᴦࡌ࡞ߩⴕ⹏ଔࠍⴕ߁ᤨߦߪޔᏒ ᳃ߩᗧࠍ⡞ߚ߁߃ߢ⹏ଔࠍߔߴ߈ߢߔޕᣇᐭߪޔᏒ᳃ߩ⹏ଔࠍขࠅࠇߡࠃ߁ߦ ߒߡ߈ߡ߅ࠅޔᏒ㐳߿⋵ߩ㚂㐳ߩਛߦߪ ߢࡆ࠹߿࠻࠶ࡀ࠲ࡦࠗޔ1 ᐕߩᬺߦߟߡ ߩႎ๔ࠍߒߡࠆ⠪߽߹ߔޕ ᄙ᭽ߥ NGO ߇⢒ߟࠃ߁ߦߒߥߣߌߥߢ߹ࠇߎޕᐭߪ ߦ․ޔNGO ߦ㑐ߒߡߪ㧟 ߟߩ࠲ࠗࡊߩ߽ߩࠍᅑബߒߡ߹ߔޕᬺ⇇࿅߇㧝ߟ⋡ߩޔଢ⋉ߦ⾗ߔࠆ࿅߇㧞ߟ ⋡߇ࡊ࡞ࠣࠖ࠹࠾ࡘࡒࠦޔ㧟ߟ⋡ߢߔޕᣇߩ㚂㐳߇⦟ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬࠍⴕ߁ߚߦޔ ․ߦࠦࡒࡘ࠾࠹ࠖࠣ࡞ࡊ߿ၞߩ NGO ߪࠍࠬࡆࠨޔឭଏߔࠆߚߩࠃ߈ࡄ ࠻࠽ߣ⠨߃ࠄࠇߡ߹ߔޕඦ೨ਛ߽↳ߒߍ߹ߒߚߌߤޔNGO ߦ㑐ߒߡᴺᓞࠍቯߒޔ NGO ࠍ⊓㍳ߦߔߴ߈ߢࠅ߹ߔ߇⊓߽ߒ߽ޔ㍳ࠍᏗᦸߒߥ႐วߢ߽㆑ᴺߥ NGO ߢ ࠆߣ߁࠶࠹࡞ࠍ⾍ࠆߴ߈ߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎޕᜰዉߪߢ߈߹ߔ߇ࠍ⋡ߪߦᤨޔඨಽ㐽ߓߡ ࠆߎߣ߽ࠆߩ߆ߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᐭᵴേߦኻߔࠆᏒ᳃ߩ⋙ⷞߪࠄ߆ࠇߎޔ㐿ᜏߔߴ߈ᄢߥಽ㊁ߢߔޕਛᄩᐭߦኻߒ ߡⴕ߁ߎߣߪኈᤃߢߪߥߣᕁ߹ߔ߇ޔߚ߹ޕ࿖ߩ⽷ᐲ߽ᡷ㕟ߔߴ߈ߢߔߚ߹ޕਛ ࿖ߩᐲ߿ᴺᓞࠍࠆߣޔ൮⊛ߥᐲߩᨒ⚵ߺߪࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔታߔࠆߚߩࡔࠞ࠾࠭ ࡓ߿ᚻᴺߪᛮߌߡࠆㇱಽ߇ࠅ߹ߔޕ ৻⸒ߢ߃߫ޔㄭ᧪ޔታߔࠆߚߩࡔࠞ࠾࠭ࡓ߿ᚻᴺߩ᭴▽ߦ߽ߞߣ⋡ࠍะߌߴ 146 ߈ߢࠅߩߘޔߢ൮⊛ߥᐲ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺࠍߟߊࠅߥ࠭ࡓࠬޔㆇ༡ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦߔߴ߈ ߢߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ฦ࿖ߩᣇಽᮭߩ᧪ߥߤߦߟߡࠈࠈ߅ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚߘޕ ࠇߢߪᱷࠅߩᤨ㑆߇ߣ 20 ಽߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚᦨޕᓟߦ⍴ᤨ㑆ߢߔ߇ޔ1 ಽ߆ 2 ಽߩᦨᓟߩ ⊒⸒ࠍ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᐲߪᕟ❗ߢߔ߇ޔᏀ┵ߩᣇ߆ࠄ⊒⸒ࠍߚߛ߈߹ߔޕൎᚻߦߡ↳ߒࠊߌࠅ߹ߖ ࠎ߇ ߩࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔBrodjonegoro వ↢߆ࠄᦨᓟߩ⊒⸒ࠍ߅㗿ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ1 ಽ 㨪2 ಽߢ߅㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ ٨Bambang P.S.Brodjonegoro ᳁㧦⑳ߩᦨᓟߩ⊒⸒ߪޔᣇಽᮭߦߟߡࠈࠎߥ࿖ߩ㆑ ࠍᲧセߒߡࠄ߆ߎߘޔቇ߱ߴ߈ߢߪߥ߆ߦߟߡߢߔߣࠈࠈ߽ࠄ߆⺰⼏ߩ߁ࠂ߈ޕ ቇ߮߹ߒߚޕᄖ࿖ߩࠤࠬ߆ࠄᣇಽᮭߩ᧪ߣวࠊߖߡ⚻ޔᷣᚑ㐳ߩ㈩ಽߦߟߡ߽Ყ セࠍߒߡቇ߱ߴ߈ߢߔޕ ࠲ࠗޔᣣᧄޔ㖧࿖ߩ⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߩ㈩ಽߢߔ߇ߦ․߇⑳ޔ⍮ࠅߚߩߪ߫߃ߣߚޔ㖧࿖ߢߪ 㧞ᄢㇺᏒޔ㊍ጊߣ࠰࠙࡞߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߦ┹ߒߡࠆߩ߆ߥߤߦ⥝߇ࠅ߹ߔߩࠗ࠲ޕ႐ วߪ᧲ධࠕࠫࠕᄢળ㧔Southeast Asian Game㧕ࠍࡃࡦࠦࠢߛߌߢߥߊࠦ࠽ߣࠗࡑࡦࠚ࠴ޔ ࡦߢ߽㐿ߒࠃ߁ߣߒߡ߹ߔޕᣣᧄߩ႐วߦߪޔᄢ߈ߥㇺᏒ߇ᐞߟ߽⚻ᷣᚑ㐳ߒߡ߹ ߔ┹ޔߢߣߎ߁ߣޕࠍㅴߡߊߢޔᄖ࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥߪ㊀ⷐߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 㧞ߟ⋡ߪၞࠗࡁࡌ࡚ࠪࡦߦߟߡޔၞ⚻ᷣߩఝవ㗅ࠍߤ߁ߟߌࠆ߆ߣ߁ߎߣ ߦߟߡቇ߮ߚߣᕁ߹ߔ৻৻ޟߪߢࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗ߫߃ߣߚޕຠᐲࠍޠዉߒߡ ߹ߔߢࠗ࠲ߣ߽ߣ߽ߪࠇߎޕዉߐࠇߚ߽ߩߢࠄ߆ߎߘޔᐲࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕߦߐࠄߦዉ ߒࠃ߁ߣߒߡ߹ߔ߇ޔᄖ࿖߆ࠄቇߴࠆߎߣߪࠈࠈߣࠅ߹ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦 ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚޕᰴߦ㊄వ↢߅ߊߒࠈࠃޔ㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ ٨㊄ ⋉ᬀ ᳁㧦 వ߶ߤߩ⊒⸒ߢ߽⸒߹ߒߚ߇ޔಽᮭߩߚߩࠕࠫࠕߩㅪᏪ㧔Asian solidarity㧕ࠍឭ᩺ߒߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕᓟޔᣇಽᮭߩࠍㅴࠆߚߦ⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ࿖ ߇දജߒߡ߆ߥߣߌ߹ߖࠎ߫߃ߣߚޕ㖧࿖ߩਛᄩࡌ࡞ߩੱߚߜ߇ಽᮭࠍᦸ߹ߥ ߩߥࠄޔ ޔࠕࠪࡀ࠼ࡦࠗޔࡦࡇࠖࡈޟਛ࿖ࠍ⠌ߥߐߊ߹߁ޕㅴߡ߹ߔࠄ߆ߛޕ ㅴࠆߴ߈ߢߔޕߔ߹߃⸒ߣޠᄖߪᄢߢߔޕਛᄩᐭߩᗧᕁቯ⠪ߦᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ࠆߣ ᕁ߹ߔޕ ߹ߚᧄޔᒰߩ᳃ਥ⊛ߥᣇ⥄ᴦࠍߔࠆߩߦߪ߇ᄢಾߥߩ߆ߣ߁ߎߣࠍ⠨߃߹ߔߣޔ ਛᄩᐭޔᣇᐭߚ߹ޔᏒ᳃ࡌ࡞ߢ߽㗴߇ࠆ߆߽ߒࠇߥ߇⇟৻ޔᄢߥߩߪᏒ ᳃ߢߔޕᏒ᳃ߪ⥄ޟޔಽߪ㑐ଥߥޟޠ᳇ߦߒߥ߁ߣޠᘒᐲࠍߣࠅ⛯ߌߡ߹ߔߣᧄޔ ᒰߩᗧߢߩᣇಽᮭࠍᯏ⢻ߐߖࠆߎߣߪߢ߈߹ߖࠎޕ ߛ߆ࠄޔᏒ᳃ࠍ߽ߞߣᢎ⢒ߔࠆߚߩᏒ᳃ᢎ⢒ࡊࡠࠣࡓ߇ᔅⷐߛߣᕁ߹ߔ⧯ߦ․ޕ ੱߚߜࠍኻ⽎ߦၞߦ߅ߌࠆᏒ᳃ߩᗧ߇ߤ߁ߒߡᄢߢࠆ߆ࠍℂ⸃ߒߡ߽ࠄ߁ߎߣ ߇ᄢಾߢߔޕᄢቇߣ߆ߐ߹ߑ߹ߥᢎ⢒ᯏ㑐ߢޔᏒ᳃ᢎ⢒ࠍ߽ߞߣㆡಾߦឭଏߢ߈ࠆᣇᴺࠍ ⠨߃ࠆᔅⷐ߇ࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 147 ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚޕWoothisarn వ↢߅ޔ㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ ٨Woothisarn Tanchai ᳁㧦ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߦኻߔࠆࠦࡔࡦ࠻ࠍ⧯ᐓߐߖߡߚߛ߈ߚߣᕁ ߹ߔޕᣇᐭߪߘࠇߙࠇᵴേߩၮḰ߇㆑ߥߞߡ߅ࠅߩߘޔၮḰ߇ᣇಽᮭࠍㅴࠆࠬ ࠹࠶ࡊࠍߡߊߴ߈ߛߣ⠨߃ߡ߹ߔ߇ࠬࡆࠨߕ߹ޕ㊂⊛ߦ߽⾰⊛ߦ߽ḩ⿷ߢ ࠆߎߣ߆ࠄࠬ࠲࠻ߒߡޔᰴߩࠬ࠹࠶ࡊߣߒߡߪ߿ࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ⦟ޔౝㇱⴕߦὶὐࠍ ᒰߡࠆߴ߈ߢߢߔᦨߡߒߘޕᓟߦ⚻ޔᷣ⊒ዷߦߟߡ⠨߃ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔߥ߁ࠃߩߘޕ ᗧߢߪޔᣣᧄߩ⚻㛎ߪࠆޔ㖧࿖ߥߤߩ⚻ᷣ⊒ዷߥߤߩࠍࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔߒޕ ߆ߒߦ․ޔᣇಽᮭߢ৻⇟㊀ⷐߥߩߪޔᏒ᳃ߦജࠍਈ߃㧔empower㧕 ޔⓍᭂ⊛ߥᏒ᳃ᵴേ߇ ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߔࠆߎߣߢߔޕᏒ᳃ࠍᏎ߈ㄟࠎߢᣇᐭߩᵴേߦෳടߒߡ߽ࠄ߁ߎߣߢߔޕ ᣇಽᮭߪᣇᐭߦജࠍਈ߃ߪߡ߭߇ࠇߎޔ᧪ߩ᳃ਥൻߩၮ⋚ߣߥࠅ߹ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚ ޕవ↢߅ޔ㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ 䃂 ᧻ῆ ᳁㧦ᚒޔߪޘหߓࠧ࡞ࠍ⋡ᜰߒߡࠇߙࠇߘޔ㆑߁ࠍᱠࠎߢࠆߣᕁ߹ ߔ↢ߚߒߣࠎߜ߈ޕᵴࠍࠄࠁࠆੱ߇ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦ⦟ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬ߇ᔅⷐߢࠆߣ⠨߃ߡ ߹ߔޕ࿁ߎߩᯏળࠍߚߛ߈߹ߒߚߎߣࠍ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇߦᗵ⻢↳ߒߍߚߣ ᕁ߹ߔޕ ߣ߁ߩߪ⚻ߩࠇߙࠇߘޔ㛎߆ࠄቇ߱ߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ߆ࠄߢߔߡߒߘޕฦ࿖߇⟤ߒᣣࠍ ታߒࠃ߁ߣታ〣ߒߡࠆߎߣ߇ℂ⸃ߢ߈߹ߒߚޕਛ࿖ߛߌߢߪߥߊޔ⇇ฦߢࡠࠞ ࡞ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߪᵈ⋡ߐࠇߡࠆ㗴ߢߔ⚻ߥ߹ߑ߹ߐޕ㛎߆ࠄቇ߮ߒࠄ߫ߔࠅࠃޔ ᧪߳ߣ⚿߮ߟߌߚߢߔޕᡷ߹ߒߡ⻢ᗧࠍߒ߹ߒߡߥ߁ࠃߩߎߦࠄߐޔᗧ឵ߩᯏ ળ߇ᜬߡࠇ߫ߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚޔߪߢࠇߘޕBrillantes వ↢߅ޔ㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ ٨Alex B. Brillantes Jr. ᳁㧦⑳߽ߎߩࠃ߁ߥᄢߥળ⼏ߦෳടߢ߈ߚߎߣࠍ߅␞ࠍ↳ߒ ߍߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕౝോ⋭㧔ᱜᑼฬ㧦ౝോᣇᐭ⋭㧕ߦએ೨ൕോߒߡߚ⚻㛎߇ࠅ߹ ߔߢߎߘޕߡߚᤨߦߪޔਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥᐭࠍ⚻㛎ߒ߹ߒߚޕ ᣇಽᮭࠍߒߚߣ߈ߦߪޔᜰ៰ߩߞߚࠃ߁ߦ⠨߃ᣇࠍᄌ߃ࠆദജࠍߒ߹ߒߚ⊛⚳ᦨޕ ߦ㗴ߦߥࠆߩߪޔᄙߊߩੱߚߜߩ⠨߃ᣇߢߔޕᣇಽᮭᡷ㕟߆ࠄ 17 ᐕߦߥࠅ߹ߔ߇ޔ㊄ వ↢߇ᜰ៰ߒߚࠃ߁ߦ߹ߛਛᄩ㓸ᮭߥ⛔ࠍᔒะߒߡࠆੱߚߜ߇߹ߔࡦࠗ࠼ࠗࠟޕ ߇ߥߣᣇᐭߪ߽ߥߩߢߔޕᡷ㕟߆ࠄ⚂ 20 ᐕ߇⚻ㆊߒߡࠆߩߢߔ߇ߛ߹ޔ ⛯ߡ߹ߔ ߛ߹ޔߛߚޕ17 ᐕߒ߆⚻ㆊߒߡߥߣ߁⸒ᣇ߽ߢ߈߹ߔޔߪߩ߁ߣޕ ߘࠇ߹ߢਛᄩ㓸ᮭ⊛ߥᡰ㈩߇ޔᐕ⛯ߡߚߩߢߒࠂ߁߆ޔࠄ߆ߛޕᣇಽᮭߪ߁߹ߊ ߞߡߥߣ߁ߩߪਇᐔߢߪߥ߆ߣᕁ߹ߔߛߊߡߺࠍߣߎࠆߡߞߎޔޕ ߐ৻ޕᐲޔუߐߥߣ㚝⋡ߢߔޕౝോ⋭ߢߚߣ߈ߩหߦળ߁ߣߞ⸒ߦ߁ࠃߩߘޔ ߡ߹ߔ ╙ߕ߹ࠍ࠻ࡈࠪࡓࠗ࠳ࡄޕ1 ߦ⠨߃ߥߣ㚝⋡ߢߔޕ ╙ 2 ߦߢߔ߇ߩߎޔળ⼏ߩ࠹ࡑߢ߽ࠆⓍᭂ⊛ߥᏒ᳃ߩෳട߇ᄢߢߔߢߎߎޕᄞࠍ ⺆ߞߡࠆࠊߌߢߪࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇ߪੱޔ㑆㆑ࠍߔࠆߎߣ߽ࠅ߹ߔ߇ߩߘޔ㑆㆑߆ࠄ ⑳ߚߜߪቇ߱ߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔ߇ࠇߎޕᄢߛߣᕁ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕਛᄩᐭࡌ࡞ߢߪᳪ 148 ⡯߇ࠆߣ⸒ࠊࠇߡ߹ߔޔߪߣߎ߁ߣޕᳪ⡯ࠍᣇᐭࡌ࡞ߦᐢߍߡࠆߣ߽⸒߃ ߹ߔ߇ޔᳪ⡯ߦ㑐ߒ߹ߒߡߪᣇᐭߦᐢ߇ߞߡࠆࠊߌߢߪߥߣᕁ߹ߔࡦࠖࡈޕ ࡇࡦߢߪ⺑ޔ⽿છ߇ᡷༀߐࠇߡ߹ߔޔࠄ߆ߛޕജࠍࠇࠆߴ߈ߎߣߪ⢻ജ㐿⊒ߢߔޕ ਛᄩᐭޔᣇᐭޔNGO ߩߔߴߡߦ߅ߡ⸒߃ࠆߎߣߢߔޕ ╙ 3 ߦ↳ߒߍߚߩߪޔ߇ߔ߹ߡߞ⸒߽ࠎߐ⊝ޔ㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߥߎߣߪ߅߇ᵹ ߔࠆߎߣߢࠅ߽⑳ޔᣣߎߩࠃ߁ߥ߆ߚߜߢෳടߢ߈߁ࠇߒߊᕁߞߡ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕ ࡃࡦࠟࡠ࡞㧔Bangalore㧕ߩ⚻㛎ߥߤ߆ࠄቇ⠌ߢ߈߹ߔߒޔᣣᧄߩ⚻㛎߆ࠄ߽ቇߴ߹ߔޕ ⑳߇ೋߡᎹవ↢ߦ߅ળߒߚߣ߈ߦශ⽎ᷓ߆ߞߚߩߪޔਛᄩᐭߩቭ߇⋵ࡌ࡞ߦ ะߒߡߊߣ߁ߎߣࠍ⡞ߚߣ߈ߢߒߚޕะᦼ㑆߇⚳ࠊࠅਛᄩᐭߦᚯߞߚߣ߈ߦ ߪᣇߩߎߣ߇ࠃߊࠊ߆ࠆߩߢߔߢࡦࡇࡦࠖࡈ߽⑳ޕหߓࠃ߁ߥߎߣࠍ⹜ߺ߹ߒߚߌߤޔ ߥ߆ߥ߆߁߹ߊ߈߹ߖࠎߢߒߚޔߪߩ߁ߣޕਛᄩߩቭߪ⋵ߦߪⴕ߈ߚߊߥ߆ࠄߢ ߔޕᣇᐭߢߊߣ߁ߎߣߪਛᄩᐭߢߊ߶ߤ৻ᵹߢߪߥߣ⠨߃ࠆ߆ࠄߢߔߎޕ ߎߢࡄ࠳ࠗࡓࠪࡈ࠻ߩ㊀ⷐᕈ߇ࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߔޔߪ࠻ࡦࠗࡐߩߢߎߎޕਛᄩᐭߩ⚵❱߇ ᣇߩⷞὐࠍ߽ߞߡߊߣ߁⠨߃ᣇߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ⑳ߪ࠳ࠪ࠶ࡊߦߟߡ߽⸅ࠇ߹ߒߚߪࡊ࠶ࠪ࠳ޕᄢߥߎߣߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ࠽ࠟᏒ㧔Naga City㧕ߩࠍߍ߹ߒߚ߇ ߚ߹ޔBrodjonegoro వ↢ߩߣߎࠈߦ߽ߔ߫ࠄߒ ⍮߇߹ߒߚޕታ㓙ߦߘߩ⍮ߦ߅ળߒ߹ߒߚߩߘޕ⍮ߪޔ ߪ⑳ޟᄙߊߩ࿖㓙ળ⼏ ߦᏨߔࠆߩߦ∋ࠇ߹ߒߚߣߥߒࠍ߁ߣ߆ࠆߡߞⴕߊ߹߁߁ߤޔߪߩ߁ߣޕ ߌߥ߆ࠄߩઁޕߔߢߣߎߪࠇߘߤߌߛޕߔ߹ߡߞ⸒ߣޠᣇᐭࠍ㥏⥰ߔࠆߎߣ ߇ߢ߈ࠆ߆ࠄߢߔޕ ᣇᐭ㑆ߩදജߣ┹߇ࠅ߹ߔޔߪߢࠕࡆࡦࡠࠦޕෳടဳߩ੍▚✬ᚑࠍⴕߞߡߡޔ Ꮢ᳃߇⥄ಽߚߜߩ࠾࠭ࠍ․ቯߒߡߺ⚵ߦ▚੍ࠍࠇߘޔㄟࠎߢ߈߹ߔޔߦ⊛⚳ᦨޕᣇ ಽᮭࠍ⺆ࠆߎߣߪߩࠬࡦ࠽ࡃࠟ⦟ޔ㆐ᚑߦߟߡߔߎߣߛߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ᦨᓟߦޔ㖧࿖ߩవ↢߇ㅪᏪ㧔solidarity㧕ߩࡀ࠶࠻ࡢࠢߚߒ߹ߡߞ⸒ࠍߣߎ߁ߣޔ ߇ߣߛߣߎ⦟߽⑳ޔᕁ߹ߔޕޔᣇಽᮭ߆ࠄ 17 ᐕ߇⚻ㆊߒ߹ߒߚ߇ࡄࡦࠗߩߘޔ ࠢ࠻ߪߤ߁ߛߞߚߩߢߒࠂ߁߆ߪ߽ߤ⑳ޕ⸽ࠍߒ߹ߔ߇ޔߪ࠻ࠬࡒࡁࠦࠛޔ㧑 ߩᚑ㐳ߥߩ߆ߣ߁ߎߣࠍ⍮ࠅߚ߇ࠅ߹ߔޔ߇ࠎߖ߹ࠅ߆ࠊ߆߁ߤ߆ࠆ߈ߢ▚⸘߇ࠇߎޕ ⑳ߪᄢߥߎߣߛߣᕁ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕ㌁ߪࠃߊߘ߁߁ߎߣࠍ⡞ߡ߹ߔޕ ޟಽᮭߣ ߁ߌࠇߤ߽ޔ㧑߇ಽᮭ߆ࠄ᧪ߡࠆߩ߆ޕߔߢߣߎ߁ߣޠ వ߶ߤߩㅪᏪߩࡀ࠶࠻ࡢࠢߣ߁ߎߣߢ⺞ޔᩏ⎇ⓥߩࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߦߒߚࠄࠃ߁ ߥ᳇߇ߒ߹ߔ߫߃ߣߚޕ࿖ㅪߩࠣ࠶࠼ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬࡦ࠲(㖧࿖࠰࠙࡞ߦᧄㇱ)ߣ৻✜ߦ ࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߦߢ߈ߥߢߒࠂ߁߆ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅ߽߁ߤޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚᦨޕᓟߦߥࠅ߹ߒߚ߇ޔᄢవ↢ࠈࠃ߆߁ߤޔ ߒߊ߅㗿ߒ߹ߔޕ ٨ᄢ ᒫ ᳁㧦㕖Ᏹߦශ⽎⊛ߥ⊒⸒߇ߞߚࠃ߁ߦᕁ߹ߔߢ߹߽ߤ⑳ޕᴦߩߎߣ ߿ᣇ⥄ᴦߩߎߣࠍീᒝߔࠆߣ߈ߦࠆޔ⒟ᐲ߿ࠍᓧߥ߆ߞߚߎߣߢߔ߇⋧߽ߟޔᚻ 149 ߪ᰷☨ߢߒߚߩߎޕᏨߪࠕࠫࠕ߇㓸߹ߞߡ߹ߔ߇ࡦ࡚ࠪࠕࠦࠕࠫࠕࠅ߹ߟޕᚑ┙ߒ ߡ߹ߔ߁ࠂ߈ޔߪߣߎ߁ߣޕ⡞ߡࠆ⑳ߤ߽߇ቇ߱ߴ߈⋧ᚻ߇ߟ᰷߽☨ߦߒ߆ߥ ߆ߞߚߣ߁ߩߪቯ⊛ߦ⚳ࠊߞߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇ߆ࠄߪޔหߓࠃ߁ߥߎߣࠍᖠߺߥ߇ࠄ⊒ࠈࠈޔዷߩౕว߽ᖱ߽㆑߁ࠃ߁ߥࠕ ࠫࠕߩ⊝ߐࠎᣇߣീᒝࠍߦߒߡޔ᰷☨ᛂୟߣߪ⸒߹ߖࠎ߇ߩ߽ߤ⑳ޔ⋭ߣߒߡߪޔ ߘࠈߘࠈ᰷☨ߣ߫ߞ߆ࠅᲧセߒߡࠆߣ߁߿ࠅᣇ߆ࠄߔߴ߈ߛߣᕁ߹ߒߚޕ ߘࠇ߆ࠄ߽߁㧝ߟߪޔᣣߪࡠࠞ࡞ࠟࡃࡔࡦ࠻ߩ⎇ⓥࠍߔࠆੱ߇㓸߹ߞߡ߹ߔ߇ޔ Ꮢ᳃ࡌ࡞ߢߪ߽ߞߣ࿖㓙⊛ߥᵹ߇ㅴࠎߢࠆߣᕁ߹ߔߪ⑳ޕᣣᤨޔ㑆߇ߥߊߖ ߹ߖࠎߢߒߚ߇ޔᣣᧄߢߪ 1998 ᐕߦ․ޟቯ㕖༡ᵴേଦㅴᴺޔ߁ߣޠNPO ᴺߣ߫ࠇ ߡࠆᴺᓞ߇ᚑ┙ߒߡ߹ߔޕᣣޔਛ࿖ߩ NGO ߩ߇ߡ߹ߒߚ߇߇ࠊޔ࿖ߩ᧪ޔ ․ߦ࿖㓙⊛ߥᵹߩߎߣࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣ߈ߦ ߩߎޔNPO ߩᵴേߦ߽߁ዋߒὶὐࠍᝪ߃ߡߩߎޔ ੱߚߜ߇ၞࠍᜂߞߚࠅޔ࿖㓙␠ળߩਛߢᵹߒߚࠅޔᣂߒࠈࠎߥࠕࠗ࠺ࠕࠍ⠨߃ߡ ߊ߁߁ߘޕࠆߔࠍߺ⹜߁߁ߘޔᐢᗧߢߩࠪ࠹ࠖ࠭ࡦ㧔Ꮢ᳃㧕ߩㆇേߺߚߥ߽ ߩ߇ᄢߦߥߞߡࠆߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇߢᦨᓟߢߔ߇ޔᣣᧄߩᴺᓞߢ࠲ࠗ࠻࡞ߦᣣᧄ⺆ߢ⸒߁ޟᏒ᳃ࠆߡߞ߇ޠᴺᓞߪ ߭ߣߟߒ߆ߥ߁߁ߤޕᴺᓞ߆ߣ߁ߣޟߪࠇߘޔᏒ᳃ㄘᢛଦㅴᴺ߁ߣޠᴺᓞ߇ ࠆߩߢߔޟߦࠇߘޕᏒ᳃ߪߣࠆߡߞ߇ޠ㕙⊕ߢߔ㧔╉㧕 ޟߩߎޔ߇ࠈߎߣޕᏒ᳃ޠ ߣ߁ߩߪߤߩࠃ߁ߦቯ⟵ߐࠇߡࠆ߆ߣ߁ߣޔනߦޟㇺᏒㇱߦࠄߒߡࠆ᳃ߣޠ ߒ߆⸒ߞߡߥߩߢߔޕ ߣߎࠈ߇ޔᣣᧄߢߢ߈߇ߞߚ NPO ᴺߣ߁ᴺᓞߪ⼏ຬ┙ᴺߢߔ߆ࠄ↱⥄ࠅ߹ߟޔ᳃ਥ ౄ߇࠙ࡦߣ⸒ࠊߥߣ᧪ߥ߆ߞߚᴺᓞߢߔޕㆇേߦෳടߒߡߚᣇޟߪޘᏒ᳃ᵴേଦㅴ ᴺ⥄ޔ߇ࠈߎߣޕߔߢ߁ࠃߚߞ߆ߚߒߦޠ᳃ౄߪޟᏒ᳃߇ޠህߥߩߢߔޕ߇ᅢ߈߆ߣ ⡞ߚࠄޔ ޟᐼ᳃߇ޠᅢ߈ߛߘ߁ߢߔ㧔╉㧕ޟޕᐼ᳃ᵴേଦㅴᴺޕ߁ࠂߒߢߥ߃⸒ߪߣޠ ߣߎࠈ߇⥄߇ߔߐޔ᳃ౄߣ߁ߩߪ⥄ၿ⪭ߥౄߢޔNPO ᴺߩ╙㧝᧦ߦ߇ࠊޔ࿖ߢೋ ߡਥߣߒߡߩޟᏒ᳃⊓߇ޠ႐ߒߡࠆߩߢߔޔߣ߁ߣ߆ࠆߡᦠߡࠎߥޕ ޟᏒ᳃߇ⴕ ߥ߁⥄↱ߥ␠ળ⽸₂ᵴേࠍ⸒߁ޕߔߢߣޠᣣᧄߩᴺᓞߢᢥ⸒ߣߒߡޔೋߡޟᏒ᳃⊓߇ޠ ႐ߒ߹ߒߚޕ ߒߚ߇ߞߡߩߎޔᏒ᳃ᵴേߩ᧪ᕈߣᗧ⟵ࠍ⑳ߤ߽ߪ߈ߜߞߣᝒ߃ߚߢࠍࠇߎޔᵴ⊒ ߦᣣᧄߩ␠ળߢᵴ߆ߒߡ߈ࠎߐ⊝ߩࠕࠫࠕߡߒߘޔᣇߩᏒ᳃ᵴേߣㅪ៤ࠍߒߡߊߣ ߁ᤨ߁߁ߘޔઍࠍㄫ߃ߟߟࠆߣᕁ߹ߔ߁߁ߘޕዷᦸߪࠆࠃ߁ߦ⠨߃ߡᦨߩ⑳ޔ ᓟߩ⊒⸒ߣߒ߹ߔޕߔ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޕ ٨Ꮉ ඳ ᳁㧦ᄢవ↢ޕߚߒ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅ߽߁ߤޔ ߘࠇߢߪޔ㧞ᤨ㑆ߦࠊߚߞߡߩࡄࡀ࡞࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚࡀࡄޕ ࠬ࠻ߩᣇޔࠄ߆ޘฦ࿖ߩࠈࠈߥታᖱߦၮߠߡޔᣇಽᮭߩ⁁ᴫߪࠆޔ᳃ෳ ടޔ᳃ߣߩදߩ⁁ᴫ⺖ࠆߌ߅ߦߎߘޔ㗴ߦߟߡ߅ߒߚߛߌߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ ߎࠇ߆ࠄ߽⑳ߤ߽Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ߣߒ߹ߒߡߪߚߒ߁ߎޔฦ࿖ߩࠈࠈߥ 150 ㆑ࠍ〯߹߃ቇ߮ว߁ᯏળࠍߥࠆߴߊ↪ᗧߒߚߣᕁߞߡ߹ߔޕ ᄖ࿖߆ࠄߏෳടߚߛߚࡄࡀࠬ࠻ߩ⊝ߐࠎޔ㆙ߣߎࠈࠍ᧪ߡߚߛ߈ࠅ߇ߣ߁ ߏߑ߹ߒߚޕᄢవ↢ߦ߽߅ᔔߒߣߎࠈߏෳടߚߛ߈߹ߒߡ߹ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅޔ ߔޔߚ߹ޕෳട⠪ߩ⊝ߐࠎ߽㐳ᤨ㑆ߦࠊߚࠅࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ߹ߒߚࠖ࠺࡞ࡀࡄߢࠇߎޕ ࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦࠍ⚳ࠊࠅߚߣᕁ߹ߔޕ 151 +++ ૰ Materials 㧝㧚ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ㨯ಽᮭᡷ㕟ߣၞ⥄ᴦߩᒝൻ 㧞㧚ฦ࿖ႎ๔ᦠ⾗ᢱ 㧞㧙㧝㧚ࡈࠖࡇࡦ 㧞㧙㧞㧚ਛ࿖ 㧞㧙㧟㧚࠲ࠗ 㧞㧙㧠㧚ࠗࡦ࠼ࡀࠪࠕ 㪈㪅㩷 ၮ⺞⻠Ṷ䊶ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈫ၞ⥄ᴦ䈱ᒝൻ㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 ᄢ㩷 ᒫ㩷 㩷 䋱㩷 ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈫ᣇಽᮭ㩷 㩷 ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䇸৻ቯ䈱ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃䈫䈠䈱ઍᯏ㑐䈱⥄Ꮖቯᮭ䈱⥄ᓞ⊛ⴕ䇹䈪䈅 䉎䇯ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈲䇮䈠䈱⥄Ꮖቯᮭ䈫䈠䈱⥄ᓞ⊛ⴕ䉕ల䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯ᣣᧄ䈪䈲䇮ᣇ⥄ ᴦ䈱ਥ䈲䇸ၮ␆䇹䋨Ꮢ↸䋩䈫䇸ᐢၞ䇹䋨ㇺᐭ⋵䋩䈱ੑጀ䈮䉋䈦䈩᭴ᚑ䈘䉏䇮ઍᯏ㑐䈲ੑర 䋨㐳䈫⼏ળ⼏ຬ䉕䈮⋥ធ᳃䈏ㆬ䈜䉎䋩䇯㩷 ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈱ᣇ╷䈲䇮࿖䈎䉌⥄ᴦ䈻䈱ോᮭ㒢䈱⒖⼑䈎⥄ᴦ䈱ോᮭ㒢䈱ⴕ䈮ኻ 䈜䉎࿖䈱㑐ਈ䈱ᑄᱛ䊶❗ᷫ䈎䇮䈱䈇䈝䉏䈎䇮䈠䈱⚵ว䈞䈫䈭䉎䇯㩷 ⥄ᴦ䈱⥄ᓞᕈ䈲䇮࿖䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈪䇮䈬䈉䈇䈉ᓎഀ䉕ᜂ䈇䇮䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭ᮭ㒢䈫⽷Ḯ䉕⥄↱䈮 䈇䈉䉎䈎䈮䉋䈦䈩䉁䈦䈩䈒䉎䇯䈖䈱㕙䈏࿅⥄ᴦ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈚䈩䇮ઍᯏ㐿䈏䇮䈠䈱ᮭ㒢䈫 ⽷Ḯ䉕䈦䈩ോᬺ䉕ⴕ䈉䈮㓙䈚䇮䈬䈱⒟ᐲ䉁䈪᳃ෳട䉕㓚䈚䇮ၞ䈫᳃䈱䊆䊷䉵 䈮ᔕ䈋䈩䈇䈒䈎䈏᳃⥄ᴦ䈱㕙䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䈖䈱ਔ㕙䈱లታ䈏⋧䉁䈦䈩䈲䈛䉄䈩⊒ዷ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈏䇮ಽᮭᡷ㕟⺰䈮䈍䈇䈩࿖ 䈫䈱㑐ଥ䈏㊀ⷞ䈘䉏䉎䈱䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈱⥄ᓞᕈ䈫䈇䈦䈩䉅䇮ോᮭ㒢䈏ᭂ䉄䈩㒢ቯ䈘䉏䇮࿖䈱㑐 ਈ䈏Ớኒ䈪䈅䉏䈳䇮᳃⥄ᴦ䈱లታ䉕࿑䉍䈏䈢䈇䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋲㩷 ᣣᧄ䈮䈍䈔䉎ಽᮭᡷ㕟㩷 㩷 䋨㪈䋩㩷 ╙ 㪈 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟㩷 ᣣᧄ䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦผ䇮㪈㪐㪐㪌 ᐕ䈲↹ᦼ䉕ೞ䉖䈣ᐕ䈫䈚䈩⸥ᙘ䈮䈫䈬䉄䉌䉏䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯ᣇಽ ᮭផㅴᴺ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䇮ᣇಽᮭផㅴᆔຬળ䈏ᵴേ䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈢ᐕ䈪䈅䉎䇯ಽᮭᆔຬળ䈲䇮ਛ㑆 