ルイス的分析と「物理主義」

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PD
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B
A
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D
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4
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attitude de se
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• 
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• 
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→
B
A
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•  O)
•  MP
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W@
•  X)
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w1 w
w1 w2
•  E
inner sphere
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W@
E
Cf. Crane 2003, Howell 2007, 2009
O
E
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•  O)
•  E
•  (A)
attitude de se
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…
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•  (B)
dicto
attitude de
attitude de se
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(E)
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(B)
(B)
•  (B)
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•  (B-1)
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•  (B-2)
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(A)
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•  (A)
•  (A)
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•  (B)
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(E)
(A) (B)
p. 121
(B)
(A)
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•  (B)
(A)
(A)
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(E)
•  (A)
(B)
(B)
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p. 118
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(E)
(E)
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Cf. Howell 2009
(B)
(E)
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(A)
(B)
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8.5
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p. 139
8.6)
→
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ex.
→
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•  X)
PPT
PPT
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…
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PPT
(X)
→
(X)
vs.
PT
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•  →
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•  →
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•  →
•  MP
W@
w1 w
w1 w2
ex.
vs.
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pp. 245-6 (T1)~(T3)
• 
• 
• 
• 
•  MP
W@
w1 w
w1 w2
…
•  O)
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→
•  [1] Crane, T. (2003), “Subjective Facts,” in H. Lillehammer
and Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays
in Honour of D. H. Meller, London: Routledge.
•  [2] Howell, R. (2007), “The Knowledge Argument and
Objectivity,” Philosophical Studies, 135: 145-177.
•  [3] Howell, R. (2009), “The Ontology of Subjective
Physicalism,” Noûs, 43(2): 315-345.