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Measuring illness cognitions
Page 51 Black blue ILLNESS COGNITIONS 51 been made previously in response to descriptions of ‘your most recent illness’. They reported that the subjects’ piles of categories reflected the dimensions of identity (diagnosis/symptoms), consequences (the possible effects), time line (how long it will last), cause (what caused the illness) and cure/control (how and whether it can be treated). A series of experimental studies by Bishop and colleagues also provided support for these dimensions. For example, Bishop and Converse (1986) presented subjects with brief descriptions of patients who were experiencing six different symptoms. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of two sets of descriptions: high prototype in which all six symptoms had been previously rated as associated with the same disease, or low prototype in which only two of the six symptoms had been previously rated as associated with the same disease. The results showed that subjects in the high prototype condition labelled the disease more easily and accurately than subjects in the low prototype condition. The authors argued that this provides support for the role of the identity dimension (diagnosis and symptoms) of illness representations and also suggested that there is some consistency in people’s concept of the identity of illnesses. In addition, subjects were asked to describe in their own words ‘what else do you think may be associated with this person’s situation?’. They reported that 91 per cent of the given associations fell into the dimensions of illness representations as described by Leventhal and his colleagues. However, they also reported that the dimensions consequences (the possible effects) and time line (how long it will last) were the least frequently mentioned. There is also some evidence for a similar structure of illness representations in other cultures. Weller (1984) examined models of illness in English-speaking Americans and Spanish-speaking Guatemalans. The results indicated that illness was predominantly conceptualized in terms of contagion and severity. Lau (1995) argued that contagion is a version of the cause dimension (i.e. the illness is caused by a virus) and severity is a combination of the magnitude of the perceived consequences and beliefs about time line (i.e. how will the illness effect my life and how long will it last) – dimensions which support those described by Leventhal and his colleagues. Hagger and Orbell (2003) carried out a meta analysis of 45 empirical studies which used Leventhal’s model of illness cognitions. They concluded from their analysis that there was consistent support for the different illness cognition dimensions and that the different cognitions showed a logical pattern across different illness types. Measuring illness cognitions Leventhal and colleagues originally used qualitative methods to assess people’s illness cognitions. Since this time other forms of measurement have been used. These will be described in terms of questionnaires that have been developed and methodological issues surrounding measurement. The use of questionnaires Although it has been argued that the preferred method to access illness cognitions is through interview, interviews are time consuming and can only involve a limited Page 51 Black blue Page 52 Black blue 52 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY number of subjects. In order to research further into individuals’ beliefs about illness, researchers in New Zealand and the UK have developed the ‘Illness Perception Questionnaire’ (IPQ) (Weinman et al. 1996). This questionnaire asks subjects to rate a series of statements about their illness. These statements reflect the dimensions of identity (e.g. a set of symptoms such as pain, tiredness), consequences (e.g. ‘My illness has had major consequences on my life’), time line (e.g. ‘My illness will last a short time’), cause (e.g. ‘Stress was a major factor in causing my illness’) and cure/control (e.g. ‘There is a lot I can do to control my symptoms’). This questionnaire has been used to examine beliefs about illnesses such as chronic fatigue syndrome, diabetes and arthritis and provides further support for the dimensions of illness cognitions (Weinman and Petrie 1997). Recently a revised version of the IPQ has been published – IPQR (Moss-Morris et al. 2002) which had better psychometric properties than the original IPQ and included three additional subscales: cyclical timeline perceptions, illness coherence and emotional representations. However, people have beliefs not only about their illness but also about their treatment, whether it is medication, surgery or behaviour change. In line with this Horne (1997; Horne et al. 1999) developed a questionnaire to assess beliefs about medicine which was conceptualized along four dimensions: two of these are specific to the medication being taken: ‘specific necessity’ (to reflect whether their medicine is seen as important) and ‘specific concerns’ (to reflect whether the individual is concerned about side effects) and two are these are general beliefs about all medicines: ‘general-overuse’ (to reflect doctors over use of medicines) and ‘general-harm’ (to reflect the damage that medicines can do). Measurement issues Beliefs about illness can be assessed using a range measures. Some research has used interviews (e.g. Leventhal et al. 1980; Leventhal and Lorenz 1985; Schmidt and Frohling 2000), some has used formal questionnaires (e.g. Horne and Weinman 2002; Llewellyn et al. 2003), some have used vignette studies (e.g. French et al. 2002) and others have used a repertory grid method (e.g. Walton and Eves 2001). French and colleagues asked whether the form of method used to elicit beliefs about illness influenced the types of beliefs reported. In one study French et al. (2002) compared the impact of eliciting beliefs using either a questionnaire or a vignette. Participants were asked either simply to rate a series of causes for heart attack (the questionnaire) or to read a vignette about a man and to estimate his chances of having a heart attack. The results showed that the two different methods resulted in different beliefs about the causes of heart attack and different importance placed upon these causes. Specifically, when using the questionnaire smoking and stress came out as more important causes than family history, whereas when using the vignette smoking and family history came out as more important causes than stress. In a similar vein French et al. (2001) carried out a systematic review of studies involving attributions for causes of heart attack and compared these causes according to method used. The results showed stressors, fate or luck were more common beliefs about causes when using interval rating scales (i.e. 1–5) than when studies used dichotomous answers (i.e. yes/no). In summary, it appears that individuals may show consistent beliefs about illness Page 52 Black blue