ႎ๔䇮㪌 ᰴ䈮䉒䈢䉎䇸൘๔䇹䇮㪉 ࿁䈱䇸ᗧ䇹䉕䇮䈠䈚䈩 㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ䈮ᦨ⚳ႎ๔䉕ឭ䈚䇮䈠䈱છോ䉕 ⚳䈋䈢䇯㪋 ᰴ䉁䈪䈱൘๔䈲 㪈㪐㪐㪐 ᐕ䈱ᣇಽᮭ৻ᴺ䈱ᚑ┙䇮⠉ᐕ䈱ታᣉ䈫䈭䈦䈩⚿ታ䈚䈢䇯 䈖䉏䉕╙ 㪈 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟䈫䉖䈪䈇䉎䇯㩷 䈠䈱ᦨᄢ䈱ᚑᨐ䈲䇮㪈㪏㪏㪏 ᐕએ᧪䈱ᯏ㑐ᆔછോᐲ䈏ోᑄ䈘䉏䇮䈠䈱⚿ᨐ䇮⥄ᴦ䈱 ോ䈎䉌࿖䈱ോ䈏⊝ή䈫䈭䉍䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎ㅢ㆐ⴕ䈏ᑄᱛ䈘䉏䇮᧦ቯᮭ䈏ᄢ䈚䈢䈖䈫䇮ో 䈫䈚䈩࿖䈫⥄ᴦ䈱㑐ଥ䉕ᓥ᧪䈱ਅ䊶ਥᓥ䈎䉌ኻ╬䊶දജ䈻ォ឵䈘䈞䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯╙ 㪈 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟䈱ᚢ⇛䈲࿖䈱㑐ਈ䈱ᑄᱛ䊶❗ᷫ䈮⟎䈎䉏䇮ታ㓙䈮ോᮭ㒢䈱⒖⼑䈲䈅䉁䉍ㅴ䉁 䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᡷᱜᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ䈱╙৻᧦䈲䇮࿖䉇ㇺᐭ⋵䈱ᓎഀ䉕㒢ቯ⊛䈮ⷙቯ䈚䇮ၮ ␆⥄ᴦ䈱Ꮢ↸䈲ᐢ䈒䇸ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎ോ䇹䉕ᜂ䈉䈖䈫䈫䈭䈦䈢䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪉䋩㩷 ਃ৻䈱ᡷ㕟㩷 ╙ 㪈 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟䈪ㅴ䉁䈭䈎䈦䈢䈱䈲⒢Ḯ⒖⼑䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯ಽᮭᆔຬળ䈱ᓟ⛮䈫䉌䉏䈩䈇䈢 ᣇಽᮭᡷ㕟ផㅴળ⼏䈲䇮⽷ౣᑪ䈱ⷞὐ䉕㊀ⷞ䈚䇮ౝ⚗䉕䈖䈚䇮⒢Ḯ⒖⼑䈱ౕ᩺䉕 155 ␜䈘䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈠䈱䈢䉄䇮⒢Ḯ⒖⼑䉕ᢿ䈚䈢ዊᴰ✚ℂ䈎䉌ⷐ⺧䉕ฃ䈔䈢ᣇ࿅䈏䇮 㪉㪇㪇㪋 ᐕ 㪏 䇮⒖⼑ኻ⽎ഥ⽶ᜂ㊄㗵䉕ਃ䊶ੑళ䈮䇮ᚲᓧ⒢䈎䉌᳃⒢䈻䈱⒢Ḯ⒖⼑䉕ਃ ళ䈮䈜䉎ᡷ㕟᩺䉕䉁䈫䉄䈢䇯ὶὐ䈲䇮ㅜ㒢ቯ䈱࿖ᐶഥ⽶ᜂ㊄䈱ᑄᱛ❗ᷫ䈫䈠䈱৻⥸ ⽷Ḯൻ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯㩷 ࿖ᐶഥ⽶ᜂ㊄䈲䇮࿖䈫⥄ᴦ䈏දജ䈚䈩ോᬺ䉕ታᣉ䈜䉎䈮㓙䈚䇮৻ቯ䈱ⴕ᳓Ḱ 䈱⛽ᜬ䈫․ቯ䈱ᣉ╷䈱ᅑബ䈱䈢䉄䈱╷ᚻᲑ䈫䈚䈩ᯏ⢻䈜䉎䉅䈱䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮 ࿖ᐶഥ⽶ᜂ㊄䈱ઃ䉕ㅢ䈛䈢ฦ⋭ᐡ䈱㑐ਈ䈏䇮⥄ᴦ䈱ၞ䈱⍮ᕺ䉇ഃᗧ䉕↢䈎䈚䈢⥄ ਥ䈭ⴕ⽷ㆇ༡䉕㒖ኂ䈚䈏䈤䈪䈅䉎䇯⥄ᴦ䈮䉅䇮࿖ᐶഥ⽶ᜂ㊄䈲ㅜ䈏ቯ䉁䈦䈩䈇䉎 䈚䇮䈅䉏䈖䉏⠨䈋䈭䈇䈪䈜䉃䈎䉌䈇䉇䈜䈇䇮䈫䈇䈦䈢ฃ䈔ข䉍ᣇ䈏䈭䈎䈦䈢䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯䈚 䈎䈚䇮ᡷ㕟᩺䈲䇮䈠䈉䈚䈢⠨䈋ᣇ䉕స䈚䈩ⴕ䈖䈉䈫ᔃ䈚䈢䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 䈚䈎䈚䇮䈖䈱ឭ᩺䉕ฃ䈔䈩ቯ䈘䉏䈢䇸ᐭ䊶ਈౄวᗧ䇹䈪䈲䇮⽶ᜂ䉕ᣇ䈮ォᇾ䈜䉎䉋䈉䈭 ࿖ᐶഥ⽶ᜂ₸䈱ᒁ䈐ਅ䈕䈏ⴕ䉒䉏䇮⥄ᴦ䈮ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈮ኻ䈜䉎⼊ᚓᔃ䈏ᒝ䉁䈦䈢䇯࿖ 䈱㑐ଥ⋭ᐡ䈲䇮䇸ᬺ䈱ㆡಾ䈭ታᣉ䉕⏕䈜䉎䈮䈲࿖䈱ᡰេ䈏㊀ⷐ䈣䇹䇮䇸৻ቯ᳓Ḱ䈱䉰䊷 䊎䉴䈭䈬䈱ၞ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅ᩰᏅ䈭䈒㓚䈜䉎࿖䈱⽿છ䈏ᨐ䈢䈞䈭䈒䈭䉎䇹䈭䈬ಽᮭᡷ㕟ኻ䈱 䉁䉍ᢥฏ䉕➅䉍䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯㩷 䋨㪊䋩㩷 ╙ 㪉 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟㩷 ᧂቢ䈱ಽᮭᡷ㕟䉕䈘䉌䈮ㅴ䉄䉎䈢䉄䇮࿖䈲䇮㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ 㪋 䇮છᦼ 㪊 ᐕ䈱ᣇಽᮭᡷ㕟ផㅴᆔ ຬળ䉕⸳⟎䈚䈢䇯ᣂಽᮭᆔຬળ䈲䇮ᒰᤨ䈱✚ℂ䈱ⷐ⺧䈮ᔕ䈋䇮㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ 㪌 䇮䇸ᣇಽᮭ ᡷ㕟ផㅴ䈮䈅䈢䈦䈩䈱ၮᧄ⊛䈭⠨䈋ᣇ㵪ᣇ䈏ਥᓎ䈱࿖䈨䈒䉍㵪䇹䉕⊒䈚䈢䇯䇸ᣇಽᮭᡷ 㕟䈲䇮࿖䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䇮࿖䈱䈎䈢䈤䈠䈱䉅䈱䈮䈎䈎䉒䉎㊀ⷐ䈭ᴦᡷ㕟䇹䈪䈅䉍䇮䇸࿖䈏ᣇ䈱䉇䉎 䈖䈫䉕⠨䈋䇮䈚ઃ䈔䉎䈫䈇䈉ਛᄩ㓸ᮭဳ䈱䉲䉴䊁䊛䈲䇮䉅䈲䉇ᝥ䈩䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇹䈫䈚䈢䇯㩷 䇸ᣇ䈏ਥᓎ䇹䈫䈲䇮䇸ᣇ䈏✚䈫䈚䈩࿖䈎䉌⥄┙䈜䉎䈫䈫䉅䈮䇮ฦၞ䈏⋧䈮ㅪᏪ䈚䈧 䈧䇱䈮⥄┙䈜䉎ᆫ䇹䈪䈅䉍䇮䈠䈱ታ䈮䈲䇸⥄ᴦⴕᮭ䇮⥄ᴦ⽷ᮭ䇮⥄ᴦ┙ᴺᮭ䉕චಽ 䈮ౕ䈚䈢ᣇᐭ䉕⏕┙䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇹䈫䈚䇮৻⥸ൻ䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇䇸ᣇᐭ䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒⪲䉕 䈦䈢䇯⥄ᴦ䈏䇸ᣇᐭ䇹䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈮䈭䉏䈳䇮࿖䈫ᣇ䈱㑐ଥ䈲䇸ᐭ㑆㑐ଥ䇹䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫 䈮䈭䉎䈎䉌䇮ኻ╬䊶දജ䈱㑐ଥ䈲䉋䉍৻ጀ⏕䈮䈭䉎䇯㩷 ᣂಽᮭᆔຬળ䈲䇮䇸ၮᧄ⊛䈭⠨䈋ᣇ䇹䋩䉕〯䉁䈋䇮൘๔䈮ะ䈔䈢䇸⟜㊎⋚䇹䈫䈚䈩䇮䉁䈢࿖᳃ 䈱ℂ⸃䈫ᡰᜬ䉕㜞䉄䉎䇸䊃䊥䉧䊷䇹䈫䈚䈩䇸ਛ㑆⊛䈫䉍䉁䈫䉄䇹䉕 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ 㪈㪈 䈮ឭ䈚䈢䇯ᡷ㕟䈱 ⋡₹䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈲䇮ᴺ䈮䉋䉎⟵ോઃ䈔䊶ᨒઃ䈔䇮㑐ਈ䈱⋥䈚䈅䉎䇯ᣇ⒢䈱ഀว䈮䈧 䈇䈩䇸ᣇ䈎䉌ਥᒛ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎 㪌㪑㪌 䉕ᔨ㗡䈮䈍䈒䈖䈫䈏ታ⊛䈭ㆬᛯ⢇䈫䈭䉎䇹䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䇸㪉㪇㪇㪋 ᐕ䉲䊢䉾䉪䇹䈫䈇䉒䉏䈢䉋䈉䈮䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎ਃ৻䈱ᡷ㕟䈏ㅴ䉄䉌䉏䉎ਛ䈪䇮ᣇઃ ⒢✚㗵䈱ᷫ䈏䈭䈘䉏䇮ᄙ䈒䈱Ꮢ↸䈪੍▚䈱⚵䉂឵䈋䉕䈭䈒䈘䉏䈢䇯⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䈇 䉒䉉䉎䇸ਃ৻䈱ᡷ㕟䇹䈏䇮⚿ዪ䇮ᣇઃ⒢䈱ᷫ㗵䈮↪䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䉕⍮䈦䈩䈚䉁䈦䈢䇯 ᣇઃ⒢䈱ౣ⸳⸘䈏䈭䈒⒢Ḯ⒖⼑䈮䈦䈩⥄ᴦ㑆ᩰᏅ䈏ᄢ䈜䉎䉋䈉䈭⚿ᨐ䈮䈭䉎䈭䉌䇮 ╙ 㪉 ᰴᡷ㕟䈻䈱ᄬᦸ䈲⊕䈮䈭䉎䇯ో࿖䈬䈖䈱ၞ䈮䉌䈚䈩䈇䈩䉅䇸ാ᳇䈫Ꮧᦸ䈏䉅䈢䉌䈘 䉏䉎ᡷ㕟䇹䈮䈭䉎䈎䈬䈉䈎䇮ᣂಽᮭᆔຬળ䈱╵↳䈏ᵈ⋡䈘䉏䉎䇯㩷 156 㩷㩷 䋳㩷 Ꮢ↸ว૬䋨䇸ᐔᚑ䈱ᄢว૬䇹䋩㩷 㩷 ᣇ⥄ᴦ䈱䉉䈒䈋䈻䈱ᓇ㗀䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪䈲䇮ಽᮭᡷ㕟䈫ਗ䉖䈪㊀ⷐ䈭േ䈐䈲Ꮢ↸ว૬䈱ㅴ ዷ䈪䈅䉎䇯㪈㪐㪐㪌 ᐕ䈲Ꮢ↸ว૬․ᴺ䈏ᡷᱜ䊶ᑧ㐳䈘䉏䈢ᐕ䈪䉅䈅䈦䈢䇯ᣣᧄ䈪䈲䇮䇸ᤘ䈱 ᄢว૬䇹䈱ᓟ䇮㪈㪐㪍㪌 ᐕએ᧪䇮㪈㪇 ᐕೞ䉂䈱․ᴺ䈪Ꮢ↸ว૬䉕࿖䈲ផㅴ䈚䈢䈏䇮䈭䈎䈭䈎 ㅴ䉁䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䈠䈖䈪䇮╙ 㪈 ᰴಽᮭᡷ㕟䈏⏕䈮䈭䈦䈢䈱䉕ᦼ䈮䇮࿖䈲䇮㪈㪐㪐㪐 ᐕ䇮ว૬․ᴺ 䉕ᡷᱜ䈚䈩⽷ᡰេᣇ╷䉕⋓䉍ㄟ䉂䇮⚂ 㪊㪉㪇㪇 䈱Ꮢ↸ᢙ䉕 㪈㪇㪇㪇 䈮䉁䈪ᷫ䈝䉎䈖䈫䉕⋡ᮡ䈮䈚 䈩䇸ᒝജ䇹䈭ว૬ଦㅴ䈮ਸ਼䉍䈚䈢䇯䈖䉏䉕䇸ᐔᚑ䈱ᄢว૬䇹䈫䉖䈪䈇䉎䇯㩷 䈖䉏䈮䉋䉍䇮㪉㪇㪇㪏 ᐕ䈱 㪈 䈮䈲䇮Ꮢ↸䈱ᢙ䈲 㪈㪎㪐㪐䋨Ꮢ䈱ᢙ䈲 㪎㪏㪏䇮↸䈱ᢙ䈲 㪈㪇㪈㪎䋩䈮䈭 䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯ᣢ䈮䇮ోੱญ䈱 㪏㪏㪅㪏䋦䈲Ꮢ䈱᳃䈪䈅䉍䇮↸ੱญ䈲䈢䈦䈢 㪈㪈㪅㪉䋦㩷 䈮ᷫዋ䈚䈩䈇 䉎䇯ዊⷙᮨ↸䈱⸃ᶖ䈫䈇䈉࿖䈱ว૬ᗧ࿑䈲⌕ታ䈮ታ䈚䈧䈧䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ว૬․ᴺ䈏 ᄬല䈜䉎 㪉㪇㪇㪌 ᐕᐲᧃ䈮䈲䇮䈫䈩䉅 㪈㪇㪇㪇 䈮䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䈚䇮ㇺᐭ⋵䈪䉂䉎䈫ว૬䈱ផㅴ䈮䈳 䉌䈧䈐䈏䈅䉍䇮࿖䈲䇮㪉㪇㪇㪌 ᐕ 㪋 䈎䉌ว૬ᣂᴺ䈮䉋䉍䇮⍮䈱൘๔䊶䈅䈦ᣓ䊶⺞䈭䈬䉕ㅢ䈛䈩䇮 䈘䉌䈮 㪌 ᐕ㑆䇮ว૬䉕ផㅴ䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯⸃ᶖ䈱䉺䊷䉭䉾䊃䈲ੱญ 㪈 ਁᧂḩ䈱↸䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ᴺᓞ䈱ว૬䈱⋡⊛䈲䇸Ꮢ↸ⴕ䈱ᐢၞൻ䈱ⷐ⺧䈮ኻಣ䈜䉎䇹䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮ോᬺ 䈱⒖▤䋨ಽᮭൻ䋩䈱ฃ䈔⋁ᢛ䇮⽷ല₸䈱ะ䇮⡯ຬ⚵❱䈱లታ䈭䈬䉅ว૬ℂ↱䈮䈭䈦䈩 䈇䉎䇯ታ㓙䈮䈲䇮ᄙ䈒䈱Ꮢ↸䈲䇮ᣇઃ⒢䈱❗䉕⢛᥊䈫䈚䈢ㅢ䈚䈱ᥧ䈇䇸⽷䉲䊚䊠 䊧䊷䉲䊮䇹䈮ਇ䉕䉌䈞䇮ว૬䈮〯䉂ಾ䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯䇸ᐔᚑ䈱ᄢว૬䇹䈱ᬌ⸽䈱ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮 ว૬䈚䈢ᣥ↸䈱ၞ䈏ᕆㅦ䈮䉏䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈲ุ䉄䈭䈇䇯Ꮢ↸ว૬䈲䇮Ꮢ↸⼏ળ⼏ ຬ䈱ỗᷫ䉕䉅䈢䉌䈚䈢䈏䇮࿖ㆬ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᡰᜬၮ⋚䈮䉅ᄢ䈐䈭ᄌൻ䈏䈐䈢䈲䈝䈪䈅䉎䇯 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ䈱ෳ⼏㒮ㆬ䈮䈍䈔䉎⥄᳃ౄ䈱ᗌᢌ䉕䉎䈫䇮ᄢㇺᏒ䈱ᮭ⠪䈱ᡰᜬ䉕⏕䈜䉎䈢 䉄ว૬䈪ዊⷙᮨᏒ↸䈱⸃ᶖ䉕࿑䉐䈉䈫䈚䈢⥄᳃ౄ䈱䇸ㇺᏒㆬᚢ⇛䇹䈱ലᕈ䈮䉅⇼䈏 䈩䈒䉎䇯㩷 㪉㪇㪈㪇 ᐕ 㪊 ᧃ䈪䇮䇸ᐔᚑ䈱ᄢว૬䇹䈏৻Ბ⪭䈫䈭䉍䇮㪈㪎㪇㪇 บ䈱ᢙ䈱Ꮢ↸䈱✬ᚑ䈫䈭䉐䈉䇯 ᱷሽ䈜䉎ዊⷙᮨ↸䉕䈘䉌䈮⸃ᶖ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎䈭䉌䈳䇮⥄ਥว૬䈎䉌ᒝว૬䉕ಾ䉍ᦧ䈋䈙䉎 䉕䈋䈭䈇䇯ᮭౄ䈫ౝ㑑䈏䈠䈉䈚䈢ᴦ䉮䉴䊃䈱㜞䈇ᚻᴺ䈮〯䉂ಾ䉎䈫䈲⠨䈋䈮䈒䈇䇯䈠䈖䈪䇮 ౝ㑑✚ℂᄢ⤿䈱⻁ᯏ㑐䈪䈅䉎╙ 㪉㪐 ᰴᣇᐲ⺞ᩏળ䈲䇮䇸Ꮢ↸ว૬䉕䉃ၮ␆⥄ᴦ 䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䇹䉕ᬌ⸛䈚䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮৻ቯ䈱ੱญએਅ䈱ዊⷙᮨ↸䈮㑐䈚䇮ᴺ䈪⟵ോ䈨䈔䈩䈇 䉎ോᬺ䉕ᄢ䈮⸃㒰䈚䇮䈠䉏䉕ㇺᐭ⋵䈮⟵ോ䈨䈔䉎䇸․↸䇹䉕ᬌ⸛䈜䉎䈫䈇䉒 䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋴㩷 Ꮊ㩷 㩷 Ꮢ↸ว૬䈱ㅴዷ䈫ᄢㇺᏒ⥄ᴦ䈱Ⴧട䋨ੱญ 㪉㪇 ਁએ䈱․Ꮢ䇮㪊㪇 ਁએ䈱ਛᩭᏒ䇮 㪌㪇 ਁએ䈱ᜰቯㇺᏒ䉕ว䉒䈞䉎䈫 㪐㪍䋩䈮䉋䈦䈩䇮ㇺᐭ⋵䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈏䉒䉏ᆎ䉄䈢䇯 157 ⴕ䈱ㇺᐭ⋵䉕ᑄᱛ䈚䇮䉋䉍ᐢၞ䈱න䋨ၞ䋩䈮ᄢ䈚䈩Ꮊ䉕⸳⟎䈚䇮࿖䈱ോᮭ㒢䉕⒖ ▤䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎േ䈐䈏ᒝ䉁䈦䈢䇯╙ 㪉㪏 ᰴᣇᐲ⺞ᩏળ䈲䇮ㅪ㇌䈲ุቯ䈚䈢䈏䇮ㇺᐭ⋵ 䉕䊝䊂䊦䈮䈚䈢ᣂᐢၞ⥄ᴦ䈫䈚䈩䈱Ꮊ䈱᭴ᗐ䋨ੑጀ䇮ੑరઍ䇮࿖䈎䉌⋧ᒰ䈱 ോᮭ㒢䈱⒖▤䋩䉕ឭ␜䈚䈢䇯㩷 Ꮊዉ䈏ౕ⊛䈭┙ᴺ䈱╷⺖㗴䈮䈭䉎ᤨᦼ䈏Ყセ⊛ᣧ䈒᧪䉎䈎䇮ᒰಽ䈲᧪䈭䈇 䈎䇮ᶖ䈋䈩䈭䈒䈭䉎䈎䇮䈠䈱ᭂ䉄䈲㔍䈚䈇䇯৻♿એ䉅ቯ⊛䈮⛯䈇䈩䈐䈢ㇺᐭ⋵ 䈏䈠䈉䈢䉇䈜䈒ᑄᱛ䈘䉏䉎䈫䉅ᕁ䈋䈭䈇䇯ၞ䈱⸳ቯ䈲⥋㔍䈪䈅䉍䇮ᐔဋੱญ 㪈㪇㪇㪇 ਁએ䈱 ᐢၞ⥄ᴦ䈏䈇䈎䈮䈚䈩᳃ෳട䈫ᣉ╷䈱ലᕈ䉕⏕䈪䈐䉎䈎චಽ䈭ᬌ⸛䈏ᔅⷐ䈪䈅䉎䇯 ㇺᐭ⋵䈱ᑄᱛ䈫䇸Ꮊ䇹䈱ዉ䈮䈲ᐢ䈒࿖᳃䈏⚊ᓧ䈪䈐䉎ℂ↱䈫⋡⊛䈏䈭䈒䈩䈲䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯 ⓭䈚䈢৻ᭂ㓸ਛ䈱᧲੩ㇺ䉕䈬䈉ᛒ䈉䈎䈣䈔䈪䉅ኈᤃ䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯㩷 䈚䈎䈚䇮Ꮊᜂᒰ⋧䈱⑳⊛⻁ᯏ㑐䈫䈚䈩䇸Ꮊ䊎䉳䊢䊮ᙣ⺣ળ䇹䈏⟎䈎䉏䇮⥄᳃ౄ䈱 Ꮊ⺞ᩏળ䈏ᵴേ䈚䇮ዋ䈭䈎䉌䈙䉎⡯⍮䈏Ꮊዉ䈮Ⓧᭂ⊛䈪䈅䉍䇮ർᶏ䈪䇸 Ꮊ․䇹䈱ታ㛎䈏ᆎ䉁䈦䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈭䈬䉕⠨䈋䉎䈫䇮䈵䉊䈦䈫䈚䈩䇮Ꮊ䈱ᐲ⸳⸘䈏ౕ ൻ䈜䉎䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇䇯䈠䉏䈏䇸䈖䈱࿖䈱䈎䈢䈤䇹䉕ỗᄌ䈘䈞䉎䈖䈫䈲㑆㆑䈇䈭䈇䇯㩷 䉅䈚䇸Ꮊ䇹䈱ዉ䈏ౕ⊛䈭ᴦᣣ⒟䈮䈦䈩䈒䉏䈳䇮䇸Ꮊ䇹䈮൮䉂ㄟ䉁䉏䉎ၮ␆⥄ ᴦ䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈏䉒䉏䉎䈱䈲ᔅ⥋䈪䈅䉍䇮ㇺᐭ⋵䈎䉌ോᮭ㒢䈱⒖⼑䉕ฃ䈔䉎ၮ␆⥄ᴦ 䈱ⷙᮨ䈱㗴䈏ౣᶋ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䈱䈫䈖䉐䇮Ꮊ䈮൮䈘䉏䉎ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈱 ⷙᮨ䈲䇮ੱญ 㪉㪇 ਁએ䈫䈜䉎᭴ᗐ䈏ജ䈪䈅䉎䈎䉌䇮䈠䈉䈭䉏䈳䇮Ꮊ䈱ਅ䈪䈲Ꮢ䈱ᄢᄙ ᢙ䈫↸䈱䈜䈼䈩䉕⸃ᶖ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈎䈉䈭䉎䇯䈠䉏䈏⥄ਥว૬䈪น⢻䈮䈭䉎䈫䈲ᕁ䈋䈭 䈇䇯㩷 㩷 䋵㩷 ዋሶ㜞㦂␠ળ䈱᧪䈫⥄ᴦ䈱ኻᔕ㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 䋨㪈䋩㩷 ੱญਃಽ䈮䈍䈔䉎ᄌൻ㩷 䈬䈖䈱⥄ᴦ䈪䉅䇮䈋䈳ၮᧄ᭴ᗐ䈭䈬ⴕㆇ༡䈱ၮᧄᣇ㊎䉕┙䈩䉎䈫䈐䈱ၮ␆䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎 䈱䈲ੱญേะ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱㓙䇮ੱญో䈱Ⴧ੍᷹ᷫ䈣䈔䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮ᐕ㦂ਃಽ䈱ੱญഀว 䈏䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭ផ⒖䉕␜䈜䈎䉕ᭂ䉄䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯ਃಽ䈫䈲䇮㪈㪌 ᱦએਅ䈱ᐕዋੱญ䇮 㪍㪌 ᱦએ䈱⠧ᐕੱญ䇮䈠䈚䈩䇮䈖䈱㑆䈱↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䉁䈪䈲䇮ᐕዋੱญ䈫⠧ᐕ ੱญ䉕ว䉒䈞䈩䇸ᓥዻੱญ䇹䈫䈳䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䉒䈏࿖䈱႐ว䇮వ䈱ᄢᚢ䈪䈱ᢌᚢᤨ䈮⚂ 㪎㪉㪇㪇 ਁ䈪䈅䈦䈢ੱญ䈏䇮ᚢᓟ䈱㜞ᐲᚑ㐳ᦼ䉕ㅢ 䈛䈩⚂ 㪌㪌㪇㪇 ਁੱჇ䈋䈢䇯䈠䈱䈉䈤䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎࿅႙䈱ઍ䈏⚂ 㪈㪌㪇㪇 ਁੱ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱ੱญჇ䈲 䇸ੱญ⊒䇹䈫ฃ䈔ข䉌䉏䇮ㆊੱญ䈫䈎↥ఽ㒢䈫䈇䈦䈢⼏⺰䈘䉏䈩䈇䈢䇯䈫䈖䉐䈏䇮ੱ䈶䈫 䈱⚻ᷣ↢ᵴ䈏⼾䈎䈮䈭䉎䈮䈇䇮ㇺᏒဳ↢ᵴ᭽ᑼ䈏᥉䈚䇮㘩䊶ක≮䊶ⴐⴡ↢䈏ะ䈜䉎 䈮䈧䉏䈩ዋ↥ዊᱫ䈫㐳ኼൻ䈏ㅴዷ䈚䈢䇯ᐔဋኼ䈏િ䈶⛯䈔䇮⇇䈪ᦨᄢ䈱㐳ኼ࿖䈮䈭䈦 䈢䇯⽺䈚䈎䈦䈢ᤨઍ䈮䈲ሶᴛጊ䈪䇮䇸ᓞ⠪䈱ሶᴛጊ䇹䈫䈇䉒䉏䈢䇯⼾䈎䈮䈭䉎䈮䈧䉏䇮㕖ᇕ䇮 ᥅ᇕ䈏ㅴ䉂䇮ว⸘․ᱶ↢₸䈏ૐਅะ䉕䈢䈬䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈢䇯⚿ᇕ䈚䈭䈇䇮䉁䈢ሶ䈬䉅䉕ᜬ 158 䈢䈭䈇↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈏Ⴧ䈋䈢䇯․䈮᧲੩䈮ઍ䈘䉏䉎ᄢㇺᏒ䈲䇮ઁ䈎䉌䈱ᵹੱญ䈏ᄙ䈒⚻ ᷣ⊛䈭↢↥ᕈ䈲㜞䈇䈏䇮ᰴઍ䉕↢䉂⢒䈩䉎䈫䈇䈉ᗧ䈪䈱↢↥ᕈ䈏ᭂ┵䈮ૐ䈒䈇ၞ䈫䈭 䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪉䋩㩷 ᐕዋੱญᲧ䈱ૐਅ㩷 ੱญ᭴ᚑ䈲䇮↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈱Ყ₸䈲䇮ᐕዋੱญ䈫⠧ᐕੱญ䈱ว⸘䈱Ყ₸䉋䉍䉅㜞䈎䈒䇮 䈚䈎䉅䇮⠧ᐕੱญ䉋䉍䉅ᐕዋੱญ䈱䈾䈉䈏ᄙ䈎䈦䈢䈱䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈠䉏䈏ᄌ䈦䈢䇯ᐕዋੱญᲧ䈏䇮 ⠧ᐕੱญᲧ䉕ਅ࿁䈦䈢䈱䈲 㪈㪐㪐㪇 ᐕઍ䈱ඨ䈳䈪䈅䉍䇮䉁䈢䇮⠧ᐕੱญ䈱䈉䈤 㪎㪌 ᱦએ䈱ᓟᦼ ⠧ᐕੱญ䈱Ყ₸䉕䉅ਅ࿁䉎䈱䈲 㪉㪇㪈㪌 ᐕ㗃䈮䈭䉎䈫੍᷹䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䈉䈚䈩 㪍㪌 ᱦએ䈱ੱญ 䈏ᄙ䈒䈭䉍䇮㪈㪌 ᱦએਅ䈏ዋ䈭䈒䈭䉎䈫䈇䈉ೋ䉄䈩䈱㛎䉕ㄫ䈋䈢䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯࿅႙䈱ઍ䈱ሶଏ 䈢䈤䈏⠧ᐕੱญ䈮䈭䉎 㪉㪇㪌㪇 ᐕ䈮䈲䇮ోੱญ䈏 㪈 ం 㪍㪇 ਁੱ䇮ᐕዋੱญ 㪈㪇㪏㪋 ਁੱ䇮⠧ᐕੱญ 䈏 㪊㪌㪏㪍 ਁੱ䇮↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈏 㪌㪊㪏㪐 ਁੱ䇮䈜䈭䉒䈤䇮䇮㪍㪌䋦એ䈅䉎↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈏ᷫ ዋ䈚䇮㪌㪇䋦䈮ㄭ䈨䈇䈩䈇䈒䉅䈱䈫੍᷹䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䋨࿖┙␠ળ㓚䊶ੱญ㗴⎇ⓥᚲ䇸ᣣᧄ䈱 ᧪ផ⸘ੱญ䇹㪉㪇㪇㪉 ᐕ 㪈 䈱ផ⸘䋩䇯⠧ᐕੱญ䈱Ყ₸䈏ᐕዋੱญ䈱Ყ₸䉕࿁䉍䇮䈠䈱䇸ᓥዻ ੱญ䇹䈱ว⸘䈏↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈮ㄭ䈨䈐䇮䈠䈱䉁䉁䈱ะ䉕䈢䈬䉎䈫䇮䈧䈇䈮䈲䇮䈖䉏䉕࿁䉎 䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈏䇮⚻㛎䈚䈢䈖䈫䈭䈇ዋሶ㜞㦂␠ળ䈱ᆫ䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 䈜䈪䈮ၞ䈮䉋䈦䈩䈲䇮䇸ᓥዻੱญ䇹Ყ䈏↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญᲧ䉕࿁䉍䇮䈚䈎䉅⠧ᐕੱญ䈏⓭ 䈚䈩ᄙ䈒䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈫䈖䉐䈏ᆎ䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲䇮ዋ䈭䈒䈫䉅䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱ੱญ᭴ᚑ䈱Ᏹ⼂䉕ⷒ 䈜ၞ␠ળ䈱䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢ၞ␠ળ䈏⚻ᷣ⊛䇮␠ળ⊛䈮ᜬ⛯น⢻䈪䈅䉎䈎 䈬䈉䈎 ᔨ䈏ᒝ䉁䉎䇯ୟ⊛䈮ੱญ䈏㓸ਛ䈚䈩䈇䉎ᄢㇺᏒ䈪↢₸䈏ᭂ┵䈮ૐ䈒䇮ㄘጊ䈪 䈲ዋሶൻ䈱ਛ䈪⠧ᐕੱญᲧ䈏㜞䉁䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯৻䈬䈉䈜䉏䈳䉋䈇䈱䈎䇯䈖䉏䈏䇮ዋሶ 㜞㦂ൻ䈱ㅴዷ䈏ᛩ䈕䈎䈔䈩䈇䉎㔍䈪䈅䉎䈫䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䈖䉏䈮䈬䈉ኻಣ䈚 䈩䈇䈒䈱䈎䇯ኈᤃ䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯㩷 ⁜䈇࿖䈮৻ంੱ䉕䈋䉎ੱญ䉕ᠩ䈜䉎䉒䈏࿖䈱႐ว䇮ੱญჇ䈫䈮▽䈇䈩䈐䈢䈘䉁䈙䉁 ⚻ᷣ␠ળ䉲䉴䊁䊛䋨㜞ᐲᚑ㐳ဳ䉲䉴䊁䊛䋩䉕䈖䈱䉁䉁⛽ᜬ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎䈱䈎䇮ੱญᷫ䉕❱䉍ㄟ䉖 䈣䉲䉴䊁䊛䈻ォ឵䈚䈩䈇䈒䈎䇮ᄢ䈐䈭ጘ〝䈮┙䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯↢↥ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈱ᷫዋ䈮䉅䈎䈎䉒䉌䈝䇮 ᓥ᧪䈱䉲䉴䊁䊛䉕⛽ᜬ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉏䈳䇮ㆬᛯ⢇䈲ਥ䈫䈚䈩ਃ䈧䈣䉐䈉䇯㽲ዋ䈭䈒䈭䈦䈩䈇䈒↢↥ ᐕ㦂ੱญ䈱ੱ䈶䈫䈏৻ੱ䈵䈫䉍䇮䈠䈱ᗧ᰼䊶⢻ജ䉕৻ጀ⊒ើ䈜䉎䈖䈫䇮䈠䈱䈢䉄䈱ੱ᧚㐿⊒䊶 ੱ᧚⊓↪䉕ⴕ䈉䈖䈫䇮㽳⋭ജൻ䈱ᛛⴚ㐿⊒䉕ⴕ䈦䈩ੱญᷫ䉕ቢ䈜䉎䈖䈫䇮㽴ᧄᩰ⊛䈭䇸㐿 ࿖䇹䈮〯䉂ಾ䉍䇮⒖᳃䊶Ꮻൻ䈮䉋䉎ᄖ࿖ੱ䉕ฃ䈔䉏䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䈱䈉䈤㽴䈱ㆬᛯ䈲䇮ᣣ ᧄ␠ળ䈏ᄙ᳃ᣖ␠ળ䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䉕ⷡᖗ䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪊䋩㩷 䉴䊁䊛䈱ォ឵䈱ᔅⷐᕈ㩷 䇮⥄ᴦ䈲䇮ੱญ䈏ᄙ䈎䈦䈢䉍䈚ᣣ䉕ᙬ䈎䈚䈏䉍䇮䈠䉏䈻䈱ᓳᏫ䉕ᦼᓙ䈜䉎䉋䉍䉅䇮ੱญ ᭴ᚑ䈱ᄌൻ䈮ኻᔕ䈜䉎䉋䈉䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱䉲䉴䊁䊛䈱⋥䈚䊶ᄌᦝ䊶ᑄᱛ䈭䈬䈱ᡷ㕟䉕ᢿⴕ䈚䈩䈇 䈎䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈒䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 159 㪉㪇㪇㪎 ᐕ䇮ർᶏᄕᒛᏒ䈏⽷ౣᑪ࿅ൻ䈚䈢⚻✲䈏ో࿖䈮ႎ䈛䉌䉏䈢䈏䇮䈠䉏䈲䇮৻ቯ 䈱ੱญ䈏䈅䈦䈢ᤨઍ䈮▽䈇䈢䉲䉴䊁䊛䉕⛽ᜬ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏䉅䈲䉇ਇน⢻䈮䈭䉍䈧䈧䈅䉎䈖䈫䉕๔ 䈕䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䈲䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䈎䇯↥䈪䈅䈦䈢ᄕᒛᏒ䈪䈲䇮䈭䉖䈫䈎ၞᵴᕈൻ䉕࿑䉐䈉䈫䈚 䈩ᛂ䈦䈢ᣇ╷䈏ഞ䉕ᄼ䈘䈝䇮৻ᤨ୫㊄䈱ㆇ↪䈮䉋䉎⧰⡺䈱⽷ㆇ༡䉕⛯䈔䈩䈇䈢䈖䈫䈏್ 䈚䈢䈏䇮㗴䈲䇮㪈㪇 ਁੱએ䈅䈦䈢ੱญ䈏䋱ਁ䋲ජੱ䈮䈭䉍䇮ᓥ᧪䈱䉲䉴䊁䊛䈏ᜬ䈢䈭䈒䈭䈦 䈩䈇䉎䈱䈮䇮䈠䉏䉕⛽ᜬ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈚䈩ⴕ䈐䉁䈦䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 䈬䈖䈱⥄ᴦ䈪䉅䇮㪉㪇㪇㪍 ᐕᐲ䈎䉌 㪉㪇㪈㪇 ᐕᐲ䈮䈎䈔䈩䈱䇸㓸ਛᡷ㕟䊒䊤䊮䇹䈫䈳䉏䉎ⴕ⽷ ᡷ㕟䉕ㅴ䉄䈩䈇䉎䇯ᐭ䈱䇸㛽ᄥ䈱ᣇ㊎ 㪉㪇㪇㪍䇹䈪䈲䇮㪉㪇㪈㪈 ᐕᐲ䈱࿖䈱ၮ␆⊛⽷ᡰ䋨䈇 䉒䉉䉎䊒䊤䉟䊙䊥䊶䊋䊤䊮䉴䋩䈱㤥ሼൻ䈱䈢䉄䈮䇮ⷐኻᔕ㗵䋨ਇ⿷㗵䋩㪈㪍䊶㪌 ళ䈱䈉䈤䇮ᱦ ᷫ䉕ᦨᄢ䈪 㪈㪋䊶㪊 ళ䈫䈜䉎䈖䈫䉕⋓䉍ㄟ䉖䈪䈇䉎䇯ੱญേะ䈫࿖䈱⽷ౣᑪ╷䈮䉋䈦䈩䇮䈍䈠 䉌䈒ᄙ䈒䈱⥄ᴦ䈱ᱦ䈲❗ዊ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈣䉐䈉䇯㩷 ৻ᣇ䇮ᱦ㕙䈪䈲䇮ੱઙ⾌䈲䇮䈖䈖ᢙᐕ᧪䈱䇸ቯຬ䈱ㆡᱜൻ䇹䈶࿅႙ઍ䈱ㅌ⡯䈮䉋䉍ᷫ ዋ䈜䉎䈏䇮䈘䉌䈭䉎ᷫ䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯ዋᢙ♖㍈䈻ะ䈎䈦䈩䈱䈑䉍䈑䉍䉁䈪䈱ദജ䈏ᔅⷐ 䈫䈭䉎䇯䈍䈠䉌䈒䇮䈖䈱⡯ຬቯᢙ䈱ᷫ䉕ᓥ᧪䈱䉋䈉䈭ㅌ⡯⡯ຬ䈱ਇల䈱䉂䈪ⴕ䈉䈱䈲㒢⇇ 䈮ㄭ䈨䈇䈩䈇䉎䇯ਇⷐਇᕆ䈭ᬺ䊶ᣉ⸳䈱ᑄᱛ䉇ᕁ䈇ಾ䈦䈢᳃䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱᳃㑆ൻ䉅ᢿⴕ䈞 䈙䉎䉕ᓧ䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ᛔഥ⾌䈲䉁䈝ᷫ䉌䈭䈇䇯⥄ᴦ䈪䈲ᣂ䈢䈭ௌ䈲ᛥ䈱ၮ⺞䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇 䉎䈏䇮ᱦਇ⿷䈏⊒↢䈜䉎䈫ਇ⿷ಽ䉕ௌ䈮䈢䉋䉐䈉䈫䈜䉎䈣䉐䈉䈚䇮ዊቇᩞ䈭䈬ᣉ⸳䈱 ᦝᣂ䉅ᦨዊ㒢ᔅⷐ䈮䈭䉎䇯㩷 䈚䈢䈏䈦䈩䇮⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䈖䈱⽷⁁ᴫ䉕ᱜ⋥䈮᳃䈮ಽ䈎䉍䉇䈜䈇ᖱႎ䈱ᒻ䈮䈚䈩䈚䇮 䈠䈱ℂ⸃䉕᳞䉄䇮ၞ␠ળ䈱หോ䈫䈚䈩䈬䈉䈚䈩䉅䉇䉌䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇ോᬺ䈏䈎䇮 䈠䉏䉕䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭ᚻᴺ䈪ታᣉ䈜䉎䈱䈎䉕᳃䈫䈮ᬌ⸛䊶⼏⺰䈚䇮ᜬ⛯น⢻䈭ⴕ⽷ㆇ䉕䉄 䈩䈇䈎䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯䈅䉏䉅䈖䉏䉅ⴕ䈦䈩᳃ḩ⿷ᐲ䉕䈕䈩䈇䈒䉋䈉䈭ᤨઍ䈲䈦䈢䇯 ᳃䈏ਇḩ䈪䉅⚊ᓧ䈚䈩䉅䉌䈋䉎╷䈱ㆬᛯ䈫੍▚䈱㓸ਛ䉕⠨䈋䈙䉎䉕ᓧ䈭䈒䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䇸㛽ᄥ䈱ᣇ㊎䇹䉕᪠ሶ䈮䈚䈩䇸᭴ㅧᡷ㕟䇹䉕ⴕ䈦䈩䈐䈢ዊᴰᮭᤨઍ䈏⚳䉒䉍䇮ౝ㑑䈪 䈱ෳ⼏㒮ㆬ䈪䈲ᮭౄ䈏ᢌർ䈚䈢䇯䇸᭴ㅧᡷ㕟䇹䈮䈉ᩰᏅᄢ╬䈱䈵䈝䉂䈮䈧䈇䈩䇮䈚 䈳䉌䈒䇸⺞ᢛ䇹䈱ᚻ䈏ᛂ䈢䉏䉎䈣䉐䈉䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᰴ䈮䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭ᮭ䈏ᚑ┙䈚䉋䈉䈏䇮⥄ᴦ䈱ⴕ ⽷ㆇ༡䈪⸒䈋䈳䇮೨ᐕᐲ䉕䊔䊷䉴䈮䈚䈩ᣂⷙᣉ╷䉕⸘↹䈚੍▚䉕ẋჇ䈘䈞䉎䈫䈇䈉䇸Ⴧಽਥ ⟵䇹䈱ᤨઍ䈮ᚯ䉎䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ᣢሽ䈱ോᬺ䉕෩䈚䈒✚ὐᬌ䈚䇮੍▚✚ᨒ䉕❗䈚䈩 䈇䈒╷䉕♖ㆬ䈚䈩䈇䈒䇸ᷫಽਥ⟵䇹䈱ᤨઍ䈏⛯䈒䈣䉐䈉䇯䈖䈱࿎㔍䈭ᤨ▵䉕䈋䈩䈇䈒䈮䈲䇮 䈭䈮䉋䉍䉅䇮᳃䈱ઍ⠪䈢䉎㚂㐳䈫⼏ຬ䈱෩䈚䈇ᤨઍ⼂䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈠䈱⼂䈫ᚻ ⣨䈮ၞ␠ળ䈱ㆇ䈏ᣣ䈾䈬ᄢ䈐䈒䈎䈎䈦䈩䈇䉎ᤨઍ䈲䈭䈇䇯䈠䉏䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈮䈍䈇䈩䉅䇮 ၞ䈱ᴦኅ䈮䈫䈦䈩䉅䇮ᄢ䈐䈭⹜✵䈪䈅䉍䇮ㅒ䈮䇮䈠䉏䈏ၞ䈱᧪䉕ಾ䉍㐿䈇䈩䈇䈒䉼䊞䊮 䉴䈮䉅䈭䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪋䋩㩷 ᷓೞ䈭ㆊ⇹ၞ㩷 㩷 㩷 ᐔᚑ䈱Ꮢ↸ว૬䈲৻Ბ⪭䈫䈭䈦䈩䉅䇮ੱญ䈏ዋ䈭䈒䇮㕙Ⓧ䈏ᐢ䈇䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎ዊⷙᮨ䈭Ꮢ 160 ↸䉕䈬䈉䈜䉎䈎䈱㗴䈲ᱷ䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯䈫䉍䉒䈔䇮ㆊ⇹ၞ䈱Ꮢ↸䈱ታᘒ䈲ᷓೞൻ䈚䈩䈍䉍䇮 䈠䈱ᛒ䈇䉕䈬䈉䈜䉎䈎䉕࿖䈲⠨䈋䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯৻৾䇳䋨ᤘ྾䋩ᐕ䈮ㆊ⇹ၞኻ╷ ✕ᕆភ⟎ᴺ䈏ቯ䈘䉏䈩એ᧪䇮䇸ㆊ⇹ၞ䇹䈱ᜰቯ䉕ฃ䈔䈢Ꮢ↸䈏ዋ䈭䈎䉌䈝ሽ䈚䈩䈐 䈢䇯㩷 㩷 ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈲䇮䈠䈱ᴺᓞฬ䈮䈅䉎䉋䈉䈮䇮䇸ኻ╷✕ᕆ䇹䇮䇸ᝄ⥝䇹䇮䇸ᵴᕈൻ䇹䇮䇸⥄┙ଦㅴ䇹䈫䇮ᤨઍ 䉕ㅊ䈦䈩㊀ὐ䉕ᄌ䈋䈩䈐䈢䇯䈖䈱㑆䇮ㇺᏒ䈻䈱ੱญᵹ䈲ᱛ䉁䉌䈝䇮䈚䈎䉅䈾䈿หᤨ䈮ዋሶ㜞 㦂ൻ䈏ㅴⴕ䈚䈢䇯ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈱㊀ὐ䈱ᄌㆫ䉕⠨䈋䉏䈳䇮䇸⥄┙ଦㅴ䇹䈱ᓟ䈮䇮䈬䈱䉋䈉䈭䉮䊮䉶䊒䊃 䉕᭴ᗐ䈪䈐䉎䈣䉐䈉䈎䇯㩷 ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈱ਅ䇮ㆊ⇹ௌ䈱ᡰេ䋨䈠䈱 㪎 ഀ䈏ᣇઃ⒢ភ⟎䋩䉅䈅䉍䇮ㆊ⇹ၞ䈱Ꮢ↸䈲䇮 ၞᵴᕈൻ䈮ജ䉕ዧ䈒䈚䈩䈐䈢䈏䇮ㅌ䈮ᱤᱛ䉄䉕䈎䈔䉎䈖䈫䈲㔍䈚䈎䈦䈢䇯Ꮢ↸ว૬䈮ᵴ 〝䉕䈠䈉䈫䈚䈩䉅䇮䈻䈐䈫䈇䈉ℂ⊛᧦ઙ䈏ᅹ䈕䈮䈭䈦䈩ᢿᔨ䈞䈙䉎䉕ᓧ䈭䈇䉬䊷䉴䉅䈅 䉎䇯ㆊ⇹ၞ䈲䇮⠹᫈䈱䈏Ⴧ䈋䇮ᨋ䈱⨹ᑄ䉅ㅴ䉂䇮㓸⪭䈏ᶖṌ䈚䈎䈰䈭䈇⁁ᘒ䈮 䈅䉎䇯䇸㒢⇇㓸⪭䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒䈇ᣇ䉅䈩䈐䈢䇯ⴕ䈱ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈏ᄬല䈚䈢ᓟ䉅䇮䈖䉏䉌䈱ၞ䉕 ⟎䈚䈭䈇䈫䈜䉏䈳䇮䉌䈎䈱ᒻ䈪ᡰេ䉕⛯䈔䉎䈾䈎䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯ㆊ⇹ၞ䊶ᝄ⥝ጊ䊶․ቯㄘ ጊ䉇㔌ፉ䊶ㄝ䊶ඨፉ䊶⽕㔐Ꮺ䊶․ቯ⽕㔐Ꮺ䈫䈇䈦䈢䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎᧦ઙਇၞ䈮㑐䈜䉎 ․ᴺ䉕ᢛℂ䊶⛔ว䈚䈩ᣂ䈢䈭ភ⟎䉕⻠䈝䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇䇯㩷 䈱ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈲 㪉㪇㪈㪇 ᐕ 㪊 ᧃ䈮ᦼ㒢䈏᧪䉎䇯ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈲䈇䉒䉉䉎⼏ຬ┙ᴺ䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥ ᴦ䈲䇮࿖ળ䈪䈱ળᵷ䈱⼏Ꮸᢙ䈭䈬ᢙ䈱⺰ℂ䈏ఝ䈜䉎⇇䈪䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ᴦ䈫䈇䈉༡䉂䈮 䈲䇮䈫䈐䈮䈲ᄙᢙ䈫䈇䈉ᢙ䈱⺰ℂ䉕䈋䈢㈩ᘦ䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䉎䇯ୟ⊛䈭ੱญ䈱ᄙᢙ䈱ㇺᏒ ᳃䈏䈠䈱䈇䈪᳃ਥᴦ䉕ᒝⴕ䈜䉏䈳䇮ੱญዋᢙᵷ䈱ㄘጊṪ䈱ੱ䇱䈲ᛂ䈤⎕䉏䈩䈇䈒 䈚䈎䈭䈇䇯ㆊ⇹ᴺ䈱ሽᑄ䈫䈠䈱ᓟ䈱ᛒ䈇䈲䇮ᄙ᭽ᕈ䈱⛽ᜬ䈫↢䈱⏕䈫䈇䈉ᴦ䈱ᧄ⾰䉕 䉎䈎䈬䈉䈎䈮䈎䈎䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋶㩷 ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈱േะ㩷 㩷㩷 䋨㪈䋩㩷 䇸ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䇹⥄ᴦ䈱⊓႐㩷 Ꮢ↸ว૬䈎䉌䇮ᓟ䈱ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈮ᓇ㗀䈚䈩䈇䈒䈫ᕁ䉒䉏䉎ᣂ䈢䈭േ䈐䈏䈖䈦 䈩䈐䈢䇯ᓥ᧪䇮ว૬ᓟ䈱⥄ᴦ䈲ㅦ䉇䈎䈮৻ൻ䈱ታ䉕ⷐ⺧䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䈏䇮䈠䉏䈲䇮੍▚ ✬ᚑ䉅⡯ຬᑄ⟎䉅ᧄᐡਛᔃਥ⟵䈮䈜䉎䈖䈫䈣䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯㩷 䈖䈱㓸ᮭ⛔วဳ䈱ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈮ኻ䈚䈩䇮䉃䈚䉐ᧄᐡ䈱ᯏ⢻䉕㒢ቯ䈚䇮ၞ㊀ⷞ䈱ಽᮭಽ ᢔဳ䈱ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈏䉏ᆎ䉄䈢䇯䈠䉏䉕ᓟ䈚䈢䈱䈲䇮ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ䈮䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ䇹䈱ⷙቯ 䋨㪉㪇㪉 ᧦䈱 㪋㩷 Ꮢ↸䈲䇸Ꮢ↸㐳䈱ᮭ㒢䈮ዻ䈜䉎ോ䉕ಽ䈘䈞䇮䈶ၞ䈱᳃䈱ᗧ䉕 ᤋ䈘䈞䈧䈧䈖䉏䉕ಣℂ䈘䈞䉎䈢䉄䇮᧦䈪䇮䈠䈱ၞ䉕ಽ䈔䈩ቯ䉄䉎ၞ䈗䈫䈮ၞ⥄ᴦ 䉕⸳䈔䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯䇹䋩䈏ᣂ⸳䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱ᩮ䈫䈘䉏䈢䈱䈲䇮᳃⥄ᴦ䈱లታ ᒝൻ䈫ද䈱ଦㅴ䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃⥄ᴦ䉕లታ䈚䈩䈇䈒ᣂ䈢䈭䈐䈦䈎䈔䈏ਈ䈋䉌䉏䈩䈫䈇䈧䈩䉋 䈇䇯㩷 161 䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ⚵❱䇹䈱ᴺൻ䈲Ꮢ↸ว૬䈱േ䈐䈱ਛ䈎䉌᭴ᗐ䈘䉏䈢䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯ว૬䈲䇮 䇸ᣂ⸳䇹䈪䈅䉏䇸✬䇹䈪䈅䉏䇮ⶄᢙ䈱⥄ᴦ䈏৻䈧䈱⥄ᴦ䈮䈭䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䈎䉌䇮ว૬ᓟ䇮 ৻ൻ䉕ㅦ䉇䈎䈮ታ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏ⷐ⺧䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯৻ൻ䈫䈲䇮ၞ䈏ᐢ䈏䉍ੱญ䈏Ⴧ䈋䉎ਛ 䈪䉋䉍䉅⥄ᴦ䈫䈚䈩䈱ᗧᕁቯ䈏৻ᧄ䈪䈪䈐䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯㗴䈲䇮䈇䈉䈫䈖䉐䈱 ৻ൻ䈏䇮⥄ᴦ䈱⚵❱ᒻᘒ䉕ᔅ䈝ᧄᐡਛᔃਥ⟵䈱䇸㓸ᮭ⛔วဳ䇹䈮䈚䈭䈔䉏䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇 䈬䈉䈎䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 䇸㓸ᮭ⛔วဳ䇹䈫䈲䇮ว૬ᓟ䈲䇮ⴕㆇ༡䈮䈍䈔䉎⽷Ḯ䈫⡯ຬ䉕ᧄᚲ䋨ᧄᐡ䋩䈮㓸ਛ䈘䈞䇮ኻ ᳃䉰䊷䊎䉴䉅䈪䈐䉎䈣䈔ၞᏅ䉕䈭䈒䈚╬䈚䈒ⴕ䈉䉋䈉䈭ᘒ䉕ᢛ䈚䈩䈇䈒䉺䉟䊒䈫䈇䈋䉎䇯 䈖䉏䈲䇮䈇䉒䈳䇸ዊ⇣䉕ᝥ䈩䈩ᄢห䈮ዞ䈒䇹䈫䈇䈉⊒ᗐ䈮ၮ䈨䈐䇮ว૬䈱ℂ↱䈫䈚䈩䈲ଐὼ䈫䈚 䈩ᩮᒝ䈇⠨䈋ᣇ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ว૬ᓟ䈱ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈲䈖䉏䈮㒢䉌䉏䈭䈇䇯ว૬䈮䉋 䉍৻䈧䈱⥄ᴦ䈮䈭䈦䈩䉅䇮䈇䈭䇮䉃䈚䉐ว૬䈲ၞ䉕ᐢ䈕䉎䈖䈫䈪䉅䈅䉎䈣䈔䈮䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈮 ▽䈇䈩䈐䈢ᣥᏒ↸න䈱䉁䈫䉁䉍䉇ታ⁁䉇ၞ䈻䈱ᗲ⌕䉕䈪䈐䉎䈣䈔ዅ㊀䈚䇮䈇䉒䈳䇸ዊ⇣ 䉕ᱷ䈚䇮ዊ⇣䉕ᄢ䈮䈚䈭䈏䉌ᄢห䈮ዞ䈒䇹ᣇᑼ䉅⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈲䇸㓸ᮭ⛔วဳ䇹 䈮ኻ䈚䇸ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䇹䈫䈹䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯䇸ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䇹䈪䈲䇮䉃䈚䉐ᧄᐡ䈱ᓎഀ䉕㒢ቯ⊛䈮 ⠨䈋䇮৻ቯ䈱ၞ䈗䈫䈮✚วᡰᚲ䉕㈩⟎䈚䇮䈠䈖䈪䈱ോᬺ䈱ㆀⴕ䈮ᔅⷐ䈭⽷Ḯ䈫⡯ຬ䈏 ㈩ಽ䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯ਔ⠪䈱㆑䈇䈱ᩭᔃ䈲৻ቯ䈱⥄ᴦᮭ䈱ઃਈ䈫ⴕ⚵❱䈱䉍ᣇ䈮䈅䉎䈫 䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯㩷 䈖䉏䉁䈪䇮Ꮢ↸ว૬䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲䇮ၞ䉕ᄢ䈚᳃ੱญ䉕Ⴧ䉇䈚䈭䈏䉌䇮⛔วൻ䈱ᗧ⼂ 䈏ᒝ䈒䈐䇮ว૬ᓟ䈱ⴕၫⴕ䈱ല₸ൻ䈏ᒝ⺞䈘䉏䈩䈐䈢䇯䈠䈖䈮䈲䇮ว૬䈫หᤨ䈮᳃⥄ ᴦ䉅ᒝൻ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈇䈉ⷰὐ䈏䈾䈫䉖䈬ᰳ⪭䈚䈩䈇䈢䇯᳃⥄ᴦ䈱ᒝൻ䈫䈲䇮ၮ␆⥄ᴦ䈱ઍ ᯏ㑐䋨㚂㐳䈫⼏ળ䋩䈮䉋䉎⥄ᴦᮭ䈱ⴕ䈮ኻ䈜䉎᳃ෳ↹䈱㓚䈫ల䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䉏䈲䇮ว૬ 䈮䉋䈦䈩ㄝၞ䈏䈘䈶䉏䇮ᓎ႐䈏᳃䈎䉌㆙䈱䈒䈖䈫䈻䈱㒐ᱛ╷䈪䉅䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪉䋩㩷 䇸ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䇹䈱⥄ᴦ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉁䈤䈨䈒䉍㩷 䇸ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䇹䈱⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䈠䈱䈉䈤䈮䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ⚵❱䇹䉕ౝ൮䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䈏䇮䈠䈱න䊶 ฬ⒓䊶ോᮭ㒢䊶⽷䊶⡯ຬ㈩⟎䈭䈬䈲䇮ว૬දቯᦠ䈎᧦䈮䉋䈦䈩ⷙቯ䈘䉏䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䈏䇮 ౕ⊛䈮䈬䈉䈜䉎䈎䈲ᒰ⥄ᴦ㑐ଥ⠪䈱ⵙ㊂䈮ᆔ䈰䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ⚵❱䇹䈱ዉ䈲䇮ᕁ䈇ಾ䈦䈩䈇䈋䈳䇮䈠䉏䈲䇮ዋሶ㜞㦂ൻ䈱䈭䈎䈪䇮㜞㦂⠪䈱 ⢻ജ䉕䉄䈢ၞ䈱ẜജ䉕ᒁ䈐䈚䇮䈪䈐䉎䈣䈔ၞ䈱ㅢ㗴䈲᳃⥄り䈪⸃䈚䇮䈠 䉏䈮䉋䈦䈩ዋᢙ♖㍈䈱ᓎ႐䉕䉍䈣䈚䈩䈇䈒䈉䈋䈪䈱ᄢ䈐䈭ᄾᯏ䈮䈭䉎น⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䉁 䈪䈲䇮䈬䈤䉌䈎䈫䈇䈋䈳䇮䉁䈝ⴕ䈏䈪䈐䉎䈣䈔ⴕ䈇䇮ੱ䉇ၞ䈲䈠䈱ቢ䊶දജ䈮䈫䈬䉁䉎 䈫䈇䈉⠨䈋ᣇ䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈠䉏䉕䇮䉁䈝䇱䈱᳃䉇ၞ䈏䈪䈐䉎䈖䈫䈲䈠䈱⥄䉌䈱್ᢿ䈫⽿છ 䈪ⴕ䈇䇮䈠䉏䈪䉅䈪䈐䈭䈇䈖䈫䉕ⴕ䈏ⴕ䈉䈫䈇䈉⊒ᗐ䈮ಾ䉍ᦧ䈋䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯ᓥ᧪䈱⊒ᗐ 䈎䉌䈜䉏䈳䇮䈖䈱⼏⺰䈲⊛⽿છ䈱ᓟㅌ䈫䈎䇮ᣂ䈢䈭᳃⽶ᜂ䈱䈚ઃ䈔䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䈣 䉐䈉䇯䈖䈉䈚䈢ᛕ್䈏ᔀᐩ䈚䈢ⴕ⽷ᡷ㕟䈱ᢿⴕ䉕㒖䉃䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䈲䉇䉌䈎䈪䈅䉎䇯น ⢻䈭ᵴേ䈲䇮䈭䉖䈪䈅䉏ၞ䈱⥄↱䈲್ᢿ䈫ᥓᕺ䉇Ꮏᄦ䈮䉋䈦䈩ഃ䉍䈚ታⴕ䈪䈐䉎⚵䉂 162 䉕↢䉂䈞䉏䈳䇮৻ᣇ䈪䉁䈤䈨䈒䉍䈱䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ᬺ䉕䈖䈚䇮ઁᣇ䈪ⴕ䈱䉴䊥䊛ൻ䉕࿑䈦䈩 䈇䈒䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇䇯㩷 䈠䈱ᣂ䈢䈭ജ䈭⚵䉂䈱৻䈧䈏䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ⚵❱䇹䈪䈅䉎䈫䈇䈋䉎䇯䈠䈱ᩭᔃ䈲৻ቯ䈱੍ ▚䋨ᬺ⾌䋩䉕ၞ䈪ᵴ䈎䈜䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈉䈭䉏䈳䇮䈠䉏䉕䈬䈉ᵴ↪䈜䉎 䈎䈏ฦၞ䈱ᗧ᰼䈫ജ㊂䈱㗴䈫䈭䉎䇯ᗧ᰼䉅䈭䈒䇮⢻ജ䉅⏴䈎䈭䈇ၞ䈲ㅌ䈜䉎䈚䈎䈭䈇䇯 ว૬䈚䉋䈉䈏䈚䉁䈇䈏䇮․䈮ਛጊ㑆ၞ䈭䈬䇮ㄘጊၞ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲䇮䈖䈱䈫䈖䉐䇮࿖䈪䉅䇸ㇺ Ꮢ䈫ㄘጊṪ䈫䈱↢ኻᵹ䇹䉇䇸䊎䉳䉾䊃䉳䊞䊌䊮ᚢ⇛䇹䈱ᣉ╷䉕ᛂ䈤䈚䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䉕⢛᥊䈮 ⠨䈋䉏䈳䇮䈎䈔䈏䈇䈱䈭䈇ㄘጊၞ䈱ଔ୯䈲䈚䈩ᄬ䉒䉏䈭䈇䈎䉌䇮ㇺᏒ᳃䈱᧪⸰䉕 ၞᵴᕈൻ䈮䈧䈭䈕䉎ᬺ䋨䈋䈳䉫䊥䊷䊮䉿䊷䊥䉵䊛䉇䊪䊷䉨䊮䉫䊖䊥䊂䉟䈱ฃ䈔䉏ᢛ䊶 ᣉ╷䋩╷䈲䉁䈜䉁䈜㊀ⷐ䈮䈭䉎䇯ዊ䈘䈒䈫䉅ഃᗧᎿᄦ䈱ᬺ䉕ၞ䈱⠧⧯↵ᅚ䈏৻✜䈮䈭䈦䈩 ข䉍⚵䉃䇯䈠䉏䈲ᔅ䈝㜞㦂⠪ᡰេ䉇ሶ䈬䉅䈱⢒ᚑ䈮ᓎ┙䈩䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯ㄘጊ䈏⢒䉖 䈪䈐䈢ੱ䈫ੱ䈱⚷䉕ㇺᏒဳ␠ળ䈱䉋䈉䈮ᒙ䉄ᢿ䈤ಾ䉌䈭䈇䈢䉄䈮䇮ၞ䈱ੱ䈶䈫䈏䈮り 䉕േ䈎䈚᳨䉕ᵹ䈜ᬺ䈮ข䉍⚵䉃䈖䈫䈏ਇนᰳ䈪䈅䉎䇯ዋሶ㜞㦂ൻ䉇ᱦ䈱❗ዊ䈮り䉕❗䉄 䈩ᓟ䉐ะ䈐䈮ኻಣ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎⥄ᴦ䈫ၞ䈖䈠䈏ᤨઍ䈮ข䉍ᱷ䈘䉏䈩䈇䈒䇯㩷 䈇䉁䈣䇮䈠䈱ᢙ䈲ዋ䈭䈇䈏䇮䇸ၞ⥄ᴦ䇹䉕⸳⟎䈚䈩䇮䇸Ꮢ᳃ಽᮭ䇹䈻ะ䈎䈍䈉䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎ㇺ Ꮢ⥄ᴦ䋨䈋䈳䇮㜞ጊᏒ䇮㘵↰Ꮢ䇮⼾↰Ꮢ䇮ർᏒ䇮ᄢᏒ䈭䈬䋩䈏䈩䈐䈢䇯䇸ಽᮭಽᢔ ဳ䇹䈭䈬⡯ຬቯຬ䈱ᷫ䈱ᵹ䉏䈱ਛ䈪ᣧ᥅䈣䉄䈮䈭䉎䈘䇮䈫䈇䈉ᶖᭂ⺰䉅ዋ䈭䈒䈭䈇䈏䇮⥄ᴦ 䈏䇸ද䇹䉕⸒䈇䇮ᣂ䈢䈭䇸ⓨ㑆䇹䈱ᒻᚑ䉕᳞䉄䉎䈭䉌䈳䇮ᣂ䈢䈭᳃⥄ᴦ䈱⚵䉂䈮 ਸ਼䉍䈜䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䉏䈭䈚䈮䇸䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞䈱ౣ↢䇹䈭䈬䈫䈩䉅ⷡ᧤䈭䈇䇯䈠䈱㓙䇮⛎䈪Ᏹ ൕ䈱⡯ຬ䈪䈭䈔䉏䈳䈪䈐䈭䈇ၞ䈱หോ䈫䈲䈎䉕䇮᳃ෳട䈮ਛ䈪ᔀᐩ⊛䈮ᬌ⸛䈜 䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯ᖱႎ䊶᳃ෳട䉕䈘䉌䈮䈋䈢ၞ⥄ᴦ䈱⹜䉂䈏ᦼᓙ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䈚䈎䈚䇮ಽᮭಽᢔဳ䈱ၮ␆⥄ᴦભ䈱ㆇ༡䈲࿎㔍䉅੍ᗐ䈘䉏䉎䇯䈠䈱ᦨᄢ䈱䉅䈱䈲䇮ᱦ䈏 ❗ዊะ䈮䈅䉎ਛ䈪䇮⡯ຬቯᢙ䈱ㆡᱜൻ⸘↹䈮䉋䉍⡯ຬ䉕ᷫ䈚䈩䈇䈎䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈖 䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䈇䈝䉏࿖ኅോຬᴺᡷᱜ䈮Ḱ䈛䈩ᣇോຬᴺ䈏ᡷᱜ䈘䉏䇮ታ❣䊶⢻ജ㊀ⷞ䈱ੱ ⹏ଔᐲ䈏ዉ䈙䉏䈩䈇䈒䈣䉐䈉䈏䇮㗴䈱ᧄ⾰䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈱䈏䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱䉋䈉䈮ᱜⷙ 䈱⡯ຬ䉕੍ቯ䈜䉎䈱䈎䈬䈉䈎䈪䈅䉎䇯䉝䉡䊃䉸䊷䉲䊮䉫䉅ㅴ䉂䇮ᜰቯ▤ℂ⠪ᐲ䈏ᯏ⢻䈚ᆎ䉄䇮 䈠䈱䈪䇮䈭䈟䇮䈅䉎䉕ⴕ䈪ⴕ䈉䈱䈎䉕ౣ⠨䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈒䈭䈦䈢䇯㩷 㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷㩷 䋨㪊䋩㩷 䇸ⓨ㑆䇹䈫䇸ද䇹䈇䈉⸒⪲䈱⊓႐㩷 ╙ 㪉㪎 ᰴᣇᐲ⺞ᩏળ䈏 㪉㪇㪇㪊 ᐕ 㪋 䈮䈚䈢䇸ᓟ䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦᐲ䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈮䈧䈇 䈩䈱ਛ㑆ႎ๔䇹䈮䈲䇮ᣇಽᮭᤨઍ䈮䈍䈔䉎ၮ␆⊛⥄ᴦ䈱䉕᭴▽䈚䈩䈇䈒䈪䈱㊀ⷐ 䈭ⷞὐ䈫䈚䈩䇮ᰴ䈱䉋䈉䈭ᵈ⋡䈜䈼䈐䇸ᣂ䈚䈇ⓨ㑆䇹䈫䈇䈉⠨䈋ᣇ䈏ᛂ䈤䈘䉏䈩䈇䈢䇯䇸 ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎᳃䉰䊷䊎䉴䉕ᜂ䈉䈱䈲䇮ⴕ䈱䉂䈪䈲䈭䈇䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈪䈅䉍䇮ಽᮭᤨઍ䈱ၮ␆⊛ ⥄ᴦ䈮䈍䈇䈩䈲᳃䉇䇮㊀ⷐ䈭䊌䊷䊃䊅䊷䈫䈚䈩䈱䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞⚵❱䇮㪥㪧㪦 䈠䈱ઁ᳃㑆䉶䉪 䉺䊷䈫䉅ද䈚䇮⋧䈮ㅪ៤䈚䈩ᣂ䈚䈇ⓨ㑆䉕ᒻᚑ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䉕⋡ᜰ䈜䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯䇹㩷 䈖䈱䇸ᣂ䈚䈇ⓨ㑆䈱ᒻᚑ䇹䈫䈇䈉ឭ᩺䈏䈭䈘䉏䈩એ㒠䇮䈖䈱⡞䈐䈭䉏䈭䈇䇸ⓨ㑆䇹䈫 163 䈇䈉⸒⪲䈫䈠䈱ᗧว䈇䈏⺰⼏䈘䉏䇮⥄ᴦ䈱ਛ䈮䈲䇮⥄ᴦㆇ༡䈱ᣂ䈢䈭ᣇ㊎䈮⚵䉂ㄟ 䉃䈫䈖䉐䉅䈩䈐䈩䈇䉎䇯ᣇᐲ⺞ᩏળ䈱ឭ᩺䈲䇮䈍䈠䉌䈒䇮ᣇಽᮭផㅴᆔຬળ䈱䇸ᦨ⚳ ႎ๔䇹㩿㪉㪇㪇㪈 ᐕ 㪍 㪀䈮䈍䈔䉎ᰴ䈱䉋䈉䈭⸷䈋䉕ᒁ䈐⛮䈇䈣䉅䈱䈫䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䇸⥄Ꮖቯ䊶 ⥄Ꮖ⽿છ䈱ේℂ䈮ၮ䈨䈒ಽᮭဳ␠ળ䉕ഃㅧ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮᳃䉂䈝䈎䉌䈱ᔃ䈱ⷡ ㉕䈏᳞䉄䉌䉏䉎䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯㵺㵺䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ឭଏ䉕䈅䈕䈩ᣇ࿅䈮䉋䉎ⴕ䉰䊷䊎 䉴䈮ଐሽ䈜䉎ᆫ䉕ᡷ䉄䇮䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞䈏ᜂ䈇ᓧ䉎䉅䈱䈲䉮䊚䊠䊆䊁䉞䈏䇮㪥㪧㪦 䈏ᜂ䈇ᓧ䉎䉅䈱 䈲 㪥㪧㪦 䈏ᜂ䈇䇮ᣇ࿅䈱㑐ଥ⠪䈏᳃䈫ද䈚䈩ᧄ᧪䈱䇺␠ળ䇻䉕ഃㅧ䈚䈩䈾䈚 䈇䇯䇹㩷 䇸ᣂ䈢䈭ⓨ㑆䇹䈫䈎䇸ᧄ᧪䈱␠ળ䇹䈫䈇䈦䈢⸒䈇ᣇ䈪䈏䈇䈎䈔䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䈲䇮 ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎䉰䊷䊎䉴䈲⥄ᴦ䈣䈔䈏ឭଏ䈜䉎䉅䈱䈫䈇䈉䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱ㅢᔨ䈎䉌⣕ළ䈚䇮ᐢ 䈒᳃㑆ᵴേ䈏䉅䈉৻䈧䈱䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ᜂ䈇ᚻ䈫䈭䉍䈉䉎䈖䈫䈮⌒䉕ะ䈔䇮䈖䈱ᣇ䈱ㅪ៤䈮䉋 䈦䈩䇮ၞ␠ળ䈮ᣂ䈢䈭ᵴേ䈱⇇䉕ᒻᚑ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈏ᤨઍ䈱ⷐ⺧䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪 䈲䈭䈇䈎䇮䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈪䈅䉐䈉䇯㩷 ⴕ䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ䈪䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈲䇮䇸᳃ਥ⊛䈮䈚䈩⢻₸⊛䈭ⴕ䇹䉕⏕䈜䉎䉋䈉ⷐ⺧䈘䉏 䈩䈇䉎䇯䇸᳃ਥ⊛䈭ⴕ䇹䈫䈲䇮ⴕᵴേ䈏᳃ᗧ䈮ၮ␆䈨䈔䉌䉏䇮᳃ᗧ䉕ᤋ䈚䈢䉅䈱䈪䈅䉍䇮 ዋᢙ䈱⠪䈏ኒቶ䈪ᗧᕁቯ䈚䈭䈇䈖䈫䇮䇸⢻₸⊛䈭ⴕ䇹䈫䈲䇮ᦨᄢ㒢ല䈭ⴕ⾗Ḯ㩿੍▚ 䈫⡯ຬ䈭䈬㪀䈱ᵴ↪䈮䉋䈦䈩ⴕ⋡⊛䉕㆐ᚑ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃ਥ⊛䈭ⴕ䈲䇮ᣣ䈪䈲ᖱႎ 㐿䊶᳃ෳട䈱ᔀᐩ䈏䇮䈠䈱⏕ᣇ╷䈫䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯䈠䉏䈲㐿䈎䉏䈢ⴕ䈪䈅䉎䇯⢻₸⊛䈭 ⴕ䈲䇮䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ⴕ⽷ᡷ㕟䈮䉋䈦䈩ㅊ᳞䈘䉏䇮㪧㪛㪚㪘 䈱ᔀᐩ䈫䈠䈱ታᘒ䈏⺑⽿છ䈫䈇䈉 ᒻ䈪䈘䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯ᴺᓞ䈮䈲䇮␜⊛䈮䈲䈖䈱ੑ䈧䈚䈎ᦠ䈎䉏䈩䈇䈭䈇䈏䇮 ᐔ䊶ᱜ䈱⏕䈏ⴕᵴേ䈱ၮᧄේೣ䈪䈅䉎䈲䈝䈪䈅䉎䈎䉌䇮ⴕᵴേ䈲䇮᳃ਥ䊶⢻₸䊶ᐔ 䈱ਃᄢේೣ䈮ၮ䈨䈇䈩ⴕ䉒䉏䈭䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈫䈇䈋䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪋䋩㩷 ᳃ද䈱ଦㅴ㩷 䈠䈖䈻䇮ᣂ䈢䈮䇸ද䇹䈏ઃ䈔ട䉒䈦䈢䇯䈇䉁䉁䈪⸒⪲䈫䈚䈩䈲䇸ห䇹䈫䇸දห䇹䈏৻⥸⊛䈪䇮 䇸ද䇹䈲䉒䉏䈩䈇䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯ၞ⥄ᴦ⚵❱䈱⸳⟎䈏ⷐ⺧䈘䉏䉎ℂ↱䈲᳃⥄ᴦ䈱ᒝൻ䈫 䈫䉅䈮᳃ද䈱ଦㅴ䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈖䈱දଦㅴ䈱ၞ⊛䈭ὐ䈨䈒䉍䈮䈲䇮ਃ䈧䈱㊀ⷐ䈭ⷞ ὐ䈏䈅䉎䈱䈪䈲䈭䈇䈎䇯㩷 ╙৻䈮䇮ද䈫䈲䇮ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎ㅢ㗴䈮᳃䈏දജ䈚䈩ข䉍⚵䉅䈉䈫䈜䉎䈫䈐ⴕ䈏ᡰ េ䋨Ⓧᭂ⊛⹏ଔ䊶ỗബ䊶ഥജ䋩䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䈦䈩䇮ⴕ䈱ᵴേ䈮᳃䉕දജ䈘䈞䉎䈖䈫䈪䈲䈭䈇 䈫䈇䈉ⷞὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯䇸ⴕ䈫᳃䈏ㅪ៤䈜䉎䇹䈫䈇䈉႐ว䇮䈠䈱ㅪ៤䈲᳃䈏⥄⊒ᕈ䈫⥄೨ਥ⟵ 䈪ၞᵴേ䉕ዷ㐿䈜䉎䈖䈫䈏೨ឭ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈫䉅䈜䉏䈳ⴕ䈲䇮ㅪ៤䉇ද䉕᳃䈏ⴕ䈻 ቢ䊶දജ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈣䈫⺋⸃䈚䈏䈤䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈠䉏䈲ᧄᧃォୟ䈱⊒ᗐ䈪䈅䉎䈇䉒䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭 䈇䇯㩷 ╙ੑ䈮䇮ද䉕䈇䈉႐ว䇮৻ᣇ䈪᳃⥄ᴦ䈱లታ䈏৻✜䈮ㅴ䉄䉌䉏䉎䈼䈐䈣䈫䈇䈉ⷞὐ䈪 䈅䉎䇯ද䈮䈲䇮ⴕ䈫᳃䈱㑐ଥ䈮㑐䈚䇮ᛕ್䈫ᑯ䈫䈎ᛶ᛫䈫ᒝⴕ䈫䈇䈦䈢ኻ᛫㑐ଥ䈪䈲 164 䈭䈒䇮ℂ⸃䊶⚊ᓧ䊶ዅ㊀䈫䈇䈦䈢ද⺞㑐ଥ䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䉕䈫䉅䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䈢䉄䇮䈖䉏䉕ㅴ䉄䉏䈳䇮䉅 䈱䉒䈎䉍䈱䉋䈇䇮දജ⊛䈭᳃䈏Ⴧ䈋䉎䈫ൊ㆑䈇䈚䉇䈜䈇䇯ⴕ䈏䉇䉎䈼䈐ᵴേ䈮㑐䈜䉎ᗧ ᕁቯㆊ⒟䈮ᖱႎ䉕ၮ␆䈮᳃䈏ᐢ䈒ෳ↹䈪䈐䉎ᯏળ䈫႐䉕లታ䈘䈞䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈲ᒰ ὼ䈪䈅䉎䇯䉃䈚䉐䇮৻ᣇ䈪᳃ෳ↹䈏ㅴ䉄䉌䉏䈩䈖䈠᳃㑆䈱ද䉅ଦㅴ䈘䉏䉎䈫⠨䈋䉎䈼䈐 䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ╙ਃ䈮䇮ද䈫䈲䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱ⴕ䈮䉋䉎᳃䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䉕䈇⋥䈜േ䈐䈪䉅䈅䉎䈫 䈇䈉ⷞὐ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈇䉁䉁䈪䇮᳃䉰䊷䊎䉴䈲ᱜⷙ䈮㓹䉒䉏䈢⡯ຬ䈮⛎ਈ䉕ᛄ䈦䈩ⴕ䈦䈩䉅䉌䈉 䈖䈫䈏ᒰὼ䈪䈅䉎䈫ⴕ䈱᳃䉅⠨䈋䈏䈤䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䈠䈉䈚䈢䉰䊷䊎䉴䈱ਛ䈮䈲䇮᥉ㅢ 䈱᳃䈏ዋ䈚ቇ⠌䈫⸠✵䉕ฃ䈔䇮ද䈱⚵䉂䉕Ꮏᄦ䈜䉏䈳᳃䈏⥄䉌䈱ᚻ䈪䈪䈐䉎䉅䈱䈏 䈅䉎䈱䈪䈲䈭䈇䈎䈫⋥䈚䈩䉂䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈮䉋䈦䈩ⴕ䈫᳃䈱ಽᬺ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈱ౣ✬ 䈏䈖䈦䈩䈇䈒䈎䉅䈚䉏䈭䈇䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪌䋩㩷 㪥㪧㪦 䈱⊓႐䈫Ⴧട㩷 ᣂ䈚䈒䇮䉒䈙䉒䈙䇸ⓨ㑆䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒䈇ᣇ䈏ⴕ䉒䉏ᆎ䉄䈢⢛᥊䈲䇮䈭䉖䈫䈇䈦䈩䉅䇮䈇䉒 䉉䉎 㪥㪧㪦 䈫䈇䈉ᵴേ䈱ᜂ䈇ᚻ䈏⊓႐䈚䈢䈖䈫䈪䈅䈦䈢䇯㕖༡࿅䉕ᐢ⟵䈮ᝒ䈋䉏䈳䇮 䈅䉎࿅䈏ណ▚䉕⠨䈋⋉䉕䈅䈕䈩䉅䇮䈠䈱⋉䉕䈠䈱࿅䈱ᚑຬ䈻䈱ႎ㈽䈫䈚䈩䈲㈩ಽ䈚 䈭䈇ᵴേ࿅䉕䈇䈉䇮䈫䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䉒䈏࿖䈱ၞ␠ળ䉕ᡰ䈋䈩䈐䈢᳃⚵❱䈱↸ౝ ળ䊶⥄ᴦળ䈲䇮ᐢ⟵䈱 㪥㪧㪦 䈱৻䈧䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈖䈮൮䉂ㄟ䉁䉏䇮䈅䉎䈇䈲ኒធ䈭㑐ଥ䉕䉅䈦䈩䈇 䉎ฦ⒳᳃࿅䈲䇮ⴕ䈱දജ࿅䈫䈇䈉ᕈᩰ䉕ᒝ䈒䉅䈦䈩䈲䈇䉎䈏䇮ุ䇮䈠䈉䈚䈢ᕈᩰ䉕䉅䈦 䈩䈇䉎䈏䉉䈋䈮䇮⋉ㅊ᳞࿅䈪䈲䈅䉍䈋䈝䇮ഥ⊛䈭࿅䈫䈚䈩ሽ⛯䈚䈩䈐䈢䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮㪥㪧㪦 䈫䈇䈉⸒⪲䈏৻⥸䈮䉒䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈢䈱䈲䇮․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേଦㅴᴺ䈏ቯ䈘䉏䇮䈖䈱ᴺᓞ 䈮ၮ䈨䈇䈩ᴺੱᩰ䉕₪ᓧ䈚䈢᳃㑆࿅䈏䇸ⓨ䇹䈻⊓႐䈚ᆎ䉄䈢䈎䉌䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേଦㅴᴺ䈱╙৻᧦䈲䇸䈖䈱ᴺᓞ䈲䇮․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേ䉕ⴕ䈉࿅䈮ᴺੱᩰ䉕 ઃਈ䈜䉎╬䈮䉋䉍䇮䊗䊤䊮䊁䉞䉝ᵴേ䉕䈲䈛䉄䈫䈜䉎Ꮢ᳃䈏ⴕ䈉⥄↱䈭␠ળ⽸₂ᵴേ䈫䈚䈩䈱 ․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേ䈱ஜో䈭⊒ዷ䉕ଦㅴ䈚䇮䉅䈦䈩⋉䈱Ⴧㅴ䈮ነਈ䈜䉎䈖䈫䉕⋡⊛䈫䈜䉎䇯䇹䈫 䈅䉎䇯․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേ䈫䈲䇮䈖䈱ᴺᓞ䈱䈮ឝ䈕䉎ᵴേ䈮ᒰ䈜䉎ᵴേ䈪䈅䈦䈩䇮ਇ․ቯ 䈎䈧ᄙᢙ䈱䉅䈱䈱⋉䈱Ⴧㅴ䈮ነਈ䈜䉎䈖䈫䇹䉕⋡⊛䈫䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㪈㪐㪐㪏 ᐕ 㪊 䈮䇸․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേଦㅴᴺ䇹䇮䈇䉒䉉䉎 㪥㪧㪦 ᴺ䈏⼏ຬ┙ᴺ䈪ᚑ┙䈚䈢䇯䈖䈱ᴺ ᩺䈲䇮ᒰೋ䇮᳃㑆ᵴേ䈱ㆇേኅ䈢䈤䈏ਥᒛ䈚䈢䉋䈉䈮䈲䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒⪲䈲ᴺᓞฬ䈮䈲䉌 䈭䈎䈦䈢䇯䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈲ᱜ㕙䈎䉌䈲⍮䈘䉏䈭䈎䈦䈢䈫䉅䈇䈋䉎䇯䇸ᐼ᳃䇹䈮䉋䉍ⷫㄭᗵ䉕䉅䈧⥄᳃ ౄ䈲䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈮䈲⼊ᚓ⊛䈪䈅䈦䈢䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮ฝ䈪䈢䉋䈉䈮䇮䈠䈱╙৻᧦䈮䈲䇸Ꮢ᳃ 䈏ⴕ䈉⥄↱䈭␠ળ⽸₂ᵴേ䈫䈚䈩䈱․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേ䇹䈫䈅䉍䇮䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒⪲䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 ᣢሽ䈱ᴺᓞ䈱ਛ䈪䇮ᴺᓞฬ䈮䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈏䈦䈩䈇䉎ᴺᓞ䈏৻䈧䈣䈔䈅䉎䋨ⴕᴺቇ⠪䈱ජ ⪲ᄢ䈱㋈ᧁᢎ䈮䉋䉎䋩䇯䇸Ꮢ᳃ㄘᢛଦㅴᴺ䇹䈪䈅䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮䈖䈱ᴺᓞ䈱㓒Ꮢ᳃ㄘ䇹䈱 䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈫䈲䇮䇸ਥ䈫䈚䈩ㇺᏒ䈱᳃䇹䈪䈅䉍䇮䈠䈖䈮䈲䇮ታ䈫䈚䈩ㇺᏒㇱ䈱᳃䉕ᜰ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈫 䈇䈉એᄖ䈮䇮․䈮ᗧ䈲䈭䈘䈠䈉䈪䈅䉎䇯䉒䈏࿖䈪䇮ਥ䈫䈚䈩䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈏ㄟ䉄䉌䉏䈢䇸Ꮢ᳃䇹䈫 165 䈇䈉⸒⪲䈏ᴺᓞ↪⺆䈫䈚䈩䈦䈢ᦨೋ䈱ᴺᓞ䈲䇮․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേଦㅴᴺ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈉䈚䈢Ꮢ ᳃䈱ᵴേ䈫䈚䈩䇮䈖䈱ᴺᓞ䈱䈮䈲ᰴ䈱䉋䈉䈮 㪈㪎 㗄⋡䈏䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 㽲ஜ䇮ක≮䈲䈱Ⴧㅴ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽳␠ળᢎ⢒䈱ផㅴ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽴䉁䈤䈨䈒䉍䈱 ផㅴ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽵ቇⴚ䇮ᢥൻ䇮⧓ⴚ䈲䉴䊘䊷䉿䈱ᝄ⥝䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽶ⅣႺ䈱ో䉕࿑䉎 ᵴേ䇮㽷ἴኂᢇេᵴേ䇮㽸ၞోᵴേ䇮㽹ੱᮭ䈱ᠩ⼔䈲ᐔ䈱ផㅴ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽺࿖ 㓙දജ䈱ᵴേ䇮㽻↵ᅚหෳ↹␠ળ䈱ᒻᚑ䈱ଦㅴ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽼ሶ䈬䉅䈱ஜో⢒ᚑ䉕࿑䉎 ᵴേ䇮㽽ᖱႎൻ␠ળ䈱⊒ዷ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽾⑼ቇᛛⴚ䈱ᝄ⥝䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㽿⚻ᷣᵴേ䈱ᵴᕈ ൻ䉕࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㾀⡯ᬺ⢻ജ䈱㐿⊒䈲㓹↪ᯏળ䈱ల䉕ᡰេ䈜䉎ᵴേ䇮㾁ᶖ⾌⠪䈱⼔䉕 ࿑䉎ᵴേ䇮㾂೨ฦภ䈮ឝ䈕䉎ᵴേ䉕ⴕ䈉࿅䈱ㆇ༡䈲ᵴേ䈮㑐䈜䉎ㅪ⛊䇮ഥ⸒䈲េഥ 䈱ᵴേ䇯㩷 ⴕ䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ䈮䈲䇮䇸ᣇ࿅䈲䇮᳃䈱䈱Ⴧㅴ䉕࿑䉎䈖䈫䉕ၮᧄ䈫䈚䈩䇮 ၞ䈮䈍䈔䉎ⴕ䉕⥄ਥ⊛䈎䈧✚ว⊛䈮ታᣉ䈜䉎ᓎഀ䉕ᐢ䈒ᜂ䈉䉅䈱䈫䈜䉎䇯䇹䈫䈅䉎䈏䇮ฝ䈱 䈮ឝ䈕䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎ᵴേ䈲䇮⥄ᴦ䈱ᵴേ䉕䈾䈿䉦䊋䊷䈚䇮ਛ䈮䈲䈠䉏䉕䈋䉎䉅䈱䉅 䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯․ቯ㕖༡ᵴേ࿅䈻⾗㊄䈏ᵹ䉏䉎⚵䉂㩿⒢⾗ᩰ㪀䈏లታ䈚䇮䈚䈎䉅䇮䈠䈱 ᵴേ䈏⋉䈱Ⴧㅴ䉕⋡ᜰ䈜⊛䈭䉅䈱䈫䈚䈩ዷ㐿䈘䉏䉏䈳䇮ήⷞ䈚䈋䈭䈇㊂䈪᳃䉰䊷䊎 䉴䈱ᣂ䈢䈭ᜂ䈇ᚻ䈏⊓႐䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪍䋩㩷 ᳃㑆ᆔ⸤䈎䉌䇸ද䇹䈻㩷 ⥄ᴦ䈱䈱ᣇ䈱ᄌൻ䈲䇮ᱜⷙ䊶Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬ䈏⋥ធ䉕䈜䉎䈫䈇䈉ᗧ䈪䈱䇸⋥ ༡䇹䈱❗ᷫ䈫䈇䈉ᒻ䉕䈫䈦䈩䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䇸᳃㑆ᆔ⸤䇹䇸䉝䉡䊃䉸䊷䉲䊮䉫䇹䈱ଦㅴ䈪䈅䉎䇯䈠䈱ၮ ᧄ䈲䇸ᄾ⚂䈮䉋䉎ᆔ⸤ᬺ䈱ታᣉ䇹䈪䈅䉎䇯䈚䈢䈏䈦䈩䇮䈖䉏䈮䉋䈦䈩ᓎᚲ䈱⽿છ㗔ၞ䈏❗ዊ 䈜䉎䉒䈔䈪䈲䈭䈇䈏䇮ᱜⷙ䊶Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬᢙ䈲ᷫ䉌䈞䉎䇯᳃㑆ᆔ⸤䈱Ⴧᄢ䈲ੱઙ⾌ᷫᚢ⇛䈱 ৻Ⅳ䈪䈅䉎䈖䈫䈲㑆㆑䈇䈭䈇䈏䇮䈠䉏䈣䈔䈮䈫䈬䉁䉌䈝䇮䈇䈒䈧䈎䈱ോᬺ䈪䈲⋥༡ᣇᑼ䈏 චಽ䈮䇸ᚻ䈮䊶ᚻᣧ䈒䊶䈒䇹䈪䈐䉎䈫䈇䈉ᩮ䉕ታ⸽䈪䈐䈭䈒䈭䈦䈢䈫䈇䈉㕙䉅ุቯ䈪䈐䈭䈇䇯㩷 䈮䇮ᓟ䇮䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ോᬺ䈏ᰴ䇱䈫⋥༡䈎䉌ᆔ⸤䈻⒖䈦䈩䈇䈔䈳䇮ᓎᚲ䈱䉟䊜䊷䉳䈫 ታᘒ䈲⋧ᒰ䈮᭽ᄌ䉒䉍䈫䈭䉎䇯╩⠪䈲䇮䈎䉌⚂ 㪈㪎 ᐕ೨䈮᳃㑆ᆔ⸤䈱ㅴዷ⁁ᴫ䉕䇸ⴕ᳃㑆 ⶄว䇹䈫䉖䈣䈖䈫䈏䈅䉎䈏䇮䈖䉏䈏䈘䉌䈮ㅴ䉄䈳䇮ᓎᚲ䈲ᆔ⸤ᄾ⚂▤ℂ䉕ਥ䈭ᵴേ䈫䈜䉎䉅 䈱䈮ᄌ⾰䈚䈩䈇䈒䇯ᴺ⊛䈮⟵ോઃ䈔䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎ോᬺ䈪䉅䇮䈠䈱ታᣉ䉕⋥༡䈎䉌᳃㑆ᆔ⸤ ൻ䈚䈩䈇䈔䈳䇮⥄ᴦ䈫䈚䈩䈱⽿છ䈲⏕䈚䈧䈧䇮⡯ຬ㈩⟎䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪䈲㒢䉍䈭䈒ᓎᚲ䉕䉴䊥䊛 ൻ䈚䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇯㪉㪇㪇㪊 ᐕ䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺᡷᱜ䈮䉋䉎䇸䈱ᣉ⸳䇹䈮㑐䈜䉎䇸ᜰቯ▤ℂ⠪ ᐲ䇹䈱ዉ䈲䇮䈖䈉䈚䈢ะ䈮৻ጀᜉゞ䉕䈎䈔䉎䉅䈱䈫䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䇯㩷 䈖䉏䈏䈘䉌䈮䇮৻ቯ䈱ോᬺ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈱න䈭䉎ᆔ⸤䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮䈠䈱ડ↹䊶ቯ䊶ታᣉ䈮㑐 䈚৻ቯ䈮ၞ䈱᳃䈮⥄ᴦᮭ䉕ઃਈ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈮䈭䉎䈫䇮ᓎᚲ䈫᳃䈱㑐ଥ䈲ᄢ䈐䈒ᄌൻ䈜䉎น ⢻ᕈ䈏䈅䉎䇯䈠䉏䉕ଦ䈚䈧䈧䈅䉎ᔨ䈏䇸ද䇹䈪䈅䉎䈫䈇䈋䉋䈉䇯㩷 䈇䉁ో࿖䈱⥄ᴦ䈱ᄙ䈒䈪䈲䇮✚ว⸘↹䈱ℂᔨ䈱৻䈧䈮ឝ䈕䉎䈭䈬䇮䇸ද䇹䉕ⴕㆇ༡ 䈱ၮᧄ䈮ᝪ䈋䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎ะ䈏ᒝ䉁䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯䈠䉏䈏৻ᤨ䈱ᵹⴕ䈭䉌䇮䈠䈱䈉䈤ᑄ䉏䉎䈏䇮䈬䈉 166 䉇䉌䈠䈉䈪䈲䈭䈘䈠䈉䈪䈅䉎䇯䇸ද䇹䈫䈇䈉⠨䈋ᣇ䈮䈲䇮䈖䉏䉁䈪䈱᳃㑆ᆔ⸤䉕䈋䇮䉁䈪ⴕ 䈱▸࿐䈪䈅䈦䈢ോᬺ䈱৻ㇱ䉕ⴕᵴേ䈎䉌ಾ䉍㔌䈚䇮᳃䊶᳃㑆䈮䉋䉎⊛ᵴ േ䈮ᆔ䈰䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎⊒ᗐ䈏䈅䉎䈫䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䇯ᆔ⸤ᬺ䈲䉌䈎䈮ⴕ䈱⽿છ㗔ၞ䈮ዻ䈚䈩䈇 䉎䈏䇮䈠䉏䉕ⴕ䈎䉌ಾ䉍㔌䈚䇮䈚䈎䉅䇮ၞ␠ળ䈱ਛ䈮ᣂ䈢䈭䇸ⓨ㑆䇹䈫䈚䈩ᒻᚑ䈚䈩䈇䈒 䈱䈲◲න䈪䈲䈭䈇䇯䉌䈎䈮䇮ᓥ᧪䈱ಽᬺ䉕ᄌᦝ䈞䈙䉎䉕䈋䈭䈒䈭䉎䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䈎䉌䈪 䈅䉎䇯㩷 ⥄ᴦ䈪䈲䇸ද䇹䈫䈇䈉⸒⪲䉕䈉䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈢䈏䇮䈖䉏䈲䇮䉝䉡䊃䉸䊷䉲䊮䉫䈱ฃ䈔⋁䈪䉅䇮 ᓥ᧪એ䈮‛ಽ䉍䈱䉋䈇දജ⊛䈭᳃䉕೨ឭ䈮䈜䉎䈖䈫䈪䉅䈭䈇䇯⥄ᴦ䈱㑐ଥ⠪䈭䈬䈮䈲䇮 䈠䈉䈭䈚䇮✕❗⽷䈱᛬䇸ଢ䈣䇹䇸ㇺว䈏䉋䈇䇹䈫ᕁ䈦䈩䈇䉎ੱ䈏䈇䉎䈏䇮䈠䉏䈲ਇ⼂䈪 㑆㆑䈇䈫䈇䈉䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯᳃ද䈲䇸Ꮢ᳃ಽᮭ䇹䈱ଦㅴ䈫⠨䈋䉌䉏䉎䈼䈐䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ၞ䈱⥄↱䈭್ᢿ䈫ᥓᕺ䉇Ꮏᄦ䈮䉋䈦䈩䇮䉁䈤䈨䈒䉍䈱䈘䉁䈙䉁䈭ᬺ䊶ᵴേ䉕䈖䈚䈩䈇䈒 䈪䇮ᦼᓙ䈘䉏䉎䈱䈲࿅႙ઍ䈱ၞᏫㆶ䈪䈅䉎䇯ၞ䈏⢒䉖䈪䈐䈢ੱ䈫ੱ䈱⚷䉕ᢿ䈤ಾ䉌 䈭䈇䈢䉄䈮䇮䈖䈱ઍ䉕䉄ၞ䈱ੱ䈶䈫䈏䈮り䉕േ䈎䈚᳨䉕ᵹ䈜ᬺ䈮ข䉍⚵䉃䈖䈫 䈏ਇนᰳ䈪䈅䉎䇯ዋሶ㜞㦂ൻ䉇ᱦ䈱❗ዊ䈮り䉕❗䉄䈩ᓟ䉐ะ䈐䈮ኻಣ䈚䉋䈉䈫䈜䉎⥄ᴦ 䈫ၞ䈲ᤨઍ䈮ข䉍ᱷ䈘䉏䈩䈇䈒䈣䉐䈉䇯㩷 䈖䈱䈢䈶ว૬䈚䈢Ꮢ↸䉅䇮ว૬䉕ㅍ䈦䈢Ꮢ↸䉅䇮෩䈚䈇⽷ᖱ䈮ኻಣ䈚䈧䈧䇸ᡷ 㕟䈱ᤨઍ䇹䉕↢䈐ᛮ䈇䈩䈇䈎䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䇯ዋሶ㜞㦂ൻ䈏ㅴⴕ䈜䉎ਛ䈪䇮Ꮢ↸䇮䈫䉍䉒 䈔ዊⷙᮨ䈭↸䈲䇮᳃䊶᳃㑆䈱ᬺ䉕ᵴᕈൻ䈘䈞䈧䈧䇮ⴕ䈱䉴䊥䊛ൻ䉕ᔀᐩ䈜䉎䈖䈫䉕᳞ 䉄䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯䈠䈱䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮ዋᢙ♖㍈䈱⡯ຬᘒ䉕ታ䈜䉎䈫䈫䉅䈮䇮ၞ䊶᳃㑆䈫䈱㑐ଥ 䈪䈲ಽᬺ⥄䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䉕䈇⋥䈚䇮䇸᳃ද䇹䈱⚵䉂䈪น⢻䈭䈖䈫䈲ⴕ䈎䉌㔌䈚䈩䈇䈒䈖 䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯↸䈏⋥㕙䈚䈩䈇䉎࿎㔍䉕ၞ䊶᳃䉅䉁䈢ᜂ䈦䈩䈇䈒ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋷㩷 ᣇ⼏ળ䈱ᡷ㕟㩷 㩷 䋨㪈䋩㩷 ᣇ⼏ળ䈱⥄Ꮖᡷ㕟㩷 ᣇಽᮭផㅴᆔຬળ䈱╙ 㪉 ᰴ൘๔䈮䈍䈇䈩䇸ᣇ⼏ળ䈱ᵴᕈൻ䇹䈏ឭ᩺䈘䉏䈩એ᧪䇮ዋ䈭 䈎䉌䈝䈱⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈏䇮ઍᯏ㑐䊶⼏ᯏ㑐䈫䈚䈩䈱⥄䉌䈱ᓎഀ䉕ᒝൻ䈜䉎⹜䉂䉕㐿ᆎ䈚䈩 䈇䉎䇯ᴦએ᧪䇮ၫⴕㇱఝ䈱䈏⛯䈇䈩䈐䈢䈖䈫䉅䈅䉍䇮᳃䈲䇮䈫䉅䈜䉏䈳⼏ળ䊶⼏ຬ䉕 䊋䉟䊌䉴䈚䈩䇮╷䉕ឭ᩺䈚䈎䈧ၫⴕ䈜䉎㚂㐳䈮䈐䈎䈔䉎ะ䈏ᒝ䈎䈦䈢䇯㩷 䈚䈳䈚䈳⼏ળ䈲᳃䈮㆙䈇ሽ䈪䈅䉍䇮㗬䉍䈮䈭䉌䈭䈇䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎䇯⏕䈎䈮䇮⼏ຬ䈱䈭䈎䈮 䈲䇮㚂㐳䈏䉇䉍䉇䈜䈇䉋䈉䈮දജ䈜䉎䈖䈫䈣䈫⥄ಽ䈢䈤䈱ᓎഀ䉕㒢ቯ⊛䈮⠨䈋䉎ੱ䈏䈇䈭䈇䈪 䈲䈭䈇䇯⼏ળ䈲⾰䈮䉋䉍╷ዷ㐿䉕ଦ䈚䇮ⴕᵴേ䉕⋙ⷞ䈜䉎ᯏ⢻䉕ᨐ䈢䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈚䈎䈚䇮 ⼏ળ䈱㓸ᮭ䈏ኾ䉌㚂㐳䈮䈅䉎䉋䈉䈭䈱⼏ળ䈏䇮᳃䈎䉌⋥ធㆬ䈳䉏䈢⼂ຬ䈮䉋䈦䈩᭴ᚑ 䈘䉏䉎⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈪䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯䈵䈭ს䈮⢛䉕ะ䈔ห⼏ຬ䈮ะ䈎䈦䈩ၫⴕㇱ䈮ዃ䉌⾰䉕䈜 䉎శ᥊䇮ၫⴕㇱ䈏䈩䈖䈭䈔䉏䈳ክ⼏䈏䈪䈐䈭䈇⼏ㆇ༡䈱ᆫ䇮⾰䈏೨䈮㚂㐳䈮ㅢ ๔䈘䉏䈩⾰䈫࿁╵䈏ᢥ┨䈪Ḱ䈘䉏䇮⼏ળክ⼏䈪䈠䉏䈏⺒䉂䈕䉌䉏䉎㘑᥊䈭䈬䈲䇮ᙗᴺ 167 䈏੍ቯ䈚䈢⼏ᯏ㑐䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈪䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯㩷 䈠䈱䈖䈫䈮᳇䈨䈇䈢⼏ળ䈲⥄Ꮖᡷ㕟䈮ਸ਼䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯䈍䈠䉌䈒䇮ᓟ䇮⥄ᴦ䈱䉉䈒䈋䈮䈫 䈦䈩㊀ⷐ䈭᩺ઙ䈮䈧䈇䈩䈲⼏ળ⥄䉌䈏ડ↹䊶┙᩺䈚䈩䈇䈒䈖䈫䈏Ⴧ䈋䈩䈇䈒䈣䉐䈉䇯䈠䈱䈢䉄䈮䇮 ⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈲䇮䈠䈱ክ⼏ㆊ⒟䈮᳃䈱ෳ↹䉕ଦ䈚䇮᳃䈮䉋䉍ㄭ䈇䇮㗬䉍䈮䈭䉎ሽ䈻䈫ᄌ り䈚䈩䈇䈎䈙䉎䉕䈋䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈮䉅ᣂ䈚䈇ᤨઍ䈏᧪䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯ർᶏᩙጊ↸⼏ ળ䇮ਃ㊀⋵⼏ળ䈲䇮ੑరઍ䉕㊀ⷞ䈜䉎䇸⼏ળၮᧄ᧦䇹䉕ቯ䉄䇮䈠䈱ᵴേ䈱లታᒝൻ䈮 ਸ਼䉍䈚䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䈖䈉䈚䈢⁁ᴫ䈱ਛ䈪䇮ᣇ⼏ળ䊶⼏ຬ䉅䉁䈢䇮䉁䈪䈱䈐䈹䉍䉕⻞⯯䈮ᝄ䉍䉍䇮⥄Ꮖᡷ㕟 䈮〯䉂ಾ䉎䈖䈫䉕᳞䉄䉌䉏䈩䈇䉎䇯㪉㪇㪇㪍 ᐕ䈮䈲ᣇ⼏ળ䈱ᯏ⢻ᒝൻ䈱䈢䉄䈱ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ䈱 ᡷᱜ䉅ⴕ䉒䉏䈢䈏䇮䈭䈮䉋䉍䉅䇮⼏ᯏ㑐䈫䈚䈩䈱⼏ળ䈏䇮ၫⴕ䈜䈼䈐ോᬺ䈱ડ↹┙᩺䈱 䈾䈫䉖䈬䉕ၫⴕᯏ㑐䈮ᆔ䈰䈩ၫⴕᯏ㑐ఝ䈱䉕㤩䈚䈩䈐䈢䈖䈫䈎䉌⣕ළ䈜䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯 䈠䈱䈢䉄䈮䈲䇮৻ᣇ䈪⼏ຬቯᢙ䈫ႎ㈽䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䉕ᬌ⸛䈚䇮ઁᣇ䈪䇮੍▚✬ᚑ䈱╷⺖㗴䈱 ឭ␜䇮㊀ⷐ䈭᧦䈱ડ↹┙᩺䇮✚ว⸘↹䈱㆐ᚑ⁁ᴫ䈱ὐᬌ䇮⼏ળክ⼏䈻䈱᳃ෳട䈭䈬䉕 䈫䈉䈚䈩䇮᳃䈱ା㗬䈫ᦼᓙ䈮Ⓧᭂ⊛䈱ᔕ䈋䈩䈇䈒ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䇯㩷 㩷 䋨㪉䋩㩷 ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩䈱⥄ᴦ⼏ળ㩷 ⥄ᴦ䈮䈍䈔䉎ⓨ㑆䈫䈇䈋䈳䇮ⴕᵴേ䈣䈔䈪䈭䈒䇮䈠䉏䈮వ┙䈧ᵴേ䈫䈚䈩⼏ ળ䈏䈅䉎䇯ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩䈱⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈱ਥᓎ䈲䇮䈇䈉䉁䈪䉅䈭䈒ㆬ䈱⼏ຬ䈪䈅䉎䇯䉅䈦䈫䉅䇮 䉒䈏࿖䈱ᣇ⼏ળ䈲䇮ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩䈲䇮䈇䈢䈦䈩㐽㎮⊛䈫䈇䈉䈎㒐ᓮ⊛䈪䈅䉎䇯䈢䈚䈎䈮䇮 ᧄળ⼏䈱ክ⼏䈲㐿䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䈚䇮ᆔຬળክ⼏䉅㐿䈘䉏䉎䉋䈉䈮䈭䈦䈩䈐䈩䈇䉎䇯㩷 䈫䈉䈇䈉䈖䈫䈏⺕䈮䈪䉅㐿䈎䉏䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䈫䈜䉏䈳䇮৻⥸⊛䈮䈲⼏ળ䈲ⓨ㑆䈫 䈇䈦䈩䉋䈇䇯⼏ળ䈲䇸㐿⸛⺰䈱႐䇹䈪䈅䉎䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎ℂ↱䉅䈠䈖䈮䈅䉎䇯㗴䈲䇮䈠䈱ⓨ㑆䈮 䈲䇮᳃䈲ற⡬એᄖ䈮䈲⊓႐䈚䈩䈇䈭䈇䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯䉅䈦䈴䉌㚂㐳䉕䈲䈛䉄䈫䈜䉎ၫⴕᯏ㑐䈫 ⼏ຬ䈢䈤䈱䉂䈪⾰⇼䉕ⴕ䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯ᵴേਥ䈱᭴ᚑ䈫䈇䈉ὐ䈪䈲䇮චಽ䈮㐿䈎䉏䈩䈇䉎䈫䈲 䈇䈋䈭䈇䇯⼏ળክ⼏䈮᳃䈏⋥ធᗧ䉕ㅀ䈼䉎ᯏળ䈲䈾䈫䉖䈬䈭䈇䇯䉃䈚䉐䇮⼏ຬ䈢䈤䈲䇮䈠 䈉䈇䈉㵺ᯏળ䉕⸳䈔䉎ᔅⷐ䈲䈭䈇䈫ᕁ䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯ⴕ䈱⼏ળክ⼏䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈏䇮ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩 䈲⽺䈚䈇䉅䈱䈪䈅䉎䈫䈲⠨䈋䈩䈇䈭䈇䈣䉐䈉䇯䈠䈖䈏㗴䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ⴕᐲ䈪䉅⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈲⡬ળ䉕㐿䈒䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䈏䇮䉁䈝㐿䈒䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇䇯⡬ળ䈲䊌 䊑䊥䉾䉪䊶䊍䉝䊥䊮䉫䈪䈅䉍䇮㐿䈱Ꮸ䈪䇮䈅䉎᩺䈮㑐䈚ၫⴕᯏ㑐એᄖ䈱ੱ䈱⸃䉕⾰䈜䈖䈫 䈪䈅䉎䈏䇮䈠䈱ਛ䈮䇮䈗䈒᥉ㅢ䈱᳃䈏⊓႐䈚䈩䉅䉌䈘䈚䈘䉒䉍䈲䈭䈇䈲䈝䈪䈅䉎䇯䈅䉎䈇䈲䇮 ᆔຬળክ⼏䈱ㆊ⒟䈪䇮᳃䈱ᗧ䉕⡬䈒႐䈫ᤨ㑆䉕⸳༡䈚䈩䇮ᐢ䈒᳃ᗧ䉕ᛠី䈚䇮䈠䉏䉕ᗧᕁ ቯ䈮ᤋ䈘䈞䈩䈖䈠᳃ઍᯏ㑐䉌䈚䈇⼏ળ䈮䈭䉏䉎䈲䈝䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 ⴕ䈱⼏ળ䈲ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩䈲ⓨ䈐䈏䈅䉍ㆊ䈑䉎䈫䉅䈇䈋䉎䇯ⴕ䈏ᖱႎ㐿䈫᳃ෳട䈮 䉋䉍ⓨ㑆䉕ᐢ䈕䇮䈅䉎䈇䈲⼾䈎䈮䈚䉋䈉䈫䈚䈩䈐䈢䈱䈮ኻᲧ䈚䈩䇮⼏ળ䈲ታ䈮⽺ᒙ䈭 ⓨ㑆䈱䉁䉁䈪䈅䉎䇯䈖䉏䈖䈠䈏䇮ㄭᐕ䇮⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䉕లታ䊶ᒝൻ䈜䈼䈐䈣䈫䈇䉒䉏䉎ᦨ䉅㊀ⷐ 䈭ℂ↱䈪䈅䉎䇯ⓨ㑆䈫䈚䈩䈱⥄ᴦ⼏ળ䈱䈅䉍ᣇ䈏䉅䈦䈫⼏⺰䈘䉏䉎䈼䈐䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 168 㩷 䋨㪊䋩㩷 䇸ㆬ⡯䇹䈱ᣂ⸳㩷 㩷 㪈㪐㪌㪇 ᐕ䈱ᣇോຬᴺ䈱ቯ䈮䈇䇮․⡯䈎৻⥸⡯䈎䉕䉒䈝䇮䇸Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬ䇹䈮ኻ䈚 䈩䈲ᣇ⥄ᴦᴺ╙ 㪉㪇㪋 ᧦䈮䉋䉍䇸⛎ਈ䇹䉕䇮䇸㕖Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬ䇹䈮ኻ䈚䈩䈲╙ 㪉㪇㪊 ᧦䈮䇸ႎ㈽䇹䉕 ᡰ⛎䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈖䈫䈮䈭䈦䈩䈇䉎䇯⇼䈭䈱䈲 㪉㪇㪊 ᧦䈮䈲⼏ળ䈱⼏ຬ䈏䇮㪉㪇㪋 ᧦䈮䈲 㐳䈏䉁䉏䈩䈇䉎䈖䈫䈪䈅䉎䇯㩷 Ᏹൕ䈪䉅㕖Ᏹൕ䈪䉅⡯ຬ䈭䉌છᮭ⠪䈎䉌ㄉ䉕䉅䉌䈦䈩䉕䈜䉎䈎䉌䇸છ⡯䇹䈫䈇䈦 䈩䉋䈇䇯ㆬ䈪⋥ធ᳃䈮䉋䈦䈩ㆬ䈳䉏䈢⥄ᴦ䈱㐳䈏Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬ䈪䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯㐳䈲ᒰㆬ⸽ ᦠ䉕ਈ䈘䉏䈩䈠䈱⡯䈮ዞ䈒䈱䈪䈅䈦䈩䇮ᚲቯ䈱ൕോᣣ䈶ൕോᤨ㑆ਛ䈮Ᏹൕൕോ䈮䈚 䈩䈇䉎䈭䈬䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈲䈭䈇䇯䈫䈜䉎䈫䇮㪉㪇㪋 ᧦䈲㐳䈏Ᏹൕ⡯䈪䈅䉎䈫䉄䈩䈇䉎䈱䈪䈲䈭䈒䇮㐳 䈮ኻ䈚䇸⛎ਈ䇹䉕ᡰ⛎䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈖䈫䉕ቯ䉄䈩䈇䉎䈮ㆊ䈑䈭䈇䈱䈎䇯䈠䉏䈭䉌䈳䇮䇸╙ 㪉㪇㪋 ᧦䈱╙ 㪈 㗄䈱⡯ຬ䈲䇮ㅌ⡯ᐕ㊄䈲ㅌ⡯৻ᤨ㊄䉕ฃ䈔䉎䈖䈫䈏䈪䈐䉎䇹䈫䈇䈉╙ 㪉㪇㪌 ᧦䈱 䇸⡯ຬ䇹䈮䈲㐳䈲䉁䉏䈭䈇䈱䈪䈲䈭䈇䈎䇯⋥ធㆬ䈱㐳䈲䇸⡯ຬ䇹䈪䈲䈭䈇䈱䈮䇮㐳䈮ኻ䈚 䈩䇮䈬䈉䈚䈩ᒰὼ䈱䉋䈉䈮ㅌ⡯㊄䈏ᡰᛄ䉒䉏䈩䈇䉎䈱䈎䇯㩷 㪉㪇㪊 ᧦䈮⼏ຬ䈱ᛒ䈇䈲䈬䈉䈎䇯㕖Ᏹൕ䈱⡯ຬ䈮ኻ䈚䈩䈲ൕോᣣᢙ䈮ᔕ䈛䈩ႎ㈽䈏ᡰᛄ䉒䉏 䉎䇯䈖䉏䈎䉌⼏ຬ䉕㒰ᄖ䈚䈩䈇䉎䈎䉌⼏ຬ䈲㕖Ᏹൕ䈪䈲䈭䈇䈱䈎䇯㪉㪇㪊 ᧦䈲න䈮⼏ຬ䈮䈲䇸ႎ ㈽䇹䉕ᡰ⛎䈚䈭䈔䉏䈳䈭䉌䈭䈇䈖䈫䉕䉄䈩䈇䉎䈮ㆊ䈑䈭䈇䈱䈎䇯䈠䉏䈭䉌䈳䇮䈬䈉䈚䈩⼏ຬ䈮 䈲䇸ᦼᧃᚻᒰ䇹䈏䉎䈱䈎䇯䉁䈢㕖Ᏹൕ⡯ຬ䈮䉎䇸ታ⾌ᑯఘ䇹䈏䈬䈉䈚䈩ᡰ⛎䈘䉏䉎䈱䈎䇯䈚䈎 䉅䇮ታ⾌ᑯఘ䈲⥄ᴦᴺ䈏ቯ䉄䉎ᱜⷙ䈱ળ⼏䈮䉎䈖䈫䈮㒢ቯ䈘䉏䇮䈠䉏䈏⼏ຬ䈱䇸⡯ോ䇹䈣䈫 ᢿቯ䈘䉏䈩䈇䉎䋨ᄢ㒋㜞ⵙ್䊶ᦨ㜞ⵙ⏕ቯ䋩䇯⼏ຬ䉅䉁䈢ㆬ䈪䈱ᒰㆬ⸽ᦠ䉕䉅䉌䈦䈩䇮䈠䈱 ⡯ോ䈮䈧䈒䇯䈠䈱䇸⡯ോ䇹䈏ᱜⷙ䈱⼏ળ䈮䉎䈖䈫䈮㒢䉌䉏䉎䈭䈬䈫䈇䈉䈖䈫䈏䈅䉐䈉䈎䇯㪉㪇㪊 ᧦ 䈎䉌⼏ຬ䉕䇮㪉㪇㪋 ᧦䈎䉌㐳䉕ᛮ䈐䈚䇮ᡷ䉄䈩⏕䈮ㆬ⡯䈫䈚䈩⟎䈨䈔⋥䈚䇮ᚲⷐ䈱ᡷᱜ 䉕䈜䉎ᔅⷐ䈏䈅䉎䈱䈪䈲䈭䈇䈎䇯㩷 169 ２．各国報告書資料 ２－１．フィリピン Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines: Reflections After 17 Years of Implementation ALEX B. BRILLANTES, JR. Professor and Dean National College of Public Administration and Governance University of the PhilippinesPhilippines-Diliman Presentation at the International Symposium on Decentralization and Local Communities, Participation, Collaboration and Better Governance GRIPS, Tokyo, Japan, 5 March 2008 1 OUTLINE Overview of the implementation of decentralization in the Philippines Historical context of decentralization in the Philippines Basic features of the Local Government Code Good practices (or "best practices") at the local level Economic Role of LGUs: LGUs: Enabler Major lessons learned over the past seventeen years 2 170 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRE SPANISH Local village-states (barangays) were existent even before the arrival of Spaniards. Barangays were autonomous territorial and political units headed by monarchical chieftains called datu, panginoo, or pangolo 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SPANISH COLONIAL ERA @ Barangays and tribal organizations were adapted by the colonial authorities to become administrative units each headed by the cabeza de barangay whose main responsibility was collection of taxes. @ Establishment of pueblos which were composed of poblaciones (town centers), barrios (rural settlements), and visitas (municipal districts) 4 171 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND SPANISH COLONIAL ERA @ 1893 - Enactment of Maura Law which established tribunales municipales and juntas provinciales @ Local government continued to be plagued by its chronic problems hence centralized government still prevailed 5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FIRST PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC @ 1898 - Malolos Constitution included provisions on decentralization and administrative autonomy @ Local law-making bodies particularly the municipal and provincial assemblies were established 6 172 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AMERICAN ERA (1902-1935) @ Organization of municipal and provincial councils by general suffrage @ Instructions of President McKinley to the Taft Commission @ Incorporation of the City of Manila @ Establishment of the Moro Province @ Organization of provincial governments @ Extension of popular control 7 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND COMMONWEALTH ERA (1935-1946) @ Local governments placed under general supervision of the President of the Republic @ President Quezon preferred to appoint the chief officials of cities and would brook no "democratic nonsense”. 8 173 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND INDEPENDENCE ERA (1946(1946-present) @ Enactment of Republic Act 2264 in 1959, entitled, "An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments." @ Enactment of Barrio Charter Act (RA 2370) seeking to transform the barrios, the smallest political unit of the local government system into quasiquasi-municipal corporations by vesting them some taxing powers 9 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND INDEPENDENCE ERA (1946(1946-present) @ "Decentralization Act of 1967" (RA 5185) - It further increased the financial resources of local governments and broadened their decisiondecision-making powers over administrative (mostly fiscal and personnel) matters @ 1973 - Marcos Constitution rhetorically committed itself to a policy of local autonomy 10 174 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND INDEPENDENCE ERA (1946(1946-present) @ Local Government Code of 1983 (Batas Pambansa Bilang 337) @ 1986 Freedom Constitution immediately after the overthrow of the Marcos regime @ 1987 Constitution - included specific provisions guaranteeing autonomy to local governments 11 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ARTICLE X SECTION 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, initiative, referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other other matters relating to the organization and operation of local units. units. 12 175 General Structure of Philippine Local Government National Government Province Highly Urbanized City Municipality Component City Barangay Barangay Barangay 13 Structure of Special Forms of Local Government and Regional Administration National Government Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (4) Province Metro Manila Development Authority (8) City (9) Municipality Barangay Barangay Municipality Barangay 14 176 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MAJOR FEATURES @ Devolution to local government units the responsibility for the delivery of various aspects of basic services that earlier were the responsibility of the national government: health, social services, environment, public works, education, tourism, telecommunications services, housing projects, investment support 15 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MAJOR FEATURES Devolution to local governments the responsibility for the enforcement of certain regulatory powers, such as the reclassification of agricultural lands; enforcement of environmental laws; inspection of food products and quarantine; enforcement of national building code; operation of tricycles; processing and approval of subdivision plans; and establishment of cockpits and holding of cockfights. 16 177 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MAJOR FEATURES @ Institution of the legal and institutional infrastructure for expanded participation of civil society in local governance. @ Increased financial resources available to local governments by (1) broadening their taxing powers; (2) providing them with a specific share from the national wealth exploited in their area, and (3) increasing their share from the national taxes 17 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MAJOR FEATURES @ Provision for the foundation for the development and evolution of more entrepreneurial-oriented local governments (e.g. build-operatetransfer (BOT) arrangements with the private sector, bond floatation, obtain loans from local private institutions) 18 178 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MASTER PLAN FOR THE SUSTAINABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LGC OF 1991 @ Phase one: ChangeChange-over Phase (1992(1992-1993) that involved the transfer to LGUs of devolved functions, with the corresponding assets and personnel; @ Phase two: Transition phase (1994(1994-1996) wherein the national government agencies (NGAs (NGAs)) and the LGUs shall institutionalize their adjustments to the decentralized schemes introduced by the Code; and 19 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 MASTER PLAN FOR THE SUSTAINABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LGC OF 1991 @ Phase three: Stabilization phase (1997-onwards). By then, it was assumed that the LGUs will have built adequate capacities in managing local affairs, and the NGAs will provide constant support and technical assistance to LGUs. 20 179 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE An interagency oversight committee which addresses specific problems encountered in the implementation of the Code referred to it. GENERAL CONCERNS x Local Finance / Local Fiscal Administration x Local Legislation / Clarifying the Role/s of the Local Legislative Bodies x Personnel Administration x Regulatory Powers of Local Government Units x Relationship between the LGUs and NGOs/POs x Clarifying the Roles and Powers of the Oversight Committee 21 Governance Paradigm: Cooperation and Partnerships LGUs, Business and Civil cSoc Government Civil Society Business 22 180 GOOD & BEST PRACTICES CATEGORIES OF BEST PRACTICES @ health services @ environmental management @ public finance @ peace initiatives @ integrated approach to development @ socio-cultural development @ employment generation / livelihood @ productivity improvement 23 GOOD & BEST PRACTICES SAMPLE BEST PRACTICE CASES @ Taking Care of People and Environment - Negros Oriental @ Saving the Marikina River @ The Mandaluyong Public Market @ Acquiring a Complete Equipment Pool in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija @ Floating Bonds for Low Cost Housing in Victorias, Negros Occidental 24 181 GOOD & BEST PRACTICES SAMPLE BEST PRACTICE CASES @ Improving the Productivity in Naga City @ Lote Para sa Mahirap: Land Banking in San Carlos City @ Eco-Walk for the Environment in Baguio City @ Health Insurance Project of Guimaras Province @ Carabao and Tractor Pool in Puerto Princesa @ Talahib Handicraft in Jones, Isabela 25 GOOD & BEST PRACTICES Resource Generation and Revenue Mobilization Malalag, Malalag, Davao del Sur: Sur: Charging user fees for health services Gingoog City: implementing a fiscal management system Santa Rosa, Laguna: Tax mapping, Computerization and GIS in Real Property Taxation Quezon City: Innovating Tax Administration measures 26 182 GOOD & BEST PRACTICES Resource Generation and Revenue Mobilization BoracayBoracay-Aklan Provincial Bonds for Tourism Development Joint Venture Project of the Province of Bohol: Bohol: Privatization of Power and Utilities San Jose de Buenavista, Buenavista, Antique: Build, Lease and Transfer Scheme One stop shop in LGUs: LGUs: rationalizing business permit: Cabuyao and Business One Stop Shop (BOSS) Citizens Charter: Naga, Naga, Marikina 27 Lessons learned, Issues and Concerns @ Decentralization has provided the context for entrepreneurial local governments. @ Decentralization of financial resources to local governments is critical for the success of devolution in the Philippines. @ Decentralization has encouraged citizens’ participation in local governance. This has contributed significantly to giving meaning to the process of people empowerment. 28 183 Lessons learned, Issues and Concerns @ Decentralization has encouraged local governments to cooperate among each other and enter into intergovernmental cooperative arrangements. @ Decentralization has provided the opportunity for national government agencies to rethink, reorient and reinvent their paradigms and ways of doing things under a devolved set up. 29 Lessons learned, Issues and Concerns @ Decentralization has also taught us to recognize the impact globalization has had upon local governance. @ Local governments must harness the potentials of information and computer technologies in their management and development operations, e.g., payroll, issuance of permits and licenses, taxation, etc. 30 184 Lessons learned, Issues and Concerns @ There has been an increasing recognition of the need to develop performance standards and indicators in measuring the productivity and evaluating the quality of services of local governments and local officials. @ International institutions and organizations have recognized the critical role of local governance in the Philippines' development strategy. 31 185 ２－２．中国 From Assistant to Partner? Social Organizations in China’s Local Community Development Dr. Chu Songyan Associate Professor, Department of Political Science China National School of Administration, P.R.C. 1 Contents I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs III. From assistant to partner: some key factors 2 186 I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view 1. An emerging weak yet vivid civil society ---a byproduct of the reform and openness. ---functions: assistants, bridges 3 7KH*URZWKRI*'3LQ&KLQD6LQFH <HDU 187 ᑈӑ<HDU *'3DPRXQWPLOOLRQ<XDQ 4 Growth of Registered NGOs since 1988 in China 1 X P E H U R I 5 H J L V W H U H G 1 * 2 V <HDU 5 Components of the Registered NGOs since 1988 in China 6RFLDO2UJDQL]WLRQV &LYLO1RQHQWHUSULVHXQLWV )RXQGDWLRQ 1XPEHUVRI5HJLVWHUHG1*2V <HDU 188 6 I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view 2ǃCoCo-existence of decentralization and centralization ---experiences ---experiences of the reform and openness: pilot, creative local governments ---tight ---tight vertical supervising system: to control the arbitrariness of local governments ---the ---the demands of the citizens are seldom considered 7 I. the contemporary state-society relationship in China: a general view 3. The imperative situation for government reform ---inconsistent ---inconsistent developing in economy and society ---the ---the failed welfare system reform ---a ---a limited holistic public service oriented government has not yet come true 8 189 II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs 1. Collaboration between NGOs and local governments: two cases Case 1: Government procurement of the NGO’ NGO’s homehomebased care for the aged service in Haishu District, Ningbo City, Zhejiang Province Case 2: Resthome Entrust Management in Yuetan Subdistrict, Subdistrict, Beijing 9 10 190 II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs Case 1 Collaboration between the government and a GONGO 11 II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs Case 2 Collaboration between the government and a grass-root NGO ࣫ҀᏖ㽓ජऎҎ⇥ᬓᑰࡃऎ䭓䰜㪧Ϣ 吸ス㗕ᑈ⽣߽णӮࡃ⧚џ䭓ᮍ⦖ 12 191 II. The relationship between local governments and NGOs 2. Reflections on the relationship between local governments and NGOs ---the ---the NGOs participation in local governance is quite limited ---NGOs ---NGOs functions have been constrained by the contemporary institutional environment ---the ---the NGOs have not been strong enough to be equal partners in local governance 13 SO’s Influence to Public Decision-making %HLMLQJ =KHMLDQJ +HLORQJMLDQJ 7RWDO 9HU\VWURQJ ˁ 5HODWLYHO\VWURQJ VWURQJ 1RWVWURQJ 1RLQIOXHQFHDWDOO +DUGWRVD\ (1 1(1 1 6XP62V%HLMLQJ=KHMLDQJ+HLORQJMLDQJ 14 192 Government-Market-Society Relations *RYHUQPHQW ˄ILUVWVHFWRUQRQSURILW˅ 62( *2132 &RPSDQLHV 1*2V ˄WKLUG VHFWRUQRQSURILW 132 ˄6HFRQG VHFWRUIRU SURILW˅ Society 15 III. From assistant to partner: some key factors 1. The sticking point: the central government’ government’s judgment of the statestate-society relationship 2. The basic enabling environment: integrated and feasible institutional structure for NGOs to develop 3ˊThe social engine: the capacity building of NGOs 4. The exterior drive: demonstration of foreign experience 16 193 Thank You ! 17 194 ２－３．タイ（１） TOPICS DECENTRALIZATION IN THAILAND 1. GENERAL PROFILE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND BY 2. CURRENT SITUATIONS WOOTHISARN TANCHAI DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, KING PRAJADHIPOK’S INSTITUTE 3. CONCEPT DECENTRALIZATION IN THAILAND 4. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E.2550 (2007) 5. DIRECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1 2 Thai administrative structure GENERAL PROFILE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND 1. Central Administration 2. Regional Administration (Provincial) 3. Local Administration 3 4 195 Thai administrative structure Thai administrative structure Ministries (20 min) Department (127 dep) 1. Central Administration 1. Central Administration 2. Regional Administration 2. Regional Administration 3. Local Administration 3. Local Administration Provinces (76 ) Districts (877) Tambon (7,255) Village (74,944) 5 6 Thai administrative structure 1. Central Administration 2. Regional Administration 3. Local Administration ee urr u t t cc rruu t t SS Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) Municipalities Sub-district Administrative Organizations (TAO) Bangkok Metropolitan Pattaya City Functions Functions Local Government CCii ttiizz eenn ss RRe evv een nuu ees s eell nnnn o rrsso PPee CentralCentral-localrelations relations Central-local 7 8 196 LOCAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION General GeneralLocal Local Administration Administration Special Special Local Local Administration Administration PAO. PAO. 2 TIERS SYSTEM Upper tier PAO PAO .. Municipality Municipality LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM Pattaya Pattaya City City BMA BMA.. Lower tier TAO. TAO. MUNICIPALITY MUNICIPALITY TAO. TAO. 9 10 Number of LGO. in Thailand Forms of Local Government PAO. Number of Organizations 75 Municipalities 1,276 TAO. 6,500 BMA. 1 Pattaya City 1 Total 7,854 As of 31 January, 2008 PAO. responsibilities Providing large-scale public services Developing an integrated provincial development plan Constructing and maintaining large-scale infrastructure Providing public education, health, and social welfare Promoting local culture, tourism, investment and trading Managing and preserving natural resource and environment Providing technical supports to lower tier localities. 11 12 197 Municipality – Pattaya City - TAO. responsibilities Local Government Revenues 1. Locally collected revenues (taxes – fees – charges – permits – fines etc.) Local development and city planning. Providing local public services, including local roads, walkway, water transportation…etc. Providing social services, including education, social welfares for children women …etc. Promotion of athletics, incomes and employment, trades, investment and tourism…ect. Promotion of democratic values, civil right, public participation in local affairs. 2. Local revenues collected by central government agencies (VAT – excise – vehicle etc.) 3. Grants 13 14 CURRENT SITUATIONS 1. Unclear Function CURRENT SITUATIONS Local Administration VS. Central Administration VS. Regional Administration PAO. VS. MUNICIPALITY TAO. 15 16 198 CURRENT SITUATIONS DENCENTRALIZATION PROCESS IN THAILAND 2. Autonomy / Regulation by CG. 3. Local Finance Autonomy 4. Local administrators / Local assembly 5. People Participation 17 18 Legal framework Section 284 : provides significant measures for establishing new decentralization system and intergovernmental relations. The The Constitution Constitution ,, 1997 1997 (Section (Section 284) 284) • Local authorities shall have autonomous power in policy formulation , administration , finance , and personnel management. • A mandate to have a decentralization act , which articulate a delineation of functions and responsibilities , and tax between the state and local authorities , as well as among local authorities themselves. • A mandate to establish a decentralization committee, who will prepare the decentralization plan, review, monitor, and provide policy recommendations for the Cabinet concerning the implementation of decentralization plan and 20 process. The Decentralization Decentralization Act Act of of 1999 1999 The The Decentralization Decentralization Plan Plan of of 2000 2000 The Action Plan Plan for for Decentralization Decentralization ,, 2001 2001 Action 19 199 Decentralization Plan 4 main goals of Decentralization Act Strategic Plan for Decentralization Approved by Cabinet on Oct 3 , 2000 Reported to the House of Representative on Oct. 18 , 2000 Reported to the House of Senate on Oct. 20, 2000 Can be revised every 5 years Transfer of missions to a local government organization Increase revenue allocation for a local government organization Criteria and means to transferring personnel from governmental agencies to a local government organization Amendment of laws and regulations concerning transfer of missions 21 22 Operation Plan Framework of Decentralization Plan Details of transferred function from Central government to Local government Approved by Cabinet on 27 Nov. 2001 Reported to the House of Representatives 13 Feb.2002 Reported to the House of Senate on 8 Feb. 2002 Promulgation in the Royal Gazette Autonomy Efficiency Interrelationship 23 24 200 Goals of Operation plan Transfer of Functions to LGO Transferring 245 functions in 6 Categories from 57 Departments in 15 Ministries by the year 2002 Increasing Local government revenue at least 20 % of national public revenue in 2001 and gradually Increase up to the minimum of 35 % in 2006 Revision of 64 of laws , regulations rules or orders to support decentralization Personal transferring from national agencies to Local government Three Transfer Models Functions that local government organization operate Local government organization operates together with the government Functions that the government still operates , whereas local government organization is also able to operate. 25 26 Transfer of Functions to LGO Decentralization Infrastructure Life Quality Promotion Orderliness And Security Of Community Planning , Investment , Promotion , Commerce And Tourism Management And Conservation Of Natural Resources And Environment Art, Culture, Custom And Local Wisdom Revenue Missions Personnel 27 Legal Amendment 28 201 Progress on Decentralization Issue Target Actual Mission (mission) Personnel (person) 245 181 4,459 35% 25.20 % CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND B.E.2550 (2007) (Volunteer Basis) Revenue (percent) (376,740 Million Baht) Laws (Act) 56 30 As of February, 2008 29 30 CONSTITUTION B.E.2550 (2007) Four major directions • • • Protection, Promotion, and Extension of Civil Rights and Liberties Curtailment of the state’s monopolistic power, extension of Civil Power, and Enhancement of Decentralization • 31 Implantation transparency, Integrity, and ethics in Politics Ensuring that oversight bodies are autonomous and robust 32 202 Local Government and Decentralization under the Constitution • • • • • Chapter III :Rights and Liberties of the Thai People Chapter V : Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies Chapter VII : Citizen Participation Chapter X : Inspection of the Exercise of State Power • • Chapter XIII : Morality of Persons Holding Political Positions, Government Officials Chapter XIV : Local Government Transitional Provisions 33 34 The essence of Local Government in the Constitution 4. Providing Public Space for People , Community, and Civil Society 5. Implantation Transparency in Local Politics 1. Extension of LGO.’ s Duty and Powers to be more Explicit and Comprehensive 2. Striking Balance between Supervision of LGO. and Autonomy 3. Development of Operational and Administrative System 35 36 203 Extension of LGO.’ s Duty and Powers to be more Explicit and Comprehensive Section 80 Section 78 Several detailed aspects and prescribed to establish administrative guidelines for state agencies and LGO. Section 281 The State will modify administrative and relationship system The State must be encourage to perform its roles and fulfill its duties in provision of various public services The state’s administrative system must be geared toward development of quality, integrity, and ethics of public LGO. Is a principal body that provides public services and partakes in decision- making process to resolve local issues 37 38 Section 283 Section 283 LGO. is responsible for supervision and provision of public services. Empowered to autonomously determine its administrative, public service, and personnel management as well as financial and fiscal policies LGO. Should be nurtured and supported to strengthen its independent administrative capacities and develop its fiscal system to accommodate comprehensive public services 39 Shall be an effort or joint effort to establish bodies in charge of providing public services Shall be laws governing the steps and procedures for decentralization to delineate the powers and duties and in come distribution between the State and provincial governments and the LGO. and among the LGO themselves Shall be laws on local income to regulate powers and duties in collection taxes and duties and other income of LGO. Must regularly review the case on a period of not more than 5 years 40 204 Section 289 Section 290 LGO. has the duty to conserve the local arts, customs, knowledge and good culture LGO. has the right to provide education and professional training in accordance with the suitability to and the needs of that locality LGO. has the right to participate in the provision of education and training by the State with regard to the national education standards and system LGO. has the duty to promote and maintain the quality of the environment LGO. has the duty to participate in considering an initiation of any project or activity outside the area of the locality which may affect the quality of the environment, health, or sanitary conditions of the inhabitant in the area 41 42 Striking Balance between Supervision of LGO. and Autonomy Section 303 (5) Section 282 Prepare or make adjustments to the following laws within 2 years ¾ Plan and procedure of decentralization ¾ Local revenue ¾ Establishment of LGO. ¾ Local government officials ¾ ect. 43 Must be exercised in so far as it is necessary Must have clear rules, procedure, and conditions which are consistent with and suitable for the structure of a local government Shall be a central standard as a guideline for LGO. To choose for their own practice. Mechanisms to check the performance of duties should be established with the people as it principle 44 205 Development of Operational and Administrative System Section 284 Section 283 LGO. shall have autonomy in laying down policies for their governance, administration, provision of public services, personnel administration, money and finance A Local financial system shall be developed to facilitate the provision of full range of public services LGO. shall be an effort or joint effort to establish bodies in charge of providing public services A special form of LGO. With different administrative structure Section 288 Personnel administration in LGO. must have a consistent standard In personnel administration of the LGO. , shall be an organization to uphold a system of good governance among the local government officials 45 46 Providing Public Space for People , Community, and Civil Society Section 287 Section 285 The voters have rights by signing a petition to recall a local council member or executive board Section 286 The voters have right to lodge with the president of the local assembly a request for consideration in issuing local ordinances 47 People living in the locality have the right to participate in the administration of LGO. LGO. Must provide information in details to the people before taking any action for a suitable period of time In the case deemed reasonable or requested by eligible voters in the locality, public hearings must be held prior to that action, or the people shall be allowed to have their say in a referendum 48 206 Implantation Transparency in Local Politics Section 287 Section 284 LGO. shall prepare performance reports on ¾ Report on budgets ¾ Report on expenditure ¾ Report on year-round performance Section 265 – 268 shall apply to members of local assembly, local administrative committee, or local administrators 49 50 Section 265 Section 265 members of local assembly, local administrative committee, or local administrators Not receive, interfere, or intervene in the granting of any concession from the State , a state agency or State enterprise; or be a partner in contract in business with the attributes of economic monopoly with the State, a State agency or state enterprise; or a be a partner or shareholder in a partnership or company receiving such concession or be a party to the contract of that nature, directly or otherwise 51 Not receive any special money or benefit from any State enterprise, over and above what the State agency or State enterprise pays to other persons in the normal course of business 52 207 Section 266 Section 266 members of local assembly, local administrative committee, or local administrators is not permitted to use his or her status or position to interfere or intervene for his or her personal benefits or others or a political party, directly or otherwise ¾ Performance of civil service, or performance of routine duties of a civil servant, staff or employee of a civil service agency, State agency, State enterprise, business in which the State holds a majority stake, or local government ¾ Recruitment, appointment, reshuffle, transfer, promotion, and salary increase of a government official holding a permanent position, receiving a salary and not being a political official, and official or employee of State agency, State enterprise, and business with the State as a majority stakeholder, or LGO. 53 54 Section 267 Can not hold a position in a partnership, company, or business enterprise pursuing profits or income to be shared , or be an employee of any person Direction of Local Government Section279 The ethical standard for persons holding political positions, government officials, and State official Section 280 The ombudsmen shall have the power and duties to advise or make recommendation on the preparation or improvement of the Code of Ethics 55 56 208 Keys Success Factors Enhancing people participation Local finance policy Capacity building for local government organization Restructuring Intra – organization management improvement Leadership and personal improvement Enhancing people participation Assurance the Quality of Services by local government organizations The right to get access to public information in possession of LGO (Section 56) The right to receive in formation, explanation and reason from a LGO before permission is giver for the operation of any project or activity which may affect the quality of the environment, health and sanitary … (Section 57) The right to participate in the decision – making process (Section 58) 57 58 The right to present a petition and to be informed of the result of its consideration within the appropriate time (Section 59) The right of person to sue a LGO (Section 60) The state must provide oversight mechanism to examine local government organization’s affairs by the people (Section 282) Signing a petition to impeach a local council member or executive board (Section 285) 59 209 Signing to submit a local ordinance for deliberation (Section 286) The right to participate in management of local affairs deliberation (Section 287) The right to present a petition and to be informed of the result of its consideration within the appropriate time (Section 287) Local government organization is petitioned by people, local government organization is obligated to hold a public hearing or arrange a referendum to resolve a direction prior to actual implementation. (Section 287) 60 61 62 63 64 210 65 66 67 68 211 69 70 71 72 212 73 74 75 76 213 77 78 79 80 214 81 82 83 84 215 85 86 87 88 216 89 90 91 217 ２－３．タイ（２） THE CASE STUDY OF PEOPLE PRATICIPATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BY WOOTHISARN TANCHAI DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, KING PRAJADHIPOK’S INSTITUTE 1 Public Participation Spectrum 1. Inform 2. Consult 3. Involve 4.Collaborate 5. Empower Increasing Level of Public Impact Inform Consult Involve Collaborate Empower 2 218 Inform To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problems, alternatives and/or solutions Fact sheets – Web sites – Open houses 3 4 219 Suratthani Municipality Journal (monthly) 5 Bang Sri Meung Municipality Journal (fortnightly) , Nonthaburi Province. 6 220 Tha – Lu Bun Journal , Tha – Lu Bun Municipality (fortnightly) , Pattani Province. 7 Consult To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions. Public comment – Focus groups – Surveys – Public meeting 8 221 Community Meeting 9 Surveys & Questionnaire 10 222 Seminar & Brain Strom 11 Involve To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered Workshops – Deliberate polling – Volunteer 12 223 Krong Suoi – Nam Sai Project (Clean and Green Canal): Nonthaburi Municipality 13 Sub Municipalities in Municipality Project : Khon Khen Municipality 14 224 The Bicycle Inspector : Kalasin Municipality 15 Environmental Spy Youth : Don Keaw TAO. , Chiang Mai 16 225 Collaborate To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision , including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution. Citizen Advisory Committees – Consensus building 17 Participatory Land/NR. Used Planning : Phethaburi Municipality 18 226 Willing to pay tax 19 Willing to pay tax 20 227 Empower Referendum for Decision - Making Citizen juries – Ballots – Delegated decisions 21 Town Council Meeting : Khon Khen Municipality 22 228 ２－４．インドネシア DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA AND ITS IMPACTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITY Bambang P.S Brodjonegoro Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia 1 LATEST SITUATION • 8th year, using revised laws (and soon to be revised again) • Despite many problems, central government is committed to retain the decentralization (no centralization idea) • All local governments have experienced direct local election, relatively peaceful with some noises from loosing parties. • Delegation of authorities and intergovernmental transfer system have improved significantly toward “finance follows functions” • From time to time, there are still tensions between central and local government 2 229 NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT FORMATION • Number of local government (districts/municipalities) increased rapidly from 340 in 2001 to 470 in 2008, and keeps increasing. • Most of new local government are categorized as poor (low GRDP per capita) regions and need extra assistance from central government • The formation mostly occurred outside Jawa and political motivation is the main driver behind. • The national parliament fully supports the formation while the central government is trying to stop, but at the end the political bargain is the decision • Economic motivation is rare except for natural resource rich regions. 3 FORMATION (CONT) • The central government has wrong incentive system for formation (and amalgamation) by issuing special fund for establishing the new local government (in 2007, it reached 500 billion Rp) • A study estimated that in 2005, the new local government formation created direct and indirect extra cost of 4.8 trillion Rp. • The proposal of new local government formation always come from local elites and local community was manipulated to give the support. It is local public participation in the wrong way ! • Money politics is unavoidable, and only the strong commitment from executives and legislatives together that can reduce the pace of formation. • In some cases, the formation is potential to create local conflicts. 4 230 FORMATION (CONT) • A study estimated the optimal number of districts/municipalities in Indonesia is 110 (currently is 470) • Currently, there are no incentives to do amalgamation. The government just issued the regulation about evaluation and steps for amalgamation (by force) • Amalgamation might be politically difficult and costly, so the interregional cooperation might be the answer for reducing inefficiencies of having too many local governments. • Few good examples of interregional cooperation have been there and it involves not only several local governments but also private companies. • Aside from central government guidance, the local community should be the main force of pushing interregional cooperation and avoid the “local ego” 5 LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT • Budget allocation for local government always increases significantly every year. • Most of local government still depend on general allocation fund (DAU) from central government • DAU has improved much as fiscal equalization grant and provides better fairness for local government • The discussion is still limited to the issue of the local budget sufficiency and how much central government should transfer the budget to the local government • For most of local government, local economy is still limited to local budget although the role of local budget to GRDP is about 20% on average. • Local budget performance in many cases is still considered more important than local economic growth, jobs creation, lower inflation, and personal income improvement. 6 231 LOCAL EC DEV (CONT) • Local community is mostly the victims of mismanagement of local budget, especially on the expenditure side. • Local executives and legislatives prioritized their interests rather than local community interests. • Only 6% of local government in Indonesia finish the budgeting process prior to the beginning of fiscal year. Additional 18% finished it on the first month of fiscal year, and about 27% after March. • In 2007 many local governments in Indonesia prefer to “invest” the budget in the bank than to spend it for public services and investment. • Only few local governments show best practices in managing their budget and using the budget as a stimulus for local economic growth through improvement of local investment climate. 7 LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES • According to a World Bank Study, 50% of respondents at local level feel there is improvement in quality of public services. • However, the central government is still struggling in determining the minimum standard of public services in basic education, basic health, and basic infrastructure. • Dualism of central and local government in handling some local public services issues sometimes did not help, or even made worse. • Local budget is mostly tied up for routine expenditure (including salary) and very limited for improving the level of public services. • Human Development Index is improving but very slow, behind neighboring countries. • Improving access to local public services should reduce poverty but local community does not have channels to voice their complains and concerns on public services. Customer right is very weak. 8 232 CONCLUDING REMARKS • Local community has not felt the “real positive impacts” of decentralization and still considered as second class (after local elites) • Local community should be better educated in evaluating the elected officials performance and local economy priorities. • The central government should emphasize more on setting up the minimum standard of basic public services and governance in local budget management. • Few best practices should be awarded and made as role models in managing local government in Indonesia. • Everybody should understand that the success of decentralization will rely on the local welfare improvement and sufficient level of basic public services 9 233 ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᲧセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲㧔䌃䌏䌓䌌䌏䌇㧕╙㧞࿁ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓ ȶ౷༷ࡀ͂౷֖২ٛȷΏϋεΐ;θ༭࣬! ᐔᚑ 21 ᐕ 2 ⊒ⴕ ✬㓸⊒ⴕ ╷⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇ Ყセᣇ⥄ᴦ⎇ⓥࡦ࠲ ޥ106-8677 ᧲੩ㇺ᷼ᧄᧁ 7-22-1 TEL:03-6439-6333 FAX:03-6439-6010